Mesothelioma: Asbestos Court Decisions

Decisions in our case-law library that involve mesothelioma: 2,859 cases, by state. Each line gives the exposure the court described, or else what it decided. For the topic itself, see Mesothelioma.

Indiana

• Harris v. AC & S., Inc. (2003). The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, vacated the Court of Appeals opinion and the trial court's summary judgment for the asbestos defendants, and remanded for the trial court to examine whether any plaintiff falls within the limited exception to the ten-year statute of repose.
• Jurich v. Garlock, Inc. (2003). The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, vacated the trial court's summary judgment for the defendants, and remanded for the trial court to decide whether a reasonably experienced physician could have diagnosed Mr. Jurich within the ten-year repose period while he had no reason to know of it.
• Harris v. AC & S., Inc. (2002). The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts' summary judgments for A.C. & S., NARCO, Mallinckrodt, Combustion Engineering, Kaiser, WTI, Rapid-American, Weil-McLain and W.R. Grace on statute-of-repose grounds and remanded, siding with the plaintiffs (Harris, Serna, Noppert and Gottschalk families).
• Allied Signal, Inc. v. Herring (2001). The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of summary judgment to the Asbestos Defendants, so Lucille Herring's wrongful death claim survived the statute of repose challenge.
• Jurich v. Garlock, Inc. (2001). The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment for Anchor Packing, Garlock, John Crane and WTI Rust Holdings, holding the ten-year statute of repose unconstitutional as applied to Carole Jurich's claims, and remanded for further proceedings.
• Lambert v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (1999). The district court denied John Crane's and W.R. Grace's motions for summary judgment and their motions to reconsider the order letting plaintiff Cheryl Lambert amend her complaint, and it reserved ruling on relation back pending more briefing.
• Novicki v. Rapid-American Corp. (1999). The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's dismissal of the Novicki estate's wrongful death complaint against Rapid-American as time-barred and remanded for further argument and evidence on timeliness under Section 5.
• Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Noppert (1999). The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order granting the Nopperts' motion to correct errors and remanded with instructions to reinstate summary judgment for Sears, so Sears won and the Nopperts lost.
• Sorenson v. Allied Products Corp. (1999). The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for Allied Products Corporation, holding Allied was not liable as successor to White Farm for Frank Sorenson's mesothelioma death, and rejecting the widow's claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction.
• Spoonamore v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. (1999). The district court granted John Crane's motion for summary judgment, ruling against the Spoonamore plaintiffs on the product claims, the wrongful death claim and the loss of consortium claim.
• Spoonamore v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. (1998). The district court granted John Crane's motion for summary judgment, ruling against the Spoonamore estate and Mrs. Spoonamore on their negligence, strict liability, wrongful death and loss of consortium claims.
• Harris v. AC & S, Inc. (1995). The court granted summary judgment to Pittsburgh Corning, Owens-Corning, Anchor Packing and Garlock, and in part to Georgia-Pacific (for Bestwall). It denied it to John Crane, to Georgia-Pacific on its joint compound, and initially to A.W. Chesterton. It later reconsidered, granted Chesterton summary judgment, and directed final judgment for all defendants.
• Knox v. AC & S, Inc. (1990). The court denied Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.'s summary judgment motion, so the estate of Darrel Knox, the plaintiff, could continue its asbestos suit against OCF.
• Knox v. AC & S, Inc. (1988). The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' summary judgment motion: CERCLA § 9658 did not preempt Indiana's statute of repose, so claims based on products delivered before 1973 were barred, but the plaintiff could still try to prove delivery and exposure from 1973 to 1985.

