Government Contractor Defense and Removal in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on government contractor defense: 310 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Massachusetts

• Pritt v. John Crane, Inc. (2022). A magistrate judge's pretrial ruling is set aside only if clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Challenges to an expert's reliability and interpretation of military specifications go to weight and credibility for the jury, not admissibility, under Rule 702 and Daubert.
• Pritt v. John Crane, Inc. (2022). A contractor asserting the government contractor defense on summary judgment must show no genuine dispute on all three Boyle prongs; disputes over what warnings and specifications the Navy required preclude judgment. Derivative sovereign immunity does not protect a contractor from liability for its own negligence.
• Sebright v. General Electric Co. (2021). Under maritime law, a manufacturer's duty to warn under the DeVries test can reach asbestos insulation added to its bare-metal product if the product required insulation to function, and the court treats the sophisticated purchaser defense as unavailable where a risk and burden balancing weighs for the Navy sailor. A plaintiff must also show that a defendant's specific product contained asbestos, and loss of consortium and parental society claims are not available under general maritime law in this circuit.
• Holdren v. Buffalo Pumps, Inc. (2009). To remove a failure-to-warn case under the federal officer removal statute, a government contractor must show reasonably precise government specifications or other evidence that the government exercised discretion over asbestos warnings, creating a genuine conflict with state law, plus a causal link. Government silence on warnings is not enough.
• Hilbert v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (2008). To remove a failure-to-warn case under the federal officer removal statute, a contractor must make a colorable showing that the government exercised discretion and imposed reasonably precise warning specifications, creating a conflict with state law. Conclusory affidavits that cite no contract or regulation do not meet that burden.
• O'connell v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. (2008). To remove under the federal officer removal statute, a defendant need only plausibly show a military contractor defense to a failure-to-warn claim: the government approved reasonably precise warnings, the contractor complied, and the contractor warned the government of hazards the government did not know. A plaintiff's disclaimer of federal claims does not defeat this removal.
• Hilbert v. Aeroquip, Inc. (2007). A defendant removing under the federal officer statute must show a causal nexus between its actions under federal direction and the claims, plus a colorable federal defense. Northrop did not show that the Navy prevented it from giving state-law warnings, so removal failed.

Mississippi

• Webb v. 3M Company (2022). A defendant that plausibly alleges the elements of federal officer removal need not submit evidence unless the plaintiff contests it, and a colorable government contractor or derivative sovereign immunity defense, acting under the Navy's specifications, and a connection to the alleged asbestos exposure satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a).
• Dickens v. A-1 Auto Parts & Repair Inc. (2020). Under Mississippi's choice-of-law rules (Restatement (Second) § 145), the law of the successor's state of incorporation and of its asset purchase agreement governs successor liability, and a successor cannot be held liable under the product line theory where those states have not adopted it.

Missouri

• MacCormack v. the Adel Wiggins Group (2017). Under Massachusetts law, a prior state-court summary judgment on causation, where the party had a full opportunity to litigate, precludes relitigating the same claims against the same defendant. Collateral estoppel may be raised by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
• Hovsepian v. Crane Co. (2016). A contractor may remove under the federal officer statute if it acted under a federal officer, there is a causal connection, and it has a colorable federal contractor defense. A plaintiff's disclaimer of federal claims does not prevent removal.
• Goede v. Aerojet General Corporation (Eastern District, 3rd Division, 2004). A trial court may, under Rule 61.01, direct that ultimate facts be taken as established as a sanction for false discovery answers, and may apply different states' laws to liability and damages under the Restatement's most-significant-relationship test. Submissibility and instructional objections not raised at trial or in the directed-verdict motion at the close of all evidence are not preserved.

Montana

• Morey v. BNSF Railway Company (2023). After the federal officer defendant is dismissed, a district court has discretion to remand the remaining state claims, weighing the stage of the case, comity, federalism, judicial economy and fairness. Here remand was appropriate, and the complaint as pleaded did not show the amount in controversy needed for diversity jurisdiction.

