Insurance Coverage in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on insurance coverage: 245 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Other federal courts

• Sybron Transition Corp. v. Security Ins. (2001). Applying New York law as interpreted by the Second Circuit, insurers' shares of a long-latency asbestos loss are allocated by time on the risk, with a one-month policy counted as one month. Time the insured self-insured stays in the denominator, and the insured may not stack policies to exceed a single per-occurrence limit.
• Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co. v. Azrock Industries Inc. (2000). Under an Erie guess of Texas law, an umbrella CGL insurer's duty to defend asbestos personal injury suits is triggered by exposure to the insured's products during the policy period, not by manifestation or diagnosis of disease. Property damage claims are still governed by the manifestation theory.
• Sybron Transition v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford (1997). Under New York law, which governed the Hartford policies and Sybron's defenses to late notice, a 22-month notice delay without valid excuse is unreasonable as a matter of law, and lack of prejudice, waiver, estoppel or bad faith did not excuse it.
• Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Management (1995). Under New York and Texas law, occurrence-based liability policies are triggered throughout a progressive disease process when the evidence shows injury-in-fact recurring at each point; the insured bears pro rata responsibility for years it chose to go uninsured but not for years after 1985 when asbestos insurance was unavailable, and each installation of asbestos building products is a separate occurrence for per-occurrence deductibles.
• Carey Canada, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co. (1991). Extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent may be used only if the contract term is ambiguous, and ambiguity must be shown by objective evidence of industry or public usage, not just the parties' own negotiations or disputes over meaning.
• Jourdan v. Equitable Equipment Co. (1989). Federal Rule 4 (summons and complaint) does not apply to enforcement of a supplemental order of default under LHWCA section 18(a), which directs the district court to enter judgment on filing of the order. A due process claim in this setting requires a showing of substantial prejudice.
• Lac D'Amiante du Quebec v. American Home Assur. (1988). Under Burford abstention, a federal court should decline to adjudicate, even in a declaratory action, a suit against an insurer already in a state's insurance liquidation proceeding, because doing so would disrupt the state's complex regulatory scheme for liquidating insolvent insurers.
• Eagle-Picher Industries v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. (1987). Under the manifestation theory, the date an asbestos-related disease was reasonably capable of diagnosis may be estimated with a statistical rollback from the diagnosis date, but the insurer may rebut it in individual cases with clear and convincing medical evidence. Under Ohio law, the insurer owes interest from the time the judgment becomes final.
• ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. (1985). Under Pennsylvania law as predicted by the court, exposure, exposure-in-residence and manifestation each count as 'bodily injury' that triggers liability coverage for asbestos claims, and a triggered policy is not prorated. The duty to defend ends when policy limits are exhausted, and it carries the insurer's right to defend.
• Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sepco Corp. (1985). Under the Fifth Circuit's Porter precedent, which the court treated as binding, asbestos-related "bodily injury" under liability policies is equated with exposure to asbestos, so coverage is triggered by exposure during the policy period.
• Wedgeworth v. Fibreboard Corp. (1983). The automatic bankruptcy stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) protects only the debtor, not its co-defendants, and a discretionary stay tied to the end of the bankruptcy was indefinite and unjustified without a clear showing of hardship. On rehearing, the court held the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to let the plaintiffs add the debtors' insurers.
• Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. (1982). Under these liability policies, an asbestos-related disease "results" (and so triggers coverage) when it becomes clinically evident, meaning reasonably capable of medical diagnosis, not at initial exposure or on actual diagnosis. Ambiguous policy language is construed in favor of the insured.
• ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (1981). A dispute among an insured and its liability insurers over defense and indemnity obligations for asbestos suits is a justiciable case or controversy, even though the underlying suits have not reached judgment. The damages counts for present injury were also justiciable.
• Ins. Co. of NA v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. (1981). For insurance coverage purposes, mesothelioma and lung cancer are treated like asbestosis, with bodily injury occurring when the worker first breathes asbestos fibers (exposure theory). Defense costs are allocated the same way as liability costs.
• Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of North America (1981). For asbestos-related disease, inhalation exposure, exposure in residence and manifestation all trigger coverage under occurrence-based liability policies, and each triggered insurer is liable in full up to one policy's limits, with allocation among insurers governed by the policies' other-insurance clauses.
• Porter v. American Optical Corp. (1981). A jury could find a respirator filter defective in design where it was never tested with asbestos dust and the plaintiff's experts showed asbestos passing through it, even though it met government and industry standards. For a progressive disease such as asbestosis, insurance liability is prorated among the insurers on the risk during the exposure period (the "injurious exposure" theory) rather than assigned to the insurer at the time symptoms first appeared.
• Ins. Co. North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations (1980). Under standard comprehensive general liability policies, 'bodily injury' from asbestosis occurs when tissue damage begins on inhalation of fibers, not at manifestation, so every insurer on the risk during exposure is liable pro rata for indemnity and defense costs. The insured is treated as self-insured for uninsured years.

