U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit: Asbestos Cases

Our case-law library holds 45 asbestos decisions from the U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit (1981–2024). Each links to our summary and the full opinion.

• Kind of court: Federal appeals court

Decisions

• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2024). The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for General Electric against the estate of Carl Gay, and affirmed the denial of reconsideration, because GE was entitled to derivative sovereign immunity.
• In re Ltl Management LLC (2024). The Third Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's dismissal of LTL Management's second Chapter 11 case for lack of financial distress, ruling against LTL and the Ad Hoc Committee and for the Talc Committee.
• In re Ltl Management, LLC (2023). The Third Circuit reversed the Bankruptcy Court's denial of the talc claimants' motions to dismiss and remanded with instructions to dismiss LTL Management's Chapter 11 petition, so the talc claimants won and LTL and J&J lost.
• In re Ltl Management, LLC (2023). The Third Circuit reversed the Bankruptcy Court's order denying the talc claimants' motions to dismiss and remanded with instructions to dismiss LTL Management's Chapter 11 petition, ruling for the talc claimants and against LTL and J&J.
• Perrone v. Johnson & Johnson (2022). The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the ERISA duty-of-prudence class action brought by J&J employee plan participants, ruling for Johnson & Johnson and the individual fiduciary defendants.
• Traser v. Sea Land Services (In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation) (2020). The Third Circuit dismissed the Estate of William Traser's appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, because the district court's 2010 dismissal of the Michigan case was valid and unappealed, leaving the shipowners (Delta, Ogden Marine, Zapata, Sea Land and others) as the winners.
• In re Energy Future Holdings Corp. (2020). The Third Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's confirmation of Energy Future Holdings' plan, ruling against the latent asbestos claimants (appellants) and for the reorganized EFH debtors.
• Devries v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation) (2017). The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the manufacturers on the widows' strict liability claims because they waived those arguments on appeal, vacated summary judgment on the negligence claims, and remanded for further proceedings.
• Hassell v. The Budd Co. (In re Asbestos Products Liability Lit.(no. VI)) (2016). The Third Circuit vacated the District Court's dismissal of Peggy Hassell's claims against Budd and Resco on Locomotive Inspection Act preemption grounds and remanded, so Hassell prevailed on appeal.
• Haas v. 3M Company (2015). The Third Circuit vacated the District Court's summary judgment for General Electric, which Haas had appealed, and remanded for further proceedings. It also held the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Brasmer's deposition testimony.
• Anderson v. Bondex International, Inc. (2014). The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's order denying Barbara Anderson leave to amend her complaint, so Georgia-Pacific and Union Carbide prevailed because the amended claims did not relate back and were time-barred.
• Crawford v. Alcoa (In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation) (2014). The Third Circuit affirmed the MDL court's dismissal with prejudice of Angie Smiddy's wrongful death complaint against Alcoa for failing to comply with Administrative Order 12, so Alcoa prevailed and Smiddy lost.
• Stevens v. CBS Corp. (In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (NO. V)) (2014). The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for CBS Corporation and International Paper against the executor of Raymond Stevens's estate, because Stevens's inconsistent testimony did not show the Micarta panels contained asbestos.
• Williams v. Georgia-Pacific (In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (NO. VI)) (2014). The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Georgia-Pacific, ruling that Baxley had not produced enough evidence that Williams was exposed to an asbestos-containing Georgia-Pacific product.
• In re Federal-Mogul Global Inc. (2012). The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment upholding the bankruptcy court's ruling that the Bankruptcy Code preempts the insurers' anti-assignment provisions, so Federal-Mogul could transfer its insurance rights to the asbestos trust over the insurers' objections.
• In re Grossman's Inc. (2010). The en banc Third Circuit overruled Frenville, held that a bankruptcy "claim" arises on pre-petition exposure, reversed the District Court's ruling for the Van Brunts, and remanded for the lower courts to decide whether due process allowed discharge of their claims by JELD-WEN's predecessor's plan.
• Kurns v. AW Chesterton Inc. (2010). The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Viad Corporation and Railroad Friction Products Corporation, holding the plaintiffs' state-law product liability claims preempted by the Locomotive Inspection Act.
• In re Congoleum Corp. (2005). The Third Circuit reversed the order approving Congoleum's retention of Gilbert, Heintz & Randolph as special insurance counsel, siding with the objecting insurers, and remanded to the District Court.
• In re Combustion Engineering, Inc. (2004). The Third Circuit vacated the District Court's order confirming Combustion Engineering's prepackaged Chapter 11 plan, vacated the § 105(a) injunction protecting Basic and Lummus, and remanded for further findings on the two-trust structure, with the insurers' appeals largely dismissed for lack of standing.
• In re Kensington International Limited (2004). The Third Circuit granted the creditors' mandamus petitions and disqualified Judge Wolin from the Owens Corning, W.R. Grace and USG bankruptcies, over a dissent; it took no action on Armstrong or Federal-Mogul.
• In re Kensington Intern. Ltd. (2003). The Third Circuit granted mandamus in part, vacating Judge Wolin's stay of discovery on the recusal motions and directing him to allow expedited discovery and rule on them by January 31, 2004, without deciding whether he must be disqualified.
• In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc. (2002). The Third Circuit held it lacked jurisdiction to review the District Court's denial of transfer and remand of the friction-product asbestos claims to state courts, and denied the automakers' and other defendants' requests for mandamus.
• In re Collins (2000). The Third Circuit denied the petitioners' request for a writ of mandamus, leaving in place the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation's decision to withhold remand of punitive damages claims, so the defendants prevailed.
• In re Patenaude (2000). The Third Circuit denied the asbestos plaintiffs' petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to remand their cases from MDL 875, so the defendants prevailed and the cases stayed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
