C. L. Sheckler and Others on a Mandatory Respirator Program at the Manville Plant (1960)

Six confidential memos on whether to require respirators at J-M's Manville, New Jersey, factory. In the first, of May 10, 1960, C. L. Sheckler reports to M. F. Naylor that 714 employees worked at 147 sampling stations above the maximum allowable dust concentration, and that a mandatory program would cost only about $18,000 a year in added pay. But he warns that by marking off "contaminated" areas "we are legally admitting evidence of exposure involving 714 people," and puts the possible workmen's compensation liability at $14,280,000. He recommends keeping respirators voluntary: "area designations should not be made," and "under no circumstances should this matter become a union issue."

What it shows

The plant's managers followed that advice. On July 5, 1960, R. W. Dobson of the Industrial Insulations plant wrote that the consensus was not to write respirator use into job evaluations "even though there is a recognized health hazard and we may be generating additional O.D. [occupational disease] cases," because of "our vulnerable position from the Union and the State standpoint" and the added wage cost. W. F. Fischer, after reviewing the question with H. M. Jackson, J-M's manager of industrial health, recommended "no change from present practice." The August 1960 hygiene report shows 45 of 172 stations in the Industrial Insulations plant still over the limit. In 1963, after an internal auditor found men not wearing respirators in dusty areas, K. H. Slater asked for the policy to be reviewed again (the 1963 audit memo).

Sheckler's memo also explains why J-M's compensation costs in New Jersey were low: "By retaining relationship with the State, we have been successful in establishing the last day worked rather than the first xray change as a 'date of accident'," and most cases were settled "via 'office settlement'." He adds that the company had assured the state that it was "correcting unfavorable conditions," while his own table shows fewer than half the stations above the limit at the start of the dust abatement program had been brought under control.

In Johns-Manville's chronology

Johns-Manville's own chronology of what the company knew describes this document as follows:

A series of memoranda among K.H. Slater to C.W. Grote on 5/10/63, C.L. Sheckler to M.F. Naylor on 5/10/60, R.W. Dobson to W.F. Fischer on 6/13/60, R.W. Dobson to W.F. Fischer on 6/30/60, R.W. Dobson and J.B. McCarty on 7/5/60 and L. Hemerda to W.F. Fischer and C.H. Grote on 8/31/60 discussed various hygiene reports and respirator surveys conducted at the Manville plant.

C.L. Sheckler's memorandum to M.F. Naylor, 5/10/60, cc: All Plant Managers, E.I. [sic] Merrill, H.M. Jackson, analyzing number employees currently exposed above TLV at Manville plant (714) and average yearly exposure hours per employee (8 hrs shift x days/year) to determine the cost of making respirators mandatory for those employees. Sheckler was concerned not only about these direct labor costs (an average of 30 points would be added to each of 714 job evaluations for "surroundings," increasing the hourly wages by an average of $.04), but even more concerned about projected increased workers' compensation liability costs since a mandatory respirator program would be the equivalent of "legally admitting evidence of exposure involving 714 people."

Thus, while the added labor costs total approximately $18,000 per year, the estimated disability awards (50% per workers), plus medical and defense legal expenses for the 714 presently exposed employees totaled $14,380,000. (This figure would be further increased by known but uninformed chest cases at the plant which, because they were not currently exposed above TLV, might not be included in the first calculation.)

Sheckler was concerned about the detrimental effect on J-M's relationship with the state of New Jersey to which he attributes J-M's relatively low workers' compensation costs. "We have assured the State Department of Engineering and Safety that we are correcting unfavorable conditions, and our relationship with them is excellent." In fact, he reports that fewer than half of those stations above TLV at the inception of the Manville Dust Abatement project had been brought under control. Based on this memorandum, J-M decided against a mandatory respirator policy.

R.W. Dobson's memorandum to J.B. McCarty dated 7/5/60 proposes to include respirator usage requirement in job evaluations/job descriptions where worker is exposed to known hazard is turned down by GHQ. Jackson participates in decision. Reasons given in opposition to the respirator requirement are "our vulnerable position from the union and the state viewpoint and the added cost that will be involved if the number of points for working conditions is increased to the maximum." Proposal turned down in spite of recognized health hazard and the possibility of generating additional O.D. cases.

Editor's note: J-M's description puts Sheckler's estimate of compensation liability at $14,380,000; his memo gives $14,280,000. The August 31, 1960, memo is addressed to C. E. Grote, not C. H. Grote.