Design Defect in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on design defect: 279 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Kentucky

• White v. Cardinal Industrial Insulation Co., Inc. (2007). Legal cause may be shown by circumstantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that the defendant's activity was a substantial factor in the harm, so summary judgment was improper. Products liability standards also apply to a distributor of asbestos-containing materials, and a contractor's compliance with contract specifications did not shield it.
• Parker v. Henry A. Petter Supply Co. (2005). Kentucky's middleman statute applies to distributors once the manufacturer is identified and subject to the court's jurisdiction, even if the manufacturer is bankrupt or other manufacturers are unnamed; but the distributor's knowledge of the defect is a fact question that needs discovery. A purchaser of a corporation's assets is not a successor unless it continues the seller's ownership or management.

Louisiana

• Alford v. Taylor-Seidenbach, Inc. (2025). Under Louisiana law before the Products Liability Act, an OSHA-compliant asbestos warning is not automatically adequate, and whether a warning was adequate is a jury question. Exposure to a particular asbestos product may be shown by circumstantial evidence.
• Legendre v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (2024). Under Louisiana law, a bare-metal product manufacturer that contemplated or specified asbestos-containing insulation for its product can be held liable for injuries from that insulation. A design defect claim fails without evidence that the product's design required asbestos insulation. Sophisticated-user and superseding-cause defenses raise fact questions that cannot be decided on summary judgment.
• Legendre v. Louisiana Ins. Guaranty Association (2024). A joiner that assembled wallboard for a shipyard is not a manufacturer, and veil-piercing to treat a parent as its subsidiary's alter ego is an extraordinary remedy requiring more than shared officers and ownership. Fact questions on control, holding out and scale preclude summary judgment on professional vendor status, and the first-to-file rule requires substantial overlap between cases.
• Legendre v. Louisiana Ins. Guaranty Association (2024). Avondale cannot use the Boyle or Yearsley government contractor defenses against failure-to-warn and failure-to-implement-safety claims. Intentional tort and fraud claims fail without evidence that injury was substantially certain or of fraudulent intent.
• Matherne v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (2024). Knowing of a product's hazards is not the same as being substantially certain that a particular person's disease would result, so the claim sounds in negligence rather than intentional tort. Close ties between a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary, without extraordinary circumstances such as fraud, do not justify piercing the corporate veil under Louisiana law. A subcontractor that installs furnished wallboard in a ship is not a manufacturer of the finished product, even under the Louisiana Products Liability Act definition.
• Ragas v. Taylor-Seidenbach, Inc. (2024). Under the Louisiana Products Liability Act, a professional vendor must hold a product out as its own and operate with the size, volume and merchandising practices that presume knowledge of defects; a plaintiff who offers no opposing evidence cannot defeat summary judgment on manufacturer, vendor or intentional tort claims.
• Becnel v. Lamorak Insurance Co. (2022). Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff opposing summary judgment need only show that a reasonable jury could find it more likely than not that he inhaled the defendant's asbestos fibers, however slight the exposure, and experts need not calculate a dose for each defendant. A manufacturer may owe a duty to warn when its product requires asbestos-containing parts or insulation to function as intended.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Ins. Co. (2022). Under pre-LPLA Louisiana law, a turbine maker can be liable for asbestos gaskets it supplied or specified as component parts, and slight exposures can suffice for substantial-factor causation. It has no duty to warn about, and no design liability for, asbestos insulation that others made and applied to its turbines.