Causation in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on medical or specific causation: 1,200 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Pennsylvania

• Smeal v. Clark Equipment Company (2022). Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must show frequent, regular and proximate exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product and competent expert evidence that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing the disease. A corporate representative's testimony that the defendant's brakes contained asbestos, together with the worker's testimony about handling the brakes and working near brake repairs, created a jury question.
• Data v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under Pennsylvania law a plaintiff must show frequent, regular and proximate exposure to the specific defendant's asbestos product, and mere presence of the product or de minimis exposure is not enough. Under maritime law the plaintiff must show exposure to the product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury, and the bare-metal defense is not available.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corp. (2021). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Minimal exposure, or mere presence of the product aboard the ship, is not enough.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under Pennsylvania law a plaintiff must show exposure to asbestos from the defendant's product with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity for a jury to infer causation. Merely showing that a product was present at the workplace is not enough.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under both Pennsylvania law (frequency, regularity and proximity) and Virginia law (actual and proximate cause), a plaintiff must produce specific evidence that the decedent inhaled asbestos fibers from the defendant's product. Evidence that the defendant sold asbestos-containing products in general does not meet that burden.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. A general recollection of a product's name, its presence on a ship, or a generic expert report does not create a genuine dispute on exposure.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must show exposure to a specific defendant's asbestos-containing product with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity. Showing that the product was merely present at the workplace is not enough.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must show exposure to asbestos from the defendant's specific product with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity. Showing that a manufacturer sold some asbestos-containing products, or that its product was present at the worksite, is not enough.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must show exposure to asbestos from the defendant's own product with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity. Showing that the product was present at the workplace, or that a manufacturer's interrogatory answers say some products may have contained asbestos, is not enough.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the specific defendant's asbestos product with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity; mere presence of the product at the workplace is not enough.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos product with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity for a jury to infer causation. Testimony of repeated close-range work near the defendant's workers can meet that standard at summary judgment.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under Pennsylvania law (frequency, regularity and proximity) and maritime law (a high enough level of exposure), proof that a defendant's product was merely present at a worksite, with only de minimis exposure, does not show the product was a substantial factor in causing the disease.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must show exposure to asbestos from the specific defendant's product with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity for a jury to infer causation. The presence of a product at a workplace, or other workers' later testimony about it, is not enough.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the disease. A few minutes of exposure within a nearly fifty-year career, and inconsistent testimony about other work, did not meet that standard.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must show exposure to asbestos from the specific defendant's product with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity; mere presence of the product or of asbestos at a workplace is not enough.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the specific defendant's asbestos-containing product with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity for a jury to infer that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. The mere presence of the product at a workplace is not enough.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the specific defendant's asbestos product with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity; the product's presence at the workplace, or speculation about earlier exposure, is not enough.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos product with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity for a jury to infer causation. Mere presence of the product at a workplace, or speculative recollection of it, is not enough.
• Blystone v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (2020). Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must show the defendant's product actually contained asbestos and that he was exposed to it with frequency, regularity and proximity; a plaintiff's unfounded belief that a product contained asbestos is speculation that cannot defeat summary judgment.
• Brandt v. Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. (2020). Under Pa.R.E. 703 an expert may not serve as a mere conduit for another expert's unadmitted testing and opinions. Without admissible exposure evidence, the medical causation opinion lacked foundation and summary judgment was proper.
• Gorton v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2020). Expert testimony that each exposure above background cumulatively contributes to mesothelioma is reliable under Rule 702 and is not the barred 'each and every breath' theory under Pennsylvania law. Disputes over whether exposure met the frequency, regularity and proximity test go to weight and are for the trier of fact.
• Gorton v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2020). Under Ohio law, which applied to the employment-based claims, workers' compensation exclusivity bars negligence and recklessness claims against an employer. It does not bar a plausibly pleaded intentional tort claim, or claims against the employer in its separate capacity as manufacturer and supplier to other employers.
• Lamson v. Georgia-Pacific LLC (2019). In an asbestos case, a plaintiff with mesothelioma need only show that some of the defendant's products contained asbestos and that his work on them generated dust. Gaps in the testimony about how many doors he worked on or for how long go to weight and credibility, which are for the jury.
