John Crane, Inc. v. Jones (2004)

Our plain-English summary of John Crane, Inc. v. Jones (Georgia Supreme Court, November 8, 2004).

Robert Jones sued John Crane, Inc. and seven other companies, claiming he developed mesothelioma from occupational exposure to asbestos dust from their products. After he died in 1997, his wife Laila Jones continued the case and added wrongful death and loss of consortium claims. Every defendant except John Crane was dismissed or went into bankruptcy before trial, and the jury awarded $1,975,000 against John Crane. John Crane argued that the trial judge should have told the jury that Jones's exposure to its products had to be a "substantial" contributing factor in his illness. The Georgia Supreme Court rejected that argument and affirmed the Court of Appeals. It said Georgia law has long held that, when several parties' negligence contributes to an injury, each is liable if its conduct was a contributing cause, even with differing degrees of fault. It found the cases John Crane cited inapplicable and noted that Georgia plaintiffs must still prove exposure to the particular defendant's asbestos product.

We wrote this summary from the court's opinion with the help of AI. It is not the court's wording, and it is not legal advice. The full opinion is below.

The decision

• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Decided: November 8, 2004
• Citation: 604 S.E.2d 822
• Docket: No. S03G1791
• Stage: Appeal from judgment after trial
• State: Georgia

Outcome. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, upholding the $1,975,000 verdict for Laila Jones against John Crane, Inc. and the trial court's refusal to give a "substantial contributing factor" jury charge.

What the court held. Where several defendants' tortious acts may have combined to cause an injury, Georgia law does not require each defendant's conduct to be a "substantial" contributing factor to be a proximate cause; it is enough that the conduct was a contributing factor.

Issues decided: Fault, Apportionment and Settlement Credits, Causation, Trial Procedure and Discovery.

Why this case is relevant

In this decision the Georgia Supreme Court answered no to the question whether, when several defendants' conduct may have combined to cause an injury, each defendant's conduct must be a "substantial" contributing factor to count as a proximate cause. It held that Georgia's long-standing law on joint wrongdoers requires only that a defendant's conduct be a contributing factor, and it upheld a jury instruction in a mesothelioma case worded that way. The court also stressed that a plaintiff must still prove exposure to asbestos products for which the defendant is responsible.

Later courts cite it mainly for that causation standard. The Georgia Court of Appeals treated it as controlling in another John Crane appeal the same year. That court has since quoted it for the plaintiff's burden of proof and for the product-exposure requirement. In 2006 the Georgia Supreme Court described it as the rule before a later statute required asbestos plaintiffs to present prima facie evidence that asbestos was a substantial contributing factor. In 2016 that court still cited it for the "contributing factor" test. Federal courts in Delaware and Georgia have relied on it when applying Georgia law to asbestos claims.

This section was drafted with the assistance of WARD, our Worldwide Asbestos Reference Desk, from the opinion and the later decisions in our library that cite it. It is not legal advice.

The people and their exposure

• Robert H. Jones: mesothelioma; died

Who	Work	Where	When	Products
Robert H. Jones	occupational exposure			products manufactured by John Crane, Inc. and other defendants

The defendants

• John Crane, Inc. (manufacturer)

Decisions this opinion cites

Earlier decisions in our library that the court cited:

• Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Ayers (U.S. Supreme Court, 2003). The Supreme Court affirmed the West Virginia trial court's judgments for the six asbestosis claimants against Norfolk & Western Railway, upholding both the fear-of-cancer damages instruction and the refusal to apportion damages to other exposures.
• Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (California Supreme Court, 1997). The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal's judgment, which had ordered a new trial for Owens-Illinois. It held that the burden-shifting instruction was error but harmless, and that the tobacco company defense issue was controlled by Richards, so the plaintiffs' judgment against Owens-Illinois was not overturned.
• Horton v. Harwick Chem. Corp. (Ohio Supreme Court, 1995). The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, which had upheld summary judgment for the asbestos product defendants, and remanded to the trial court, so the Hortons and Derrick won on the causation standard. It agreed with the appellate court that alternative liability does not apply.
• Lockwood v. AC & S, Inc. (Washington Supreme Court, 1987). The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and the trial court, leaving in place the $183,372 jury verdict for Albert Lockwood against Raymark Industries.
• Hoffman v. Allied Corp. (U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, 1990). The Eleventh Circuit reversed summary judgment for Armstrong World Industries and the other defendants and remanded, finding genuine issues of material fact for the Hoffmans' claim.
• Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp. (U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, 1986). The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment for the defendants: directed verdicts for Raymark, Celotex and Pittsburgh Corning, a jury verdict for the other four defendants, and the challenged evidentiary rulings and jury instructions, against plaintiff Lohrmann.
• Blackston v. Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co. (U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, 1985). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for AC&S, Inc. against pipefitter Benjamin Blackston, holding that his evidence could not show he worked with or near AC&S's asbestos-containing products.
• John Crane, Inc. v. Jones (Georgia Court of Appeals, 2003). The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the $1,975,000 jury verdict for Laila Jones against John Crane, Inc., upholding the jury charge, the evidence rulings and the denial of j.n.o.v. or a new trial.

