Storer v. Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc. (2017)

Our plain-English summary of Storer v. Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc. (U.S. District Court, Western District of Louisiana, August 22, 2017).

Martha Storer and her four adult children sued Trane US, Inc. and other defendants over the death of Bud Storer, their husband and father. They alleged he died in 2013 from mesothelioma caused by asbestos exposure. He had run Storer Equipment Company, which had a franchise agreement with Trane. Trane ended that agreement in 2014. The opinion does not describe how or where he was exposed. The plaintiffs' amended complaint sought economic damages, including loss of financial support and lost revenues to the Company. Trane asked for partial summary judgment, arguing that no pleaded claim supported economic damages to the Company, that such damages are not recoverable in Louisiana wrongful death and survival actions, and that the franchise termination complied with the contract. The court denied the motion. It found Trane cited no rule barring such damages and agreed that loss of earnings is compensable. Whether the losses include income Bud Storer would have earned through the Company is a factual question for the jury. The plaintiffs have no breach of contract claim.

We wrote this summary from the court's opinion with the help of AI. It is not the court's wording, and it is not legal advice. The full opinion is below.

The decision

• Court: U.S. District Court, Western District of Louisiana
• Decided: August 22, 2017
• Docket: Civil Action No. 14-2488
• Stage: Summary judgment
• State: Louisiana

Outcome. The court denied Trane US, Inc.'s motion for partial summary judgment on economic damages, leaving the plaintiffs' claims for lost earnings and loss of support, including income through the Company, for the jury.

What the court held. Whether lost earnings and loss of support include income the decedent would have earned through his company is a question of fact that cannot be resolved on summary judgment. If the plaintiffs prove their tort claims, the factfinder determines the damages proximately caused.

Issues decided: Compensatory Damages, Wrongful Death and Survival.

The people and their exposure

• Bud Storer: mesothelioma; died

The defendants

• Trane US, Inc. (manufacturer)
• Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc. (manufacturer)
• Crown Beverage Packaging L.L.C. (manufacturer)

Other decisions in this case

Other rulings from the same court in the same case, in our library:

• Storer v. Crown Cork & Seal Company (January 31, 2017). The magistrate judge granted plaintiffs' third motion to compel Trane US, Inc.'s Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, overruled Trane's objections, and ordered a prepared witness, a $2,000 fee payment and reimbursement of deposition costs.

The court's opinion

The text below is Google Scholar's copy of the court's opinion, a public record. Numbers in brackets, such as [*921], mark where each page of the printed reporter begins.

MARTHA DENMON STORER, ET AL.,

v.

CROWN CORK & SEAL COMPANY, INC, ET AL.

Civil Action No. 14-2488.

August 22, 2017.

United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Shreveport Division.

Martha Denmon Storer, Plaintiff, represented by John S. Odom, Jr., Jones Odom.

Martha Denmon Storer, Plaintiff, represented by Scott M. Hendler, Hendler Lyons & Flores, pro hac vice & Michael J. Brickman, Richardson Patrick Westbrook, pro hac vice.

Craig Storer, Plaintiff, represented by John S. Odom, Jr., Jones Odom, Scott M. Hendler, Hendler Lyons & Flores, pro hac vice & Michael J. Brickman, Richardson Patrick Westbrook, pro hac vice.

Mark Storer, Plaintiff, represented by John S. Odom, Jr., Jones Odom, Scott M. Hendler, Hendler Lyons & Flores, pro hac vice & Michael J. Brickman, Richardson Patrick Westbrook, pro hac vice.

Laurie Storer, Plaintiff, represented by John S. Odom, Jr., Jones Odom, Scott M. Hendler, Hendler Lyons & Flores, pro hac vice & Michael J. Brickman, Richardson Patrick Westbrook, pro hac vice.

Sheryl Storer, Plaintiff, represented by John S. Odom, Jr., Jones Odom, Scott M. Hendler, Hendler Lyons & Flores, pro hac vice & Michael J. Brickman, Richardson Patrick Westbrook, pro hac vice.

Crown Cork & Seal Co Inc, Defendant, represented by Michael D. Lonegrass, Galloway Johnson et al, Richard G. Duplantier, Jr., Galloway Johnson et al & Rodger Gregory Green, Jr., Galloway Johnson et al.

Trane U S. Inc, represented by Joseph B. Morton, III, Maron Marvel et al.

Trane U S. Inc, Defendant, represented by Angela M. Bowlin, Frilot, David Jonathan Hemken, Cook Yancey et al, Herschel E. Richard, Jr., Cook Yancey et al, James H. Brown, Jr., Frilot, John M. Fitzpatrick, Wheeler Trigg & O'Donnell, pro hac vice, John J. Hainkel, III, Frilot, Kelsey Anne Eagan, Frilot, Magali Ann Puente-Martin, Frilot, McNeil James Kemmerly, Richard Muncie Crump, Maron Marvel et al, Robert Kennedy, Jr., Cook Yancey et al & Shelley Kathryn Napolitano, Maron Marvel et al.

Crown Beverage Packaging L L C, Defendant, represented by Joseph H. Hart, IV, Pugh Accardo et al, Daniel Edwin Oser, Pugh Accardo et al & Thomas A. Porteous, Pugh Accardo et al.

MEMORANDUM RULING

ELIZABETH E. FOOTE, District Judge.

