Choice of Law in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on which state's law applies: 374 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Louisiana

• Cole v. Celotex Corp. (1992). In long-latency occupational disease cases, pre-Act law applies when significant tortious exposures occurred before the comparative fault act took effect, and contribution among defendants is governed by that same law. Coverage is triggered by exposure during the policy period, and a plaintiff may recover under each triggered annual policy.

Maryland

• Hailey v. Air and Liquid Systems Corporation (2020). A plaintiff must show, for each defendant separately, regular and frequent (or substantial) exposure to that defendant's own product where the plaintiff actually worked; the mere presence of a defendant's product somewhere in the workplace is not enough. The court found the result the same under Maryland and maritime law.
• Fullen v. 3M Company (2019). A party relying on foreign law must give reasonable notice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1; notice given at the close of discovery, after earlier reliance on forum law, is unreasonable and waives foreign law. A late witness designation is not excluded where the surprise can be cured and no prejudice is shown.
• Knauer v. Johns-Manville Corp. (1986). Maryland's three-year filing period in its Wrongful Death Act is a condition precedent to the claim, so federal Rule 15(c) relation back cannot save a late wrongful death claim in a diversity case. The general three-year limitations period for survival claims is an ordinary statute of limitations, so the survival claims relate back to the original filing.

Massachusetts

• Cook v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corporation (2023). Asbestos exposure claims arising from repair and maintenance aboard a Navy ship on navigable waters fall within admiralty jurisdiction, so substantive maritime law applies, with state law only supplementing where maritime law is silent. General maritime law does not bar loss of consortium, punitive or survival damages against a manufacturer in such a case.
• Burleigh v. Alfa Laval, Inc. (2018). Under the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 145-146, the law of the place of injury applies unless another state has a more significant relationship. Maine, where the decedent lived, worked and was exposed, had that relationship on the issues decided, even though the defendant's conduct occurred in Massachusetts.
• Eagle-Picher Industries v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. (1981). Under these occurrence-based liability policies, exposure to asbestos results in bodily injury only when it produces clinically evident, diagnosable disease, so coverage is triggered at manifestation, measured by the date of diagnosis or, if none, the date of death, with no pro rata apportionment.

Michigan

• Marshall v. Celotex Corp. (1988). Under Michigan law as the court applied it, a plaintiff may not proceed on a concert of action theory where she cannot show that any defendant supplied the asbestos-containing products to which the decedent may have been exposed, absent joinder of a significant majority of the potentially responsible parties.
• Marshall v. Celotex Corp. (1987). Under Michigan law as predicted by the federal court, plaintiff could not shift the product-identification burden to defendants through alternative liability (not all possible defendants were joined), market share liability (inappropriate for non-fungible asbestos products and no proof of substantial market share) or enterprise liability (no joint control of risk alleged). Concert of action still requires proof of causation.
• Ins. Co. of No. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations (1978). Under occurrence-based liability policies, asbestos-related bodily injury occurs when fibers injure lung tissue after exposure, not when disease manifests, so every insurer on the risk during the exposure period must defend and indemnify, with costs apportioned by years of coverage.

Mississippi

• Bedford v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2020). Under the Mississippi Products Liability Act, asbestos plaintiffs must prove product identification, exposure to the defendant's product, and proximate cause through expert testimony; without evidence quantifying exposure to the defendant's product, summary judgment is proper.
• Dickens v. A-1 Auto Parts & Repair Inc. (2020). Under Mississippi's choice-of-law rules (Restatement (Second) § 145), the law of the successor's state of incorporation and of its asset purchase agreement governs successor liability, and a successor cannot be held liable under the product line theory where those states have not adopted it.
• McCarty v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (1980). In a diversity case the federal court applies state collateral estoppel law, and Mississippi requires mutuality of parties. Even under federal non-mutual offensive estoppel, it would not apply here because the issues were not identical, the earlier results conflicted, and the defendants could not have foreseen the later litigation.

