Loss of Consortium in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on loss of consortium: 241 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Indiana

• Black v. ACandS, Inc. (2001). The asbestos exception to the ten-year products liability statute of repose, Ind. Code 34-20-3-2, applies to persons who mined commercial asbestos and to persons who sold it without mining it. A plaintiff must produce evidence supporting an inference that he inhaled asbestos dust from the specific defendant's product.
• Jurich v. Garlock, Inc. (2001). The asbestos exception to the Indiana Product Liability Act's repose period covers sellers of raw or processed commercial asbestos, not sellers of asbestos-containing products. The general ten-year repose period violates the open courts clause of Article I, Section 12 as applied to a latent asbestos disease where exposure began before the Act or there is no evidence the product was over ten years old at exposure.
• Spoonamore v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. (1999). A plaintiff must produce evidence that he inhaled asbestos from the defendant's product. Indiana's asbestos exception to the ten-year statute of repose applies only to defendants that both mined and sold commercial asbestos. Where the repose period has run on the underlying product claims, a wrongful death claim based on them is also barred.
• Spoonamore v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. (1999). If the product liability statute of repose has expired for the claims underlying an asbestos wrongful death action, the wrongful death action is barred too. The asbestos accrual provision, Ind. Code § 34-20-3-2, applies only to defendants who mined and sold commercial asbestos.
• Spoonamore v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. (1998). Indiana's asbestos exception to the ten-year product liability statute of repose applies only to defendants that both mined and sold commercial asbestos. Where the exception does not apply and the repose period has run, the underlying product claims and the wrongful death claim based on them are barred.

Iowa

• Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1994). Asbestos plaintiffs may prove causation under a flexible substantial-factor test, with circumstantial evidence of exposure to the defendant's product, without proving how much that product contributed to the disease. Punitive damages in asbestos cases are not per se unconstitutional, and the defendant bears the burden of showing a due process violation.
• Beeman v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Fund (1993). Evidence of cancer risk from asbestos is admissible to show a manufacturer's duty to warn and the reasonableness of a plaintiff's fear of cancer, and proof of exposure plus cumulative-effect expert testimony can create a jury question on proximate cause. Knowledge sufficient to trigger a duty to warn does not by itself support punitive damages, and Iowa law does not allow a separate award for lost opportunity to live out a full life expectancy.

Kentucky

• Williams v. Schneider Electric USA, Inc. (2023). Duty turns on foreseeability, not on labels like bystander, and household members who regularly and repeatedly came into close contact with a worker's asbestos-contaminated clothes over an extended period are owed a duty where the take-home danger was foreseeable by the late 1960s. A brief, unrelated stint of employment does not make workers' compensation exclusivity bar the non-work-related claims.
• Surita v. Arvinmeritor, Inc. (2017). Under Kentucky law, negligence, strict liability, warranty and misrepresentation claims all require proof that each defendant's product was a substantial factor in causing the harm, meaning a probable rather than merely possible cause.
• Brown v. Kentucky Utilities Company (2015). After severing a federal-officer defendant's third-party claims, a federal court may decline supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2) and (4) where state-law claims predominate and a late-removed case was nearly ready for state trial.
• Stallings v. Georgia-Pacific Corporation (2015). Under both maritime law and Kentucky law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product at a level high enough to make a finding of substantial causation more than conjecture. A manufacturer is not liable for asbestos in other makers' replacement parts, and an expert opinion that any exposure is a substantial cause does not meet that standard.
• Bruszewski v. Motley Rice, LLC (2012). Under Kentucky law, a malpractice claim for failing to file suit before the limitations period ran accrues when that period expires, even if the client could still recover from bankruptcy trusts. Kentucky law does not allow recovery of "lost" punitive damages in a legal malpractice action.
• Rehm v. Ford Motor Company (2011). Evidence rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. The trial court properly admitted 28-year-old newspaper articles under the ancient-documents hearsay exception and let a qualified expert testify, because weaknesses in expert testimony go to weight and are tested on cross-examination. A loss of consortium claim accrues when the disease becomes manifest, not on exposure.
• Carroll v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (2000). Asbestosis and lung cancer are separate and distinct diseases, so a cause of action for lung cancer accrues on the date of the cancer diagnosis rather than the earlier asbestosis diagnosis.

