State ex rel. Thompson v. Ohio Edison Co. (1999)

Our plain-English summary of State ex rel. Thompson v. Ohio Edison Co. (Ohio Supreme Court, April 7, 1999).

The widow of a man who died of mesothelioma sought workers' compensation death benefits from his former employer, Ohio Edison, through the Industrial Commission and the Bureau of Workers' Compensation. Under Ohio law, death benefits are based on the decedent's average weekly wage in the year before the disease began. Because he had left the workforce, that formula produced a zero wage, so the award was set at the statewide minimum. The widow argued that mesothelioma's long latency was a 'special circumstance' that justified a different method and a higher award. The Ohio Supreme Court agreed that special circumstances existed, but it held the commission's wage figure was still substantially just. The court reasoned that the wage calculation aims to replace future lost income, and the decedent had no future income to lose after withdrawing from the labor market. It also rejected her equal protection claim, finding she was not similarly situated to claimants whose decedents lost income because of death. The court affirmed the lower court. One justice dissented.

We wrote this summary from the court's opinion with the help of AI. It is not the court's wording, and it is not legal advice. The full opinion is below.

The decision

• Court: Ohio Supreme Court
• Decided: April 7, 1999
• Citation: 85 Ohio St. 3d 290
• Docket: No. 96-1715
• Stage: Appeal from other
• State: Ohio

Outcome. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment, upholding the Industrial Commission's minimum-level death benefit award and ruling against the claimant widow and in favor of Ohio Edison and the Commission.

What the court held. Although mesothelioma's long latency creates 'special circumstances' under R.C. 4123.61, the average weekly wage set by the commission was still substantially just because the decedent had no future compensation to lose. Denying a maximum award did not violate equal protection because the claimant was not similarly situated to claimants whose decedents lost income due to death.

Issues decided: Wrongful Death and Survival, Employer and Contractor Liability, and Workers' Compensation.

The people and their exposure

• Thompson (decedent, husband of claimant): mesothelioma; died

The defendants

• Ohio Edison Company (employer)
• Industrial Commission (government)
• Bureau of Workers' Compensation (government)

Later decisions citing this one

2 later decisions in our library cite this one:

• State ex rel. Hiatt v. Indus. Comm. (Ohio Supreme Court, 2003). The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' denial of a writ of mandamus, upholding the Industrial Commission's award of only the statutory minimum death benefit to the widow, Hiatt, over her claim for a higher award.
• State EX rel. General Motors Company v. Webster (Ohio Court of Appeals, 10th Appellate District, 2014). The court overruled General Motors' objections, adopted the magistrate's decision, and denied GM's request for a writ of mandamus, leaving the Industrial Commission's death benefit award to the widow, Dionicia Webster, at the statewide maximum of $775 per week.

The court's opinion

The text below is Google Scholar's copy of the court's opinion, a public record. Numbers in brackets, such as [*921], mark where each page of the printed reporter begins.

85 Ohio St.3d 290 (1999)

THE STATE EX REL. THOMPSON, APPELLANT,

v.

OHIO EDISON COMPANY ET AL., APPELLEES.

No. 96-1715.

Submitted January 12, 1999.

Decided April 7, 1999.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

[*291] Shapiro, Kendis & Associates Co., L.P.A., and Rachel B. Jaffy, for appellant.

Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Gerald H. Waterman, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees Industrial Commission and Bureau of Workers' Compensation.

Roderick, Myers & Linton, Robert F. Linton and Matthew W. Oby, for appellee Ohio Edison Company.

Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy and Marc J. Jaffy, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers.

Per Curiam.

One question is before us: Is the rate of death benefits so substantially unjust as to merit a departure from R.C. 4123.61's standard AWW formula because "special circumstances" are found to exist? Upon review, we answer that question in the negative.

Death benefits are set at sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the decedent's AWW, subject to a statewide maximum and minimum. R.C. 4123.59. In an [*292] occupational disease claim, average weekly wage is based on earnings for the year prior to disability onset. R.C. 4123.61. But where "special circumstances" exist and the traditional formula does not do "substantial justice" to the claimant, an alternative method may be used. Id.[1]

The traditional formula currently produced a zero AWW, which translated into an award at the minimum statewide AWW level. Claimant contends that mesothelioma's long latency presents the "uncommon situation" anticipated by the exception for "special circumstances." See State ex rel. Wireman v. Indus. Comm. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 286, 551 N.E.2d 1265. She makes a convincing argument. We have already recognized the unique workers' compensation considerations posed by long-latency occupational diseases. This occupational disease, moreover, has certainly presented an uncommon situation— the occupational disease that killed claimant did not affect his income. We find, therefore, that "special circumstances" indeed exist.

The more difficult question is whether "special circumstances" notwithstanding, the AWW set by the commission is substantially just. We find that it is. AWW "`is designed to find a fair basis for award for the loss of future compensation.'" (Emphasis added.) Wireman, 49 Ohio St.3d at 287, 551 N.E.2d at 1266-1267. Here, when mesothelioma struck, the decedent had no future compensation to lose. He had withdrawn from the labor market without evidence of an intent to reenter.

Claimant last asserts that denial of a maximum award offends equal protection. This argument fails. Claimant compares her situation to that of claimants whose decedents experienced a loss of income due to death. The present claimant is not, therefore, similarly situated—a finding that is essential to a successful equal [*293] protection claim. State ex rel. Doersam v. Indus. Comm. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 115, 543 N.E.2d 1169.

The judgment of the court of appeals is hereby affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. F.E. SWEENEY, J., dissents and would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

COOK, J., not participating.

[1] R.C. 4123.61 provides:

"The average weekly wage of an * * * employee at the time of the * * * disability due to the occupational disease begins is the basis upon which to compute benefits. "* * *

"In death * * * claims, * * * the decedent's average weekly wage for the year preceding the * * * date the disability due to the occupational disease begins is the weekly wage upon which compensation shall be based. * * *

"In cases where there are special circumstances under which the average weekly wage cannot justly be determined by applying this section, the administrator of workers' compensation, in determining the average weekly wage in such cases, shall use such method as will enable him to do substantial justice to the claimants."

Sources

• The opinion on Google Scholar
• Ohio asbestos laws
• Ohio asbestos exposure sites