Missouri

• Guthe v. Johnson & Johnson (2024). A petition must at least describe the type of product the decedent was exposed to and allege that the defendant made or distributed it; Missouri law recognizes no standalone products-liability tort of willful and wanton misconduct, though the allegations may be read as a punitive damages request.
• Douglas v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer, Inc. (2020). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), transfer was warranted because witness and party convenience, record location, and the place of exposure favored the plaintiff's home district. Her plaintiff's-choice-of-forum deference was reduced because Missouri was not her residence and not her first choice.
• MacCormack v. the Adel Wiggins Group (2017). Under Massachusetts law, a prior state-court summary judgment on causation, where the party had a full opportunity to litigate, precludes relitigating the same claims against the same defendant. Collateral estoppel may be raised by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
• Urbach v. the Okonite Company (Eastern District, 2017). Under Wisconsin substantive law, co-worker testimony and expert bystander-exposure evidence can support a jury finding that a defendant's asbestos product was a substantial factor in causing mesothelioma. Wisconsin's wrongful-death cap applies after fault is apportioned, and the Wisconsin statute requiring assignment of asbestos trust claims before collecting a judgment is procedural, so Missouri law governs it.
• Hovsepian v. the Adel Wiggins Group (2016). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 a federal court applies the preclusion law of the state that issued the earlier judgment. Under Massachusetts law, a prior summary judgment on causation, reached after the party had a full opportunity to be heard, bars relitigating that issue.
• Zurich American Insurance Company v. Insurance Company of North America (2016). Under Missouri law, a settlement of a progressive-disease asbestos claim is allocated among consecutive insurers pro rata by time on the risk. No equitable contribution or subrogation lies against an insurer whose allocated share is less than its deductible.
• HK Porter Company, Inc. v. Transit Casualty Company IN Receivership (Western District, 2006). Under Pennsylvania law, clear and unambiguous policy language governs; the policy, effective May 1, 1982, superseded or controlled over the earlier Confirmation, and the exclusion's reference to the "Named Insured" covered the same subsidiaries and acquired companies that were covered under the policy.
• Goede v. Aerojet General Corporation (Eastern District, 3rd Division, 2004). A trial court may, under Rule 61.01, direct that ultimate facts be taken as established as a sanction for false discovery answers, and may apply different states' laws to liability and damages under the Restatement's most-significant-relationship test. Submissibility and instructional objections not raised at trial or in the directed-verdict motion at the close of all evidence are not preserved.

Nebraska

• In re Estate of McConnell (2020). Wrongful death proceeds are not estate property and are not waived by a premarital agreement unless its language specifically waives them. A spouse's wrongful death recovery is limited to pecuniary loss after the death, and pain and suffering before death belongs to the estate under a survival claim.

New Jersey

• Continental Insurance Company v. Honeywell International, Inc. (2017). In an insurance allocation dispute over nationwide asbestos products claims, choice of law is decided under Restatement §§ 188 and 6 (as applied in Pfizer), not by a presumption for the place of contracting. The Owens-Illinois unavailability exception means an insured does not share in allocation for years when insurance was not reasonably available.
• Feaster v. AW Chesterton Company (2015). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in the injury, including that the defendant made or distributed the asbestos-containing product. New Jersey law would give the same result because liability requires an asbestos-containing product made or supplied by the defendant.
• Shearer v. AW Chesterton Company (2015). Under maritime law, which governed work aboard a dry-docked Navy ship, a manufacturer owes no duty to warn about asbestos products it neither made nor distributed, so a turbine maker is not liable for insulation applied after the turbine left its control.
• Haas v. 3M Company (2014). Under New Jersey's frequency, regularity and proximity test, a plaintiff must show exposure to an asbestos-containing component of the defendant's product; speculation does not suffice. A contractor meeting the three Boyle prongs is shielded from both design defect and failure-to-warn claims where the specifications are silent on warnings.
• Seckular v. Celotex (1986). Under Florida law, the place of diagnosis does not necessarily determine where an asbestos-related cause of action arose for borrowing-statute purposes; that can be a fact question. A New Jersey court with no interest in the case should defer to the Florida courts as a matter of comity and allow voluntary dismissal without prejudice.
• Lac D'Amiante Du Quebec v. Am. Home Assur. Co. (1985). Under New Jersey law as predicted by the court, ambiguous CGL and umbrella policies are triggered by exposure, exposure in residence, and manifestation of asbestos disease or damage, and each triggered insurer is jointly and severally liable for the full loss and defense costs without proration, subject to contribution.

