Expert Testimony in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on admissibility or sufficiency of expert testimony (Daubert: 785 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Utah

• Hipwell v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (2022). A party seeking to exclude an entire category of evidence without specifying the particular items cannot show irrelevance or unfair prejudice, and whether an intervening cause was foreseeable is generally a jury question. The Navy's knowledge of asbestos hazards is relevant to the failure-to-warn claim and to the government contractor and DeVries defenses.
• Anderson v. Ford Motor Company (2014). An expert's opinion that each of the plaintiff's described exposures was individually substantial, based on his testimony about specific products combined with scientific data on fiber release and dose, is not an inadmissible 'every exposure' opinion. Weaknesses in its underpinnings go to weight, not admissibility.
• Anderson v. Ford Motor Company (2013). A replacement causation expert may be allowed after the original expert's death, but testimony on the 'every exposure' theory of causation is barred because the district judge ruled it does not meet Rule 702 and Daubert.
• Anderson v. Ford Motor Company (2013). Expert testimony that every asbestos exposure above background contributes to mesothelioma is inadmissible under Rule 702 and Daubert when the experts lack data on the dose needed to cause disease and on the plaintiff's exposure to the defendants' products.
• Smith v. Ford Motor Company (2013). An expert's "every exposure" opinion, that each and every asbestos exposure contributes to mesothelioma, lacks sufficient facts, data and reliable science to be admissible under Rule 702 and Daubert, and would also be excluded under Rule 403.

Vermont

• Carpin v. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (2024). Under 12 V.S.A. § 518(a), the "last occurrence" to which a latent injury is attributed is the most recent proximate cause, here the last asbestos exposure, not the latent cellular changes preceding diagnosis; the twenty-year repose period is a permissible legislative policy choice under Article 7.

Virginia

• Goodrich v. John Crane, Inc. (2018). A defense expert's opinion must rest on sufficient facts and data under Rule 702, and the defendant, as proponent, bears that burden. Studies quantifying relative asbestos fiber potency were excluded as unreliable, while converting fiber-release test results to time-weighted averages was allowed.
• Wilson v. AC&S, Inc. (2015). Whether under maritime law (exposure to the product as a substantial factor) or Virginia law (exposure more likely than not sufficient to cause the illness), a plaintiff needs evidence that the defendant's product released enough asbestos fibers to cause the disease. A belief that a part looked like asbestos, plus visible dust, did not supply that evidence.
• John Crane, Inc. v. Hardick (2012). Nonpecuniary damages are not recoverable in a wrongful death action for a seaman, whether under DOHSA, the Jones Act, or general maritime law, and a Navy sailor who contributed to the function of vessels and had a substantial connection to them is a seaman. Arguments not briefed under Rule 5:27 are waived.
• John Crane, Inc. v. Jones (2007). General maritime law applies to a shipyard worker's asbestos injury when the location and connection tests are met, including where the manufacturer marketed its products for marine use. Virginia courts decide whether a verdict is excessive from the facts of each case, not by comparing it with verdicts in other cases.
• Large v. Bucyrus-Erie Co. (1981). Under Virginia law as stated in Locke v. Johns-Manville, a claim accrues when the plaintiff was physically hurt, as shown by medical evidence. If the injury was complete more than two years before suit, later exposure that caused no new injury does not extend the limitations period.