• Orvosh v. Program OF Group Ins. for Salaried Emp. (2000). The Third Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment for Donald Orvosh, held that Volkswagen's termination of his long-term disability benefits was not arbitrary and capricious, remanded for summary judgment for Volkswagen and the plan, and affirmed the denial of attorney fees.
• Greenleaf v. Garlock, Inc. (1999). The Third Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part: it held that the state-court damages verdict barred relitigation of damages, so judgment for the Greenleafs against Garlock and Owens Corning must be entered at the state amount. It also ordered a new trial on Garlock's and Owens Corning's crossclaims against the non-appearing defendants.
• Feidt v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1998). The Third Circuit dismissed Westinghouse's (CBS's) appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, leaving in place the district court's order remanding the Feidts' suit to New Jersey state court.
• Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc. (1996). The Third Circuit vacated the district court's order certifying the Georgine settlement class and its preliminary injunction, and remanded with directions to decertify the class, so the settlement between the CCR asbestos companies and class counsel could not proceed as a class action.
• Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. SS Co., Inc. (1996). The Third Circuit reversed the jury verdict for the shipping company and manufacturer defendants and remanded for a new trial, because the district court wrongly limited the testimony of plaintiff's treating physician and pulmonologist; it affirmed the other challenged rulings and denied reassignment to a new judge.
• Kirk v. Raymark Industries, Inc. (1995). The Third Circuit reversed the judgment for plaintiff Sarah Kirk against Owens-Corning and remanded for a new trial on damages and liability, because the district court refused to strike two biased jurors for cause, impairing Owens-Corning's peremptory challenges; it also found hearsay errors but upheld delay damages in principle.
• Dunn v. Hovic (1993). The en banc Third Circuit rejected Owens-Corning's challenges to liability for punitive damages, but vacated the $2 million punitive award and remanded for entry of $1,000,000, so Dunn won liability and a reduced award while Owens-Corning won a further reduction.
• Sealover v. Carey Canada Inc. (1993). The Third Circuit reversed the district court's treatment of the Manville Trust as a settled defendant, in plaintiff Alma Sealover's favor, and also reversed the delay-damages award covering a continuance the plaintiff requested, in W.R. Grace's favor, remanding for entry of a new judgment.
• Blancha v. Raymark Industries (1992). The Third Circuit reversed the district court's order granting plaintiffs a new trial, and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for Keene Corporation consistent with the first jury verdict, undoing the plaintiffs' win at the retrial.
• Borman v. Raymark Industries, Inc. (1992). The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal to charge the jury on apportionment and its denial of Celotex's motion on lost wages, leaving the verdict for Mrs. Borman and her husband's estate against Celotex in place.
• Rotondo v. Keene Corp. (1992). The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Keene Corporation's motions for directed verdict, j.n.o.v. and a new trial, leaving the jury verdict for Rose Rotondo in place.
• Threadgill v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. (1991). The Third Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a new trial and remanded for a new trial on negligence and conspiracy, because the Sumner Simpson documents were wrongly excluded and the error was not harmless; the plaintiffs (Threadgill's widow and children) won against the Manville Fund.
• Howell v. Celotex Corp. (1990). The Third Circuit affirmed the judgment entered on the jury's verdict for the asbestos defendants, holding that the district court properly let the jury decide whether Howell's pleural thickening was a compensable injury.
• Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. US (1988). The Third Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the United States' motion to dismiss and remanded for entry of judgment for the United States, so asbestos manufacturer Eagle-Picher could not recover contribution or indemnity from the government.
• Lac D'Amiante du Quebec v. American Home Assur. (1988). The Third Circuit vacated the district court's judgment against insurer Midland Insurance Co. and remanded with directions to dismiss, holding the district court should have abstained in favor of New York's liquidation proceeding; Lac D'Amiante du Quebec lost its federal judgment.
• In re Asbestos Litigation (1987). The Third Circuit answered the certified question in the negative, holding that New Jersey's bar on the state-of-the-art defense for asbestos manufacturers does not violate equal protection or due process, which was a loss for the manufacturers (Raymark, Owens-Illinois, GM and others) and a win for the plaintiffs.
• Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp. (1986). The Third Circuit vacated the zero-dollar judgment and remanded for a new trial limited to Herber's fear-of-cancer distress and cancer-monitoring costs. It affirmed the exclusion of increased-risk damages and rejected the asbestos suppliers' challenges to the liability findings.
• Shelly v. Johns-Manville Corp. (1986). The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of the intentional-tort theory but reversed the judgment on the pleadings for Raymark and remanded, because the plaintiffs' allegations of exposure away from the workplace stated a claim under the dual capacity exception.
• ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. (1985). The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for ACandS that exposure, exposure-in-residence and manifestation each trigger coverage and that losses are not prorated, reversed the rulings on the duty and right to defend in favor of Aetna and Travelers, and vacated the 'other insurance' ruling.
• Rocco v. Johns-Manville Corp. (1985). The Third Circuit affirmed the verdicts against Johns-Manville and Pittsburgh Corning and the denial of new trial and JNOV, but held that payments from non-joint-tortfeasor (Group A) settlements should not reduce the verdict, and that Unarco's pro rata release still reduced the verdict despite its bankruptcy. Delay damages are limited to a non-settling defendant's pro rata share, and the case was remanded because the severed claims against Keene remain open.
• ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (1981). The Third Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of ACandS's declaratory and damages claims against Aetna and Travelers (and Travelers' cross-claim) as non-justiciable, and remanded for further proceedings.