• Walker v. Blackmer Pump Co. (2019). A deceased witness's deposition is not admissible under the former-testimony hearsay exception against defendants who had no meaningful opportunity to cross-examine him. Maritime law governs shipboard Navy exposure, and under it the bare-metal defense turns on foreseeability, which makes circumstantial exposure evidence enough to reach a jury.
• Walker v. Viad Corp. (2019). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury, and the bare-metal defense is a foreseeability standard rather than a bright-line rule. A summary judgment movant may not raise a new argument and evidence for the first time in a reply brief.
• Gilbert v. Advance Auto Parts (2018). In an asbestos case a plaintiff must produce evidence that exposure to the specific defendant's product was frequent, regular and proximate; general testimony that a parts store or vehicle make was used at the workplace, without evidence tying the decedent to that product, is too speculative to survive summary judgment.
• Floyd v. AstenJOHNSON, Inc. (2017). To survive summary judgment in an asbestos case, a plaintiff must show through evidence of frequency, regularity and proximity that he inhaled asbestos fibers shed by the specific defendant's product; co-worker testimony that does not identify the plaintiff as exposed, and speculation from presence at the same plant, is insufficient.
• Roverano v. John Crane, Inc. (2017). The Fair Share Act applies to strict liability asbestos cases, so a fact-finder must allocate liability among strictly liable tortfeasors in proportion to their liability rather than per capita. Settlements with bankrupt entities may be considered in that allocation because the Act bars use of the allocation against them and so does not conflict with the Bankruptcy Code.
• Rost v. Ford Motor Co. (2016). An expert may tell the jury that every asbestos exposure adds to a person's cumulative dose without offering barred "each and every breath" testimony. Where exposure to the defendant's product was frequent, regular and proximate and competent medical testimony supports substantial-factor causation, the jury decides causation, and the expert need not compare the plaintiff's exposures to other asbestos products.
• Groover v. CBS Corporation (2014). Under the frequency, regularity and proximity standard, a plaintiff must make some affirmative showing that the plaintiff or decedent breathed dust from the particular defendant's product; working with or around the product is not enough.
• Schott v. Viad Corp. (In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation) (2014). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to asbestos in a product the defendant made or supplied, and expert speculation that the defendant probably supplied original or replacement parts is not enough. A manufacturer is not liable for asbestos parts it did not make or supply.
• Krauss v. Trane US Inc. (2014). A plaintiff must produce evidence that the defendant's product contained asbestos and was present at the worksite before the frequency, regularity and proximity test is reached. Lay affidavits based on 'knowledge and belief' rather than actual knowledge are speculative and cannot defeat summary judgment.
• Nelson v. Airco Welders Supply (2014). Expert causation testimony resting on the 'any-exposure' theory is inadmissible under Betz v. Pneumo Abex, and plaintiff's counsel may not give the jury a formula or amount for non-economic damages. Strict liability, including failure to warn, is limited to a product's intended use by an intended user, and intended use includes the intermediate steps needed to fulfill the product's purpose.
• Rost v. Ford Motor Company (2014). Betz v. Pneumo Abex does not bar all 'any exposure' expert opinion, and on review of a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law the record is viewed in the verdict winner's favor. Under Moore v. Ericsson, an asbestos-containing product may be treated as defective as a matter of law because it contains asbestos.
• Smith v. Bmw OF North America LLC (2014). A company is liable as an apparent manufacturer under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 400 only if it put the product out as its own, which turns on how users would see it and on the company's control. Piercing the corporate veil requires domination beyond an ordinary parent-subsidiary relationship, and exposure to a defendant's product must be more than de minimis.
• Howard v. AW Chesterton Co. (2013). In dose-responsive diseases, the any-exposure theory (each and every exposure is a substantial cause) cannot establish substantial-factor causation, and bare de minimis exposure is insufficient; experts must make an individualized assessment of exposure history, and summary judgment is available in such cases.
• Nelson v. Airco Welders Supply (2013). Following Betz v. Pneumo Abex, expert testimony that each and every asbestos exposure is a substantial contributing factor to mesothelioma is inadmissible. Plaintiff's counsel also may not suggest a specific dollar value for non-economic damages, and the instructions here did not cure that suggestion.
