Punitive Damages in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on punitive or exemplary damages: 291 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

New York

• Mauro v. John E. Potente & Sons (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2020). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must make a prima facie showing through admissible evidence that its product did not contribute to the illness, and cannot do so merely by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof or by relying on an attorney's affirmation.
• Rothlein v. Whittaker Clark & Daniels (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2020). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must make a prima facie showing that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's illness; pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof is not enough.
• Germain v. Whittaker Clark & Daniels (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2020). A supplier seeking summary judgment on product identification must first show its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's illness. Plaintiffs need only show facts from which liability can be reasonably inferred, and conflicting testimony about exposure raises credibility issues for a jury.
• Rivera v. General Electric Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2020). Workers' compensation exclusivity bars only injuries arising from employment with the defendant. Where plaintiffs allege exposure to GE's products during earlier employment with other employers, fact issues preclude summary judgment, and the punitive damages claim is left for the trial judge after all the evidence.
• Olson v. Brenntag N. Am., Inc. (2020). A jury could rationally find that J&J's talcum powders exposed the plaintiff to asbestos, that this exposure caused her mesothelioma, and that J&J's conduct warranted punitive damages. The compensatory award was excessive, and a 12:1 punitive-to-compensatory ratio was unconstitutionally excessive, so the court capped it at 7:1.
• Rothlein v. American Int'l Indus. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A company that buys another's assets is not liable for the seller's torts unless one of four exceptions applies (assumption, merger, mere continuation, fraud). A defendant cannot win summary judgment on causation by pointing to gaps in plaintiff's proof; it must show its product could not have contributed to the illness.
• Germain v. American Int'l Indus. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). Under New York law, a corporation that buys another's assets is not liable for the seller's torts unless it assumed the liability, merged with the seller, was a mere continuation of it, or took part in a fraudulent transaction; none of these exceptions applied here.
• Carlstrand v. Domco Prods. of Texas (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A defendant cannot win summary judgment on causation by pointing to gaps in plaintiff's proof; it must first make a prima facie showing that its product did not contribute to the plaintiff's illness. Plaintiffs' late notice that they would pursue punitive damages, contrary to the case management order, supported dismissing that claim.
• Hernandez v. Whittaker, Clark & Daniels (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A defendant cannot win summary judgment in an asbestos case by pointing to gaps in plaintiff's proof; it must make a prima facie showing that its product could not have contributed to the illness, and conflicting expert evidence on general and specific causation raises fact issues.
• Alleyne v. Whittaker Clark & Daniels (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A talc supplier cannot win summary judgment by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof. It must first show its talc could not have contributed to the illness, and conflicting expert and testimony evidence on contamination raises fact issues for trial.
• Epstein v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A premises owner is liable under Labor Law § 200 and common law negligence only if it controlled the means and methods of the work, and conflicting testimony and evidence of that control raises fact issues. An owner outside the manufacturing, selling or distribution chain cannot be held strictly liable for products.
• Young v. Avon Prods. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A defendant cannot win summary judgment in an asbestos case by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof, and conflicting expert evidence on general and specific causation raises fact issues for trial. New York does not recognize an independent cause of action for civil conspiracy.
• Young v. Whittaker, Clark & Daniels (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A defendant cannot win summary judgment by pointing to gaps in plaintiff's proof; conflicting expert affidavits on general and specific causation raise issues of fact for trial, and plaintiffs need only show facts from which liability may reasonably be inferred.
• Macaluso v. A.O. Smith Corp. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation) (1st Dept., 2019). A jury's findings of exposure and recklessness stand if supported by legally sufficient evidence, but damages awards that deviate materially from reasonable compensation under CPLR 5501(c) must be reduced or retried.
• Moldow v. AI Friedman, LP (2019). A defendant cannot win summary judgment by pointing to gaps in plaintiff's proof; it must show its product could not have contributed to the disease. Conflicting expert affidavits on general and specific causation raise credibility issues that cannot be resolved on motion papers.
• Olson v. Brenntag N. AM. Inc. (2019). Due process bars punishing a defendant for harm to nonparties, so punitive-damages evidence must be tied to the conduct that harmed the plaintiff; post-injury conduct that could not have harmed plaintiffs is inadmissible, while out-of-state conduct and advertisements that are part of the same course of wrongful conduct may be admitted to show reprehensibility.
• Shulman v. Brenntag N. AM., Inc. (2019). Where the parties' experts conflict on whether the defendants' talc contained asbestos and whether it caused the plaintiff's mesothelioma, credibility issues cannot be resolved on summary judgment. Evidence that defendants knew of and concealed asbestos in their talc raises a fact issue on punitive damages.
