Product Identification in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on product identification: 1,060 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Pennsylvania

• Korol v. Aurora Pump Company (2023). In Pennsylvania asbestos cases, courts apply the frequency, regularity and proximity test, which is less strict in mesothelioma cases and where there is specific product evidence. Co-worker testimony about cramped Navy engine and fire rooms and routine gasket and packing work on identified pumps and valves created a jury question on exposure.
• Mullen v. American Circuit Breaker Corporation (2023). Under the frequency, regularity and proximity test, which is less demanding in mesothelioma cases, co-worker testimony that a worker stood next to dust from removing asbestos-like packing from the defendant's valves was enough to send the question of causation to a jury.
• Pine v. John Crane, Inc. (2023). Under maritime law, a plaintiff needs evidence of exposure to the defendant's product high enough to make substantial-factor causation more than conjectural, and coworker testimony that only the defendant's gaskets were used can meet that. Survival, non-pecuniary and punitive damages are not available under general maritime law against a non-employer manufacturer in a seaman's death claim.
• Warrington v. 3M Company (2023). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. A bare-metal failure-to-warn claim also requires proof under DeVries that the manufacturer directed or required incorporation of the asbestos part and knew or had reason to know it was dangerous.
• Data v. Joy Global Underground Mining (2022). Under Pennsylvania's frequency, regularity and proximity test, a plaintiff must show actual inhalation of fibers from the defendant's product, and mere presence of asbestos nearby is not enough. A manufacturer that sells a product with an asbestos component installed has a duty to warn about aftermarket replacement parts of that type.
• Gorton v. Eaton Corporation (2022). Under Pennsylvania's frequency, regularity and proximity test, which is less demanding in mesothelioma cases with direct evidence of exposure, a jury could find that work on asbestos-containing motor controllers was a substantial factor in causing the disease. The plaintiff did not invoke admiralty jurisdiction, so maritime law did not apply.
• Hilster v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2022). Under Connecticut law, a plaintiff must identify an asbestos-containing product the defendant is responsible for and show it was a substantial factor in causing the harm. Purchase orders that could be tied to the plaintiff's work only through speculation do not create a genuine factual dispute.
• Hilster v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2022). Under either maritime or Connecticut law, a pump maker is not liable for asbestos in third-party external gaskets and insulation it did not require, and a plaintiff must offer non-speculative evidence of exposure to the defendant's own asbestos-containing product. The government contractor defense under Boyle also barred the design defect and failure-to-warn claims on this record.
• Hilster v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2022). Under Connecticut law, a plaintiff must identify an asbestos-containing product the defendant is responsible for and offer evidence supporting an inference that the plaintiff inhaled asbestos dust from it; recalling the defendant's name on a valve or in plans, without more, is speculation and does not suffice.
• Hilster v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2022). Under either maritime or Connecticut law, a pump maker is not liable for third-party external asbestos gaskets it did not specify, supply or require, and a plaintiff needs non-speculative evidence of exposure to the defendant's own asbestos-containing product. The government contractor defense also applied, because the Navy approved the specifications and warnings and knew of the asbestos hazards.
• Rogers v. AO Smith Corp. (2022). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to each defendant's asbestos-containing product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Under DeVries, the bare metal defense defeats a claim over asbestos insulation added to a turbine unless the turbine required that asbestos insulation.
• Smeal v. Clark Equipment Company (2022). Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must show frequent, regular and proximate exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product and competent expert evidence that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing the disease. A corporate representative's testimony that the defendant's brakes contained asbestos, together with the worker's testimony about handling the brakes and working near brake repairs, created a jury question.
