Too little, too late? The home office and the asbestos industry regulations, 1931: a reply

Our plain-English summary of Too little, too late? The home office and the asbestos industry regulations, 1931: a reply, by M. Greenberg, N. Wikeley (Medical History, 1999).

The study

• Authors: M. Greenberg, N. Wikeley
• Journal: Medical History
• Published: 1999;43(4):508-10; discussion 511-3
• Type of article: Historical article
• Cited by: 2 articles, as counted by NIH iCite
• Read it: PubMed · Publisher · Free full text

In plain English

This is not a research study but a short comment replying to a 1998 Medical History article by Peter Bartrip, which had criticised the authors' earlier work on Britain's Asbestos Industry Regulations of 1931. The authors argued that Greenberg's earlier article had reviewed work published in England, France and America between 1898 and 1928 that drew attention to asbestos dangers. They said Bartrip's discussion of the regulations themselves was deficient, neglecting the "scheduled areas" outside which the dust control, medical examination and compensation rules largely did not apply, and the exemptions. Citing Turner & Newall documents released through American litigation, they argued the company sought to limit regulatory control. They disputed Bartrip's claim that the asbestosis mortality rate declined after the regulations. In their view, official statistics seriously under-recorded asbestos-related deaths, and comparing 1931 with 1957 ignored latency. They called the Factory Inspectorate's enforcement woefully deficient. The authors concluded that the industry's failure to meet the 1931 rules, not scholars' hindsight, was the source of its problems. They noted that a short note let them address only some of Bartrip's points.

We wrote this plain-English summary from the full article with the help of AI, and a second AI model checked each sentence against the article. It is not the authors' wording; the abstract and the article are their own account.

What the study did and found

• Design: historical commentary; a reply to another author's journal article
• Who was studied: No people were studied. The comment concerns the UK Factory Department and Factory Inspectorate, the Asbestos Industry Regulations 1931, and British asbestos companies, especially Turner & Newall.
• Exposure: Asbestos dust in British asbestos factories, and the 1931 regulations on dust control, medical examinations and compensation. No fiber types are named.
• Main results:
  • The authors stated that Greenberg's earlier article reviewed a body of work published in England, France and America between 1898 and 1928 that drew attention to the potential dangers of asbestos exposure.
  • The authors argued that Bartrip's discussion of the regulations themselves, as opposed to the process leading up to them, was deficient. They said he neglected to describe the "scheduled areas" or the scope of the exemptions.
  • The authors said Turner & Newall documents, obtained through American litigation, support the view that the company tried to limit regulatory control. They cited a 1932 letter from director Robert Turner about removing the industry from the schedule of dangerous occupations.
  • The authors disputed Bartrip's claim that the asbestosis mortality rate declined after the regulations. They argued that official statistics seriously under-recorded asbestos-related deaths.
  • The authors said Bartrip's comparison of data for 1931 and 1957 was meaningless because it did not take account of the latency period.
  • The authors argued that the Factory Inspectorate's enforcement of the 1931 rules was deficient. As examples, they cited long histories of dust control failures at J W Roberts and at Cape Asbestos's Hebden Bridge factory.
  • The authors stated that in a 1995 case brought by Chase Manhattan Bank in New York, the Turner & Newall defence did not contest the company's past failures in dust control.
• The authors' conclusion: The authors contended that the industry's failure to meet the 1931 rules was the source of its problems, rather than scholars exaggerating the asbestos hazard with hindsight, as Bartrip had claimed.
• Limitations the authors state:
  • The authors stated that the space limits of a note allowed them to address only some of the main weaknesses they saw in Bartrip's analysis.

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• The silence: the asbestos industry and early occupational cancer research--a case study — D.E. Lilienfeld (1991)
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• Revising the British Occupational Hygiene Society asbestos standard: 1968-1982 — M. Greenberg (2006)

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