New Jersey

• Losurdo v. Viacomcbs Inc. (2025). Under maritime law and DeVries, a manufacturer's duty to warn turns on whether it directed incorporation of asbestos parts, knew the integrated product was dangerous, and had no reason to believe the sailors using it would know of the danger. Under Miles, punitive and loss-of-consortium damages are not available in a maritime wrongful death action.
• Klick v. Asbestos Corporation Ltd. (2022). When the party that removed under the federal officer statute is dismissed, a federal district court may either keep the remaining state-law claims or remand, weighing judicial economy, convenience and fairness. Here the court chose to remand.
• Hammell v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2021). Reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy requiring overlooked facts or law or clear error. A material factual dispute over what the Navy knew about asbestos hazards defeats summary judgment on the government contractor defense.
• Hammell v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2020). Under the DeVries test applied in maritime law, whether a manufacturer had a duty to warn about asbestos-containing parts made by others depends on factual questions: whether its product required the part, whether it knew the integrated product was dangerous, and whether it had reason to think users would realize the danger. Disputed facts about what the Navy knew also defeated summary judgment on the government contractor defense.
• Grimes v. AT&T Corp. (2018). When the federal defendant that supported removal under the federal officer removal statute drops out, the district court keeps discretion to decide whether to retain or remand the remaining state-law claims, and may decline supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) in favor of remand.
• Thomas-Fish v. Aetna Steel Products Corp. (2018). A contractor building a government vessel under agency contracts satisfies the 'acting under,' 'for or relating to,' and colorable federal defense requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) without showing detailed federal control or a specific federal directive on warnings. A facial challenge accepts the removal notice's allegations as true.
• Grimes v. AT&T Corp. (2017). A plaintiff facing a personal jurisdiction challenge should be allowed jurisdictional discovery unless the claim is clearly frivolous. Prior rulings against the defendants did not by themselves supply the facts needed to establish jurisdiction.
• Hammell v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2015). Under maritime law, a manufacturer is not liable for, and owes no duty to warn about, asbestos-containing parts it did not manufacture or supply, and a plaintiff must show exposure to an asbestos product made or supplied by that defendant. The government contractor defense could not be resolved on summary judgment where there was a factual dispute over whether the Navy controlled warnings.
• Haas v. 3M Company (2014). Under New Jersey's frequency, regularity and proximity test, a plaintiff must show exposure to an asbestos-containing component of the defendant's product; speculation does not suffice. A contractor meeting the three Boyle prongs is shielded from both design defect and failure-to-warn claims where the specifications are silent on warnings.
• Hammell v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2014). A defendant removing under the federal officer removal statute need only identify facts which, viewed favorably to it, would establish a colorable government contractor defense; the court does not weigh credibility or the quantum of evidence at the removal stage.
• Papp v. Fore-Kast Sales Co., Inc. (2014). A private defendant seeking federal officer removal must show it acted under direct and detailed federal control over the challenged conduct; where the claim is only failure to warn, military control over design and manufacture is not enough without evidence the government barred warnings.
• Scearce v. 3M Company (2013). A removing defendant bears the burden of showing its removal was timely, and the 30-day clock under § 1446(b) runs from when removability was first ascertainable from the pleading or other paper, not from when it became uncontestable. Raytheon did not show why it needed to know the specific product to ascertain removability.
• Lewis v. Asbestos Corporation, Ltd. (2012). Under the federal officer removal statute, one defendant that satisfies the Feidt factors can remove the entire case without the other defendants joining, and the court may keep the related state-law claims under supplemental jurisdiction.
• Feidt v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1998). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), a remand order based on the district court's finding that removal jurisdiction was lacking under the federal officer removal statute is not reviewable on appeal, even if the court was wrong, and certification under § 1292(b) does not avoid that bar.

New York

• Donohue v. CBS Corporation (2017). A defendant seeking federal officer removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) need only make a colorable showing that it acted under a federal officer, has a colorable federal defense, and has a causal nexus to the federal directive, without proving the defense on the merits. Removal by one such defendant brings the whole case, including non-removing co-defendants, into federal court.
• Cuomo v. Crane Co. (2014). To remove under the federal officer removal statute, a defendant need only offer some competent evidence of a colorable federal contractor defense; the court does not resolve the merits or factual disputes. For failure-to-warn claims, the government need not have dictated the literal text of a warning, only approved reasonably precise specifications and controlled the nature and content of the warnings.
• Gates v. Smith Water Products Co. (2014). A private contractor can remove under the federal officer removal statute if it acted under a federal officer, acted under color of federal office, and has a colorable federal defense. A defense is colorable if the facts, viewed favorably to the defendant, would establish a complete defense at trial.
• Osterhout v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2014). To remove under the federal officer removal statute, a defendant need only show a colorable federal defense, meaning facts which, viewed favorably to the defendant, would establish a complete defense at trial; it need not prove the defense.
• Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. Ronald Dummitt v. AW Chesterton (2012). A valve manufacturer may owe a duty to warn about asbestos gaskets, packing and insulation made by others when it meant its valves to be used with them or knew or should have known they would be. Under CPLR Article 16, the Navy is not counted in apportioning fault because Feres and the grave-injury rule bar suit against it.
• Curry v. American Standard, Inc. (2009). A defendant removing under the federal officer removal statute need only show it acted under a federal officer, that the claims relate to those acts, and that it has a colorable federal defense, not a clearly sustainable one. The government contractor defense may be asserted against state-law failure-to-warn claims.
• Nesbiet v. General Electric Co. (2005). A defendant seeking federal officer removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) must show a colorable federal defense, that it acted under federal direction, and a causal nexus; circumstantial evidence that the Navy controlled warnings on equipment can satisfy these without direct proof that the Navy forbade an asbestos warning.
• Ronsini v. Worthington Corp. (Matter Of New York City Asbestos Litigation. Elaine Ronsini V. Garlock, Inc.) (1st Dept., 1998). Evidence was sufficient for a jury to link a defendant's asbestos-containing components and products to the worker's injury. A government contractor defense charge was unwarranted without evidence of a conflict between state warning requirements and federal requirements. A defendant that challenges its share of fault must show the equitable shares of the settling defendants.
• Ciletti v. Raymark Indus. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (1997). A defendant asserting the military contractor defense to a design defect claim must prove every Boyle element, including warnings to the government, and merely raising some elements is not enough. New York does not recognize a child's claim for loss of parental consortium, and filing a proof of claim with the Manville Trust is not a settlement that supports a set-off under General Obligations Law § 15-108.
• Tabolt v. Flintkote Co. (In re New York Asbestos Litigation) (1994). A jury may infer exposure to a defendant's asbestos product from circumstantial evidence that the product was sold at the worksite and produced dust. Irreconcilable answers on a special verdict form require a new trial rather than the court discarding one answer. Settlement credits under N.Y. G.O.L. § 15-108 follow the New York Court of Appeals' aggregate method.
• Grispo v. Eagle-Picher Indus. (In re Joint E. & S. Dist. New York Asbestos Lit.) (1990). Under Boyle, a military contractor facing a state-law failure-to-warn claim must show that the government dictated or controlled the product's warnings, creating a significant conflict with state law; government specifications on product content alone do not displace a duty to warn.