• Data v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under Pennsylvania law a plaintiff must show frequent, regular and proximate exposure to the specific defendant's asbestos product, and mere presence of the product or de minimis exposure is not enough. Under maritime law the plaintiff must show exposure to the product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury, and the bare-metal defense is not available.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corp. (2021). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Minimal exposure, or mere presence of the product aboard the ship, is not enough.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under Pennsylvania law a plaintiff must show exposure to asbestos from the defendant's product with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity for a jury to infer causation. Merely showing that a product was present at the workplace is not enough.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under both Pennsylvania law (frequency, regularity and proximity) and Virginia law (actual and proximate cause), a plaintiff must produce specific evidence that the decedent inhaled asbestos fibers from the defendant's product. Evidence that the defendant sold asbestos-containing products in general does not meet that burden.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. A general recollection of a product's name, its presence on a ship, or a generic expert report does not create a genuine dispute on exposure.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must show exposure to a specific defendant's asbestos-containing product with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity. Showing that the product was merely present at the workplace is not enough.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must show exposure to asbestos from the defendant's specific product with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity. Showing that a manufacturer sold some asbestos-containing products, or that its product was present at the worksite, is not enough.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must show exposure to asbestos from the defendant's own product with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity. Showing that the product was present at the workplace, or that a manufacturer's interrogatory answers say some products may have contained asbestos, is not enough.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the specific defendant's asbestos product with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity; mere presence of the product at the workplace is not enough.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos product with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity for a jury to infer causation. Testimony of repeated close-range work near the defendant's workers can meet that standard at summary judgment.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under Pennsylvania law (frequency, regularity and proximity) and maritime law (a high enough level of exposure), proof that a defendant's product was merely present at a worksite, with only de minimis exposure, does not show the product was a substantial factor in causing the disease.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must show exposure to asbestos from the specific defendant's product with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity for a jury to infer causation. The presence of a product at a workplace, or other workers' later testimony about it, is not enough.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the disease. A few minutes of exposure within a nearly fifty-year career, and inconsistent testimony about other work, did not meet that standard.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must show exposure to asbestos from the specific defendant's product with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity; mere presence of the product or of asbestos at a workplace is not enough.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the specific defendant's asbestos-containing product with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity for a jury to infer that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. The mere presence of the product at a workplace is not enough.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the specific defendant's asbestos product with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity; the product's presence at the workplace, or speculation about earlier exposure, is not enough.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos product with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity for a jury to infer causation. Mere presence of the product at a workplace, or speculative recollection of it, is not enough.
• Blystone v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (2020). Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must show the defendant's product actually contained asbestos and that he was exposed to it with frequency, regularity and proximity; a plaintiff's unfounded belief that a product contained asbestos is speculation that cannot defeat summary judgment.
• Blystone v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (2020). A worker's testimony that he spent full days a few feet from workers scraping asbestos pipe insulation, together with company documents showing asbestos coating use, creates a genuine dispute about exposure. A negligence claim against an employer for a safe workplace does not need expert testimony to establish duty.
• Brandt v. Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. (2020). Under Pa.R.E. 703 an expert may not serve as a mere conduit for another expert's unadmitted testing and opinions. Without admissible exposure evidence, the medical causation opinion lacked foundation and summary judgment was proper.
• Gorton v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2020). Under Ohio law, which applied to the employment-based claims, workers' compensation exclusivity bars negligence and recklessness claims against an employer. It does not bar a plausibly pleaded intentional tort claim, or claims against the employer in its separate capacity as manufacturer and supplier to other employers.
• Mehnert v. Agilent Technologies, Inc. (2020). Under Colorado law a plaintiff must show a defendant's product was a substantial contributing cause of the injury. A worker's testimony identifying the products in the defendant's catalog, how he used them and how often creates a genuine factual dispute on exposure, and the credibility of that testimony is for the jury.
• Kardos v. Armstrong Pumps, Inc. (2019). A non-movant may use a properly executed affidavit and a deceased plaintiff's deposition testimony to oppose summary judgment where the deposition arguably meets the former-testimony hearsay exception because defendants had an opportunity to cross-examine him.
• Kraus v. Alcatel-Lucent (2019). Product identification evidence need not be enough to survive summary judgment to justify further discovery; it is enough that it suggests the plaintiff might have been near asbestos-containing products. Overbroad requests are narrowed, and requests about employees or factories are denied where the plaintiff never worked for the defendant.
