FILED
U. S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FEB 11 1971
JAMES R. COONEY, CLERK
BY DEPUTY Margaret Driver

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

BEAUMONT DIVISION

CLARENCE BOREL

VS.

FIBREBOARD PAPER PRODUCTS CORPORATION, ET AL

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6449

SECOND AMENDED ORIGINAL ANSWER OF JOHNS-MANVILLE PRODUCTS CORPORATION TO PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED ORIGINAL COMPLAINT

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW, Johns-Manville Products Corporation, one of the Defendants in the above styled and numbered Action, and subject to its Motion For More Definite Statement and Motion to Strike Certain Allegations, files this its Second Amended Original Answer to Plaintiff's Second Amended Original Complaint and for such Answer, this Defendant would show the Court:

1.

Assuming that the domicile and place of incorporation of the various corporate Defendants is correctly alleged, it is admitted that this Court has jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship of the parties.

2.

This Defendant can neither admit nor deny the allegations as to the residence of the various Plaintiffs for lack of knowledge.

3.

Answering the allegations in Paragraph Three (3), this Defendant is without knowledge as to each and all of said allegations except that it is admitted that Clarence Borel died on the third (3rd) day of June, 1970.

4.

In reply to Paragraph Four (4) it is denied that Plaintiffs have any cause of action for wrongful death under Article 4671, Revised Civil Statutes of the State of Texas; it is further denied that Article 5525, Revised Civil Statutes of the State of Texas, creates

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any cause of action. It is denied that this Defendant caused the Deceased any personal injuries during his lifetime.

4A.

In answer to Paragraph Four A (4A), it is admitted that Johns-Manville Products Corporation manufactures materials used for insulation containing asbestos. It is denied that the insulation products manufactured by this Defendant are placed on the market to be purchased and used by the general public, but to the contrary, this Defendant sells its products to insulation contractors, who employ experienced insulation workers in the application of the product. Further, this Defendant does not purport to answer said allegations contained in Paragraph 4A for each and all of the other named Defendants.

5.

In answer to Paragraph Five (5), this Defendant says that it is without knowledge as to the employment of Deceased as an insulator, between the years 1936 to 1969, and it is likewise without knowledge that he was required to handle large quantities of the products manufactured and distributed by the above named Defendants, including this Defendant. This Defendant denies each and all of the allegations contained in the last sentence of Paragraph Five (5), and it specifically denies that the insulation products manufactured by it were dangerous.

6.

The allegations in Paragraph Six (6) are denied.

7.

In reply to the allegations contained in Paragraph Seven (7), this Defendant denies that any injury and damages complained of by the Plaintiffs were directly and proximately caused by any negligence or carelessness of this Defendant. In reply to the allegations contained in Paragraph Seven (7) (a), this Defendant answering only for itself, denies said allegations. This Defendant denies the allegations contained in Paragraph Seven (7) (b), (c), (d) and (e).

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8.

In reply to the allegations contained in Paragraph Eight (8), this Defendant denies that it breached any warranty which may have existed as to its products and as to the Deceased. The allegations contained in Paragraph Eight (8) (a), (b), (c) and (d) are denied.

8A.

This Defendant denies the allegations contained in Paragraph Eight A (8A) of the Complaint and it is specifically denied that its products were unsafe for their intended use.

9.

This Defendant denies the allegations contained in Paragraph Nine (9).

10.

In reply to the allegations in Paragraph Ten (10), this Defendant denies that Deceased sustained any injury as a result of any act or omission on the part of this Defendant and denies that Deceased was injured as the result of any alleged breach of warranty of this Defendant. This Defendant has no knowledge or information as to the cause or causes of Deceased's alleged disability and death but it denies that same were caused or brought about as a result of any act or omission on the part of this Defendant or from the use of any product manufactured by this Defendant.

11.

This Defendant denies the allegations contained in Paragraph Eleven (11).

12.

This Defendant denies the allegations contained in Paragraph Twelve (12).

13.

This Defendant denies the allegations contained in Paragraph Thirteen (13), and denies that Plaintiffs are entitled to recover any sum against this Defendant.

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14.

This Defendant denies the allegations contained in Paragraph Fourteen (14).

15.

