Pleural Mesothelioma: Asbestos Court Decisions

Decisions in our case-law library that involve pleural mesothelioma: 362 cases, by state. Each line gives the exposure the court described, or else what it decided. For the topic itself, see Pleural Mesothelioma.

Ohio

• Fagerholm v. Gen. Elec. Co., Inc. (8th Appellate District, 2009). The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's protective order limiting discovery and its summary judgment for General Electric, rejecting Beverly Fagerholm's employer intentional tort claim.
• Werts v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (8th Appellate District, 2009). The appellate court affirmed the judgment on a jury verdict for John Crane, Inc., rejecting Betty Werts's challenges to expert fiber-release testimony and to admission of a proof-of-claim form, which was error but harmless.
• State EX rel. Pilkington N. AM. v. Indus. Comm. (10th Appellate District, 2007). The court adopted its magistrate's decision and granted a writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission to vacate the order placing 100 percent of risk liability on Pilkington as a self-insured employer and to issue an amended allocation order; Pilkington largely won, but its request to assign the claim wholly to the state fund was denied.
• Varner v. Ford Motor Co. (8th Appellate District, 2007). The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment for Ford Motor Company, holding Yvonne Varner's workers' compensation death claim was filed too late.
• Barone v. Gatx Corp. (11th Appellate District, 2006). The appeals court reversed the trial court's denial of John Crane's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for John Crane over the executor's $32,600 verdict.
• English v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (1984). The court ruled that Dr. Kleinerman, whom both sides had contacted as an expert, could be used at trial by any party and that his testimony was subject to discovery by all parties, rejecting the defendants' claim to exclusive use.
• Laster v. Celotex Corp. (1984). The district court denied the plaintiffs' pretrial motions asking it to take judicial notice that asbestos causes asbestosis and mesothelioma, ruling for the Celotex defendants on the point.

Oklahoma

• Olsen v. Oklahoma Gas and Elec. Co. (4th Division, 2012). The Court of Civil Appeals reversed summary judgment for Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co. and remanded, holding the statute of repose did not bar Eloise Olsen's wrongful death claims.
• Zinc Corp. OF America v. Reeder (2nd Division, 2007). The Court of Civil Appeals sustained the three-judge Workers' Compensation Court panel's order awarding death benefits to Naomi Reeder, so Zinc Corporation of America and Ace American lost.
• Angelo v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. (1993). The Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial of the Angelos' motion for a new trial and the judgment for the asbestos product defendants entered on the jury's phase-one verdict.
• Fisher v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. (1989). The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, treated as summary judgment, holding that Fisher's 1986 mesothelioma suit was barred by his earlier release, so the asbestos defendants won and the Fishers lost.

Oregon

• Long v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corporation (2025). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order remanding Richard Long's case to Oregon state court, rejecting Foster Wheeler's federal officer removal and admiralty jurisdiction arguments.
• Laux v. Akebono Brake Industry Co., Ltd. (2015). The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation, granted plaintiff Marilee Laux's motion to remand the case to state court, and denied the Japanese defendants' motion to dismiss as moot, so Akebono Brake Industry and the other defendants lost on removal.
• Mason v. Mt. St. Joseph, Inc. (2009). The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the estate's claims against General Electric, holding they were not product liability civil actions and were therefore barred by Oregon's 10-year negligence statute of ultimate repose.

