Mesothelioma: Asbestos Court Decisions

Decisions in our case-law library that involve mesothelioma: 2,859 cases, by state. Each line gives the exposure the court described, or else what it decided. For the topic itself, see Mesothelioma.

Maryland

• Arbogast v. AW Chesterton Co. (2016). The court granted summary judgment to Eaton (Cutler Hammer), Foster Wheeler, Schneider Electric (Square D), Union Carbide and Crane. It denied summary judgment to MCIC and denied Georgia-Pacific's motion against the strict liability claim.
• Arbogast v. AW Chesterton Co. (2016). The court excluded the plaintiffs' expert's opinion about asbestos exposure from Micarta and granted summary judgment to CBS Corporation (Westinghouse) against Charles and Barbara Arbogast on all claims.
• Arbogast v. AW Chesterton Co. (2016). The court excluded the plaintiffs' expert Dr. Vance's opinions that GE wire and GE marine turbines exposed Arbogast to asbestos, and granted summary judgment to General Electric on all of the Arbogasts' claims against it.
• Arbogast v. AW Chesterton Co. (2016). The court granted the defendants' summary judgment motions that the plaintiffs did not oppose, and entered partial judgment for all defendants on the aiding and abetting and conspiracy claims; fourteen defendants remain in the case.
• Oliver v. Campbell McCORMICK, Inc. (2016). The court granted Oliver's motion to sever and remand all non-third-party claims to Baltimore City Circuit Court, and granted in part and denied as moot in part Campbell-McCormick's motion to reconsider the stay, keeping only the third-party claims.
• Rhodes v. McIC, Inc. (2016). The court denied the plaintiffs' motion to remand and their alternative motion to sever and remand the non-Crane Co. claims, so Crane Co. kept its federal forum under the federal officer removal statute.
• Sawyer v. Union Carbide Corporation (2016). The court granted the plaintiffs' motion to remand the case to Baltimore City state court, finding Foster Wheeler failed to establish a colorable federal contractor defense or a causal nexus needed for federal officer removal.
• Stein v. Pfizer Inc. (2016). The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Baltimore City circuit court's summary judgment for Pfizer, holding Pfizer was not an "apparent manufacturer" of Insulag, and denied the Stein family's motion for judicial notice.
• Citrano v. John Crane-Houdaille, Inc. (2015). The court granted the plaintiffs' motion to remand the suit to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City after GE was dismissed, over CBS's opposition, and denied the plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a surreply.
• Haney v. 3M Company (2015). The district court granted Hopeman Brothers' motion for summary judgment on all claims, ruling that the plaintiffs' evidence of Haney's exposure to Hopeman-installed Marinite panels was too infrequent and brief to be a substantial factor in causing his mesothelioma.
• Haney v. 3M Company (2015). The court granted Crane Co.'s motion for summary judgment against the Haney plaintiffs, finding no admissible evidence that Haney was exposed to asbestos in a product for which Crane Co. is liable.
• May v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (2015). The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the Court of Special Appeals' affirmance of summary judgment for the pump manufacturers (Air & Liquid Systems, Warren Pumps, IMO Industries) and remanded for further proceedings, ruling for Ruth May.
• Sherin v. John Crane-Houdaille, Inc. (2015). The district court denied the Plaintiffs' motion to remand the remaining claims against Union Carbide and A.W. Chesterton to Baltimore City Circuit Court, retaining supplemental jurisdiction, so Union Carbide prevailed on the motion.
• Sroka v. Union Carbide Corp. (2015). The court granted the plaintiffs' motion to remand to Baltimore City Circuit Court, holding that Hopeman Brothers, Lofton Corp. and Wayne Manufacturing had not raised a colorable federal contractor defense to support federal officer removal.
• Citrano v. John Crane-Houdaille, Inc. (2014). The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion to remand the case to state court, or to sever and remand the claims against the non-removing defendants, so General Electric kept its federal forum.
• Netzer v. Union Carbide Corp. (2014). The court granted Netzer's motion to remand to the Baltimore City Circuit Court, rejecting CBS Corp.'s removal because the passing of a witness deadline was not an "other paper" that triggered a right to remove.
• Sherin v. John Crane-Houdaille, Inc. (2014). The court denied Union Carbide's motion in limine and its summary judgment motion on product identification, exposure and causation, but granted summary judgment to Union Carbide on the duty-to-warn claim and on the unopposed warranty, fraud, conspiracy, aiding and abetting and punitive damages claims.
