Statute of Limitations in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on statute of limitations: 381 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

New Jersey

• Andreoli v. State Insulation Corporation (2011). A plaintiff may use fictitious-party practice under Rule 4:26-4 only if he did not know the defendant's identity, described the fictitious defendant adequately, supplied an affidavit on how he learned the identity, and acted diligently. The plaintiff bears the burden of showing this, and a defendant is prejudiced by losing the repose the statute of limitations gives it.
• Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. US Gypsum Co. (2001). A civil RICO claim accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of its injury, and a building owner who should have known of the potential asbestos hazard in its buildings more than four years before suing is time-barred. A prior state class settlement is given the preclusive effect it would have in the state that rendered it.
• Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. US (1988). Following the Sandy Hook approach, a contribution claim against the United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act accrues when the underlying cause of action arises, not at settlement, so it is barred after two years.
• Seckular v. Celotex (1986). Under Florida law, the place of diagnosis does not necessarily determine where an asbestos-related cause of action arose for borrowing-statute purposes; that can be a fact question. A New Jersey court with no interest in the case should defer to the Florida courts as a matter of comity and allow voluntary dismissal without prejudice.
• Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp. (Law Division, 1985). A person with asbestosis cannot recover damages for an enhanced risk of cancer alone when cancer cannot be shown to be reasonably probable. Emotional distress from that risk and the cost of medical monitoring are recoverable, and asbestosis and later cancer are separate diseases, so a later cancer claim is not barred.