Other federal courts

• Estate of Barabin v. AstenJohnson, Inc. (2014). The en banc Ninth Circuit vacated the jury judgment for the Barabins against AstenJohnson and Scapa and remanded for a new trial, because the district court admitted expert testimony without making the required relevance and reliability findings.
• Wannall v. Honeywell, Inc. (2014). The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court's exclusion of the plaintiff's late expert declaration and its grant of summary judgment for Honeywell, the successor to Bendix, against the estate of John Tyler.
• Barabin v. AstenJohnson, Inc. (2012). The Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment for Henry and Geraldine Barabin against AstenJohnson and Scapa and remanded for a new trial because the district court admitted expert testimony without making Daubert reliability determinations.
• Consorti v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. (1995). The Second Circuit vacated the loss-of-consortium award to Frances Consorti, ordered a new trial on John Consorti's pain and suffering unless he accepts remittitur to $3.5 million, and otherwise affirmed the judgment against Owens-Corning Fiberglas, which had appealed.
• Tragarz v. Keene Corp. (1992). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the $3,000,000 judgment for Grace Tragarz against Keene and Owens-Corning Fiberglas, but reversed the denial of Keene's request to file a contribution cross-claim against OCF and remanded for proceedings between the two defendants.
• Hoffman v. Allied Corp. (1990). The Eleventh Circuit reversed summary judgment for Armstrong World Industries and the other defendants and remanded, finding genuine issues of material fact for the Hoffmans' claim.
• Lee v. Celotex Corp. (1985). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for National Gypsum against Ouida Lee, the widow and executrix, because she did not show that Jack Lee was exposed to an asbestos-containing National Gypsum product.
• Shuman v. United States (1985). The First Circuit reversed the district court's judgment for plaintiff Edythe Shuman, holding that the United States was not liable because the discretionary function exception of the FTCA barred the claim.
• Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (1982). The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment for Johns-Manville and the other asbestos defendants, which had dismissed Blannie Wilson's survival and wrongful death claims as time-barred, and remanded for further proceedings.
• Clutter v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (1981). The Sixth Circuit reversed the district courts' rulings that the plaintiffs' claims were time-barred and remanded for a determination of when each plaintiff's disease manifested, favoring the plaintiffs Clutter, Dwiggins and McGreevey over the asbestos manufacturers.
• Vaughan v. Johns-Manville Corp. (1981). The Fourth Circuit vacated summary judgment for the asbestos manufacturers (Johns-Manville and others) and remanded for further proceedings, holding admiralty jurisdiction was present and laches rather than the Virginia two-year statute governed timeliness, so the widow's claim was revived.