• Burns v. Bechtel Corp. (2013). The Court of Special Appeals affirmed summary judgment for Bechtel, holding Jean Burns's claims over her husband's mesothelioma were barred by Maryland's statute of repose.
• Georgia Pacific v. Farrar (2013). The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the Court of Special Appeals and the Baltimore City Circuit Court judgment of over $5 million for Jocelyn Farrar, holding that Georgia Pacific owed her no duty to warn in 1968-69, so Georgia Pacific won.
• Joyner v. AC & R. Insulation Co. (2013). The court let plaintiff Joyner amend his complaint to disclaim all damages tied to Crane Co.'s valves, remanded his remaining Cranite gasket claims against Crane Co. to the Baltimore City Circuit Court, and denied the motion to strike and the motions for reconsideration by Crane Co. and Owens-Illinois as moot.
• Barlow v. John Crane Houdaille, Inc. (2012). The court granted Joyce Barlow's motion to remand the case to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, rejecting Colgate-Palmolive's fraudulent joinder argument, denied her request for fees, and did not rule on Colgate's motion for judgment on the pleadings.
• Brannan v. Wallace & Gale Asbestos Settlement Trust (2012). The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court's summary judgment for the Wallace & Gale Asbestos Settlement Trust, so the four estates could not seek further money from the Trust.
• Dilks v. 4520 Corp., Inc. (2012). The court granted Dilks's motion to remand to state court because Ingersoll-Rand's federal officer removal was untimely, but denied her request for attorney's fees and costs.
• Georgia-Pacific v. Farrar (2012). The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the jury verdict and judgment of about $4.995 million for Jocelyn Farrar against Georgia-Pacific, rejecting Georgia-Pacific's challenges on duty to warn, causation evidence, and the jury instruction.
• Jones v. John Crane-Houdaille, Inc. (2012). The district court denied, without prejudice, the plaintiffs' (Michael and Paulette Jones) motion to remand, finding the defendants' notice of removal plausibly alleged federal enclave jurisdiction, so the defendants kept the case in federal court for now.
• Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Saville (2011). The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment for Mr. Saville against Scapa on causation, the cross-claim JNOV and the effect of his admissions, but reversed on bankruptcy trust offsets and remanded for discovery of the trust settlement agreements so the verdict could be reduced.
• Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Saville (2010). The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Baltimore City judgment for Carl Saville against Scapa Dryer Fabrics and the Wallace & Gale Asbestos Settlement Trust, and upheld the denial of their cross-claims against the settling defendants.
• Csr, Limited v. Taylor (2009). The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the Court of Special Appeals and directed it to affirm the Baltimore City Circuit Court's dismissal of CSR, Limited for lack of personal jurisdiction, so CSR won and the estates lost.
• Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Saville (2009). The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment for Carl Saville against Scapa Dryer Fabrics and the Wallace & Gale Asbestos Settlement Trust, and upheld the denial of their JNOV and new-trial motions and of Scapa's request for a further reduction for bankruptcy trust payments.
• Taylor v. Csr Limited (2008). The Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit court's dismissal of the estates' claims against CSR Limited for lack of personal jurisdiction and remanded for further proceedings, ruling for the plaintiff estates.
• Georgia-Pacific Corporation v. Benjamin (2006). The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the intermediate appellate court: the survival action against Georgia-Pacific and Union Carbide was time-barred, but summary judgment for the defendants on the wrongful death action was error.
• John Crane, Inc. v. Puller (2006). The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the jury verdicts for the Cichy plaintiffs against John Crane, Inc. and for the Puller plaintiffs against Garlock Sealing Technologies, but remanded so the statutory cap could be removed from the loss of consortium awards; the cap on the wrongful death awards was upheld.
• Benjamin v. Union Carbide Corporation (2005). Affirmed summary judgment for Union Carbide and Georgia Pacific on the survival action as time-barred, but reversed it on the wrongful death action and remanded, so Elsie Benjamin may continue that claim.
• Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Cook (2005). The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the judgment for the Gianottis against Owens-Illinois, holding that the damages cap did not apply, the loss of consortium claim could proceed, the release reserved the mesothelioma claim, and the verdict was properly reduced for the Babcock & Wilcox settlement.
• Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Cook (2005). The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the judgment for John and Shirley Gianotti against Owens-Illinois, rejecting its challenges to the release, the noneconomic damages cap, the loss of consortium claim and the verdict reduction.
• Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Hunter (2005). The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Baltimore City judgment: it rejected Owens-Illinois's challenges to the evidence and to the consortium award, and rejected Ms. Hunter's cross-appeal challenging the remittitur and the wrongful death damages cap.
• Wilson v. John Crane, Inc. (2005). The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the Court of Special Appeals, holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing Garlock leave to withdraw its deemed admissions, so the plaintiffs kept the verdict for now, and it remanded for the intermediate court to decide the remaining issues.
• Wajer v. Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (2004). The Court of Special Appeals affirmed summary judgment for Baltimore Gas and Electric Company against Anthony and Frances Wajer, holding BGE owed no duty under Restatement §§ 414 or 343 and that the other theories were not preserved.
• Garlock v. Gallagher (2003). The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the jury verdicts and the evidentiary and trial-management rulings for the plaintiffs, but reversed the Gallagher judgment calculation in favor of John Crane, Garlock and Anchor on the stipulated dismissal of the cross-claims, and remanded the Tamburrino calculation in Garlock's favor.
• Owens-Illinois v. Gianotti (2002). The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgments for John Gianotti and his wife against Owens-Illinois, rejecting its challenges, and also rejected the Gianottis' cross-appeal over the reduction of their judgments for the Babcock & Wilcox default and settlement.
• Sledz v. Flintkote Co. (2002). The court granted plaintiff Sledz's motion to remand the case to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City because Flintkote's removal came more than one year after the action commenced, and denied his request for attorney's fees.
• Hollingsworth v. Connor (2000). The court reversed the judgment against Hollingsworth & Vose for lack of personal jurisdiction in Maryland, affirmed the rulings favoring Connor against Lorillard on the jury instructions, expert testimony, sufficiency of evidence and spoliation, and remanded on the noneconomic damages cap and settlement credits.
• Owens Corning v. Walatka (1999). The court reversed the trial court's refusal to apply Maryland's noneconomic damages cap to the Walatka verdicts, ruling for Owens Corning and Owens-Illinois, and remanded to apply the cap to all claims; it affirmed the Adams judgments against Owens Corning, ruling for the Adams plaintiffs.
• Pittsburgh Corning Corp. v. James (1999). The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the Court of Special Appeals' dismissal of Pittsburgh Corning's and Owens Corning's appeals, holding that denial of their motions to dismiss for inconvenient forum could not be appealed immediately, so the Virginia plaintiffs (James and Wise) prevailed on the appealability question.
• ACandS v. Abate (1998). The Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgments for the trial plaintiffs against U.S. Mineral, against Stebbing, and for Goodman and Morrow against Hampshire for insufficient evidence. It vacated the Theis and Glensky judgments against Hampshire for an instruction error, ordered Ciotta's award cut to the $350,000 cap, ordered reformed starting dates on two verdict sheets, and otherwise affirmed for the plaintiffs against Rapid-American and Crane.
• Adams v. Owens-Illinois (1998). The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Baltimore City jury verdicts, which were for the defendants in seven cases and for the plaintiffs in the Parsons and Drebing mesothelioma cases, and ordered the appellants to pay costs.
• Ford Motor v. Wood (1998). The Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment for Mrs. Wood against Ford Motor Company for insufficient proof that her husband was exposed to Ford's brake and clutch products, and affirmed the judgment for the Grewe plaintiffs.
• Porter Hayden v. Bullinger (1998). The Court of Appeals of Maryland vacated the trial court's apportionment of damages in the Grimshaw and Granski cases, ruling for Owens Corning and Porter Hayden against the plaintiffs, and remanded for further proceedings.
• Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw (1997). The appeals court held that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages applies to the wrongful death awards in Zumas and McCaffery, but not to the personal injury and consortium awards. It ordered Grimshaw's medical-expense award cut to the stipulated amount and reversed the judgment against Hopeman Brothers. It otherwise affirmed the judgments for the plaintiffs against Anchor and Owens-Corning.
• ACandS Inc. v. Asner (1996). The Court of Appeals reversed the Court of Special Appeals, vacated the Baltimore City judgments for the plaintiffs against ACandS and Porter Hayden, and remanded for a new trial on liability for compensatory damages only, holding the punitive damages evidence insufficient.