Later decisions citing this one

12 later decisions in our library cite this one:

• Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Knight (Georgia Supreme Court, 2016). The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' affirmance of the judgment for Roy Knight and his wife against Scapa Dryer Fabrics, holding that admitting Dr. Abraham's causation testimony was an abuse of discretion.
• DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Ferrante (Georgia Supreme Court, 2006). The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial courts' rulings that Georgia's 2005 asbestos claims Act could not constitutionally be applied to the plaintiffs' pending asbestos cases, so the plaintiffs won and the defendants lost.
• Bowers v. CSX Transportation, Inc. (Georgia Court of Appeals, 2023). The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's exclusion of the plaintiff's causation expert and its grant of summary judgment to CSX Transportation, so the estate of Luther Bowers lost.
• Davis v. John Crane, Inc. (Georgia Court of Appeals, 2019). The court reversed summary judgment for John Crane, Inc. on product identification, and affirmed summary judgment for FMC Corporation on the negligent design and failure-to-warn claims over third-party replacement parts.
• Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Knight (Georgia Court of Appeals, 2015). The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment on the jury verdict for Roy and Milva Knight against Scapa Dryer Fabrics, rejecting all of Scapa's challenges to the evidence, the expert testimony, the jury charges and the evidentiary rulings.
• Butler v. Union Carbide Corporation (Georgia Court of Appeals, 2011). The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's exclusion of Dr. Maddox's specific causation testimony and its grant of summary judgment to Union Carbide, so Mrs. Butler lost.
• Putzel Elect. Contractors v. Jones (Georgia Court of Appeals, 2006). The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court's affirmance of the workers' compensation award to Allen Ray Jones, rejecting the limitation and insufficient-exposure arguments of Putzel Electric Contractors and its insurer CNA Risk Management.
• John Crane, Inc. v. Highsmith (Georgia Court of Appeals, 2004). The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of $1,266,377 for Lois Highsmith and the estate of James Highsmith against John Crane, Inc., rejecting its challenges to the jury charges and the sufficiency of the evidence.
• Pruitt v. Deere & Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (U.S. District Court, District of Delaware, 2020). The magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment for Taco, Terex and Trane, and partial summary judgment for Deere, against plaintiff John Pruitt, who did not oppose the motions.
• Pruitt v. Amdura (In re Asbestos Litigation) (U.S. District Court, District of Delaware, 2020). The magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment for Amdura and BorgWarner Morse TEC, and denying summary judgment for Gardner Denver and Warren Pumps, in John Pruitt's mesothelioma suit.
• Hanson v. Colgate-Palmolive Company (U.S. District Court, Southern District of Georgia, 2018). The district court granted Colgate-Palmolive's motions for summary judgment and partial summary judgment on punitive damages, entering judgment against Douglas Hanson on all claims because he had no evidence that his late wife was exposed to asbestos in Cashmere Bouquet talc, or at what level.
• Newman v. Avocet Enterprises (In re Asbestos Litigation) (Delaware Superior Court, 2011). The court denied Avocet Enterprises' motion for summary judgment on the Newmans' remaining claims, because Newman's testimony about using Ventbestos raised a factual dispute on causation, and found the motion moot as to the withdrawn conspiracy claim.

