Farrall v. Atlas Turner (In re Asbestos Litigation Limited TO Farrall, 2011)

Our plain-English summary of In re Asbestos Litigation Limited TO Farrall (Delaware Superior Court, January 11, 2011).

James Farrall and his co-plaintiffs sued Atlas Turner, Inc. and Bell Asbestos Mines, Ltd. after Mr. Farrall was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2011. The opinion does not describe his work or how he was exposed to asbestos. In 1973 the plaintiffs had sued the same defendants in Delaware Superior Court over asbestos-related injuries. In 1982 they signed releases, and that case was dismissed in 1983. The defendants moved to dismiss the new suit, arguing the releases barred it. The plaintiffs argued the releases covered only claims that could have been raised in 1973, and that mesothelioma had not been diagnosed then. The court found the release unambiguous. It covered known, unknown, unmanifested and feared injuries resulting from exposure to the defendants' asbestos products, which the court read to include long-latency diseases such as mesothelioma. The plaintiffs offered no evidence of fraud, duress, coercion or mutual mistake. The court granted the motions to dismiss. It also criticized plaintiffs' counsel for omitting key words when quoting the release.

We wrote this summary from the court's opinion with the help of AI. It is not the court's wording, and it is not legal advice. The full opinion is below.

The decision

• Court: Delaware Superior Court
• Decided: January 11, 2011
• Stage: Motion to dismiss
• State: Delaware

Outcome. The court granted Atlas Turner, Inc.'s and Bell Asbestos Mines, Ltd.'s motions to dismiss, holding the 1982 release barred James Farrall's new mesothelioma claims; the plaintiffs lost.

What the court held. A clear and unambiguous general release covering known and unknown, unmanifested injuries from asbestos exposure bars a later suit for a long-latency disease such as mesothelioma, absent fraud, duress, coercion or mutual mistake.

Issues decided: Settlements and Releases.

The people and their exposure

• James Farrall: mesothelioma

The defendants

• Atlas Turner, Inc.
• Bell Asbestos Mines, Ltd.

The court's opinion

The text below is Google Scholar's copy of the court's opinion, a public record. Numbers in brackets, such as [*921], mark where each page of the printed reporter begins.

In re Asbestos Litigation Limited to James Farrall.

C.A. No. 11C-05-257 ASB.

January 11, 2011.

Superior Court of Delaware. New Castle County.

Raeann Warner, Esquire, Jacobs & Crumplar, P.A., 2 East 7th Street, P.O. Box 1271, Wilmington, Delaware 19899. Willard F. Preston, III, Esquire, Goldfein & Joseph, 3513 Concord Pike, Suite 2000, Wilmington, DE 19803. JOHN A. PARKINS, JR., Judge.

Dear Counsel:

Defendants, Atlas Turner, Inc. and Bell Asbestos Mines, Ltd., filed omnibus motions to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs filed an action (C.A. No. 77) in this court in 1973 for asbestos related injuries. On November 23, 1982 Plaintiffs signed releases in that case and an order of dismissal was entered on February 1, 1983 in regards to the Defendants. Defendants argue these releases bar Plaintiffs' latest claims. In opposing the motion, Plaintiffs argue the 1982 release does not bar their new claims because James Farrall was not diagnosed with mesothelioma until 2011. They reason that the release only applied to claims that were or could have been raised in the 1973 case and, because Mr. Farrall's mesothelioma had not yet been diagnosed, it could not have been raised. Plaintiff base their argument on language in the release saying it applies to "claims which have been or could have been asserted against Atlas and Bell in Civil Action No. 77, 1973."[1] The earlier portion of that sentence adds clarity and states, "from any and all actions, causes of action, claims, demands and/or unknown personal injuries and/or losses resulting in any way from my exposure to asbestos or to products containing asbestos [of Defendants]."[2] The "court determines the parties' intent from the overall language of the document."[3]

This case turns on the language of the 1982 release, which the court finds is unambiguous. There is no doubt from the language of the release that the parties intended to foreclose a suit based upon then unknown diseases which are manifested later. For example, the release prohibits any suit for "known, feared and/or unknown personal injuries. . . resulting in any way from [Plaintiff's] exposure to asbestos or to products [of Defendants] containing asbestos."[4] Elsewhere the Release provides:

It is understood and agreed that this is a full and final Release to Releasees [sic] of all claims of every nature and kind including claims for contributions and indemnity and hereby releases claims that are known,

unknown, suspected, unsuspected, manifested, unmanifested and/or feared to the extent provided above.[5] There is no doubt that the references to "known and unknown" and to "unknown. . . unsuspected. . . unmanifested" injuries were intended to encompass long latency diseases such as mesothelioma. The only limitation is that such disease result "in any way. . . from [Plaintiff's] exposure to asbestos or to products [of Defendants] containing asbestos."[6] "Delaware courts recognize the validity of general releases. A clear and unambiguous release will [only] be set aside where there is fraud, duress, coercion, or mutual mistake concerning the existence of a party's injuries."[7] Plaintiff offers no evidence of fraud, duress, coercion, or mutual mistake.

On a final note, the court is disturbed by Plaintiff's counsel's effort to make a point by omitting from quotations key words or phrases which disprove her argument. In her submittal she quoted portions of the following two provisions from the Release but omitted the language printed in bold:

It is understood and agreed that this is a full and final Release to Releasees [sic] of all claims of every nature and kin including claims that are known, unknown, suspected, unsuspected, manifested, unmanifested

and/or feared to the extent provided above.[8]

And

from any and all actions, causes of action, claims, demands and/or all consequential, punitive and exemplacy damages arising out of, or in any way growing out of, any and all known, feared and/or unknown personal injuries and/or other losses resulting in any was from my exposure to asbestos or to products containing asbestos fibers which are the subject of claims which have been or could have been asserted against Atlas and Bell in Civil Action No. 77, 1973.[9]

Whether intentional or merely careless, these sorts of omissions fall far below what is expected of a Delaware lawyer and cannot continue.

Defendants' motions to dismissare GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

[1] Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendants Atlas Turner, Inc.'s and Bell Asbestos Mines, Ltd.'s Omnibus Motions to Dismiss, Ex. A, at 1 (hereinafter Plaintiffs' Response).

[2] Id. (emphasis added).

[3] Deuley v. DynCorp Intern., Inc., 8 A.3d 1156, 1163 (Del. 2010) (citing Tucker v. Albun, Inc., 1999 WL 1241073, at [*2] (Del. Super)). [4] Plaintiffs' Response, Ex. A, at 1.

[5] Plaintiffs' Response, Ex. A, at 3.

[6] Id., Ex. A, at 1.

[7] Deuley, 8 A.3d at 1163 (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).

[8] Plaintiffs' Response, Ex. A, at 3.

[9] Id. Ex. A, at 1.

Sources

• The opinion on Google Scholar
• Delaware asbestos laws
• Delaware asbestos exposure sites