• Cohen v. American Biltrite Inc. (2018). On a summary judgment motion, a defendant must affirmatively show that exposure to asbestos in its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's mesothelioma or was insufficient to do so; pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's evidence does not meet that burden, and conflicting expert findings raise fact issues.
• Connor v. Brann (2018). Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner cannot recover for mental or emotional injury without a prior showing of physical injury. A § 1983 plaintiff must plead each defendant's personal involvement to hold that defendant individually liable. A prisoner's transfer out of the facility generally moots claims for injunctive relief.
• Germain v. Johnson & Johnson (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). A defendant cannot win summary judgment by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof, and conflicting expert evidence on whether talc contained asbestos and caused mesothelioma raises fact issues for a jury. Plaintiffs need only show facts from which liability may be reasonably inferred.
• Rothlein v. Johnson & Johnson (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must show its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's illness, and conflicting expert evidence on whether talc products contained asbestos and caused the disease raises fact issues for trial. Unsworn expert reports may be considered in opposition if other admissible evidence is also submitted, and a court may consider late sworn affidavits absent prejudice.
• Nauheimer v. Union Carbide Corp. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). Under CPLR 602, consolidation of asbestos cases is favored where common questions exist and individual issues do not predominate, and the opposing party must show specific prejudice; one motion on notice to all affected parties suffices, and moving for consolidation does not waive a punitive damages claim.
• Prokocimer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). Summary judgment is denied where the plaintiff's evidence raises triable issues of fact on whether defendants knew or should have known of asbestos hazards. Unopposed loss of consortium claim may be dismissed.
• Macaluso v. A.O. Smith Water Prods. Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). A jury verdict is set aside only if it could not be reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence, but damages that deviate materially from reasonable compensation must be reduced. A boiler maker has a duty to warn of asbestos hazards from foreseeable removal of its boilers and the asbestos components used with them.
• Garrido v. Johnson & Johnson (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must unequivocally show its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's illness. Defense expert affidavits that relied on speculation, assumptions, unannexed studies, or data from outside the exposure period did not meet that burden, and conflicting expert evidence presented fact issues for trial.
• Shulman v. Brenntag N. AM., Inc. (2018). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must unequivocally show its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's illness, and speculative or conclusory expert affidavits fail that burden. Conflicting expert evidence on whether talc was contaminated with asbestos raises fact issues for trial.
• Zoas v. BASF Catalysts, LLC (2018). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must make a prima facie showing that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's illness; pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof or rebutting her experts is not enough. Conflicting expert affidavits on exposure and causation raise fact issues that preclude summary judgment.
• Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. (2017). The Coordinating Judge issued a case management order setting procedures for all NYCAL asbestos personal injury and wrongful death cases, superseding earlier orders effective July 20, 2017; no party won or lost.
• Jackson v. 84 Lumber Co. (Onondaga, 2016). State-of-the-art testimony is admissible where an adequate foundation is laid. Specific causation opinions on asbestos exposure need only give a scientific expression of exposure, and the question is generally one for the jury, so no Frye hearing was required.
• Miller v. Hennessy Indus. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (2016). A manufacturer that knew its product would mainly be used with asbestos-containing brakes and designed it for that use may be held to have a duty to warn. Visible dust from an asbestos-containing product can support expert testimony on specific causation of mesothelioma without precise dose quantification.
• Sweberg v. Crane Co. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation) (1st Dept., 2016). A manufacturer that promoted and sold asbestos insulation for its boilers, and for which insulation was a practical necessity, could be held to have a duty to warn of asbestos hazards. Unpreserved objections to jury instructions are not reviewed.
• Hackshaw v. Crane Co. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation) (1st Dept., 2016). Applying the Court of Appeals' 2016 standard, a manufacturer may be liable for failing to warn of asbestos hazards in insulation used with its products where it promoted and sold that insulation and its products needed insulation to operate safely and efficiently.
• Hernandez-Vega v. Fisher Controls Int'l (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2015). A defendant moving for summary judgment in an asbestos case must unequivocally show its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury, and personal jurisdiction defenses not raised in a pre-answer motion or the answer are waived under CPLR 3211(e). A valve maker with a sufficiently significant role, interest or influence in the asbestos parts used with its valves may be liable even if the valve was "bare metal."
• Assenzio v. Burnham (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2015). A verdict is set aside as a matter of law only where no valid line of reasoning could support it. Testimony on cumulative asbestos exposure, together with evidence of exposure to the defendant's equipment, can establish causation under New York's Frye standard. Awards that deviate materially from reasonable compensation must be reduced.
• Hackshaw v. Crane Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2015). A verdict may be set aside only where no valid line of reasoning could support it. A manufacturer with a significant role, interest or influence in the asbestos components used with its products may owe a duty to warn, and evidence of that role supported the failure-to-warn and recklessness findings. Awards that deviate materially from reasonable compensation are reduced under CPLR 5501(c).
