What is asbestosis: Asbestos Court Decisions

Decisions in our case-law library that involve asbestosis: 395 cases, by state. Each line gives the exposure the court described, or else what it decided. For the topic itself, see What is asbestosis.

Pennsylvania

• Gatling v. Eaton Corp. (2002). The Superior Court affirmed summary judgment for Uniroyal and the other defendants, holding the Gatlings' second suit for symptomatic nonmalignant asbestos disease barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations.
• Lonasco v. A-Best Products Co. (2000). The Superior Court affirmed the denial of judgment notwithstanding the verdict to Owens-Corning and Garlock on Phase I, and affirmed the grant of a new Phase II trial on Garlock's liability, so the Lonascos and the Collinses prevailed.
• McCauley v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1998). The Superior Court reversed the trial court's refusal to remove a compulsory nonsuit entered against plaintiff Bradley McCauley on statute of limitations grounds, and remanded for a new trial, ruling against the defendants.
• Sporio v. Wcab (Songer Const.) (1998). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court and held that the widow, Madeline Sporio, could collect death benefits for her husband's mesothelioma death, against Songer Construction and the other employers.
• McNeil v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1996). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's order to the extent it allowed a new trial on the lung cancer claim (a win for Owens Corning), and affirmed a new trial limited to the McNeils' non-cancer injury claims (a win for the McNeils).
• Busfield v. AC & S., Inc. (1994). The Superior Court affirmed the trial court's order excluding evidence of Alva Busfield's fear of developing cancer, so the plaintiffs lost against the asbestos defendants.
• DiDio v. Philadelphia Asbestos Corp. (1994). The court stayed Keene's appeal because of its bankruptcy, vacated the judgment against Fibreboard because asymptomatic pleural thickening and asbestosis based on fear of cancer were not compensable, and affirmed the $900,000 judgment against Owens-Illinois and the severance of its cross-claims.
• Behrendt v. GAF Corp. (1993). The trial court granted the plaintiff estate's post-trial motion and ordered a new trial limited to damages, finding the $65,000 and $5,000 awards inadequate and not a compromise verdict, against defendants GAF, National Gypsum, Owens Corning and U.S. Gypsum.
• Dempsey v. Pacor, Inc. (1993). The Superior Court vacated the judgments entered for the six plaintiff couples against Owens-Illinois, Keene and Fibreboard and remanded for a new trial on damages only, with no fear or increased-risk-of-cancer elements.
• Fisk v. Wcab (general Elec.) (1993). The Commonwealth Court affirmed the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, which had required benefits to be calculated on the decedent's 1980 wage (date of last exposure) and had reversed the referee's 20% penalty against General Electric; the claimant widow lost on both issues.
• Sealover v. Carey Canada (1992). The court held the four non-settling defendants (W.R. Grace, U.S. Gypsum, GAF, National Gypsum) jointly and severally liable, deducted the Owens-Corning settlement and a one-sixth Manville Trust share from the verdict, and awarded the plaintiffs Rule 238 delay damages, with some periods excluded.
• Sealover v. Carey Canada (1992). The court granted W.R. Grace's and U.S. Gypsum's motions and entered partial summary judgment for them on the plaintiff's punitive damage claim, so Alma Sealover could not try punitive damages.
• Lilley v. Johns-Manville Corp. (1991). The Superior Court affirmed the judgment against Fibreboard Corporation for one-eighth of the Lilleys' verdict plus delay damages, and also rejected the Lilleys' cross-appeal over the directed verdict on Fibreboard's cross-claims against Garlock and Eagle-Picher.
• Bushless v. GAF Corp. (1990). The Superior Court affirmed the trial court's summary judgments for GAF and the other defendants against plaintiffs Bushless, Barber, Kelly and Edmond, because the plaintiffs could not link any defendant's product to their work areas.
• Maher v. Wcab (BP Oil Corp.) (1989). The Commonwealth Court reversed the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board's affirmance of the referee's denial of benefits to claimant Maher against B.P. Oil Corporation and remanded for a determination of the date of disability and computation of benefits.
• Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. US (1987). The court denied the United States' motion to dismiss Eagle-Picher's Federal Tort Claims Act contribution claim, and granted the United States' alternative request to certify the legal question to the Third Circuit for interlocutory appeal.
• Morgan v. Johns-Manville Corp. (1986). The court reversed summary judgment for the defendant asbestos companies in the Bagian case and remanded it, and affirmed summary judgment for the defendants in the Alice and Morgan cases because their claims were time-barred.
• Colombo v. Johns-Manville Corp. (1984). The court granted the United States' motion to dismiss Pittsburgh-Corning's third-party complaint on all claims except the sixth claim (negligence as vessel owner), which survived, and applied the same ruling to the Raymark and Eagle-Picher motions for leave to file similar complaints.
• Asbestos Insul. Co. v. Wcab (McGOVERN) (1983). The Commonwealth Court affirmed the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board's order, leaving Asbestos Insulating Co. and its insurer liable for the disability and death benefits of Joseph McGovern's widow.
• Gill v. Pacor, Inc. (1982). The trial court denied Johns-Manville's motions for judgment n.o.v. and for a new trial, and also denied the plaintiffs' motion for a partial new trial on punitive damages, leaving the $125,000 compensatory verdict for the plaintiffs in place.
• Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd. (1982). The court denied all post-trial motions (judgment n.o.v. and new trial) by both plaintiffs and defendants, leaving the jury's liability and damages verdicts in place, including the finding that George Neal's claim was time-barred.
• Staiano v. Johns-Manville Corp. (1982). Affirmed summary judgment for the asbestos product manufacturer defendants, holding the Staianos' claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
• Amader v. Johns-Manville Corp. (1981). The court denied the Amaders' motion to file a third amended complaint adding an emotional distress claim, ruling in favor of Johns-Manville and the other defendants.
• Carbonaro v. Johns-Manville Corp. (1981). The federal court granted Owens-Corning Fiberglas's motion for summary judgment, holding the plaintiffs' asbestos suit barred by the prior state-court judgment for the defendants, so the plaintiffs lost.
• Grabowski v. Turner & Newall (1980). The court granted summary judgment for the defendant asbestos suppliers in the DaMato, Lindahl, Saylor and Pearson cases as time-barred, and denied it in the Grabowski, Gravatt and Marincola cases because of factual gaps.
• Bambrick v. Asten Hill Mfg. Co. et al. (1972). The Commonwealth Court reversed the awards of the Workmen's Compensation Board and the Philadelphia Common Pleas Court to Robert Utter, Margaret Utter and Alice Bambrick, and dismissed all three claim petitions in favor of Asten Hill, its insurers and the Commonwealth.