This Defendant denies the allegations contained in the prayer and denies that the Plaintiffs or either of them are entitled to recover any damages either actual, special or exemplary, and denies that Plaintiffs are entitled to any relief against this Defendant.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

First Affirmative Defense

This Defendant denies that the Deceased sustained any injury as a result of contact or use of any product manufactured by this Defendant.

Second Affirmative Defense

Further answering, and by way of affirmative defense, Defendant says that the products which this Defendant manufactured and sold were at all times reasonably fit and suitable for the purposes for which they were manufactured and sold and Defendant denies that the same were in anywise defective for the use for which they were manufactured.

Third Affirmative Defense

If Deceased did sustain any injury as a result of the use of any product manufactured by this Defendant, which is expressly denied, then such injury was sustained as a result of the occupation of the Deceased, in that he had been engaged as an insulator or worker in the insulation field for a number of years, and at all times knew that he was working in dust laden air which contained asbestos dust, as well as other dust particles, part of which were created by his own work and the work of other insulators, and by the failure of his employer or the owner of the premises on which he was working to provide facilities for the elimination of dust laden air, and therefore, any such injury as he may have sustained was some occupational disease resulting from his long continued occupation as an

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insulator and not as a result of any isolated incident or contact with any product manufactured by this Defendant. This Defendant says that it is not legally liable or responsible for any occupational disease which was suffered or sustained by Deceased in the course of his employments over a number of years; and further, this Defendant denies that the Deceased worked with products manufactured by this Defendant.

Fourth Affirmative Defense

This Defendant denies that any product or products which it manufactured and sold for heat insulation purposes in anywise caused or brought about any injury or illness, if any, to the Deceased, and this Defendant says that the physical conditions of which Plaintiffs complain were in nowise caused or brought about by any product manufactured or sold by this Defendant, but such condition was due solely to disease and other causes or to the acts, and omissions of third persons, and the acts of the Deceased.

Fifth Affirmative Defense

Further answering herein and while denying that the Deceased sustained any injury as a result of contact or use of any product manufactured by this Defendant, if he did sustain injury, or did sustain an occupational disease as a result of the use of any insulation product manufactured by this Defendant, separately, or in conjunction with products manufactured by other Defendants; then this Defendant says that Deceased was guilty of various acts, wrongs and omissions, each and all of which amounted to negligence in the performance of his work and occupation, which acting together or separately was a proximate cause of his injury. In this connection, this Defendant would show that Deceased failed to use and utilize any safety devices, such as masks and respirators, for breathing, and that he failed to request the use of such masks and respirators; that he failed to request his employer to furnish blowers and other equipment to remove the dust laden air, and he worked in dust laden air with full knowledge that he was inhaling

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such dust laden air; and he continued to work with insulation materials containing some asbestos after he knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that it was affecting his health.

Sixth Affirmative Defense

This Defendant says that if Deceased sustained any injury as a result of the use of any material or materials manufactured by this Defendant, which is denied, the danger, if any, arising from the continued use of such material or materials was open and obvious and was well known to the Deceased, or should have been known to him; but nevertheless, he continued to work as an insulator, and continued to subject himself to air which was laden with insulation material.

In the alternative, if there was any danger, and such was not open and obvious and apparent to Deceased, at all times, nevertheless, he knew at all times of the dangers involved with insulation materials containing some asbestos and in working in dust laden air where insulation materials were in use, and he continued to use and to work with such materials and under such conditions with such knowledge, and therefore, this Defendant owed him no duty to warn him of any potential dangers involved, and he is therefore barred from any recovery under the theory of volenti non fit injuria.

Seventh Affirmative Defense

(a) If Deceased did sustain any injury as a result of the use of any product manufactured by this Defendant, which is denied, then such occurred more than two (2) years prior to the filing of this suit on the 20th day of October, 1969, and such cause of action is barred by the two (2) year statute of limitations of the State of Texas.

(b) If Deceased did sustain any injury as the result of the use in the State of California of any product manufactured by this Defendant, which is denied, then such occurred more than one (1) year prior to the filing of this suit on the 20th day of October, 1969, and such cause of action is barred by the one (1)

year statute of limitation of the State of California. The law of California provides for a one (1) year statute of limitation as to actions for personal injury, and further provides that the filing of a claim for workmen's compensation does not toll or suspend the running of the statute of limitation. Defendant gives notice that it will rely upon the law of the State of California.