Amounts in the opinion

• $1,975,000 (total)

On our site

• Georgia Mesothelioma Lawyer: Asbestos Claims, Deadlines & Compensation

The court's opinion

The text below is Google Scholar's copy of the court's opinion, a public record. Numbers in brackets, such as [*921], mark where each page of the printed reporter begins.

604 S.E.2d 822 (2004)

278 Ga. 747

JOHN CRANE, INC.

v.

JONES et al.

No. S03G1791.

November 8, 2004.

Reconsideration Denied December 9, 2004.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

[*823] Hawkins & Parnell, Ollie M. Harton, Elizabeth B. Padgett, Baker & McKenzie, Michael A. Pollard, for appellant. Lane & Gossett, Roger B. Lane, Brunswick, for appellees.

Alston & Bird, Dow N. Kirkpatrick, II, J. Kennard Neal, Orlyn O. Lockard III, McNatt & Greene, Hugh B. McNatt, Brinson, Askew, Berry, Seigler, Richardson, Robert M. Brinson, Troutman Sanders, Daniel S. Reinhardt, Whelchel, Brown, Readdick & Bumgartner, J. Thomas Whelchel, Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, Sara S. Turnipseed, Thomas F. Wamsley Jr., Hunton & Williams, Jay B. Bryan, Emily R. Bramer, amici curiae.

HINES, Justice.

This Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in John Crane v. Jones, 262 Ga.App. 531, 586 S.E.2d 26 (2003), to consider the question:

Where separate tortious acts allegedly committed by multiple defendants may have combined to produce the plaintiff's injury, must each individual tortfeasor's conduct constitute a "substantial" contributing factor in the injury in order to be considered a proximate cause thereof?

We conclude that the question must be answered in the negative; therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The following facts are set forth in the opinion of the Court of Appeals. In 1996, Robert H. Jones filed a negligence and product liability action against John Crane, Inc. ("John Crane") and seven other corporate defendants alleging that he contracted mesothelioma because of occupational exposure to asbestos dust from products manufactured by the defendants. After Jones's death in 1997, his wife and the executrix of his estate, Laila A. Jones ("Jones"), was substituted as plaintiff and amended the complaint to add claims of wrongful death and loss of consortium. All defendants but John Crane were either dismissed from the suit or filed for bankruptcy prior to trial. The jury returned a $1,975,000 verdict against John Crane, and the trial court denied John Crane's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for new trial. John Crane appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury that Jones could not recover unless her husband's [*824] exposure to its products was a "substantial contributing factor" to his injuries.[1] The Court of Appeals concluded that the jury was properly charged on proximate cause. Id. at 535(1), 586 S.E.2d 26.

John Crane argues that the Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion because the "substantial factor" formulation is consistent with Georgia law, has been widely accepted throughout the country, and is justified by public policy considerations. But such arguments are unavailing.

Contrary to John Crane's contention, requiring that its contribution to the resulting injury be "substantial" is not in accord with the longstanding law of Georgia. As the Court of Appeals noted in its opinion, the charge given by the trial court, which instructed that in order to find proximate cause the individual defendant's tortious conduct had to be a contributing factor in bringing about the plaintiff's damages, is entirely consistent with established law regarding the concurrent negligence of joint tortfeasors. Gooch v. Ga. Marble Co., 151 Ga. 462, 463-464, 107 S.E. 47 (1921). The jury should not have been limited in

considering the defendant's liability to only that situation in which its contribution to the plaintiff's injury was "substantial," for Georgia law clearly contemplates differing degrees of culpability among joint tortfeasors.

Where the injury is the result of the concurring negligence of two or more parties, they may be sued jointly or severally.... It is well settled that an action may be maintained against two joint tort-feasors whose negligence contributes to produce an injury, even though the same obligations do not rest upon each with respect to the person injured. It is sufficient to support a recovery if the negligence of both be a contributing cause, even though one owes to the person injured a higher degree of care, and even though there be differing degrees of negligence by each.

(Emphasis supplied.) John Crane v. Jones, supra at 533(1), 586 S.E.2d 26, quoting Gooch v. Ga. Marble Co., supra at 463-464, 107 S.E. 47.