Before the Court is a motion for partial summary judgment filed by Defendant Trane US, Inc. ("Trane"). Record Document 141. For the reasons discussed below, Defendant's motion is DENIED.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Martha Storer and her four adult children (collectively "Plaintiffs") brought this suit against Trane and several other defendants, alleging liability for the death of their husband and father Bud Storer from mesothelioma allegedly caused by asbestos exposure. Record Document 204. Bud Storer died in 2013. Id., p. 1. Before his death, he operated Storer Equipment Company ("the Company"), in which Plaintiffs are shareholders. Record Document 164, p. 7. The Company had a franchise agreement with Trane, which Trane terminated in 2014. Id., p. 10.

In their complaint, Plaintiffs alleged four claims: (1) negligence of asbestos manufacturer sellers, suppliers and distributors, which they allege was the proximate cause of Bud Storer's illness; (2) strict liability of asbestos manufacturers, sellers, suppliers, and distributors; (3) "intentional tort of fraudulent misrepresentation causing physical harm;" and (4) "intentional tort battery." Record Document 204, pp. 6-12. For the first time in the amended complaint, Plaintiffs list economic damages as among the damages sought. Record Document 204, p. 13. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to damages for loss of financial support from Bud Storer, including damages resulting from Trane's cancellation of the Company's franchise agreement because of Bud Storer's death, causing lost revenues to the Company and to Plaintiffs as the Company's shareholders. Id.

Trane moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of damages, arguing that Plaintiffs are not entitled to economic damages for any business losses to the Company because Plaintiffs pled no cause of action that would warrant economic damages to the company, economic damages are not compensable in wrongful death and survival actions in Louisiana, and because no damages are warranted by the termination of the franchise because the termination complied with the terms of the franchise agreement. Record Document 141.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) directs that a court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."[1] Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, answers to interrogatories, admissions, depositions, and affidavits on file indicate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). When the burden at trial will rest on the non-moving party, the moving party need not produce evidence to negate the elements of the non-moving party's case; rather, it need only point out the absence of supporting evidence. See id. at 322-23.

If the movant satisfies its initial burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute of material fact with the motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant must demonstrate that there is, in fact, a genuine issue for dispute at trial by going "beyond the pleadings" and designating specific facts for support. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). "This burden is not satisfied with `some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,'" by conclusory or unsubstantiated allegations, or by a mere scintilla of evidence. Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). However, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1985) (internal citations omitted); Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986) (the court must "review the facts drawing all inferences most favorable to the party opposing the motion"). While not weighing the evidence or evaluating the credibility of witnesses, courts should grant summary judgment where the critical evidence in support of the nonmovant is so weak and tenuous that it could not support a judgment in the nonmovant's favor. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.

B. Trane's Motion

Trane argues that Plaintiffs are not entitled to economic damages for lost profits of the Company. Record Document 141. Trane advances three grounds for this argument: that no cause of action pled in the Petition would warrant economic damages, that economic losses to the Company are not compensable in wrongful death and survival actions, and that no damages are available as a result of termination of the franchise agreement. Id. Plaintiffs argue that they may recover damages for loss of support, which includes loss of financial support, and thus may include the lost profits of the Company. Record Document 164.

Trane attempts to turn a factual question into a purely legal one by carving out a class of economic damages and then arguing that economic damages were not pled and are not compensable in this sort of action as a matter of law. Record Document 141-1, pp. 4-8. Trane offers no case establishing such a bright-line rule, and in fact agrees that loss of earnings is compensable. Id., p. 7 ("Loss of earnings are the only economic damages compensable in this survival action. . ."). If Plaintiffs prove the elements of their tort claims, they are entitled to whatever damages the factfinder determines were

proximately caused by those injuries. These include loss of earnings in a survival action and loss of support in a wrongful death action. Broussard v. Med. Protective Co., 2006-331 (La. Ct. App. 2/21/07); 952 So. 2d 818, 818-19. A jury could determine that loss of earnings and loss of support includes income that Bud Storer would have earned but for his death. What damages were caused by Bud Storer's death, and what the extent of those damages may be, is a question of fact. Aldredge v. Moses, 595 So. 2d 379, 381 (La. Ct. App. 1992) ("The determination of actual damages is a question of fact."). The Court cannot resolve a question of fact at this stage.

Trane similarly argues that Plaintiffs cannot recover economic damages from the termination of the franchise agreement. To the extent that Trane's argument is that Plaintiffs have alleged no breach of contract claim, this is correct. Plaintiffs may not recover for breach of contract because they have not claimed any breach of contract. However, as discussed above, if Plaintiffs prove their tort claims, it will be up to the jury to determine the amount of damages that would appropriately compensate them for their injuries. Such a determination may be based on facts such as the amount of earnings and support that Plaintiffs lost because of Bud Storer's death. Whether that loss of earnings and loss of support includes income Bud Storer would have earned through the Company is a question of fact, and cannot be decided by the Court at summary judgment. Therefore, Trane's motion for partial summary judgment must be DENIED.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, Trane's motion for partial summary judgment [Record Document 141] is DENIED. [1] Rule 56 was amended effective December 1, 2010. Per the comments, the 2010 amendment was intended "to improve the procedures for presenting and deciding summary judgment motions and to make the procedures more consistent with those already used in many courts. The standard for granting summary judgment remains unchanged." Therefore, the case law applicable to Rule 56 prior to its amendment remains authoritative, and this Court will rely on it accordingly.

Sources

• The opinion on Google Scholar
• Louisiana asbestos laws
• Louisiana asbestos exposure sites