• Webber v. Ford Motor Company (2013). A judgment entered by the prothonotary under Pa.R.C.P. 227.4(1)(b) after 120 days of pending post-trial motions cannot be opened, vacated or reconsidered by the trial court. A jury verdict is recorded when docketed absent ambiguity, and a new trial is not warranted where a reasonable theory supports the jury's answers.
• Betz v. Pneumo Abex LLC (2012). A Frye hearing is warranted when a trial judge has articulable grounds to believe an expert did not apply accepted scientific methodology in a conventional way, and the 'any-exposure' opinion that every fiber is a substantial contributing factor conflicts with dose-response science and the substantial-factor standard, so excluding it was not an abuse of discretion.
• Conner v. Alfa Laval, Inc. (2012). Under maritime law, a manufacturer is not liable for harm caused by, and has no duty to warn of the hazards of, asbestos products that it did not manufacture or distribute, even if it was foreseeable that those products would be used with its own.
• Fisher v. Sexauer (2012). To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must show frequent, regular exposure in proximity to the defendant's asbestos product. The relaxed exposure standard for mesothelioma does not extend to other diagnoses such as small-cell carcinoma.
• Rabovsky v. Goulds Pumps (In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (NO. VI)) (2012). Under Rule 702 and Daubert, an expert's opinion that each and every exposure to asbestos above background contributes to mesothelioma is sufficiently reliable to be admitted. Lack of specific testing goes to cross-examination, and Pennsylvania's substantial factor test is not about the quantity of the agent.
• Rabovsky v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (2012). A defendant waives the defense of insufficient process by failing to raise it by pre-answer motion or in its answer, and Gregg's frequency, regularity and proximity test does not bar expert 'each and every exposure' opinions on mesothelioma causation under Rule 702.
• Senger v. AH Bennett Company (2012). Under North Dakota law a plaintiff must raise a genuine issue of fact that exposure to the defendant's product proximately caused the injury. General coworker testimony about refinery work, which does not tie a particular decedent to the defendant's product, leaves causation to speculation.
• Various Plaintiffs v. Various Defendants (2012). Applying North Dakota law, a plaintiff must raise a genuine issue of material fact that exposure to the defendant's product proximately caused the injury. General testimony about the refinery and its work practices, without evidence tying a decedent to the defendant's product, leaves any inference of causation to speculation.
• Howard v. AW Chesterton Co. (2011). The frequency, regularity and proximity test is not rigid and must be adapted to the case, including diseases like mesothelioma that can follow minor exposures. At summary judgment a court must view the evidence favorably to the non-moving party and may not treat testimony about no visible dust as an admission of no inhaled fibers or settle credibility disputes against the plaintiff.
• Anderson v. Salmon Bay and Gravel Co. (In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation) (2011). An expert's opinion that every occupational and bystander asbestos exposure above background was a substantial contributing factor in causing mesothelioma may be admitted under Rule 702 when supported by published studies and agency statements. Disputes over the underlying facts, such as fiber type, go to cross-examination and the jury.
• Breedlove v. CSX Transportation (In re Liability Litigation) (2011). An expert may rely on exposure summaries and deposition excerpts prepared by plaintiff's counsel if they have a factual foundation in the record, and weaknesses go to cross-examination. HIPAA does not bar asking a non-covered-entity defendant about asbestos claims that non-parties have brought in litigation.
• Linster v. Allied Signal, Inc. (2011). A plaintiff must present evidence that he inhaled asbestos fibers shed by the specific defendant's product, judged by the flexible frequency, regularity and proximity test. Co-worker and plaintiff testimony about asbestos gaskets and packing was enough to create a genuine issue of fact, and the presence of other brands goes to apportionment, not sufficiency of proof.
• Wagers v. Sgl Carbon, LLC (2011). Under North Carolina law, a premises owner owes an independent contractor's employees a general duty to warn of hidden dangers, but no breach occurs where the contractor already knew the danger. The owner also owes a nondelegable duty for inherently dangerous work, and whether the work was inherently dangerous is usually a jury question.