Successor Liability in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on successor liability: 210 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

New York

• Paroni EX rel. Estate OF Paroni v. General Electric UK Holdings Ltd. (2021). A New York federal court lacks specific jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. 302(a)(1) or due process where asbestos injuries from 1960s-80s California exposure do not arise from a 2015 corporate acquisition, and a parent's contacts are not imputed to a subsidiary absent alter-ego control. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), a court may transfer rather than dismiss to cure lack of personal jurisdiction.
• Paroni v. General Electric UK Holdings Ltd. (2021). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), a court may transfer a case in the interest of justice to cure a lack of personal jurisdiction, considering whether transfer alleviates a procedural obstacle, enables personal jurisdiction, would severely prejudice the defendant, and whether the case is clearly doomed.
• Smith v. AC Light. & Elec. Supplies, LLC (2021). Under Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence, a premises owner or contractor owes a duty to provide a safe workplace only if it had authority to supervise or control the activity causing the injury; evidence that it oversaw the work raises a fact issue.
• Corcione v. Amchem Prods., Inc. (2020). A corporation that buys another's assets is not liable for the seller's torts unless an exception applies (assumption of liability, merger, mere continuation, or fraud). Product exposure testimony that is guesswork about the brand and about asbestos content does not raise a triable issue.
• Paroni EX rel. Estate OF Paroni v. Alstom SA (2020). A court may order jurisdictional discovery where the plaintiff has identified a genuine issue of jurisdictional fact, and a defendant's unsworn statements in a legal brief are not enough to defeat that request or win dismissal.
• Rothlein v. American Int'l Indus. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A company that buys another's assets is not liable for the seller's torts unless one of four exceptions applies (assumption, merger, mere continuation, fraud). A defendant cannot win summary judgment on causation by pointing to gaps in plaintiff's proof; it must show its product could not have contributed to the illness.
• Germain v. American Int'l Indus. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). Under New York law, a corporation that buys another's assets is not liable for the seller's torts unless it assumed the liability, merged with the seller, was a mere continuation of it, or took part in a fraudulent transaction; none of these exceptions applied here.
• Peralta v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). The original tortfeasor doctrine did not make Cyprus Amax Minerals Company answerable for the talc torts of its subsidiary Cyprus Mines, because a parent is not liable for a subsidiary's torts unless its control disregards the subsidiary's corporate independence, and plaintiffs showed no such control.
• Babcock v. Watts Water Technologies (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). Plaintiffs need only make a non-frivolous showing of specific jurisdiction to defeat a CPLR 3211(a)(8) motion, and a defendant's lack of documentation of pre-merger assets and liabilities left successor-liability jurisdiction a non-frivolous theory. Leave to amend to add a defendant is freely given absent surprise or prejudice.
• DeRozieres v. Munaco Sealing Solutions (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). Collateral estoppel applied because personal jurisdiction over Munaco and its status as successor to the New York company had already been decided against it in a prior case, and the newly offered contract did not change that analysis.
• Rothlein v. Imerys Talc America (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). General jurisdiction over a corporation exists only where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business. A corporation that buys another's assets is not liable for the seller's torts unless an exception applies (assumption, merger, mere continuation, or fraud).
• Shulman v. Brenntag N. AM., Inc. (2019). Where the parties' experts conflict on whether the defendants' talc contained asbestos and whether it caused the plaintiff's mesothelioma, credibility issues cannot be resolved on summary judgment. Evidence that defendants knew of and concealed asbestos in their talc raises a fact issue on punitive damages.
• Hooper-Lynch v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. (2018). A defendant moving for summary judgment on causation must unequivocally establish through admissible evidence that its product could not have contributed to the injury. Conflicting expert evidence on whether the talc contained asbestos raises credibility issues for a jury.
• Shulman v. Imerys Talc America (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). New York courts may exercise specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) over a talc supplier whose predecessors sold talc to a New York company, where the plaintiff's claim of injury from the finished product has an articulable nexus to those sales.
• Cohen v. Imerys Talc America (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). Under New York law a company that buys another's assets is not liable for the seller's torts unless an exception applies (assumption of liability, merger, mere continuation, or fraud); a purchase that left the seller in business, without assuming its liabilities, fell within no exception, and New York does not recognize a product line exception.
• Watts v. A & J Plumbing & Heating Corp. (2018). A corporation that buys another's assets is not liable for the seller's torts unless it assumed the liability, there was a de facto merger or mere continuation, or the sale was fraudulent. The asset purchase agreement here excluded liability for product claims based on occurrences on or before the closing date.
• Montanez v. Beck/Arnley Worldparts (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2017). Under New York law, continuity of ownership is a necessary predicate to finding a de facto merger and successor liability for a seller's torts, and other indicia such as continuing benefit cannot substitute for it absent appellate direction.
• Finerty v. Abex Corp. (2016). A parent corporation that is not itself a manufacturer, seller or distributor in the chain of distribution cannot be held strictly liable for its subsidiary's products unless the corporate veil can be pierced; being in a position to exert pressure on a subsidiary or controlling a trademark does not create strict liability.