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (2022). Under Louisiana law a duty to household members for take-home exposure can exist before 1972 without an OSHA rule, and Article 2317 custody can be shared. A seller is a professional vendor, liable like a manufacturer, only if it held the product out as its own and had sufficient size and volume of sales.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (2022). Under Louisiana law a plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's asbestos product, and a deceased father's out-of-court statements about where he worked are hearsay not covered by the Rule 804(b)(4) family-history exception. A manufacturer has no duty to warn of dangers of a third party's asbestos insulation it did not make, sell, specify or recommend, but may be liable if it supplied or specified asbestos gaskets.
• Labarre v. Bienville Auto Parts Inc. (2022). Under Louisiana law, a seller that did not hold products out as its own or control their design or quality is not a manufacturer or professional vendor strictly liable for them. A non-manufacturer seller can still be liable in negligence if it knew or should have known the product was dangerous, and whether a user is sophisticated is ordinarily a fact question.
• Reulet v. Lamorak Ins. Co. (2022). Under Air & Liquid Systems v. DeVries, a manufacturer may have a duty to warn when its product requires an asbestos part and it knows the integrated product is likely dangerous, even if it did not supply the part; slight exposures suffice to create a fact dispute on exposure.
• Marsh v. Huntington Ingalls, Incorporated (2020). Accepting the petition's allegations as true, a plaintiff exposed to asbestos aboard ships in Louisiana waters and ports who alleges the defendant supplied asbestos products to those sites has shown prima facie personal jurisdiction and stated a plausible products liability claim under general maritime law (Restatement (Second) of Torts 402A).
• Michel v. Ford Motor Co. (2019). A party seeking to amend after the scheduling-order deadline must show good cause under Rule 16(b), and then Rule 15(a) leave is freely given. Prejudice to the opposing party can be cured by a continuance, and futility is judged by the Rule 12(b)(6) standard.
• Hayes v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd. (2015). Under the Louisiana Products Liability Act, a manufacturer is liable only for harm from a reasonably anticipated use of its product. The court held the brake drum blow out procedure was not a reasonably anticipated use in the 1990s, given the manufacturer's repeated warnings and instructions.
• Hayes v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd. (2015). Under the Louisiana Products Liability Act, a plaintiff must identify the defendant's product as a source of the asbestos exposure and show it was a substantial factor in causing the illness; speculation about unidentified vehicles and brake jobs is not enough.
• Meyers v. Chesterton (2015). Plaintiffs' verified, binding disclaimer of strict-liability and design-defect claims was effective, and for failure-to-warn claims a federal officer removal defendant must show direct government control that prevented it from giving warnings, which was not shown.
• Savoie v. Pennsylvania General Insurance Co. (2015). To remove under the federal officer removal statute, a defendant must show a causal nexus between its actions under federal direction and the claims; for failure-to-warn and strict-liability claims, that requires showing the government directly controlled warnings or how asbestos materials were handled, not just that it mandated the materials. A federal defense such as the LHWCA cannot independently support removal.
• Comardelle v. Pennsylvania General Insurance Company (2014). Under Louisiana Civil Code Article 2317 (as it applied before 1996), a plaintiff must show the defendant had care, custody and control (garde) of the harmful thing; evidence of responsibility for employee safety and knowledge of asbestos risk does not show control of the asbestos itself.
• Comardelle v. Pennsylvania General Insurance Company (2014). A contractor may remove under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), if it is a person, acted under a federal officer's direction with a causal nexus to the claims, and raises a colorable federal defense. Removal proper as to one claim makes the whole case removable.