(c) If Deceased did sustain any injury as the result of the use in the State of Louisiana of any product manufactured by this Defendant, which is denied, then such occurred more than one (1) year prior to the filing of this suit on the 20th day of October, 1969, and such cause of action is barred by the one (1) year statute of limitation of the State of Louisiana. The law of Louisiana provides for a one (1) year statute of limitation as to actions for personal injury, and further provides that the filing of a cliam for workmen's compensation does not toll or suspend the running of the statute of limitation. Defendant gives notice that it will rely upon the law of the State of Louisiana.

(d) If Deceased did sustain any injury as the result of the use of any product manufactured by this Defendant in any other state of the union, then this Defendant gives notice and pleads each and all of the statutes of limitation of the respective states where the alleged cause of action arose as to said alleged cause of action. Defendant likewise pleads the statute of limitation of the State of Texas as to each and all of said alleged causes of action.

Eighth Affirmative Defense

If Deceased did sustain any injury as the result of the use of any product manufactured by this Defendant, which is denied, then such occurred more than four (4) years prior to the filing of this suit on October 20, 1969, and such cause of action for personal injury is barred by the four (4) year statute of limitation of the State of Texas.

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Ninth Affirmative Defense

Further answering, this Defendant says that Deceased was an experienced insulation worker according to his allegations and knew at all times that he was working with asbestos and products containing asbestos, as well as other products, which were harmful to him; or in the alternative, if he did not know this, his employers at all times knew that they were working with insulation materials which contained some asbestos, and said employers had knowledge of the fact that particles of said products could enter the air when said product was cut or applied, and the employer likewise had knowledge that if blowers or fans were not used in the area, that their employees would be subject to the dust hazard and inhalation of dust; and further, it is common knowledge that if an individual works in an area where the air is laden with dust, that the individual will breathe this dust into his nose and body system unless the employee uses some mask, respirator or some protective device, or unless the employer provides some means whereby the dust is removed from the air as a safety measure.

Tenth Affirmative Defense

This Defendant denies the existence of any warranty on the part of this Defendant and denies any fault or breach of warranty on the part of this Defendant, but to the contrary, says that the insulation product or products manufactured by it were at all times reasonably fit and suitable for the purposes of insulation which was the purpose for which they were manufactured and sold, and the Deceased's injury, if any, did not result from any defect in said product. Further, any and all dust conditions which resulted from use of the product were created during the application thereof at which time the product was cut or changed from the original form in which it was manufactured by this Defendant, and the conditions under which the Deceased worked were at all times prescribed by his employer or the owner of the premises where the Deceased was employed. This Defendant had no responsibility for the condition or conditions at the place of work where Deceased was performing his work.

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Eleventh Affirmative Defense

Further answering herein, and in the alternative, this Defendant says that the Deceased's alleged injuries and damages, if any, were caused solely, or in the alternative, were proximately caused by acts, wrongs, omissions and negligence of third parties, or a third party, for whose acts this Defendant is in nowise liable or responsible; or in the alternative, if Deceased sustained any injury from the use of any product, or from any breach of warranty, none of which are admitted, but denied, then such was the result of the fault or breach of warranty of third parties other than this Defendant.

Twelfth Affirmative Defense

Further answering herein, and in the alternative, this Defendant says that the Deceased's claims to injury and damage, if any, were the result of an unavoidable accident.

Thirteenth Affirmative Defense

Further answering herein and in the alternative, this Defendant would show that there is and was no legal liability on the part of this Defendant, because of the fact that the alleged happenings in question were brought about or caused by transitory conditions arising in the course of the work which the Deceased was doing, and ordinarily incident thereto; and Deceased and his employers used their own manner, method and means of performing such work, and this Defendant owed no duty with respect to such work, nor was there any relationship as between Deceased and this Defendant which created any duty on the part of this Defendant as to the manner or method in which the work was done or the conditions under which the Deceased performed such work.

Fourteenth Affirmative Defense

Further answering herein, this Defendant says that during the period of time for which the Deceased is asserting a claim and injury that the State of Texas had enacted a workmen's compensation law which provided that the disease of asbestosis is an occupational disease for which a person engaged in the occupation of an asbestos

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worker or working with asbestos products can claim workmen's compensation disability benefits against his last employer at the time the disease is discovered. According to the Plaintiff's pleadings, Deceased worked with asbestos and asbestos products over a period of some 33 years and if Deceased had asbestosis, such was due to the nature of his occupation and was acquired over a long period of time and was not the result of working with any particular product or products, but was due to the nature of his employment.