Louisiana

• Thibodeaux v. General Electric Company (2025). Under Louisiana law, there is no loss of consortium claim for asbestos exposure that occurred before 1982.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (2022). Under Louisiana law an injured plaintiff cannot claim loss of consortium, but he may recover damages for household services he can no longer perform himself because of his injury, even though the services are unpaid.
• Sampey v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (2021). Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff has no loss of consortium, service or society claim based on her own injuries, because such a claim depends on another person having been injured.
• Sanchez v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (2021). A Louisiana loss of consortium, service, and society claim is derivative and requires allegations that another person was injured. Under Louisiana's exposure theory, an insurer is liable only for exposure during its policy period.
• Whatley v. Eagle, Inc. (2014). Under the derivative jurisdiction doctrine, a federal court on removal under § 1442 acquires only the jurisdiction the state court had, and a tort claim against the United States or its agencies may be brought only in federal court, so the court lacked jurisdiction over the claim against the VAMC. When removal jurisdiction is doubtful, remand is appropriate.
• Booth v. Acands (4th Circuit, 2003). A defendant moving for summary judgment may point to an absence of factual support for an element, and plaintiffs must then show they can prove it was more probable than not that the decedent was exposed to the defendant's product; a purchase form linking the defendant to a subcontractor's order was not enough to show exposure.
• Ewing v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. (3rd Circuit, 2003). Since the 1976 amendment to La.R.S. 23:1032, workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy against executive officers, so survivors' loss of consortium claims arising after 1976 are barred. The 1999 reenactment of La.Civ.Code art. 2315 did not retroactively apply the 1982 loss of consortium amendment.
• Emery v. Owens-Corporation (1st Circuit, 2001). Where the substantial injury-producing asbestos exposures occurred before Louisiana's comparative fault law took effect, pre-comparative-fault virile share principles apply rather than jury-assigned percentages. Under the pre-1976 statutes, a premises owner was not a statutory employer entitled to tort immunity, and the statutory employer question is for the court rather than the jury.
• Atkinson v. Celotex Corp. (3rd Circuit, 1994). A jury's general damage awards in asbestos injury cases are reviewed under a great-discretion standard and are disturbed only if beyond what a reasonable trier of fact could award. Where medical evidence supports two permissible views, the jury's choice is not manifestly erroneous.

Maryland

• John Crane, Inc. v. Puller (2006). A claim for asbestosis and a claim for mesothelioma are separate claims, so the voluntary dismissal of the earlier asbestosis suit did not bar the later suit by collateral estoppel because no fact was actually litigated. In asbestos cases a loss of consortium claim arises when the underlying injury claim arises (the exposure test), so Maryland's non-economic damages cap does not apply to it when it does not apply to the underlying survival action.
• Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Cook (2005). Under the exposure approach, the noneconomic damages cap does not apply when the last asbestos exposure was before July 1, 1986, and this also covers a derivative loss of consortium claim. A premarital latent injury does not bar a consortium claim if neither spouse knew or could reasonably have known of it at marriage.
• Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Cook (2005). A loss of consortium claim based on a latent premarital injury that neither spouse knew or could have known of at marriage accrues when the injury is discovered or reasonably discoverable. It is not subject to the damages cap when the underlying personal injury claim is not. A release reserving claims for mesothelioma is read as a whole under objective contract principles.
• Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Hunter (2005). A witness's testimony is not stripped of probative value because of conflicts or inconsistencies on peripheral points. In asbestos cases a loss of consortium claim arises with the underlying injury and is not capped if the last exposure was before July 1, 1986. A trial judge may consider the ratio between survival-action and consortium damages when deciding remittitur, and the cap applies to a wrongful death claim that arose at death after the cap took effect.
• Wajer v. Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (2004). A premises owner that hires independent contractors is not liable to a contractor's employee under the retained-control rule (§ 414) or the safe-workplace rule (§ 343) unless it controlled the operative details of the very work that caused the injury; asbestos products the contractors brought in were their own work product, not a preexisting latent condition.
• Crane, Inc. v. Scribner (2002). For the Maryland cap on non-economic damages, the court may look to the plaintiff's last exposure to the defendant's asbestos product; if that exposure was undisputedly before July 1, 1986, the cap does not apply. The plaintiff bears the burden of showing the cause of action arose before the cap date, and a genuine factual dispute goes to the jury.
• Owens-Illinois v. Gianotti (2002). Under Scribner, the Maryland noneconomic damages cap does not apply when the plaintiff's last asbestos exposure was before July 1, 1986. A loss of consortium claim is barred by a premarital injury only if the couple knew or should have known of the injury when they married.
• Porter Hayden Company v. Wyche (1999). The statutory cap on noneconomic damages applies presumptively, and plaintiffs bear the burden of producing probative evidence that the disease arose before the cap's July 1, 1986 effective date; a hedged expert estimate that did not show the cancer pre-dated that date was insufficient.
• Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw (1997). The Maryland cap on noneconomic damages applies to asbestos wrongful death claims arising after October 1, 1994. For personal injury claims, the cause of action arises when the disease develops, not at exposure or at diagnosis. Substantial-factor causation requires evidence of the frequency, regularity and proximity of the plaintiff's exposure to the defendant's product.
• ACandS, Inc. v. Asner (1995). A punitive damages claim in a products liability case goes to the jury if the plaintiff offers evidence that could clearly and convincingly show actual malice (actual knowledge of the hazard and conscious disregard of it). Exposure to the products of non-party companies is irrelevant to whether a defendant's product was a substantial factor. A spouse's death ends the measure of consortium damages but not the consortium claim, and solatium damages may also be recovered.