• Smith v. Union Carbide Corp. (2014). Under Louisiana law, a premises owner owes a direct duty of reasonable care to a contractor's employees, and a fact issue on breach can exist without proof the owner handled the asbestos. Strict liability under Article 2317 failed because the owners lacked custody of the asbestos during installation and the dusty construction conditions were a temporary hazard, not a defect.
• Najolia v. Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, Inc. (2012). A defendant may remove under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), by showing it acted under a federal officer's direction, has a colorable federal defense, and there is a causal nexus between plaintiff's claims and its federal acts; a design-defect claim satisfying this makes the whole action removable.
• Faulkner v. McCarty Corp. (4th Circuit, 2003). A port authority that leased warehouses to stevedores with complete control, and that did not know asbestos was stored there, owed no duty under duty-risk analysis or La. R.S. 9:3221 and was not strictly liable under La. C.C. arts. 2317 and 2322. The Louisiana Supreme Court has rejected the public duty doctrine.
• Hennegan v. Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Co. (4th Circuit, 2002). Under federal maritime law, a manufacturer is strictly liable if its asbestos product, unreasonably dangerous and sold without warnings, was a substantial contributing cause of the harm. A non-settling defendant is solidarily liable for the whole of the damages, less the fault share of the settling employer.
• Abadie v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (5th Circuit, 2001). A product is unreasonably dangerous per se if its danger-in-fact outweighs its utility, regardless of the manufacturer's knowledge. Working near contractors who cut the product is enough evidence of exposure to support liability.
• Abadie v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (5th Circuit, 2001). In a long-latency asbestos case, a cause of action accrues, for choosing between pre- and post-1976 law, when exposures were significant enough to start a disease process that progresses independently of further exposure. Under pre-comparative-fault Louisiana law, a settling or bankrupt solidary obligor found liable counts as a virile (pro rata) share, and co-employee safety officers are liable only for a personal breach of a delegated duty.
• Asbestos v. Bordelon, Inc. (4th Circuit, 1998). Where significant asbestos exposure occurred before the Louisiana Products Liability Act, pre-Act law governs, including strict liability for products unreasonably dangerous per se, by design or for failure to warn, and pre-comparative-fault virile share rules. A manufacturer is liable only if plaintiffs show frequent, regular exposure to its product, and prescription runs from the time a plaintiff has actual or constructive knowledge of an asbestos-related injury.
• Held v. Avondale Industries, Inc. (4th Circuit, 1996). A marine surveyor who is not a seaman is not barred by maritime law from asserting Louisiana state remedies, and a plaintiff's expert affidavit that any exposure contributed to mesothelioma raises a genuine issue of material fact on causation that prevents summary judgment.
• Coates v. AC and S, Inc. (1994). Pre-comparative-fault law and equal ("by heads") apportionment governed the wrongful death claim because the significant exposures came before August 1, 1980. The court refused to rule asbestos products unreasonably dangerous per se as a matter of law, admitted the OSHA and EPA publications, and denied Owens-Corning's three motions.
• Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (1986). In Louisiana strict products liability, a manufacturer is liable for a product that is unreasonably dangerous per se or in construction or composition even if it did not and could not have known of the danger. Knowledge available to the manufacturer matters only under failure-to-warn and alternative-design theories.
• Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (1985). The en banc Fifth Circuit certified a question to the Louisiana Supreme Court asking whether a strict products liability manufacturer may avoid liability by showing it did not and could not have known of its product's danger; it did not decide the appeal between Halphen and Johns-Manville.