New York

• Biljetina v. Brenntag N. AM., Inc. (2025). A claim for latent asbestos injury must be brought within three years of discovery under CPLR 214-c(2). Equitable estoppel and relation-back did not save claims against a new defendant that showed no wrongdoing and no unity of interest with the original defendants.
• Pawlowski v. Avon Prods., Inc. (2024). Under CPLR 214-c the limitations period began when the plaintiff was informed of her mesothelioma diagnosis, not when a nodule was first found and removed, and the COVID-19 executive order toll extended the filing deadline.
• Badamo v. Chevron USA Inc. (2022). A Jones Act claim for cancer accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the cancer, and a suspicious mass is not enough as a matter of law. Under the Jones Act's relaxed causation standard, circumstantial evidence of asbestos exposure on a vessel can reach a jury.
• Castro v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. (2021). Under New York's borrowing statute, a nonresident plaintiff's out-of-state claim is subject to the shorter of New York's or the accrual state's limitations period, and Virginia's two-year period ran from the mesothelioma diagnosis. A loss of consortium claim is derivative and fails when the primary claims are dismissed.
• Castro v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. (2021). A New York court treats the statute of limitations as procedural but, under CPLR 202, applies the shorter of New York's or the accrual state's period to a nonresident's claim. Virginia's two-year period therefore barred the claims, which accrued when mesothelioma was diagnosed.
• Castro v. Johnson & Johnson (2021). The court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation without de novo review because no party objected, and granted summary judgment on the ground that the claims were time-barred.
• Paroni v. General Electric UK Holdings Ltd. (2021). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), a court may transfer a case in the interest of justice to cure a lack of personal jurisdiction, considering whether transfer alleviates a procedural obstacle, enables personal jurisdiction, would severely prejudice the defendant, and whether the case is clearly doomed.
• Johnson v. Aurora Pump Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). Specific personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) or (a)(2) requires evidence that the defendant actually transacted business in New York or committed a tortious act there, and a plaintiff's inference that a sales employee visited the Brooklyn Navy Yard does not meet that requirement.
• Lindsey v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). Where the only connection to New York is that the corporate defendant has its principal place of business there, the action may be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds; an eight-month delay after obtaining sufficient discovery did not waive the motion.
• Niemeyer v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). A breach of warranty claim is governed by the four-year limit of UCC 2-725 and cannot be revived under CPLR 214-c, which covers only personal injury and property damage. Fraud must be pleaded with the specificity CPLR 3016(b) requires, and a civil conspiracy claim fails when the underlying tort fails.
• US v. Silver (2018). An indictment may charge a continuing bribery scheme in a single count, and the government need only prove that some aspect of the quid pro quo scheme continued into the limitations period. McDonnell did not overrule the 'as opportunities arise' theory of bribery.
• Matter of Diegelman v. City of Buffalo (4th Dept., 2017). Under General Municipal Law § 50-e (5), a court weighs all relevant factors, and no single factor decides the matter. Even assuming no reasonable excuse for the delay, a late notice of claim may be allowed where the municipality learned the facts within a reasonable time and showed no substantial prejudice.
• US v. Silver (2017). Under McDonnell, an "official act" must be a decision or action on a specific matter involving a formal exercise of governmental power, and an instruction covering any action under color of official authority is erroneous. The error is harmless only if clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a properly instructed jury would have convicted. Section 1957 money laundering does not require tracing of commingled funds.
• Feinberg v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (2016). Under CPLR 214-c, whether early symptoms were too isolated or inconsequential to start the limitations period is a fact question for the jury where the evidence is conflicting. On summary judgment, the defendant bears the burden of showing its product could not have caused the injury; the plaintiff need not exclude other causes.
• Wells v. 3M Co. (3rd Dept., 2016). Under CPLR 214-c (2), a defendant seeking dismissal as time-barred must show the plaintiff discovered, or should have discovered, the primary condition underlying the claim (or an indistinct disease) more than three years before suing; separate and distinct diseases may each have their own discovery date.
• Erickson v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. (2015). Montana's ten-year statute of repose for improvements to real property protects architects, engineers, surveyors and contractors, not manufacturers and suppliers of products such as asbestos-containing turbines.
• Quinlan v. Marine Transport Lines (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (2015). Equitable tolling applies only where the plaintiff timely filed in the wrong forum, the defendant actively misled the plaintiff, or the plaintiff was extraordinarily prevented from filing; the diligence standard applies to counsel as well, and plaintiffs showed neither active misleading nor extraordinary prevention.
• Walker v. Abb, Inc. (2013). Under CPLR 306-b, a court may extend the time to serve a defendant for good cause or in the interest of justice, weighing factors such as diligence, the limitations period, delay, promptness and prejudice. The NYCAL case management order's amendment provision does not cure defective service on a party already named.
• Garner v. Ngc Bodily Injury Trust (2012). Under New York CPLR 214-c, a personal injury claim accrues when the physical condition or symptoms of the latent disease appear, not when its cause is discovered. The earlier ruling on the accrual date therefore barred relitigation by collateral estoppel, and the claims were time-barred in any event.
• Andrucki v. Alcoa, Inc. (2011). A claim against the Port Authority requires a notice of claim served at least sixty days before suit and commencement within one year of accrual. Plaintiffs who served a valid notice and then added the Port Authority by supplemental summons and amended complaint within the year met these conditions, and the relation-back doctrine did not apply.
• Garner v. Dii Industries, LLC (2011). Under New York CPLR 214-c, the limitations period for a toxic-exposure claim runs from discovery of the physical condition, not from discovery of its cause. Because the link between asbestos and disease was publicly known well before the later trust determination, the claim was untimely and amendment would be futile.
• Crowder V AW Chesterton Co. (2009). A foreign statute of repose is substantive, so New York courts apply a choice-of-law analysis rather than automatically applying CPLR 202. Under the Neumeier rules, the law of the locus state (Indiana) governed, and applying its repose statute did not violate New York public policy.
• IN the Matter of United States Lines Inc. (2006). A bankruptcy court's rolling bar date order is interpreted as a claims-administration order rather than a statute of limitations, so the court may use New York's physical-manifestation approach to decide when injury manifested. Timeliness is a core issue decided without a jury, and the claimant bears the ultimate burden once the objector shows the claim is untimely.
• Falise v. American Tobacco Co. (2000). A RICO plaintiff relying on mail or wire fraud must show reliance, which is less demanding for a broad scheme aimed at the public, and must show proximate cause under the Holmes factors. The Trust could not show its own reliance for the settlement and litigation theories, but could show the claimants' reliance for the direct payment theory.
• Consorti v. Owens Corning (1995). In toxic substance exposure cases, the tortious injury is deemed to occur as a matter of law when the toxic substance is introduced into the body, so a spouse has no loss of consortium claim if the exposure preceded the marriage, even if disease appeared later.
• Consorti v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1995). The Second Circuit did not decide the appeal; it certified to the New York Court of Appeals the question whether a spouse's loss of consortium claim is valid when mesothelioma arose after the marriage from asbestos exposure before it, and kept jurisdiction pending the answer.
• Kulzer v. Pittsburgh-Corning Corp. (1991). Under New York's 1986 revival statute, a wrongful death claim is not revived if the decedent had any employment-related asbestos exposure within three years of death, since accrual follows the last-date-of-exposure rule and does not depend on whether that last exposure proximately caused the death.
• Campo v. Asbestospray Corp. (1st Dept., 1990). Plaintiffs with only minor asbestos-related conditions who disclaim recovery for present injuries and seek to preserve claims for possible future serious disease are asking for an advisory opinion. The one-year revival statute is a condition precedent that cannot be tolled.
• Simpson v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp. (1990). A due process challenge to punitive damages based on earlier awards in asbestos cases fails when the defendant has not made an adequate factual record. A preponderance standard of proof, denial of bifurcation within the trial judge's discretion, and denial of a continuance to join the Manville Trust did not require reversal.
• Fusaro v. Porter-Hayden Co. (1989). A later-diagnosed, distinct asbestos disease such as mesothelioma is a separate injury, and the limitations period under CPLR 214-c starts anew when it is discovered, even if an earlier asbestosis claim was time-barred. Successor-liability allegations in an amended complaint relate back to the original complaint under CPLR 203 when they arise from the same transactions and the defendants are united in interest.
• Campo v. Asbestospray Corp. (1988). The court would not judicially extend the legislature's one-year revival period for time-barred asbestos claims, and a class action brought without present claims for injury does not toll that period. New York had not adopted a 'two-injury' rule, and adopting one would be a judicial extension of CPLR 214-c.
• In re Johns-Manville Corp. (1984). Future asbestos claimants who were exposed before the filing date but have not yet manifested disease are parties in interest under Bankruptcy Code section 1109(b), and the court may appoint a legal representative for them under its equitable powers (28 U.S.C. 1481 and 11 U.S.C. 105(a)).
• Matter of Smith v. Certain Teed Prods. Corp. (3rd Dept., 1981). Mesothelioma is not a 'dust disease' under Workers' Compensation Law section 44-a, because that phrase is limited to the pneumoconiosis group, so the 12-month limit of section 40 applies. Any change to that classification is for the Legislature.
• Matter of Steinhardt v. JohnsManville Corp. (1981). In New York, a claim for harm from inhaling a foreign substance such as asbestos accrues when the substance is inhaled, not when the disease is discovered. Adopting a discovery rule was left to the Legislature.
• Matter of Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp. (4th Dept., 1980). A personal injury claim accrues when the harmful substance is inhaled, not when the injury is discovered, so the limitations period ran from the injury and not from the later diagnosis. Strict products liability claims sounding in tort carry the same limitations period as negligence.