Washington

• Johnson v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2025). A scheduling order deadline may be modified only for good cause, which turns on the moving party's diligence; carelessness, such as filing the wrong document and not noticing for weeks, is incompatible with diligence.
• Perkins v. United States (2024). Under the FTCA and Washington law, a plaintiff must show by non-speculative evidence that the decedent was exposed to a substantial dose of asbestos resulting from negligent violation of a mandatory and specific directive, and that this exposure was a substantial factor in her disease. An expert opinion that every exposure above background counts toward a cumulative dose is unreliable.
• Perkins v. United States (2024). Motions in limine and pre-admission requests that depend on evidence as it comes in at a bench trial are premature and may be revisited at trial. A Rule 30(b)(6) deponent's testimony does not bind the organization like a judicial admission, but can be used for impeachment.
• Perkins v. United States (2024). The discretionary function exception does not apply where a mandatory and specific directive prescribes a course of action, and factual disputes over whether Navy asbestos directives were mandatory and followed preclude dismissal. Under Washington law, duty turns on foreseeability of a general field of danger, and disputed expert evidence on substantial-factor causation precludes summary judgment.
• Perkins v. United States (2024). Under Rule 702 the court acts as gatekeeper and tests the soundness of an expert's methodology, not the correctness of conclusions; the government's objections to assumptions and exposure assessment went to weight rather than admissibility.
• Deem v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2023). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show actual exposure to the defendant's asbestos and that it was a substantial contributing factor, which requires substantial exposure for a substantial period when direct evidence is absent. The presence of a defendant's product at a shipyard is not enough.
• Holdsworth v. Scapa Waycross, Inc. (1st Division, 2023). A plaintiff in an asbestos case may prove exposure to a defendant's product through circumstantial evidence, and expert testimony that all asbestos exposure cumulatively contributes to the disease, together with that exposure, supports a reasonable inference that the product was a substantial factor. A judge's curative instruction to disregard one statement in closing argument did not require reversal, because any error was cured by the written instructions.
• Welch v. Crane Co. (2023). Expert reports satisfy Rule 26(a)(2)(B) if they give a complete statement of the opinions and their basis, even without case-specific review of the plaintiff's circumstances. The lack of case-specific review goes to cross-examination, not admissibility.
• Welch v. Crane Co. (2023). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show actual exposure to asbestos-containing materials from the defendant's product and that the exposure was a substantial contributing factor in causing the injury. The mere presence of a defendant's products on the ship is not enough. A manufacturer's duty to warn is assessed under the DeVries three-part test.
• Hickson v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (1st Division, 2022). To survive summary judgment, an asbestos plaintiff must show a genuine issue of fact on exposure to asbestos and on causation under the Lockwood factors; potential exposure and an expert's conditional hypothetical opinion, without evidence of actual exposure, require speculation and are not enough.
• Roemmich v. 3M Company (1st Division, 2022). Where a plaintiff's mesothelioma results from cumulative asbestos exposure from multiple sources, the substantial factor test governs proximate cause and a combined but-for and substantial factor instruction is error. A superseding cause instruction is unsupported when the intervening employer negligence was foreseeable and no evidence showed the employer had specific knowledge of the defect.
• Strong v. Honeywell International, Inc. (2022). Where the gap between the scientific publications and the experts' opinions is not too great, toxic tort expert opinions are admissible under Daubert, and disputes over their basis go to weight for the jury rather than admissibility.
• United States Fidelity & Guaranty v. Ulbricht (2022). Under Washington law, an insurer's duty to defend is triggered where the policy conceivably covers the complaint, and refusing to defend on the basis of certificates of insurance until full lost policies were found was bad faith; terms of lost policies must be shown by clear, cogent and convincing evidence.
• Behrmann v. Abb, Inc. (2021). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show with evidence of the amount or duration of exposure that a defendant's asbestos product was a substantial factor in causing the disease; general evidence of possible exposure is not enough. A failure to warn claim fails when causation cannot be shown.
• Coogan v. Borg-Warner Morse Tec Inc. (2021). An appellate court may set aside a jury's damages verdict supported by substantial evidence only if the record unmistakably shows it was based on passion, prejudice or another improper consideration; the size of the verdict alone is not enough.
• Jack v. Dco, LLC (2021). Under Washington law, a take-home exposure claim fails without evidence of asbestos on the premises and without evidence that the risk to a worker's family was foreseeable at the relevant time. A post-sale failure-to-warn claim fails without specific evidence that an adequate warning would have led the plaintiff to avoid injury.
• Strong v. Honeywell International, Inc. (2021). Under Washington law a witness is presumed competent, and a dementia diagnosis shortly before a deposition does not by itself make a witness incompetent or require a competency hearing. Late discovery of records the movant could have sought earlier, and which the opposing party does not control, may be barred by protective order.
• United States Fidelity and Guaranty v. Ulbricht (2021). An insurance claims-handling expert may testify about industry standards and whether an insurer's conduct conformed to them, but may not give opinions on ultimate issues of law or on the reasonableness of the insurer's conduct.
• Varney v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (2021). A declaration offered as a dying declaration was properly excluded where the evidence did not show the declarant had personal knowledge of its contents; the district court's factual findings were reviewed for clear error and its evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion.