Iowa

• Beverage v. Alcoa, Inc. (2024). The Iowa Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment for Alcoa on the Beverage family's premises-liability claim and remanded for the district court to apply the unmodified land possessor-entrant duty of care; Alcoa lost and the family won.
• Beverage v. Alcoa, Inc. (2022). The Iowa Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals decision and reversed summary judgment for Alcoa and Iowa-Illinois Taylor Insulation, remanding for further proceedings, so the Beverage plaintiffs prevailed over both defendants.
• Beverage v. Alcoa, Inc. (2021). The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for Alcoa and Iowa-Illinois Taylor Insulation, holding the Beverage estate and children's asbestos claims were barred by Iowa Code section 686B.7(5), and declined to reach an unpreserved due process claim.
• Kinseth v. Weil-McLain (2018). The Iowa Supreme Court ordered a new trial for Weil-McLain because the estate's lawyer prejudiced the jury in closing arguments, while upholding most of the trial court's rulings on the verdict form, evidence and punitive damages for use on retrial.
• Kinseth v. WEIL-McLAIN Company (2017). The Iowa Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict against Weil-McLain and remanded for a new trial because plaintiffs' counsel repeatedly violated limine rulings in closing argument, ordered McDonnell & Miller valves added to the verdict form, and affirmed on plaintiffs' cross-appeal.
• Ganske v. Spahn & Rose Lumber Co. (1998). The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Larry and Lois Ganske's common-law suit against his former employers (Spahn and Rose Lumber, Carnation/Nestle, Deere), holding workers' compensation was the exclusive remedy, and found the constitutional challenge waived.
• Harder v. ACandS, Inc. (1998). The federal district court denied General Electric's motion for summary judgment, holding that Iowa's fifteen-year statute of repose did not bar the Harders' claims against GE over asbestos insulation blankets.
• Tallman v. WR Grace & Co.-Conn. (1997). The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for W.R. Grace & Co. under the fifteen-year statute of repose and also affirmed denial of the other manufacturers' summary judgment motions, so both the plaintiff's appeal and the cross-appeal failed.
• Perrin v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1994). The district court granted summary judgment to defendants Owens Illinois, Owens Corning and Fibreboard and third-party defendant Flintkote, and denied the Perrins' request to shift the burden of proof on causation.
• Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1994). The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for Marilyn Spaur and her husband's estate against Owens-Corning Fiberglas, including compensatory, loss of consortium and punitive damages.

Kansas

• Dickenson v. Brenntag North America, Inc. (2023). The magistrate judge granted Henkel's motion to compel production of Dickenson's settlement agreements with Pfizer, Barretts Minerals and any others, denied without prejudice the request for settlement communications, and declined to award expenses.
• Dickenson v. Brenntag North America, Inc. (2022). The court granted plaintiff Dickenson's motion for limited jurisdictional discovery against defendant BSI, allowing written discovery and a short deposition for 60 days before he must respond to BSI's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
• Little v. the Budd Company, Inc. (2020). The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment for Nancy Little against The Budd Company, holding Budd waived its Locomotive Inspection Act preemption theory and that the Safety Appliance Act does not preempt her state tort claims.
• Little v. Budd Company (2019). The district court denied both the plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees and expenses under Rule 37(c)(2) and The Budd Company's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, leaving the jury verdict for the plaintiff in place.
• Little v. Budd Co. (2018). The court denied Budd's motion for summary judgment on federal preemption of the state-law claims, granted it on the alternative negligence per se claim, and granted plaintiff's motion in part and denied it in part. It also struck a paragraph of Budd's president's declaration.
• Little v. Budd Company (2018). The court denied Budd Company's motion to exclude Dr. Brody, granted in part and denied in part its motion to exclude Dr. Castleman (barring testimony about what Budd knew), and denied the motion on Dr. Frank as moot.
• Little v. Budd Company (2018). The court denied The Budd Company's motion to amend and certify its two earlier orders on Federal Safety Appliance Act preemption for interlocutory appeal, so plaintiff Nancy Little prevailed on the motion.
• Little v. the Budd Company (2018). The district court overruled The Budd Company's objection and affirmed the magistrate judge's order denying its motion to add a ninth expert witness and reopen discovery, so plaintiff Nancy Little prevailed on this motion.
• Little v. the Budd Company (2018). The court denied The Budd Company's Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, so plaintiff Nancy Little's state law claims and her alternative negligence per se claim proceed.
• Harding v. Proko Industries, Inc. (1991). The court granted the plaintiff's motion and ruled that Texas law, not Kansas law with its 10-year statute of repose, governed the claims against Proko, Georgia-Pacific, National Gypsum and United States Gypsum.
• Menne v. Celotex Corp. (1989). The court denied the summary judgment motions of defendants Celotex and Fibreboard, which argued the wrongful death action was barred by Kansas's ten-year provision, so plaintiff Mary Menne's claim could proceed.
• Menne v. Celotex Corp. (1986). The court overruled the post-trial motions (JNOV, new trial, remittitur) of Celotex, Eagle-Picher, Fibreboard and Raymark, leaving in place the $2,500,000 jury verdict for plaintiff Menne, and explained that Nebraska law would adopt alternative liability.
• Miller v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (1982). The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, refusing to bar Johns-Manville from disputing that its asbestos insulation was defective and unreasonably dangerous, so Johns-Manville prevailed on the motion.

