Rittenhouse v. St. Regis Hotel Joint Venture (1992)

Our plain-English summary of Rittenhouse v. St. Regis Hotel Joint Venture (New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, February 18, 1992).

Eva Rittenhouse, an interior decorator, spent eighteen days and more than eighty hours at the St. Regis Hotel in New York during a liquidation sale in December 1988 and January 1989. She then saw a sign warning of cancer-causing material and learned that asbestos removal work had been done on some floors. She had survived cancer in 1982 and became very anxious about contracting mesothelioma. She sued the hotel owners, general contractor, asbestos removal subcontractors, architects and the liquidation company for emotional distress and "cancerphobia." The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants and ordered her law firm to pay $10,000 in sanctions for a frivolous claim. The law firm appealed the sanctions. The Appellate Division agreed with the dismissal because objective testing of her person and possessions showed no physical manifestation of asbestos contamination. It reversed the sanctions because the record did not show the action was frivolous or brought in bad faith. The court also warned the Bar that frivolous actions would be met with strict application of the sanctions rule.

We wrote this summary from the court's opinion with the help of AI. It is not the court's wording, and it is not legal advice. The full opinion is below.

The decision

• Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 1st Dept.
• Decided: February 18, 1992
• Citation: 180 A.D.2d 523
• Stage: Appeal from summary judgment
• State: New York

Outcome. The Appellate Division left in place the dismissal of Rittenhouse's action on summary judgment for the hotel owners, contractors, architects and liquidator, but reversed and vacated the $10,000 in sanctions the trial court had imposed on her law firm.

What the court held. Sanctions under CPLR 8303-a require a finding that the action was commenced frivolously or in bad faith, and the record did not support that finding. Summary judgment was proper where objective testing showed no physical manifestation of asbestos contamination.

Issues decided: Fear of Cancer and Medical Monitoring, Trial Procedure and Discovery.

The people and their exposure

• Eva Rittenhouse (bystander)

The defendants

• St. Regis Hotel Joint Venture (premises owner)
• Sheraton New York Corporation (premises owner)
• St. Regis Sheraton Corporation (premises owner)
• the Equitable Life Assurance Society (premises owner)
• the Sheraton Corporation (premises owner)
• Tishman Construction Corporation (contractor)
• Testwell Craig Laboratory Inc. (contractor)
• Hazardous Waste Engineering Consultants, Inc. (contractor)
• D & G Painting and Asbestos Company (contractor)
• Brennan Beer Gorman
• NCL National Content Liquidators

Amounts in the opinion

• $10,000.00 (other)

The court's opinion

The text below is Google Scholar's copy of the court's opinion, a public record. Numbers in brackets, such as [*921], mark where each page of the printed reporter begins.

180 A.D.2d 523 (1992)

Eva Rittenhouse, Plaintiff,

v.

St. Regis Hotel Joint Venture et al., Respondents. Landau & Kleinbaum, Esqs., Nonparty Appellant

February 18, 1992

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, First Department.

Concur — Sullivan, J. P., Kupferman, Ross and Kassal, JJ.

Ms. Eva Rittenhouse, an interior decorator, attended a public liquidation sale of furniture, pictures, linens, etc., sponsored by NCL National Content Liquidators (NCL), and held from December 18, 1988 through January 6, 1989, during working hours, at the St. Regis Hotel (Hotel), New York County. During that period of time, Ms. Rittenhouse allegedly spent a total of eighteen days and more than eighty hours inspecting various items of personally throughout the Hotel, in the course of which she noticed many holes in the ceilings and walls, exposed piping and extensive debris strewn about. On January 3, 1989, for the first time, Ms. Rittenhouse noticed a sign in the Hotel, reading "Hazardous Cancer Causing Material", indicating that there was an asbestos removal project in progress. Having survived cancer in 1982, Ms. Rittenhouse became very distressed about the effects thereof [*524] upon her health, and therefore she contacted City and Federal agencies, including the New York City Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) and the United States Environmental Protection Agency, seeking information about, inter alia, "friable asbestos". The DEP had on a file a form stating that during December 1988, in the Hotel, asbestos removal work had taken place on the 3rd, 12th, and 16th floors. Following her receipt of the information about the asbestos removal activities in the Hotel, according to her physician, Ms. Rittenhouse was put into a state of extreme anxiety over contracting mesothelioma, giving rise to spastic colon attacks. Subsequently, Ms. Rittenhouse (plaintiff) retained a law firm (law firm), who, in 1989, commenced an action against multiple defendants for damages, alleging that the negligence of those defendants caused disturbed asbestos containing material to be present at the Hotel, resulting in plaintiff's emotional distress, mental anguish and "cancerphobia". The eleven defendants, include: (a) five hotel owner entities (owners), consisting of St. Regis Hotel Joint Venture, Sheraton New York Corporation, St. Regis Sheraton Corporation, the Equitable Life Assurance Society, and the Sheraton Corporation; (b) the hotel general contractor, Tishman Construction Corporation; (c) the asbestos removal subcontractors, Testwell Craig Laboratory Inc. (Testwell), Hazardous Waste Engineering Consultants, Inc. (Hazardous), and D & G Painting and Asbestos Company (D & G); (d) architects, Brennan Beer Gorman, and (e) NCL.

After the joinder of issue, and the conducting of some discovery, the defendant owners jointly moved for summary judgment, and, inter alia, moved, pursuant to CPLR 8303-a, that sanctions in the amount of $10,000.00 be imposed on plaintiff's counsel for commencing and/or continuing an allegedly frivolous claim in bad faith. Thereafter, while the architect and three of the asbestos removal defendants, Testwell, Hazardous and D & G moved for identical relief as the defendant owners, defendant NCL only moved for summary judgment, without sanctions. In response, plaintiff cross-moved for an order permitting her to take the depositions of the principals in two of the defendants, Testwell and the Sheraton New York Corporation.

By order, entered on or about October 23, 1990, the IAS Court, inter alia, upon granting defendants' motions for summary judgment, dismissing the action, directed plaintiff's law firm to pay $2,500.00 to each of the counsel for the moving [*525] parties for the benefit of their respective clients for a total of $10,000.00 in costs (see, CPLR 8303-a), and denied the plaintiff's cross-motion. Further, by order, entered on or about December 17, 1990, the IAS Court, inter alia, denied appellant law firm's motion for reconsideration and/or rehearing of the prior order. The law firm appeals from the sanctions. After our examination of the record, since we find that all objective testing of plaintiff's person and possessions had demonstrated no physical manifestation of asbestos contamination, we agree with the IAS Court's determination granting defendants' motions for summary judgment. Nevertheless, we find that the IAS Court erred in imposing sanctions upon the law firm, since the record before us does not support the conclusion that the "plaintiff's commencement of this action was `frivolous' or in `bad faith', the stated grounds for the award (CPLR 8303-a)" (Hinckley v Resciniti, 159 AD2d 276, 277 [1st

Dept 1990]). Significantly, the IAS Court acknowledged, in denying the motion for reconsideration and/or rehearing, that "counsel may well have commenced the action in good faith".

However, we think it appropriate at this time to indicate to the Bar that frivolous and baseless actions will not be tolerated and will result in a strict application of the provisions of CPLR 8303-a.

Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the costs against the law firm.

Sources

• The opinion on Google Scholar
• New York asbestos laws
• New York asbestos exposure sites