Massachusetts

• Cook v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corporation (2023). Asbestos exposure claims arising from repair and maintenance aboard a Navy ship on navigable waters fall within admiralty jurisdiction, so substantive maritime law applies, with state law only supplementing where maritime law is silent. General maritime law does not bar loss of consortium, punitive or survival damages against a manufacturer in such a case.
• Pritt v. John Crane, Inc. (2023). Where a product manufacturer that was not the seaman's employer is sued over an indivisible injury from asbestos exposure on the high seas and in territorial waters, neither the Jones Act nor DOHSA applies. General maritime law then permits punitive damages, loss of consortium damages and survival remedies, so an amendment seeking them is not futile.
• Sebright v. General Electric Co. (2021). Under maritime law, a manufacturer's duty to warn under the DeVries test can reach asbestos insulation added to its bare-metal product if the product required insulation to function, and the court treats the sophisticated purchaser defense as unavailable where a risk and burden balancing weighs for the Navy sailor. A plaintiff must also show that a defendant's specific product contained asbestos, and loss of consortium and parental society claims are not available under general maritime law in this circuit.
• Thayer v. Pittsburgh-Corning Corporation (1997). Under Vassallo, a defendant is not liable under the implied warranty of merchantability for failure to warn of risks not reasonably foreseeable at the time of sale, so state of the art evidence is relevant. Lack of privity is judged by the date of injury, not the date of exposure or sale.

Michigan

• Beaudrie v. Anchor Packing Co. (1994). Under Eddington, a workers' compensation carrier may seek reimbursement from the entire third-party recovery, whatever the type of damages, where the recipient is a compensation beneficiary; recoveries by non-beneficiaries are not subject to the lien.

Mississippi

• Bedford v. American Honda Motor Co. (2019). A party's deposition may be prohibited in extraordinary circumstances, such as when an uncontested medical opinion shows the deposition creates a substantial risk to the witness's life and health, particularly where the requesting party delayed seeking it.

Missouri

• Urbach v. the Okonite Company (Eastern District, 2017). Under Wisconsin substantive law, co-worker testimony and expert bystander-exposure evidence can support a jury finding that a defendant's asbestos product was a substantial factor in causing mesothelioma. Wisconsin's wrongful-death cap applies after fault is apportioned, and the Wisconsin statute requiring assignment of asbestos trust claims before collecting a judgment is procedural, so Missouri law governs it.
• State EX rel. Ford Motor Company v. Nixon (Western District, 2007). Workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for workplace injury claims, and only the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission can decide whether an injury was accidental or intentional. A co-employee is not liable at common law unless he committed an affirmative negligent act beyond the employer's duty to provide a safe workplace.

Nevada

• Knutson v. Allis-Chalmers Corp. (2005). A defendant claiming fraudulent joinder bears a heavy burden to show the plaintiff obviously cannot state a claim against the non-diverse defendant under well-settled state law, and doubts or unsettled state law are resolved in favor of remand. A plaintiff's opposition brief that adds no new facts or law does not start a new removal period under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).

New Jersey

• Losurdo v. Viacomcbs Inc. (2025). Under maritime law and DeVries, a manufacturer's duty to warn turns on whether it directed incorporation of asbestos parts, knew the integrated product was dangerous, and had no reason to believe the sailors using it would know of the danger. Under Miles, punitive and loss-of-consortium damages are not available in a maritime wrongful death action.
• Kaenzig v. Charles B. Chrystal Company, Inc. (2015). In an asbestos failure-to-warn case, a plaintiff must prove product-defect causation and medical causation, and exposure is a substantial factor if it meets the frequency, regularity and proximity test. Discovery of a non-testifying consulting expert's facts or opinions requires exceptional circumstances.
• Anderson v. AJ Friedman Supply Co. (2010). An employer shielded by workers' compensation exclusivity for an employee's direct occupational exposure can still be sued under a dual persona theory for a separate duty owed to the employee's spouse for take-home asbestos exposure. Fault need not be allocated to the employer in its capacity as the plaintiff's own employer.
• Thalman v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas (1996). A jury damages award may be set aside or reduced only on a carefully reasoned and articulated finding that it would be a manifest denial of justice; a remittitur based on speculation or an unexplained 'more reasonable number' was improper.
• Schiavo v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas (1995). A 'day in the life' videotape is admissible once the trial judge finds it relevant, probative and an accurate depiction of the injuries, and error in admitting punitive-phase documents without foundation may be harmless where the punitive award was minimal.
• Goss v. American Cyanamid Co. (1994). A plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos products with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity, but may do so by circumstantial evidence, including a distributor's supply of the products to the plant. A trial court may not set aside a jury verdict and resubmit an issue when the evidence supports a reasonable inference for the jury's finding.

New York

• Maffei v. Burnham (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (1st Dept., 2025). Expert testimony from an industrial hygienist and a thoracic surgeon sufficed to establish specific causation, and the compensatory, consortium and punitive awards and the 15% fault allocation to the plaintiff for smoking were upheld as reasonable and supported by the evidence.
• Pritt v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2022). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's own product and that the product was a substantial factor in causing the disease. Minimal exposure, or exposure only to another maker's component, is not enough. Maritime law also allows loss of consortium and punitive damages in a non-Jones Act claim.