New York

• Rasso v. Avon Prods., Inc. (2025). Even if an appellate ruling applying Texas causation law were a change in the law, a defendant moving for summary judgment must meet its prima facie burden under New York procedure by affirmatively disproving causation. Pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof under the governing substantive law is not enough.
• English v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation) (1st Dept., 2024). Where a foreign resident's exposure occurred mostly in another state, that state's law (here Texas) governs proof of specific causation. Under Texas law, epidemiological evidence can establish specific causation only if it shows the product more than doubled the plaintiff's risk.
• Rasso v. Avon Prods., Inc. (2023). New York law, not Texas law, governed the motion, because the user testified to significant use of the powder in New York and Colgate is based in New York. Conflicting evidence on asbestos contamination of the talc and on specific causation created fact issues that precluded summary judgment.
• Pritt v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2022). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's own product and that the product was a substantial factor in causing the disease. Minimal exposure, or exposure only to another maker's component, is not enough. Maritime law also allows loss of consortium and punitive damages in a non-Jones Act claim.
• Unger v. AW Chesterton Co. (2022). Under New York interest analysis, asbestos laws are conduct-regulating rules, so the law of the place of the tort applies. That place is where the plaintiff was first exposed, not where he was diagnosed; the movant also failed to show a relevant conflict between New York and New Hampshire law.
• Castro v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. (2021). Under New York's borrowing statute, a nonresident plaintiff's out-of-state claim is subject to the shorter of New York's or the accrual state's limitations period, and Virginia's two-year period ran from the mesothelioma diagnosis. A loss of consortium claim is derivative and fails when the primary claims are dismissed.
• Castro v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. (2021). A New York court treats the statute of limitations as procedural but, under CPLR 202, applies the shorter of New York's or the accrual state's period to a nonresident's claim. Virginia's two-year period therefore barred the claims, which accrued when mesothelioma was diagnosed.
• Fletcher v. Clinique Laboratories (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2020). A defendant seeking forum non conveniens dismissal bears a heavy burden, and dismissal is not warranted where the action has a substantial New York nexus beyond the defendant's New York base and where plaintiffs show no adequate alternative forum.
• Phelps v. CBS Corporation (2020). An expert may give specific-causation and exposure opinions in response to hypothetical questions based on facts established elsewhere at trial, and challenges to the factual assumptions go to weight rather than admissibility. Testimony from the worker, a naval expert and an industrial hygienist was enough to create a genuine factual dispute on whether exposure from Crane Co. valves was a substantial factor in causing mesothelioma.
• Epstein v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). Under New York choice-of-law rules, a causation standard is a conduct-regulating rule governed by the law of the place of the tort. A summary judgment movant must make its own prima facie showing and cannot rely on gaps in the plaintiff's proof or on expert evidence first submitted in reply.
• Pyle v. Pfizer Inc. (2018). A forum non conveniens dismissal requires the movant to carry a heavy burden; it is denied where the case has a substantial nexus to New York beyond the defendants' corporate offices and where plaintiffs show no adequate alternative forum.
• Holzworth v. Alfa Laval Inc. (2016). Whether New York or New Jersey law applies, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product at levels known to cause the disease. A single one-to-three-hour exposure within a long career of exposure is insufficient, and the wrongful death claims fail with the underlying claims.
• Holzworth v. Alfa Laval Inc. (2016). A plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's own asbestos-containing product, and a pump maker has no duty to warn about third-party asbestos parts used with its pumps absent evidence it had an active role, interest or influence in their use. Under maritime and New York law alike, wrongful death claims fail if the underlying liability claims fail.
• Warren v. Amchem Prods., Inc. (2016). New York law governed the privilege waiver question, because New York has the strongest interest as the site of the alleged exposure. Under New York law, a party that repeatedly fails to safeguard a privileged document and lets its witness and counsel disclose it waives the privilege.
• Erickson v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. (2015). Montana's ten-year statute of repose for improvements to real property protects architects, engineers, surveyors and contractors, not manufacturers and suppliers of products such as asbestos-containing turbines.
• Djokic v. United States Steel Corp. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2015). Under the third Neumeier rule in split-domicile cases, the law of the place of injury normally governs unless another state's interest displaces it. Pennsylvania's workers' compensation law therefore applied, and its exclusivity provision did not bar this suit.
• Voelker v. John Crane (Matter of Eighth Jud. Dist. Asbestos Litig.) (Erie, 2015). A trial court may set aside a damages award that deviates materially from reasonable compensation and order a new trial unless the defendant stipulates to a higher award. The jury's allocation of 100% fault to the defendant was a fair reading of the evidence, and New York law applied because the plaintiff lived in New York when first exposed.
• Viera v. BASF Catalysts LLC (2015). A case may be transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) if it could have been brought in the transferee district, meaning that court would have had personal jurisdiction and venue at filing, and the convenience and interest-of-justice factors favor transfer. Here, Florida jurisdiction over a distributor of the product was supported by its Florida sales, and the factors favored Florida.
• McCormick v. Burnham (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2013). Where Kansas is the plaintiff's domicile and place of injury and the parties agree, Kansas law governs, so comparative fault allocates each defendant's liability by percentage and statutory caps on non-economic damages are applied by the court, not disclosed to the jury.
• Logan v. AP Moller-Maersk, Inc. (2013). In New York asbestos cases, a defendant seeking summary judgment must first unequivocally show its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury; failing that, the motion is denied regardless of the opposition, and the court need not reach choice of law.
• Bernard v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. (IN the Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (1st Dept., 2012). Asbestos actions may be consolidated for joint trial under CPLR 602(a) where they share a common disease, a common defendant and a common type of exposure, and the defendant shows no prejudice. Possible differences in state law do not require separate trials.
• Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. (1st Dept., 2012). Asbestos actions may be consolidated for joint trial under CPLR 602(a) where they share a common disease, defendant and type of exposure, and the defendant shows no prejudice. Possible differences among states' laws do not require separate trials where the causation standards are the same and jury instructions can address any differences.