Rhode Island

• Cary v. American Optical Corporation (2013). The court deferred ruling on Watts's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, denying it without prejudice and granting plaintiff Gloria Cary limited jurisdictional discovery into Watts's Rhode Island contacts.

Tennessee

• Segroves v. Union Carbide (2015). The Tennessee Supreme Court (through its Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel) reversed the trial court's summary judgment for employer Union Carbide and Martin Marietta Energy System and remanded the employee Jimmy Segroves's asbestosis claim for further proceedings.
• Blackmon v. Illinois Central Railroad Company (2014). The Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's summary judgment for Illinois Central Railroad, which had been based on a release from an earlier asbestosis settlement, and remanded for further proceedings, so the widow's FELA claim continues.
• Lively EX rel. Lively v. Union Carbide Corporation (2013). The Tennessee Supreme Court (through its Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel) affirmed the trial court: the widow, Armethia Lively, recovered only funeral expenses from Union Carbide because the 1982 date of injury capped her benefits below her husband's $90,000 settlement.
• Kelley v. Union Carbide Corporation (2011). The Tennessee Supreme Court (through its Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel) affirmed the trial court's award of death benefits to the widow, Naomi Kelley, rejecting Union Carbide's argument that the 1991 settlement barred her claim, and upheld the trial court's method of calculating the weekly benefit rate.
• Woody v. AW Chesterton Company (2008). The Court of Appeals reversed the denial of summary judgment for the defendants as to claims from pre-release asbestos exposure, which the 1980 release barred, but left Rebecca Woody's claims from post-release exposure standing.
• Mackie v. Young Sales Corp. (2001). The Tennessee Supreme Court rejected the Appeals Panel's findings, held that James Mackie's voluntary retirement did not bar workers' compensation benefits, and affirmed the trial court's award for Dorothy Mackie based on the maximum weekly rate, against Young Sales Corporation.
• Denton v. Southern Ry. Co. (Eastern Section, 1993). The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment dismissing Norfolk Southern Corporation, but reversed the $25,000 jury verdict for Denton against Southern Railway and remanded for a new trial because of an erroneous causation/damages instruction and the exclusion of fear-of-cancer and cancer-monitoring evidence.
• Potts v. Celotex Corp. (1990). Answering questions certified by the Sixth Circuit, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the one-year limitations period did not bar Elizabeth Potts's mesothelioma claim against Celotex and the other asbestos product defendants, so the plaintiff prevailed on the limitations question.
• Potts v. Celotex Corp. (1988). The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants, including Celotex, and dismissed Elizabeth Potts's mesothelioma suit as barred by Tennessee's one-year statute of limitations.
• Clay v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (1983). The Sixth Circuit stayed the appeal as to bankrupt Johns-Manville, vacated the jury verdicts for Raybestos-Manhattan and remanded for retrial, so the Clay and Bailey plaintiffs won on appeal.
• Daniels v. Combustion Engineering, Inc. (Eastern Section, 1978). The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment on a jury verdict for the defendant insulation manufacturers, overruling all of plaintiffs Thomas and Oma Daniels' assignments of error.