John Crane points to Polston v. Boomershine Pontiac-GMC Truck, 262 Ga. 616, 423 S.E.2d 659 (1992), and Fulmore v. CSX Transp., 252 Ga.App. 884, 557 S.E.2d 64 (2001),[2] as support for the use of the "substantial contributing factor" formulation. But, neither case advances its position. Polston is inapposite because it was a crashworthiness or enhanced injury case, that is, the defendant manufacturer's asserted liability was based upon alleged design defects which were contended to have enhanced the injuries the plaintiff received in a collision. Polston v. Boomershine Pontiac-GMC Truck at 616, 423 S.E.2d 659. Thus, the defendant was liable only to the extent that any design defect enhanced or aggravated the plaintiff's injuries over and above the circumstances without the alleged defect. Id. at 619, 423 S.E.2d 659. Consequently, the plaintiff had the burden of proving that the design defect was a substantial factor in producing the additional damages. Id.

Fulmore is likewise a poor analogy for the present case because it was the consolidated appeal of 18 negligence actions brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA). As noted by the Court of Appeals, the sole basis in Fulmore for mentioning "substantial factor" in the context of proximate cause was a case from a foreign jurisdiction which was both factually and legally inapposite. See Grassis v. Johns-Manville Corp., 248 N.J.Super. 446, 591 A.2d 671 (1991). [*825] Citing Prosser and Keeton,[3] John Crane asserts that the "substantial factor" formulation should be employed in multiple tortfeasor asbestos cases because:

It aids in the disposition of ... two other types of situations which have proved troublesome. One is that where a similar, but not identical result would have followed without the defendant's act; the other where one defendant has made a clearly proved but quite insignificant contribution to the result, as where he throws a lighted match into a forest fire.

But the first type of case described is akin to the situation of an enhanced injury, which this Court has already addressed. See Polston v. Boomershine Pontiac-GMC Truck, supra. The second presents the circumstance of a de minimis contribution to the injury. And as the Court of Appeals concluded, the jury charge at issue would not have misled the jury into believing that it could award damages for a de minimis exposure to asbestos. John Crane v. Jones, 262 Ga.App. at 533(1), 586 S.E.2d 26.

What is more, John Crane's citation to Prosser and Keeton is misleading because the quoted excerpt discusses the suitability of employing the "substantial factor" test as a substitute for the traditional "but for" test when determining cause-in-fact, not proximate cause. Prosser and Keeton, in fact, criticize extending the "substantial factor" formulation into the area of proximate cause.

As applied to the fact of causation alone, the test though not ideal, may be thought useful. But when the "substantial factor" is made to include all of the ill-defined considerations of policy which go to limit liability once causation in fact is found, it has no more definite meaning than "proximate cause," and it becomes a hindrance rather than a help. It is particularly unfortunate in so far as it suggests that the questions involved are only questions of causation, obscuring all other issues, and as it tends to leave to the jury matters which should be decided by the court.[4]

Prosser and Keeton, On The Law of Torts, § 42 at 278 (5th ed.1984).

The idea of a "substantial factor" formulation in multiple tortfeasor cases is not a new concept. See, e. g., Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920), overruled in part by Borsheim v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 149 Minn. 210, 183 N.W. 519 (Minn.1921). Such a test was originally proposed by Jeremiah Smith in a law review article published in 1911. Smith, "Legal Cause in Actions of Tort," 25 Harv. L.Rev. 103 (1911). See Jeter v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 716 A.2d 633, 636(n.2) (Pa.Super 1998), citing Prosser & Keeton, On the Law of Torts, § 42, p. 278 (5th ed.1984). And as John Crane submits, the formulation has been used in some other jurisdictions in the context of asbestos litigation. See e.g., Jeter v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., supra.; Horton v. Harwick Chem. Corp., 73 Ohio St.3d 679, 653 N.E.2d 1196 (1995). But what has not been mentioned are the very real problems with applying a "substantial factor" standard in such negligence actions. A recent legal commentator observed that an "important reason for urging the courts not to use the `substantial factor' vocabulary in discussing legal cause questions is a fear of proliferating issues." Robertson, "W. Page Keeton Symposium on Tort Law: The Common Sense of Cause in Fact," 75 Tex. L.Rev. 1765, 1780 (1997). In the analysis of a negligence action, the plaintiff must satisfy the elements of the tort, that is, the plaintiff must show a duty, a breach of that duty, causation, and damages. Id.; Johnson v. American Nat. Red Cross, 276 Ga. 270, 272(1), 578 S.E.2d 106 (2003). It would be a departure from the analysis to add the requirement that the causal connection must be substantial. Robertson, supra at 1781. Once the term "substantial factor" is employed in the general negligence law [*826] vocabulary, there is the danger that it will be used not only to describe a general approach to the legal cause issue, but will turn into a separate and independent hurdle that the plaintiff will have to overcome in addition to the standard elements of a claim of negligence. Id. So too, has there been great difficulty and disparity in the courts' definition of "substantial factor." See, e. g., Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. 16 Cal.4th 953, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 16, 941 P.2d 1203 (1997); Horton v. Harwick Chem. Corp., supra at 686-687, 653 N.E.2d 1196; Lockwood v. A C & S, Inc., 109 Wash.2d 235, 744 P.2d 605 (1987); Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1162-1163 (4th Cir.1986).