Kentucky

• Brewer v. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. (2024). The court granted in part and denied in part defendant BOC's motion for orders to obtain records: it will order the Social Security Administration to release the former husbands' records limited to the periods of marriage to Brewer, but denied orders directed to the Kentucky workers' claims department, employers and medical providers.
• Kentucky Employers'mutual Insurance v. Hall (2024). The Court of Appeals reversed the Workers' Compensation Board's dismissal for lack of standing and remanded to the ALJ to determine which insurer was on the risk on Hall's date of last exposure, in favor of KEMI and Letcher County and against Encova.
• Letcher County Board OF Education v. Hall (2023). The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that the Department of Workers' Claims, not the Board of Claims, has jurisdiction over Roger Hall's workers' compensation claim against the Letcher County Board of Education, so Hall prevailed.
• Williams v. Schneider Electric USA, Inc. (2023). The Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment for Square D and Union Carbide on the ground that they owed Vickie Williams no duty, vacated the order excluding the plaintiffs' expert's talc opinions, and affirmed the denial of Square D's workers' compensation exclusivity defense, remanding for further proceedings.
• Papineau v. Brake Supply Company, Inc. (2022). The court granted Brake Supply's motion to permit an apportionment instruction naming Fras-Le, a third-party defendant dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, contingent on Brake Supply presenting enough evidence at trial of Fras-Le's fault.
• Papineau v. Brake Supply Company, Inc. (2022). The court granted third-party defendant Fras-Le's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, ruling against third-party plaintiff Brake Supply.
• Hayes v. Colgate-Palmolive Company (2021). The court affirmed the jury instructions and the exclusion of the Gordon Paper, but reversed and remanded for a new trial against Johnson & Johnson because admitting its corporate representative's personal-use testimony was reversible error; the defense verdict for Colgate stood.
• Papineau v. Brake Supply Company, Inc. (2021). The court denied Brake Supply's summary judgment motion on exposure, causation and the Middleman Statute defense, granted it on the Papineaus' punitive-damages claim, excluded only the plaintiffs' hygienist Paskal's warnings testimony, and denied the other motions to exclude experts.
• Papineau v. Brake Supply Company, Inc. (2021). The court denied the Papineaus' motion to sever or bifurcate Brake Supply's third-party claims against Fras-le and Carlisle Industrial, so all claims will be tried together.
• Schneider Electric USA, Inc. v. Williams (2021). The Court of Appeals dismissed Schneider Electric (Square D)'s appeal of the denial of summary judgment as interlocutory, for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded to the trial court, which favors Williams.
• Sheets v. Ford Motor Co. (2021). The Kentucky Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded to the trial court, holding that neither appellate court had jurisdiction over Ford's interlocutory appeal of the denial of summary judgment on up-the-ladder immunity, so Sheets's estate prevailed on the jurisdiction question.
• Papineau v. Brake Supply Company (2020). The court granted third-party defendant Fras-le North America's motion for summary judgment on Brake Supply's indemnity and apportionment claims and denied Brake Supply's motion to hold that motion in abeyance.
• Papineau v. Brake Supply Company (2020). The court denied third-party defendant Fras-le S.A.'s motion to dismiss Brake Supply's third-party complaint without prejudice, reserving judgment on service and personal jurisdiction and ordering 120 days of limited jurisdictional discovery.