• Konstantin v. Tishman Liquidating Corp. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (1st Dept., 2014). Consolidation of asbestos cases under CPLR 602(a) rests in the trial court's discretion, applying the Malcolm factors flexibly. A manufacturer that has a sufficiently significant role, interest or influence in the asbestos components used with its product after sale may have a duty to warn about them, though foreseeability alone does not create that duty.
• McCloskey v. AO Smith Water Prods. (2014). A verdict will be set aside as a matter of law only if no valid line of reasoning could lead rational jurors to it. A defendant found reckless is liable for the full verdict regardless of apportionment, and a defendant bears the burden of proving the equitable shares of other entities.
• Peraica v. Crane Co. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (2013). Under New York law, whether a manufacturer of a bare-metal product had a duty to warn of asbestos insulation others applied to it after sale is a question of fact for the jury where the manufacturer knew or should have known the product would be used with asbestos-containing materials. A court may reduce a jury award that deviates materially from reasonable compensation.
• Konstantin v. 630 Third Ave. Assoc. (2012). A verdict is set aside as a matter of law only if no valid line of reasoning could support it, and a pain and suffering award is reduced under CPLR 5501(c) when it deviates materially from reasonable compensation. Expert causation opinions need only a proper foundation in generally accepted methods, not studies on identical circumstances.
• IN the Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. (2007). A jury's finding that a defendant acted with reckless disregard, which makes it liable for the full verdict under CPLR 1603(7), stands where the record shows the defendant knew of asbestos dangers and failed to warn. A damages award is reviewed for whether it deviates materially from reasonable compensation, and the jury's verdict receives great deference.
• Hamilton v. Garlock, Inc. (2000). Evidence of exposure to the defendant's products, state-of-the-art notice and reckless concerted conduct supported the verdict. A defendant that offers no proof on allocating fault among joint tortfeasors forfeits any reduction for settling defendants' shares, so a directed verdict on allocation is proper.
• Ciletti v. Raymark Indus. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (1997). A defendant asserting the military contractor defense to a design defect claim must prove every Boyle element, including warnings to the government, and merely raising some elements is not enough. New York does not recognize a child's claim for loss of parental consortium, and filing a proof of claim with the Manville Trust is not a settlement that supports a set-off under General Obligations Law § 15-108.
• Maltese v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (1997). Reckless disregard requires a gross negligence standard: intentionally acting in disregard of a known or obvious risk so great that harm is highly probable, with conscious indifference to the outcome. General awareness that high, prolonged asbestos exposure could cause injury did not meet that standard.
• Mtr. OF Nyc Asbestos Litig. (1997). A jury may consider a manufacturer's actual knowledge of asbestos dangers in allocating relative culpability under CPLR article 16, and answers to interrogatories by settling defendants cannot be offered by a non-settling defendant who is no longer adverse to them. A recklessness finding must be set aside if no valid line of reasoning could support it.
• Simpson v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp. (1990). A due process challenge to punitive damages based on earlier awards in asbestos cases fails when the defendant has not made an adequate factual record. A preponderance standard of proof, denial of bifurcation within the trial judge's discretion, and denial of a continuance to join the Manville Trust did not require reversal.

North Carolina

• Pike v. Dempster Industries, Inc. (2024). Under North Carolina law, an asbestos plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product with frequency, regularity and proximity (the Lohrmann test), which also applies in mesothelioma cases; general expert evidence that every exposure contributes does not satisfy it. Without compensatory liability, punitive damages fail.
• Walls v. Ford Motor Company (2022). Under North Carolina law, an asbestos plaintiff can show causation with direct or circumstantial evidence of regular exposure to a defendant's product over an extended period, without expert testimony specific to that defendant. Punitive damages require clear and convincing evidence that corporate managers actually understood the specific risk.
• Walls v. Ford Motor Company (2021). In an asbestos case under North Carolina law, a plaintiff must show actual exposure to the defendant's product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury, which requires more than casual or minimal contact. Punitive damages require clear and convincing evidence of fraud, malice, or willful or wanton conduct.
• Walls v. Ford Motor Company (2021). General boilerplate objections to discovery are invalid, and a party claiming work-product protection must show the protection applies and describe the withheld documents. A party that delays correcting inaccurate discovery responses without justification may be made to pay expenses under Rule 37, and net worth discovery requires some factual showing that punitive damages are viable.
• Bell v. American International Industries (2018). Under North Carolina law, willful or wanton conduct for punitive damages requires conscious and intentional disregard of others' rights and safety, which is more than gross negligence. Allegations that top management rejected advice to warn of asbestos hazards plausibly pleaded it, but a conspiracy claim requires an alleged agreement between defendants.