• In re Johns-Manville Corp. (2016). A person exposed to asbestos before the debtor's petition date holds a prepetition claim even if disease appears later. Such a claim against a Manville subsidiary is discharged by that subsidiary's plan and is also channeled to the Manville Trust under the Manville injunction, and notice by publication plus a future claims representative satisfied due process.
• North v. National Grid Generation (IN the Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (1st Dept., 2016). An owner that specifies the means and methods of work and coordinates the trades can be liable under Labor Law § 200, and a pre-1996 indemnification clause covering all losses arising from the work can require the contractor to indemnify the owner, including fees for defending the plaintiff's action but not for prosecuting the indemnity claim.
• Unterberg v. ExxonMobil Oil Corp. (2016). A Jones Act claim lies only against the seaman's employer, and a parent company is treated as the employer or vessel owner only if the subsidiary is its mere instrumentality or alter ego, which requires actual domination rather than mere stock ownership or some overlap of personnel and offices.
• Finerty v. Abex Corp. (1st Dept., 2015). A parent company is not liable on a veil-piercing theory, but fact issues exist whether it may be directly liable for its role in standardizing and distributing a subsidiary's asbestos-containing parts. Personal jurisdiction over a foreign subsidiary under CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) requires that it reasonably expected the out-of-state exposure to have consequences in New York.
• Gayoso v. Fiat USA (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2015). Where a defendant claims it is not the successor to the company that sold the product, the plaintiff may take limited discovery on the corporate relationship before summary judgment, because the Schumacher successor-liability exceptions, de facto merger and alter ego theories cannot be ruled out on the existing record.
• Matter of Crist v. Amchem Prods., Inc. (Erie, 2015). Under CPLR 327(a), a New York court may dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds where the defendants carry their heavy burden of showing little connection between New York and the case, here because the plaintiff's residence, exposure, employment, records and witnesses were all in Michigan.
• Burawa v. Acker Drill Co. (2014). A reasonable inference that the plaintiff was exposed to Hercules engines made in the period for which the defendant is responsible, together with the defendant's failure to rebut the corporate history, creates a triable issue of fact that defeats summary judgment.
• Houston v. Beazer E., Inc. (2014). A corporation is liable as successor for its predecessor's torts only if it acquired all or substantially all of the predecessor's assets and one of the exceptions (such as de facto merger or mere continuation) applies; the plaintiffs showed neither an asset transfer nor such an exception.
• Proctor v. Alcoa, Inc. (2014). On summary judgment the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant; evidence that a defendant's predecessors supplied the taping and floor tile work at the site raises triable issues on successor responsibility for the plaintiff's exposure.
• Shtockhammer v. 29th Street Hotel Acquisition, LLC (2014). On a motion to dismiss, a complaint and supporting affidavit alleging asbestos exposure at a property state premises liability and negligence claims against the buyer, and the purchase agreement's transfer of the property's liabilities, including asbestos, did not conclusively defeat them. Veil-piercing claims against related entities may proceed to discovery.
• Logan v. AP Miller-Maersk, Inc. (2013). A corporation that acquires another's assets may take on the seller's tort liabilities through a de facto merger, which is judged case by case on many factors. The seller's continued existence for years after the sale does not alone defeat such a claim.
• Konstantin v. 630 Third Ave. Assoc. (2012). A verdict is set aside as a matter of law only if no valid line of reasoning could support it, and a pain and suffering award is reduced under CPLR 5501(c) when it deviates materially from reasonable compensation. Expert causation opinions need only a proper foundation in generally accepted methods, not studies on identical circumstances.
• Walker v. Abb, Inc. (2012). Summary judgment on product identification is premature under CPLR 3212(f) where the defendant has not produced relevant discovery, such as sales records and details of a sale of its division, that could bear on whether its products were a source of exposure.
• Bernard v. Brookfield Props. Corp. (2011). A person whose asbestos disease had not appeared when a debtor's reorganization plan was confirmed did not lose her claims, because due process outweighs the plan's discharge language. A corporation that acquires another's assets can be liable as successor-in-interest only on certain grounds, and the defendants did not show these were absent.
• Gennone v. AJ Eckert Company, Inc. (2010). A corporation that buys another's assets is not liable for the seller's torts unless one of four exceptions applies (express or implied assumption, merger, mere continuation, fraud). A party seeking more discovery under Rule 56(f) must show how it would create a genuine factual issue, and speculation is not enough.
• Thaut v. AO Smith Water Prods. (2010). Plaintiff's testimony that he was close by when machinists worked on boilers, together with documents showing the defendant's predecessor supplied valves for those boilers, raised a triable issue of fact on exposure to the defendant's products.
• Penny v. United Fruit Co. (1994). New York's long-arm statute, CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii), requires that the defendant expect or reasonably expect its act to have consequences in New York. British shipowners could not foresee a British crewman later moving to New York and developing mesothelioma there. A parent is liable as employer under the Jones Act only if the subsidiary is its mere instrumentality, which requires actual domination.
• Fusaro v. Porter-Hayden Co. (1989). A later-diagnosed, distinct asbestos disease such as mesothelioma is a separate injury, and the limitations period under CPLR 214-c starts anew when it is discovered, even if an earlier asbestosis claim was time-barred. Successor-liability allegations in an amended complaint relate back to the original complaint under CPLR 203 when they arise from the same transactions and the defendants are united in interest.