Maine

• Bernier v. Raymark Industries, Inc. (1986). In a failure-to-warn claim under Maine's strict liability statute, the manufacturer's actual or constructive knowledge at the time of sale is relevant, and wrongful death damages are available. An asbestos claim does not arise until physical injury manifests itself, not at inhalation, so the statute applies if the disease manifested after its October 3, 1973 effective date.
• Austin v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. (1984). Maine's comparative negligence statute (14 M.R.S.A. § 156) applies to strict products liability claims under § 221. A plaintiff's fault counts only if it consists of voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, not a mere failure to discover or guard against a defect.

Maryland

• Basil-Flippen v. General Electric Company (2024). Strict products liability requires that the product have left the seller's possession or control. A seller that is also contractually obligated to install the product retains control until installation is complete, so strict liability does not apply to injuries arising during installation.
• Dugger v. Union Carbide Corporation (2019). A jury could infer from several witnesses' testimony that they did not recall seeing warnings on brake boxes, despite their regular handling of the brakes, that no warnings were present, which creates a genuine dispute of material fact on whether the warnings were adequate.
• Arbogast v. AW Chesterton Co. (2016). Under Maryland law a plaintiff must show exposure to respirable fibers from a specific defendant's asbestos-containing product with frequency, regularity and proximity. A manufacturer is liable for third-party asbestos used with its product only in the narrow circumstances described in May. A strict liability claim for a product sold before Phipps (1976) may proceed because the claim accrues at diagnosis.
• Stein v. Pfizer Inc. (2016). Under the objective reliance test, the actual reliance test, and the enterprise liability test alike, a parent company is not an "apparent manufacturer" of a subsidiary's industrial product where the sophisticated purchaser knew it bought from the subsidiary and the parent did not substantially participate in the design, manufacture or distribution.
• May v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (2015). A manufacturer has a duty to warn in negligence and strict liability about asbestos-containing replacement parts it did not supply when its product contains asbestos and no safer material is available, asbestos is critical to the product, periodic maintenance involving asbestos parts is required, and the manufacturer knows or should know of the risk.
• May v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2014). A manufacturer has no duty to warn of the hazards of asbestos-containing replacement parts (here, gaskets and packing) that it neither manufactured nor placed into the stream of commerce, even if it was foreseeable that such parts would be used with its product.
• Adams v. Owens-Illinois (1998). A trial judge's rulings on juror challenges, new trial motions and evidence are reviewed only for abuse of discretion, and the appellate court does not reweigh the evidence or expert credibility. Absent a showing of prejudice, and given a verdict that is not irreconcilably defective, the judgments stand.
• Vaughn v. Marine Transport Lines, Inc. (1989). A shipowner that settles a seaman's unseaworthiness claim may obtain indemnity from a manufacturer whose asbestos-containing product made the vessel unseaworthy, by showing potential liability, contribution of the product, and a reasonable settlement. A good-faith settlement with other manufacturers extinguishes contribution claims and does not reduce the non-settling manufacturer's liability.

Massachusetts

• Pritt v. John Crane, Inc. (2022). A contractor asserting the government contractor defense on summary judgment must show no genuine dispute on all three Boyle prongs; disputes over what warnings and specifications the Navy required preclude judgment. Derivative sovereign immunity does not protect a contractor from liability for its own negligence.

Minnesota

• 80 S. 8th St. Ltd. Ptsp. v. Carey-Canada (1992). A claim that asbestos-containing fireproofing contaminated a building with dangerous fibers is not an economic loss claim based on product failure to perform, so the economic loss doctrine does not bar tort claims in negligence and strict liability for maintenance, removal and replacement costs.
• Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (1982). Under the flexible approach to offensive collateral estoppel, defendants may be barred from relitigating that asbestos dust can cause asbestosis and mesothelioma. They may not be estopped on other issues based on earlier trials in which many of them did not take part, because that would violate due process.

Mississippi

• Dickens v. A-1 Auto Parts & Repair Inc. (2019). Under the Mississippi Product Liability Act's innocent seller provision, a seller is not liable unless it controlled the product's manufacture, altered it, or knew of the defect. A general allegation of failure to warn does not plead actual or constructive knowledge, so the defense appeared on the face of the complaint.
• McCarty v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (1980). In a diversity case the federal court applies state collateral estoppel law, and Mississippi requires mutuality of parties. Even under federal non-mutual offensive estoppel, it would not apply here because the issues were not identical, the earlier results conflicted, and the defendants could not have foreseen the later litigation.

Missouri

• Guthe v. Johnson & Johnson (2024). A petition must at least describe the type of product the decedent was exposed to and allege that the defendant made or distributed it; Missouri law recognizes no standalone products-liability tort of willful and wanton misconduct, though the allegations may be read as a punitive damages request.
• Poage v. Crane Co. (Eastern District, 2nd Division, 2017). A plaintiff can show a valve maker's product was a substantial factor in causing mesothelioma through a co-worker's testimony about shared work on the valves, and the maker owes a duty to warn and to design safely where its valves required or specified asbestos gaskets and packing. Missouri's statutory cap on punitive damages does not apply to this wrongful death action, and a defendant's setoff under § 537.060 is limited to settlements actually reached, not possible future asbestos trust recoveries.