Further, the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act provides workmen's compensation benefits for the death of an employee if the death resulted from an injury or occupational disease incurred or sustained in the course of his employment and such death benefits accrue to the widow of the deceased employee.

Fifteenth Affirmative Defense

As a further ground of relief and pleading in the alternative, this Defendant says that if any judgment is entered herein jointly and severally against it and other Defendants, that in such event this Defendant is entitled to contribution against such other Defendants in accordance with the provisions of Article 2212 of Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes of the State of Texas.

Sixteenth Affirmative Defense

Further answering, Defendant shows unto the Court that the Plaintiff, Thelma Freida Borel, instituted this suit against various Defendants, including Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation and Standard Asbestos Manufacturing & Insulating Company and others, seeking recovery against such Defendants for the full amount of her damages, alleged to have been the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND ($500,000.00) DOLLARS. Your Defendant, Johns-Manville Products Corporation, has filed Cross-Actions against the said Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation and Standard Asbestos Manufacturing & Insulating Company, seeking full indemnity, or in the alternative, contribution. Thereafter, for valuable consideration, to-wit, FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE and 55/100 ($4,225.55) DOLLARS, paid

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to the said Thelma Freida Borel and intervenor in "final compromise and settlement of all claims and causes of action asserted by the said Thelma Freida Borel" and FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE and 55/100 ($4,225.55) DOLLARS paid by Standard Asbestos Manufacturing & Insulating Company, she "fully and finally released and discharged the said Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation and Standard Asbestos Manufacturing & Insulating Company of any and all claims which were or might be asserted against them," and the said Thelma Freida Borel, in her own right and as the surviving widow of Clarence Borel, for the consideration of FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE and 55/100 ($4,225.55) DOLLARS, fully and finally released the said Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation from this suit and also released "any and every character of claim, demand, damage, cause of action and expense" that she now had or might have against such concern, and acknowledged that said suit, as well as all claims, demands, damages, causes of action and expense, already accrued or which might arise in the future were in all things "fully and finally compromised, settled and released." In consideration of FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE and 55/100 ($4,225.55) DOLLARS paid by Standard Asbestos Manufacturing & Insulating Company she executed a similar release. Defendant shows unto the Court that having received and accepted such sums and fully and finally released said Defendants that such constitutes a final and complete payment and discharge of all claims and causes of action of the said Thelma Freida Borel in her own right and as surviving widow of Clarence Borel, and by virtue of the receipt and acceptance of such payments all claims and damages of the said Thelma Freida Borel have been fully and finally paid, satisfied and extinguished.

Seventeenth Affirmative Defense

Further answering herein and in the alternative, Defendant shows unto the Court that if the payment and receipt of said sum of FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE and 55/100 ($4,225.55) DOLLARS paid by each of said Defendants and the execution of such releases of all claims already accrued or which might arise in the

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future does not constitute full payment and satisfaction of all claims for all of Plaintiff's damages, that since said Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation and Standard Asbestos Manufacturing & Insulating Company were guilty of negligence, breach of express and implied warranty, and responsible for the injury and death of the said Clarence Borel and the damages sued for by the said Thelma Freida Borel, that such payment constitutes a partial discharge and acquittance of Plaintiff's damages and any damages, if any, awarded Plaintiff on trial hereof should be reduced by one half or such other proportion as may be just and proper under the evidence and verdict.

Eighteenth Affirmative Defense

Further answering, Defendant shows unto the Court that in connection with the final disposition and payment by Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation and Standard Asbestos Manufacturing & Insulating Company to Thelma Freida Borel, that the said Thelma Freida Borel and her attorney, Ward Stephenson, agreed to forever indemnify and save harmless the said Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation and Standard Asbestos Manufacturing & Insulating Company from any and all claims, demands, damages, causes of action or liability, which they or their successors, receivers and assigns, might have or which might be asserted against them by the various Defendants named herein, including your Defendant, Johns-Manville Products Corporation. Your Defendant being entitled to judgment for indemnity over and against Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation and Standard Asbestos Manufacturing & Insulating Company, or, in the alternative, for judgment for contribution, asserts such releases and indemnity agreements in full and final release of all claims herein asserted, or, in the alternative, partial release thereof, which releases and indemnity agreements your Defendant is entitled to assert in order to avoid circuity of actions.