As to public policy concerns, John Crane's arguments are likewise unpersuasive. John Crane urges that refusing to embrace the "substantial contributing factor" formulation will subject every defendant in asbestos actions to joint and several liability for injuries caused by others' conduct, and will encourage an increase in asbestos cases, thus creating administrative problems for the judicial system. However, asbestos litigation is not new, and the absence of a "substantial contributing factor" formulation has not led to the proliferation of such lawsuits, nor is it likely to do so. John Crane's assertions ignore the fact that the injured plaintiff in Georgia must prove that he or she was exposed to asbestos-containing products for which the defendant is responsible. Blackston v. Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co., 764 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir.1985). Under Georgia law, proximate cause is an essential element of the plaintiff's case regardless of whether the plaintiff proceeds under a theory of negligence or strict liability. Id. at 1482; OCGA § 51-1-11(b)(1); Jones v. NordicTrack, 274 Ga. 115, 550 S.E.2d 101 (2001). See also Hoffman v. Allied Corp., 912 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir.1990); Lee v. Celotex, 764 F.2d 1489, 1490 (11th Cir.1985); Lowie v. Raymark Industries, 676 F.Supp. 1214, 1216 (S.D.Ga.1987). As was noted in Blackston v. Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co., the fact that the plaintiff must "identify the asbestos-containing product of a particular defendant and show that [he] worked in proximity to [use of that product] sets a standard that is difficult to meet, in view of the length of time between exposure and perceived injury and the migratory nature of much of the employment involving asbestos exposure." Id. at 1486. Thus, refusing to endorse the additional hurdle that each individual tortfeasor's conduct must constitute a "substantial" contributing factor in the plaintiff's injury in order to be considered a proximate cause thereof will neither subject defendants like John Crane to unjust liability nor open the floodgates of asbestos litigation. Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

[1] The trial court gave the following charge, which was agreed to by the parties except for the omission of the word "substantial": Proximate cause requires a showing by the plaintiff that the defendant's negligence was a factor in bringing about the loss. Where several negligent acts may have produced plaintiff's injury, to be considered the proximate cause an individual defendant's tortious conduct must constitute a contributing factor in bringing about the plaintiff's damages. Now, to hold an individual defendant liable, the plaintiff must introduce sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find that more than likely, their exposure to a particular defendant's product was a factor in producing their injuries.

John Crane v. Jones, at 532(1), 586 S.E.2d 26.

[2] Disapproved in part, Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 151 n. 11, 123 S.Ct. 1210, 155 L.Ed.2d 261 (2003). [3] Prosser and Keeton, On the Law of Torts, § 41, pp. 267-68 (5th ed.1984).

[4] Prosser and Keeton have noted that some courts that adopted a "substantial factor" test for both cause-in-fact and proximate cause subsequently experienced problems with the formula. See Seward v. Minneapolis Street Railway Co., 222 Minn. 454, 25 N.W.2d 221 (1946), discussing Peterson v. Fulton, 192 Minn. 360, 256 N.W. 901 (1934). Prosser and Keeton, On the Law of Torts, § 42 at 278.

Sources

• The opinion on Google Scholar
• Georgia asbestos laws
• Georgia asbestos exposure sites