North Carolina

• In re Aldrich Pump LLC (2023). Financial distress is not a constitutional or jurisdictional prerequisite to filing Chapter 11. Under the Fourth Circuit's Carolin test, a bad faith dismissal requires both objective futility and subjective bad faith, and objective futility was not shown. Section 1112(b) cause also was not shown.
• In re Bestwall LLC (2023). A bankruptcy court has "related to" jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) to enjoin thousands of identical asbestos claims against a non-debtor affiliate when they could conceivably affect the debtor's estate. A § 105(a) preliminary injunction in chapter 11 requires only a realistic possibility of successful reorganization, not a showing that a permanent § 524(g) injunction will issue.
• Bell v. American International Industries (2021). Under North Carolina law a corporation that buys another's assets is not liable for the seller's liabilities unless one of four exceptions applies; neither de facto merger nor mere continuation was shown, and North Carolina does not recognize the product line exception.
• In re Aldrich Pump LLC (2021). Under the Texas divisional merger statute the asbestos liabilities belong only to the debtors, so suits against non-debtor affiliates to recover them are stayed under section 362(a)(1). Claims such as fraudulent transfer, alter ego and successor liability are estate property or belong first to the trustee, and are stayed under section 362(a)(3). A preliminary injunction under section 105 was warranted because such suits would interfere with reorganization.
• In re Dbmp LLC (2021). Because the Texas divisional merger allocated all of Old CertainTeed's asbestos liabilities to DBMP, claims on those liabilities are claims against the debtor and are stayed under section 362(a)(1). Alter ego, successor liability and fraudulent transfer theories against the non-debtor affiliates are estate property or first-crack avoidance claims, stayed under section 362(a)(3).
• In re Bestwall LLC (2019). In the Fourth Circuit, a Chapter 11 case may be dismissed as a bad faith filing only if it is both objectively futile and filed in subjective bad faith. A properly venued case is transferred only if the movant shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the interests of justice or the convenience of the parties require it.
• In re Garlock Sealing Technologies LLC (2017). A reorganization plan that creates an asbestos trust, was approved by the required 75% of voting asbestos claimants, and meets the other requirements of Bankruptcy Code section 524(g) and section 1129 may be confirmed with a channeling injunction protecting the debtors and related parties.
• Moore v. Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc. (2017). The Woodson exception to workers' compensation exclusivity applies only where an employer intentionally engages in misconduct knowing it is substantially certain to cause serious injury or death; knowledge that harm was possible or probable is not enough.
• Branson v. American International Industries (2016). A court may defer a belated personal jurisdiction challenge until trial under Rule 12(i) when the defendants answered late and participated in discovery planning, and the jurisdictional facts need further development and overlap with the merits. Under Rule 12(c), the complaint's allegations were enough to prevent dismissal.
• Starnes v. AO Smith Corporation (2014). To avoid summary judgment, plaintiffs must produce admissible evidence of frequent, regular, and proximate exposure to an asbestos-containing product for which the defendant is legally responsible. A successor corporation can be liable only if it acquired the predecessor's business assets associated with the alleged tort.

Ohio

• Taylor v. BASF Catalysts, LLC (8th Appellate District, 2023). A trial court abuses its discretion by finding an attorney's claims frivolous based solely on a non-binding out-of-state ruling between different parties, because the party seeking sanctions bears the burden of showing why that ruling should carry weight. A voluntary dismissal under Civ.R. 41, without egregious conduct, is not by itself frivolous or harassing conduct.
• Blakely v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (9th Appellate District, 2019). An unrebutted statutory presumption under R.C. 2307.941 that a premises owner complied with state safe exposure levels does not by itself defeat a premises claim built on a theory that the owner knew those levels were unsafe. A negligence-based supplier claim under R.C. 2307.78(A)(1) is not barred by DiCenzo or a privity requirement, and the product question is whether the component had left the manufacturer's control, not whether it was still in a manufacturing process.
• Schwartz v. Honeywell Internatl., Inc. (8th Appellate District, 2016). Expert testimony on cumulative asbestos exposure and brake dust causing mesothelioma was admissible without quantified dose, and evidence of manner, proximity and frequency of exposure met Ohio's substantial factor test (R.C. 2307.96). Evidence that a feasible non-asbestos alternative existed supported the design defect claim, and enough evidence of flagrant disregard existed that punitive damages should not have been taken from the jury.
• Tucker v. CompuDyne Corp. (8th Appellate District, 2014). An inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document can waive attorney-client privilege under a case-by-case, five-factor test with fairness weighing heavily, and work-product protection for factual information yields on a showing of good cause (relevant and otherwise unavailable).