Nineteenth Affirmative Defense

Your Defendant further shows unto the Court that by virtue of such compromise, settlement, release and indemnity agreement there

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has been entered an interlocutory judgment in this cause providing that Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation and Standard Asbestos Manufacturing & Insulating Company have finally discharged any and all claims which were or might be asserted against them "including claims asserted by way of intervention and Cross-Action," and which interlocutory judgment further recites that the Court determine that the said Defendants, Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation and Standard Asbestos Manufacturing & Insulating Company should be in all things dismissed from this suit. Should such interlocutory judgment be construed as a dismissal of the Cross-Actions asserted by Johns-Manville Products Corporation against Owens-Corning Fiberglas and Standard Asbestos Manufacturing & Insulating Company, then Defendant asserts the same as a full and complete bar of any and all claims herein asserted by or in behalf of the said Thelma Freida Borel, individually and as the heir of Clarence Borel, Deceased, because by virtue of such action your Defendant and Cross-Plaintiff has been deprived of the right of indemnity or contribution asserted against the said Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation and Standard Asbestos Manufacturing & Insulating Company by way of Cross-Action.

WHEREFORE, this Defendant prays judgment of the Court that Plaintiffs take nothing against it and that it go hence and recover its costs; in the alternative, that it have judgment for contribution against the other Defendants as set out above.

Respectfully submitted,

Gordon R Pate

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Beaumont, Texas 77701

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CROSS-ACTION OF DEFENDANT,
JOHNS-MANVILLE PRODUCTS CORPORATION

TO THE SAID HONORABLE COURT:

COMES NOW, Johns-Manville Products Corporation, one of the Defendants in the above styled and numbered Action, and supplementing its Second Amended Original Answer to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Original Complaint, and complaining of Combustion Engineering, Inc., Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation, Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation, Eagle-Pitcher Industries, Inc., Pittsburgh Corning Corporation, Unarco Industries, Inc., Philip Carey Corporation, Standard Asbestos Manufacturing & Insulating Company, Ruberoid Company and Armstrong Cork Company, all hereinafter called Cross-Defendants, says:

1.

This Defendant says that if Deceased sustained any injury as the result of any act or omission on the part of the Defendant, Johns-Manville Products Corporation, which this Defendant denies, then such injury was caused and proximately caused and contributed to by the acts and omissions of the remaining Defendants above named, and each of them, the Defendant, Unarco Industries, Inc., being a successor in interest to Unarco Asbestos and Rubber Company, and if any judgment is entered herein against the Defendant, Johns-Manville Products Corporation, then in such event this Defendant is entitled to indemnity from each and all of the other Defendants; or in the alternative, is entitled to contribution against each and all of the other Defendants, in accordance with the provisions of Article 2212 Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes of Texas.

2.

This Defendant, subject to its contention that the Plaintiffs have no cause of action against any of the Defendants herein because of the Deceased's use of the products containing asbestos and solely for the purpose of pleading, if necessary, alleges against each of the Cross-Defendants, each and every act herein as is alleged

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in the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Original Complaint, against each and all of said Defendants.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Defendant prays judgment of the Court that Plaintiffs take nothing against it, and that it go hence with its costs; and in the alternative, that it have judgment for indemnity; or in the further alternative, that it have judgment for contribution as set out above.

Respectfully submitted,

Gordon R Pate

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Attorneys for Defendant,
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing Second Amended Original Answer of Defendant, Johns-Manville Products Corporation, to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Original Complaint was mailed to the following attorneys of record:

Mr. Ward Stephenson
Mr. Ben L. Reynolds
Mr. George E. Duncan
Mr. W. N. Arnold, Jr.
Mr. George A. Weller
Mr. Dale Dowell

Mr. James W. Mehaffy, Sr.
Mr. Charles S. Pipkin
Mr. John G. Tucker
Mr. Gerald P. Coley
Mr. Robert E. Barnes, Jr.
Mr. Frank Bean

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT

OF TEXAS - BEAUMONT DIVISION

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