North Carolina

• Ratcliff v. American Honda Motor Co. Inc. (2019). Under North Carolina law, a disease claim accrues when the disease is diagnosed, and a later progression of the same cancer to another subtype does not restart the three-year limitations period. The plaintiff also had reason to suspect an asbestos cause long before the later diagnosis.
• Garlock Sealing Technologies, LLC v. Simon Greenstone Panatier Bartlett, A Professional Corporation (2015). A statute of limitations defense, Noerr-Pennington and state litigation privileges cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss unless all necessary facts appear on the face of the complaint. Litigation conduct is not shielded from RICO, and the complaint adequately pleaded fraud, conspiracy and RICO.
• Payne v. Charlotte Heating & Air Cond. (2005). The time limit in the fourth paragraph of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-61.6, which gave asbestosis and silicosis death claims a shorter period than other latent occupational diseases, violates the Equal Protection Clause under rational basis review. The Commission's findings on asbestosis, causation and last injurious exposure were supported by competent evidence and so were binding.
• Gardner v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd. (1986). Forecasting North Carolina law from Wilder v. Amatex, the court held that the six-year products liability statute of repose, N.C.G.S. § 1-50(6), does not apply to asbestos disease cases, and that the three-year limitations period runs from diagnosis of the disease.
• Wilder v. Amatex Corp. (1985). The former ten-year statute of repose in N.C.G.S. § 1-15(b) does not apply to claims arising from disease. A disease claim accrues when the disease is diagnosed, and the three-year limitations period runs from that date. On product exposure, plaintiff must show actual exposure to the defendant's product, not just shipment of products to job sites where he worked.

Ohio

• Nuckols v. Consol. Rail Corp. (6th Appellate District, 2022). Under FELA's discovery rule, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of both the injury and its cause. Whether a worker should have connected his cancer to workplace exposure is a fact question for the jury when the evidence leaves it genuinely disputed.
• Ridenour v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (2014). A prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim for asbestos exposure requires a present injury or unreasonable risk of serious future harm, plus proof that each defendant knew of and disregarded an excessive risk. Knowing that asbestos is present, or holding a supervisory job, does not show that.
• Oglesby v. Consol. Rail Corp. (6th Appellate District, 2009). Ohio Civ.R. 10(D)(2), which requires a merit affidavit with a medical claim, is procedural and constitutional, and a plaintiff who substitutes real parties for John Doe defendants after the one-year service period cannot use relation back where the limitations period has run.
• Penn v. A-Best Prods. Co. (10th Appellate District, 2007). R.C. 2305.10(B)(5) gives two independent ways for an asbestos claim to accrue: being informed by competent medical authority, or the date the plaintiff should have known of the injury through reasonable diligence. The H.B. 292 prima facie requirements apply only to nonmalignant conditions, lung cancer in a smoker, and wrongful death claims, and the definition of 'competent medical authority' in R.C. 2307.91(Z) does not govern accrual under R.C. 2305.10.
• Varner v. Ford Motor Co. (8th Appellate District, 2007). Under R.C. 4123.85, a workers' compensation death claim from occupational disease must be filed within two years after death, and the Svet rule (six months from diagnosis as occupational) applies to living claimants, not death claims.