Texas

• Burford v. Howmet Aerospace, Inc. (14th District, 2024). The court of appeals reversed the trial court's no-evidence summary judgment for Alcoa (Howmet Aerospace) and remanded for further proceedings, ruling for the Burford family.
• Fisher v. BNSF Railway Company (2nd District, 2022). The court affirmed the take-nothing summary judgment for BNSF Railway, holding that Alan Fisher's 2006 release barred his widow June's FELA suit over his asbestos-related lung cancer.
• Payne v. BNSF Ry. Co. (2nd District, 2022). The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed the take-nothing summary judgment for BNSF, holding that Harrah's 2017 release barred his daughter's FELA claims for his lung cancer and death.
• Acevedo v. Abraham (2017). The court granted summary judgment to nurse practitioner Johny Abraham and Dr. Patrick Strunk on qualified immunity, dismissed prisoner Efrain Acevedo's claims with prejudice, and denied his motion to add state-law malpractice claims as futile.
• Union Carbide Corporation v. Synatzske (2014). The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, held that Dr. Prince's report did not satisfy the safety valve requirement and that Chapter 90 was not unconstitutionally retroactive as applied, and rendered judgment dismissing the Emmites' wrongful death suit against Union Carbide.
• Union Carbide Corp. v. Synatzske (2012). The en banc court affirmed the MDL pretrial court's order denying Union Carbide's motion and renewed motion to dismiss, so the Emmites' asbestosis wrongful-death claims could go forward.
• Union Carbide Corporation v. Synatzske (1st District, 2012). The en banc court affirmed the MDL pretrial court's order denying Union Carbide's motion and renewed motion to dismiss, so the Emmites' wrongful death claims could go forward; Union Carbide lost.
• Union Carbide Corporation v. Synatzske (1st District, 2011). The court of appeals affirmed the MDL pretrial court's order denying Union Carbide's motion and renewed motion to dismiss, ruling for the Emmites, though it found Dr. Prince's reports did not meet the pulmonary function testing requirement.
• Alcoa, Inc. v. Behringer (5th District, 2007). The appeals court reversed the judgment on the jury verdict for Barbara and Leroy Behringer and rendered judgment that they take nothing against Alcoa, because Alcoa owed Mrs. Behringer no legal duty.
• Borg-Warner Corporation v. Flores (2007). The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment, which had affirmed Arturo Flores's jury verdict, and rendered judgment for Borg-Warner because the causation evidence was legally insufficient.
• Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores (13th District, 2004). The court of appeals overruled all nine of Borg-Warner's issues and affirmed the trial court's judgment for Arturo Flores, including the $103,200 compensatory award and $50,000 punitive award.
• In re Roc (4th District, 2004). The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's no-evidence summary judgments for all defendants and against the plaintiff workers and their family members, who had alleged asbestosis or silicosis from paints and coatings at two nuclear power plants.