Pennsylvania

• The Continental Insurance Company v. Pennsylvania Electric Company (2024). An insurer must defend the whole suit if any claim in the underlying complaint is potentially covered, and the complaint is read liberally in the insured's favor. A workers' compensation case (Tooey) does not control how a liability policy's employer's liability exclusion is read.
• Washington Penn Plastic Co., Inc. v. the Phoenix Insurance Company (2024). Claims manuals, guidelines and procedures are relevant and discoverable in insurance bad faith litigation where they contain instructions on how employees process claims. A party relying on other produced documents in its responses must identify them specifically. Privilege disputes need an adequate privilege log before the court can rule.
• Shook v. Avon Products, Inc. (2019). A defendant removing under bankruptcy "related to" jurisdiction must show the action itself affects the debtor's rights or liabilities without further litigation; contingent indemnification agreements and shared insurance are not enough. Remand was also supported on equitable grounds.
• National Fire Insurance Company OF Hartford v. Burns & Scalo Roofing Company (2017). Under Pennsylvania law, an insurer's duty to defend is determined from the factual allegations of the underlying complaint compared with the policy. Where those allegations fall within the employee-injury exclusion, there is no duty to defend or indemnify, and extrinsic evidence of a different employment status is not considered.
• Mt. McKinley Ins. Co. v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp. (2014). An excess insurer has no standing to object to an asbestos reorganization plan when insurance-neutrality language preserves its policy rights and the plan does not materially increase the quantum of liability or administrative burdens, distinguishing In re Global Industrial Technologies.
• In re Pittsburgh Corning Corporation (2013). A plan that creates an asbestos personal injury trust and channeling injunction can be confirmed under §524(g) and §1129 when the trust is adequately funded, treats present and future claims equitably, and covers non-debtor parties only for claims derivative of the debtor. A plan that is "insurance neutral" and leaves coverage rights to non-bankruptcy proceedings does not harm non-settling insurers.
• In re Pittsburgh Corning Corporation (2013). A Chapter 11 plan may create an asbestos personal injury trust and a §524(g) channeling injunction protecting nondebtor shareholders and insurers whose alleged liability derives from the debtor, if the plan is fair and equitable to present and future claimants. The plan here was 'insurance neutral', so a non-creditor insurer and a non-creditor co-defendant lacked standing and their objections failed on the merits.
• In re Pittsburgh Corning Corporation (2011). A § 524(g) channeling injunction may protect non-debtor affiliates only for claims derivative of the debtor, and the plan must define its scope clearly. Insurance neutrality language must follow Combustion Engineering without ambiguous qualifications.
• AstenJohnson v. Columbia Cas. Co. (2007). Under Pennsylvania law, trade usage, the parties' usage and the insured's course of performance showed that "asbestosis" in a policy exclusion meant all asbestos-related diseases, so the exclusion barred coverage for all asbestos claims. An insured's unexcused 20-year delay that prejudices the insurer can bar a coverage suit under laches.
• United Insurance v. France Refractories (1996). An insurer may rescind a policy for fraud by proving a false application statement on a subject material to the risk, made with the applicant's knowledge that it was untrue or in bad faith. Laches requires the insured to show prejudice from the delay, and the automobile-insurance limits on rescission (Act 78) do not apply to liability insurance.
• United Nat. Ins. v. France Refractories (1995). Under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5501(c), equity courts may be guided by statutes of limitation but may not rely on them alone to decide whether an equitable claim is timely. They must also apply the doctrine of laches.
• JH France Refractories v. Allstate (1993). Under comprehensive liability policies, exposure, progression and manifestation of asbestos disease each count as bodily injury that triggers coverage. Each triggered insurer is fully liable up to its limits, not merely for a pro rata share, and the insured may choose which triggered policy responds.
• United Nat. Ins. Co. v. JH France Refractories Co. (1992). A trial court sitting in equity may apply a statute of limitations to decide whether an action is timely, and a two-year limitations period governs an equitable action to rescind an insurance policy obtained by fraud. The discovery rule delays accrual to aid a diligent plaintiff and cannot be used to move accrual earlier.
• Amatex Corp. v. Aetna (1979). Under the Pennsylvania Declaratory Judgments Act, underlying tort claimants are indispensable parties to a coverage declaratory action between insured and insurer, and a request to decide coverage theories without an individual claimant is an advisory opinion outside the court's jurisdiction.