• Kraus v. Alcatel-Lucent (2019). A party moving to compel must identify the specific discovery requests and how the responses are deficient. Discovery against a defendant is limited to asbestos-containing products the plaintiff could have encountered at the alleged exposure sites, but it cannot be limited to products the current evidence shows he was exposed to. A motion to compel is not a vehicle for determining liability.
• Lamson v. Georgia-Pacific LLC (2019). In an asbestos case, a plaintiff with mesothelioma need only show that some of the defendant's products contained asbestos and that his work on them generated dust. Gaps in the testimony about how many doors he worked on or for how long go to weight and credibility, which are for the jury.
• Walker v. Blackmer Pump Co. (2019). A deceased witness's deposition is not admissible under the former-testimony hearsay exception against defendants who had no meaningful opportunity to cross-examine him. Maritime law governs shipboard Navy exposure, and under it the bare-metal defense turns on foreseeability, which makes circumstantial exposure evidence enough to reach a jury.
• Walker v. Viad Corp. (2019). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury, and the bare-metal defense is a foreseeability standard rather than a bright-line rule. A summary judgment movant may not raise a new argument and evidence for the first time in a reply brief.
• Gilbert v. Advance Auto Parts (2018). In an asbestos case a plaintiff must produce evidence that exposure to the specific defendant's product was frequent, regular and proximate; general testimony that a parts store or vehicle make was used at the workplace, without evidence tying the decedent to that product, is too speculative to survive summary judgment.
• Floyd v. AstenJOHNSON, Inc. (2017). To survive summary judgment in an asbestos case, a plaintiff must show through evidence of frequency, regularity and proximity that he inhaled asbestos fibers shed by the specific defendant's product; co-worker testimony that does not identify the plaintiff as exposed, and speculation from presence at the same plant, is insufficient.
• Rabovsky v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2016). Under the law of the case doctrine, a prior ruling in the same case that the manufacturer could be liable under Schwartz was not reopened. Under Schwartz, a manufacturer may be liable for negligent failure to warn about asbestos components it neither made nor supplied if it knew its product would be used with such components, knew asbestos was hazardous, and gave no adequate warning.
• Groover v. CBS Corporation (2014). Under the frequency, regularity and proximity standard, a plaintiff must make some affirmative showing that the plaintiff or decedent breathed dust from the particular defendant's product; working with or around the product is not enough.
• Haldaman v. Eaton Corporation (2014). To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must show frequent, regular and proximate exposure to the specific defendant's asbestos-containing product. Showing only that asbestos was generally present in the workplace is not enough.
• Schott v. Viad Corp. (In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation) (2014). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to asbestos in a product the defendant made or supplied, and expert speculation that the defendant probably supplied original or replacement parts is not enough. A manufacturer is not liable for asbestos parts it did not make or supply.
• Krauss v. Trane US Inc. (2014). A plaintiff must produce evidence that the defendant's product contained asbestos and was present at the worksite before the frequency, regularity and proximity test is reached. Lay affidavits based on 'knowledge and belief' rather than actual knowledge are speculative and cannot defeat summary judgment.
• Painter v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., Inc. (2014). To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must show regular work in physical proximity to the defendant's asbestos-containing product, with frequency, regularity and proximity sufficient for a jury to infer inhalation of its fibers. Vague testimony that a brand was used, without details, leaves a jury to speculate.
• Rost v. Ford Motor Company (2014). Betz v. Pneumo Abex does not bar all 'any exposure' expert opinion, and on review of a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law the record is viewed in the verdict winner's favor. Under Moore v. Ericsson, an asbestos-containing product may be treated as defective as a matter of law because it contains asbestos.
• Smith v. Bmw OF North America LLC (2014). A company is liable as an apparent manufacturer under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 400 only if it put the product out as its own, which turns on how users would see it and on the company's control. Piercing the corporate veil requires domination beyond an ordinary parent-subsidiary relationship, and exposure to a defendant's product must be more than de minimis.