• Wright v. 3M Company (1st Division, 2021). An owner does not retain control over an independent contractor's work merely by requiring compliance with safety laws and general safety rules, but an erroneous retained-control instruction did not require reversal because the verdict also rested on premises liability. RCW 4.22.060 requires settling parties to provide a copy of the proposed settlement agreement, so a reasonableness ruling made without the full agreements is an abuse of discretion.
• Clayton v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2020). An expert whose methodology has a reliable basis in his discipline and rests on sufficient facts meets the Rule 702 threshold. Disagreements about how he applied the method or weighed the facts go to weight and cross-examination, not admissibility.
• Coogan v. Borg-Warner Morse Tec Inc. (2nd Division, 2020). A trial court acts as gatekeeper and abuses its discretion by excluding an expert opinion because it disagrees with the conclusion rather than because the foundation is inadequate. A noneconomic damages verdict can be set aside under CR 59(a)(5) when it shocks the court's conscience, even without a finding of passion or prejudice.
• Deem v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2020). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show actual exposure to asbestos-containing materials installed by the defendant and that the exposure was a substantial contributing factor; evidence that machinists sometimes worked on products that could have contained asbestos, supported only by speculative expert opinion, does not meet that standard.
• Wineland v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2020). Expert testimony on a worker's asbestos exposure may rest on Navy records, a shipmate's declaration and the expert's experience even without eyewitness accounts of the specific work. Differences in the facts go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.
• Wineland v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2020). The Court did not rule on Puget Sound Commerce Center's Daubert motion; it renoted the motion and allowed plaintiffs to file a sur-reply on the reliability of the experts' substantial contributing factor opinions.
• Varney v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under Washington law and the Lockwood factors, a plaintiff may identify a manufacturer through a co-worker's testimony about products present at the workplace, and a minimally sufficient showing of exposure and causation creates a genuine issue of fact. Summary judgment evidence need not be in a form admissible at trial.
• Varney v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under Washington law a plaintiff must show a reasonable connection between the injury, the product and its manufacturer. Once the court had excluded the decedent's affidavit and the causation expert's opinion, no admissible evidence remained to show that connection.
• Varney v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under Washington product liability law, a plaintiff must show a reasonable connection between the injury, the product and the manufacturer. With Mr. Varney's affidavit and the causation expert's opinion excluded, and no opposition filed, plaintiffs could not show that Parker-Hannifin's products were a substantial factor in causing his disease.
• Varney v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under Washington products liability law (and maritime law), a plaintiff must offer admissible evidence connecting the injury to the defendant's product. Without the excluded affidavit and expert opinion, the plaintiffs could not show that Warren's products caused the disease.
• Varney v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under Washington products liability law, a plaintiff must show a reasonable connection between the injury, the product, and the manufacturer; without admissible evidence of causation, summary judgment for the defendant is proper.
• Varney v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under Washington products liability law (Lockwood), a plaintiff must offer admissible evidence connecting the injury, the defendant's product and the defendant; without the excluded affidavit and expert opinion, causation could not be found.
• Barabin v. Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. (2018). A court may not order a new trial on damages unless it has a firm conviction the jury erred, and may not grant judgment as a matter of law where substantial evidence, including admissible expert testimony on causation and exposure, supports the verdict.
• Barabin v. Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. (2018). A court may use its inherent power to sanction an attorney who fails to comply with its evidentiary rulings, here by reading to the jury from a document the court had excluded as hearsay.
• Barabin v. Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. (2018). Under Washington law, a plaintiff may use circumstantial evidence, such as sales records showing which machines received a defendant's asbestos-containing products and the plaintiff's work on those machines, to let a jury infer exposure and causation without direct identification of the product.
• Barabin v. Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. (2018). Expert causation opinions resting on an "every exposure" or "cumulative exposure" theory, under which any exposure that adds to total dose is a substantial factor, are unreliable and inadmissible under Rule 702 and Daubert. Differences between test conditions and actual workplace conditions go to weight rather than admissibility.
• Barabin v. Scapa Dryer Felts, Inc. (2018). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, a court may exclude an expert's testimony when its probative value is minimal and it substantially duplicates another expert's testimony; a different specialty alone does not make substantially identical testimony non-cumulative.
• Jack v. Borg-Warner Morse Tec LLC (2018). Expert testimony on asbestos exposure is admissible under Rule 702 if it is relevant and reliable, and disputes between experts go to weight. 'Every exposure' and 'cumulative exposure' theories are unreliable, and an expert must be qualified in the specific field he testifies about.
• Jack v. Borg-Warner Morse Tec, LLC (2018). Under Washington law, an employer could not be charged with foreseeing take-home asbestos risks in and before 1955, when no studies or industry knowledge linked household exposure to disease. Washington's wrongful death statute also allows a spouse who married after the injury to recover loss of consortium damages arising from the death.
• Rublee v. Carrier Corporation (1st Division, 2017). Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 400, assumed to be adopted in Washington, a defendant is liable as an apparent manufacturer only if the evidence satisfies a reliance or enterprise test. Under the objective reliance test, a reasonable purchaser in the position of the actual (industrial) purchaser is the relevant viewpoint.