Rhode Island

• Podedworny v. American Insulated Wire Corp. (2014). A bankruptcy plan may condition a corporate debtor's discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d); where the plan deferred discharge until the Hercules Policy was exhausted, the automatic stay stayed in place and the statute of limitations stayed tolled.

South Carolina

• Covil Corporation EX rel. Protopapas v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Company (2024). The notice-prejudice rule applies only where innocent third parties' rights are at stake, but an insurer may escape coverage for late notice only if the insured's breach of the notice provision was material under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241. Attending mediation and expressing willingness to contribute did not waive the notice right, and the products hazard and completed operations exclusions did not apply.
• Protopapas v. Wall, Templeton & Haldrup, PA (2023). A dissolved corporation's statute of repose under S.C. Code § 33-14-107 applies only if a statutorily compliant notice of dissolution was published, and the party asserting the defense bears the burden of proving publication.
• Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company v. Metal Masters, Inc. (2022). A federal court may decline to hear an insurer's declaratory judgment action where a parallel state action involving the same issues and parties is pending, based on the Nautilus factors of state interest, efficiency, entanglement and procedural fencing.
• Covil Corporation EX rel. Protopapas v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Company (2022). An insurer's attendance at mediation and expressed willingness to contribute to a settlement can support an inference that it waived its policy's timely-notice requirement. The products hazard and completed operations exclusions did not apply where the asbestos exposure occurred during the insured's ongoing work within the policy period.

Texas

• Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance Co. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co. (2025). Under Texas law, policies that cover an 'occurrence' defined as exposure to conditions causing personal injury are triggered only by asbestos exposure during the policy period. The duty to indemnify under these policies is measured by the underlying petitions' allegations, not by facts actually established.
• Bradshaw v. Johnson & Johnson (2019). Federal 'related-to' bankruptcy jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) requires that the outcome could conceivably affect the bankruptcy estate; the removing party did not show this through contractual indemnity, shared insurance, or unity of identity.

Utah

• One Beacon American v. Huntsman Polymers (2012). Under the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws most significant relationship test, Texas law governed the CGL policy, and Texas law applies the exposure trigger theory to progressive asbestos-disease bodily injury claims.

Washington

• United States Fidelity & Guaranty v. Ulbricht (2022). Under Washington law, an insurer's duty to defend is triggered where the policy conceivably covers the complaint, and refusing to defend on the basis of certificates of insurance until full lost policies were found was bad faith; terms of lost policies must be shown by clear, cogent and convincing evidence.
• United States Fidelity and Guaranty v. Ulbricht (2021). An insurance claims-handling expert may testify about industry standards and whether an insurer's conduct conformed to them, but may not give opinions on ultimate issues of law or on the reasonableness of the insurer's conduct.
• CBS Corporation v. Ulbricht (1st Division, 2020). A court reviewing a covenant judgment for reasonableness weighs the Chausee factors, and no single factor controls. It may consider past verdicts and the risk and expense of a later bad faith suit against the insurers, and its findings stand if substantial evidence supports them.
• Ulbricht v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company (2020). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a), a court has broad discretion to consolidate actions with common questions of law or fact, weighing judicial economy, speed, risk of inconsistent results and prejudice.
• Weyerhaeuser Company v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company (2008). The rule from Weyerhaeuser II, which required coverage for damage before the insured's connection to a site, is not extended beyond hazardous waste cleanup. Weyerhaeuser also did not show it was actually held jointly and severally liable for exposures before it made the products.

Wisconsin

• Sybron Transition v. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford (2000). Under New York's injury-in-fact, time-on-the-risk allocation, a partial-year policy is charged only for the months it was in effect, although its full policy limit remains available. The insured bears the share of an insolvent insurer, and a fee award in a Wisconsin declaratory judgment action is discretionary.