Pennsylvania

• Fisher v. American International Industries (2024). The Superior Court affirmed the denial of American International Industries' motions for nonsuit, directed verdict and JNOV, but vacated the judgment that gave it one-half of the verdict and remanded for judgment divided per capita among it, Whittaker Clark and Daniels, and Colgate-Palmolive.
• Hilster v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2022). The district court granted defendant Eckel Industries' motion for summary judgment against the Hilster plaintiffs for lack of evidence that Mr. Hilster was exposed to an Eckel asbestos product, and dismissed Eckel's motion to exclude plaintiffs' expert as moot.
• Hilster v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2022). The district court granted summary judgment to Warren Pumps, LLC and against the Hilster plaintiffs, and dismissed Warren's motion to exclude the plaintiffs' two experts as moot.
• Hilster v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2022). The district court granted summary judgment for The William Powell Company against the Hilster plaintiffs because there was no evidence Mr. Hilster was exposed to asbestos from a Powell product, and dismissed Powell's motion to exclude the plaintiffs' expert as moot.
• Hilster v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2022). The district court granted summary judgment to Air & Liquid Systems Corporation, successor to Buffalo Pumps, and entered judgment against the Hilster plaintiffs.
• Brandt v. Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. (2020). The Superior Court affirmed the trial court's exclusion of the plaintiff's exposure expert testimony and its grant of summary judgment to Colgate-Palmolive, against Charles Brandt and the Estate of Sally Brandt.
• Shook v. Avon Products, Inc. (2019). The magistrate judge recommended granting plaintiff Shook's motion to remand to the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, rejecting Johnson & Johnson's bankruptcy "related to" removal, and denying her motion for hearing as moot.
• Gorton v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (2018). The court granted dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction for Pacific Bell, Nevada Bell and AT & T, Inc., found jurisdiction over Ford and AT & T Corp., but dismissed the claims against those two without prejudice as conclusory, allowing plaintiffs to amend.
• Daley v. AW Chesterton, Inc. (2012). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's order reversing summary judgment for U.S. Supply and Duro-Dyne, allowing Daley's mesothelioma suit to proceed, and remanded for further proceedings.
• Anderson v. Salmon Bay and Gravel Co. (In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation) (2011). The court refused to preclude plaintiffs' pathologist Dr. Hammar's "every exposure" opinion, finding it reliable enough under Rule 702 and leaving the defendant's objections to cross-examination, so Salmon Bay's motion failed as to him; it found Dr. Brodkin had not offered that opinion and could not evaluate Dr. Brody for lack of record materials.
• Linster v. Allied Signal, Inc. (2011). The Superior Court vacated the judgment, reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for Crane Company, and remanded for further proceedings, so the Linsters (plaintiffs) won and Crane Company lost.
• Gregg v. VJ Auto Parts Co. (2009). On remand from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Superior Court affirmed summary judgment for V-J Auto Parts and denied the estate's motion to amend the complaint.
• Anderson v. Bondex Int'l (In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation) (2009). The magistrate judge denied plaintiff Barbara Anderson's motion for leave to amend her complaint, because the new workplace-exposure claims did not relate back to the initial complaint and would be time-barred, so the amendment was futile; defendants Bondex, Georgia-Pacific and Union Carbide prevailed.
• Anderson v. Bondex Int'l (In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation) (2009). The court denied the motions in limine by Bondex, RPM, Georgia-Pacific and Union Carbide to exclude evidence of plaintiff Anderson's exposure to joint compound dust during sanding and cleanup, holding the Virginia statute of repose did not bar it.
• Gregg v. VJ Auto Parts Company (Eastern District, 2007). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court's order, which had reversed summary judgment for V-J Auto Parts, held that the trial court did not err in applying the frequency, regularity, proximity assessment, and remanded for further proceedings.
• Baumgart v. Keene Bldg. Products Corp. (1995). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, evenly divided, affirmed the Superior Court's order, leaving in place summary judgment for the asbestos defendants on the widow's survival action as time-barred.
• Ace Robbins, Inc. v. Wcab (bullock) (1994). The Commonwealth Court affirmed the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board's order, which upheld the referee's award of benefits to claimant Bullock against his employer Ace Robbins, Inc.
• Vigiolto v. Johns-Manville Corp. (1986). The federal district court granted summary judgment to the asbestos manufacturer defendants because the plaintiff, the widow, could not identify which manufacturer's products her husband was exposed to, and market share and enterprise liability did not apply.
• Grabowski v. Turner & Newall (1980). The court granted summary judgment for the defendant asbestos suppliers in the DaMato, Lindahl, Saylor and Pearson cases as time-barred, and denied it in the Grabowski, Gravatt and Marincola cases because of factual gaps.

Rhode Island

• Carson v. 3M Company (2018). The court granted ExxonMobil's motion for summary judgment, holding the Carsons' common-law suit was barred by the Workers' Compensation Act's exclusivity provision, and also dismissed Dorothy Carson's derivative loss of consortium claim.
• Hostetter v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2014). The Superior Court granted summary judgment to ArvinMeritor against plaintiff Eliza Hostetter because she could not show that her late husband was exposed to ArvinMeritor's asbestos-containing brake products.
• Sweredoski v. Alfa Laval, Inc. (2013). The Superior Court granted defendant Crane Co.'s motion to amend its answer to add the government contractor defense, because plaintiff Rosie Sweredoski did not show prejudice.
• Melford v. Abex Corporation (2012). The Superior Court denied the Melfords' motion to stay their Rhode Island asbestos case in favor of a later-filed Louisiana case, so the case stays in Rhode Island against Mack Trucks and the other defendants.
• Westfall v. Whittaker, Clark & Daniels (1983). The court granted summary judgment to Omya and Windsor Minerals, ruling that the estate's claims against them failed because they were not duly served within a reasonable time, and the estate lost.

South Carolina

• Edwards v. Scapa Waycross, Inc. (2022). The Court of Appeals of South Carolina affirmed the judgment for Stewart's estate against Scapa, upholding the denial of JNOV, the additur increasing survival damages to $1 million, the refusal to reallocate settlement proceeds, and the exclusion of Stewart's bankruptcy trust claims.