Ohio

• Kallsen v. AW Chesterton Company (2021). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3), the 30-day removal period runs from receipt of a paper from which removability can first be clearly ascertained. Here that was the product identification disclosure and deposition, not the vague complaint and complaint brochure.
• Shonkwiler v. AW Chesterton Company (2017). After the defendants able to invoke the federal officer statute were dismissed, only state law claims remained, and a federal court ordinarily declines supplemental jurisdiction and remands them to state court when the case is at an early stage.
• French v. AW Chesterton Company (2016). Contractors who build Navy equipment under close Navy direction can remove under the federal officer removal statute if they show a colorable government contractor defense. The 30-day removal clock starts when the plaintiff serves a paper showing the case is removable, and a defendant need not search its own records first.

Oregon

• Long v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corporation (2025). Federal officer removal requires a causal nexus between federally directed conduct and the plaintiff's claims, which is absent where the plaintiff disclaims exposure on Navy vessels. The saving to suitors clause bars a federal court from keeping a case removed from state court on admiralty jurisdiction alone.
• Long v. 3M Company (2024). Federal officer removal requires a causal nexus between the plaintiff's claims and the defendant's actions under federal direction, and a plaintiff's waiver of all claims from Navy and government-commissioned vessels removes that nexus. Admiralty jurisdiction over claims filed in state court does not by itself support removal.
• Coury v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2018). A settlement-related email from a plaintiff's side can be an "other paper" under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) that restarts the removal clock, and a plaintiff who has regained remand through a waiver of Navy-ship claims and then signals an intent to pursue them can be removed again under the federal officer removal statute.

Other federal courts

• Savoie v. Huntington Ingalls, Incorporated (2016). Under the federal officer removal statute, negligence claims about safety measures the government did not control show no causal nexus, but pre-1996 Louisiana strict liability claims based on the mere use of asbestos required by government contract specifications do show one, and removal of the whole case is proper if a single claim qualifies.
• Sequira v. 3M Company (2015). A defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the government contractor defense when the government approved reasonably precise specifications, the equipment conformed to them, and the government knew the hazards as well as the contractor did. A California mesothelioma plaintiff must offer expert evidence that exposure was a substantial factor in causing the disease, and an issue not raised in the district court will not be reviewed on appeal.
• Wilde v. Huntington Ingalls, Incorporated (2015). To remove under the federal officer removal statute, a contractor must show a causal nexus between its actions under federal direction and the plaintiff's claims, and a colorable federal defense. Without evidence the exposed worker was around the federally directed work, or details of the claimed government specifications, the contractor cannot show a likelihood of success.
• Leite v. Crane Co. (2014). When a plaintiff factually challenges federal officer removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), the Rule 12(b)(1) framework applies and the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence a colorable federal defense and a causal nexus to acts taken at a federal officer's direction.
• Wood v. Crane Co. (2014). After the thirty-day removal window closes, a defendant may amend a notice of removal only to correct allegations already made, not to add a new ground for federal jurisdiction. A defendant who chose not to assert a federal defense for the gasket claims could not rely on it after the plaintiff dropped the valve claims.
• Ruppel v. CBS Corporation (2012). A private contractor may remove under the federal officer removal statute if it was a person acting under a federal officer, the suit relates to acts under color of office, and it has a colorable federal defense; the government contractor defense can be colorable for both use-of-asbestos and failure-to-warn claims without proof that the government prohibited warnings.