The Johns-Manville Knowledge Chronology

The 1890s

1898

February 8, 1898. Henry Ward Johns, whose asbestos company was a forerunner of Johns-Manville, dies at 60; his death certificate gives the cause as "phthisis pulmonalis." Read the document

The 1900s

1902

1902. Dangerous Trades, a British text on industrial hazards, lists asbestos weaving among the most injurious processes known since ancient times. Read the document

1907

1907. Dr. H. Montague Murray tells a British government committee that an asbestos carding-room worker died of lung fibrosis, and that the disease will occur "if there is dust." Read the document

The 1910s

1918

1918. A U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics report says American and Canadian life insurers generally decline asbestos workers because of the industry's health hazards. Read the document

The 1920s

1924

July 26, 1924. Dr. W. E. Cooke reports in the British Medical Journal the death of a 33-year-old asbestos factory worker from lung fibrosis, the first proved case in English medical literature. Read the document

1927

December 3, 1927. Dr. W. E. Cooke names the disease "pulmonary asbestosis" in the British Medical Journal, alongside papers by Stuart McDonald and Sir Thomas Oliver. Read the document

1929

May 8, 1929. Anna Pirskowski, a former Manville plant worker, sues Johns-Manville in federal court over asbestos dust; the case is settled in 1934. Read the document
November 1929. Metropolitan Life surveys dust at J-M's Manville plant, the first of a planned industry-wide study, and finds excessive counts at pipe-covering saws and cement mixers. Read the document
December 9, 1929. A. Hughes at the Manville factory tells J-M's Legal Department that "one more victim" was the day's work: "We got her." Read the document

The 1930s

1930

1930. The U.S. Public Health Service reports a tentative "safe" dust level of 10 to 20 million particles per cubic foot for granite-cutting plants. Read the document
1930. J-M's Manville factory rule booklet tells workers to wear respirators when instructed, without saying why. Read the document
January 1930. Metropolitan Life surveys dust at Raybestos-Manhattan's Charleston plant, sees no signs of asbestosis without examinations, and calls the hazard "very remote." Read the document
February 1930. Metropolitan Life X-rays 20 workers at Raybestos-Manhattan's Manheim plant and finds asbestos dust injury in ten of them. Read the document
February 1930. Metropolitan Life finds asbestosis in five of nine readable X-rays at Raybestos-Manhattan's Bridgeport and Stratford plants, despite low dust counts. Read the document
March 24, 1930. A British government report by Merewether and Price finds lung fibrosis in about one in four asbestos workers examined, rising with years of exposure. Read the document
May 1930. Merewether publishes his asbestos findings in The Journal of Industrial Hygiene, describing a serious, sometimes fatal lung fibrosis in asbestos workers. Read the document
September 16, 1930. J-M learns that the Travelers has paid a total disability claim to Joseph Stepka, who is suing the company, and asks its lawyer to find out why. Read the document

1931

April 30, 1931. Britain makes asbestosis compensable under its workmen's compensation law, with a presumption for workers in asbestos processes five years or more. Read the document
July 15, 1931. Dr. Lanza of Metropolitan Life urges J-M to examine all workers, says asbestosis should be compensable to protect the industry, and reports masks ineffective. Read the document
July 28, 1931. Voorhees tells Vice President Williams that since the dust suits at Manville, J-M has weighed modern dust collection and physical examinations of employees. Read the document
September 9, 1931. Vice President Williams directs every J-M plant to plan dust collection on the Manville model and submit budgets. Read the document

1932

January 1932. Dust disease researchers, including Metropolitan Life's Lanza and Saranac Laboratory's Gardner, form the informal Konicide Club to share research on dust and health. Read the document
February 12, 1932. X-rays of Manville plant workers read by a federal doctor show widespread lung disease; J-M asks that the results be kept confidential and out of the lawsuits. Read the document
April 25, 1932. A J-M superintendent of mills orders respirators worn at all times in the baghouse and packing work, on pain of immediate discharge. Read the document
August 1932. An insurance industry publication describes asbestos dust as a constant danger to workers and advises underwriters to charge extra for the dustiest jobs. Read the document
November 25, 1932. Waukegan's manager says workers resist respirators and urges dust equipment and examinations to "fortify our position" against lawsuits like those against another asbestos company. Read the document
December 20, 1932. Vice President Williams asks every J-M plant what it has spent on dust control, examinations and respirator instructions since September 1931. Read the document
December 22, 1932. Waukegan reports it has spent nothing on dust equipment since 1931 and has issued no written respirator instructions. Read the document
December 22, 1932. Nashua's manager reports $475 spent on dust collection, no bad dust condition, and homemade cheesecloth respirators. Read the document
December 23, 1932. Alexandria's manager reports respirators are optional and resisted, and that the plant makes "no attempt at all to examine the heart or lungs." Read the document
December 24, 1932. Canadian Johns-Manville reports no new factory dust equipment since 1931 and says its mill workers "do not find respirators practicable." Read the document
December 27, 1932. The Los Angeles plant reports that nothing has been done to collect dust or protect employees from it, and no examinations given. Read the document
December 28, 1932. Lompoc reports a 75% cut in dust since 1929, required respirators, and rotation of men out of dusty jobs so "their exposure will not be too great." Read the document

1933

February 20, 1933. Vandiver Brown recalls that J-M would not support a New Jersey compensation bill because it wanted more time "to set our house in order." Read the document
March 22, 1933. Maryland Casualty Company asks J-M for help defending two silicosis suits against a home insulation firm that used J-M material. Read the document
April 18, 1933. Vandiver Brown tells J-M's president that a Pennsylvania commission, with Lanza a member, left asbestosis off its compensable diseases. Read the document
May 10, 1933. Vandiver Brown cables J-M's president to insist that Williams "eliminate remaining suspects" and bring other plants "to Manville efficiency." Read the document
May 12, 1933. S. A. Williams reviews dust control at seven J-M plants, from $48,000 spent at Manville to plans still awaiting approval at Pittsburg. Read the document
May 22, 1933. To avoid negligence charges, Vandiver Brown recommends masks, ventilation and posted dust warnings for J-M's home insulation workers. Read the document
June 21, 1933. Vandiver Brown lends Toledo lawyer C. B. Belknap, later of Owens-Illinois, the court papers from two New Jersey rock wool silicosis trials. Read the document
June 26, 1933. J-M's chief engineer calls Pittsburg's dust control estimates "a bit startling," having expected minor repairs to do the job. Read the document
June 26, 1933. To settle 11 asbestosis suits, plaintiffs' lawyer Samuel Greenstone promises never to help bring another claim against J-M over the same conditions. Read the document
June 29, 1933. J-M's chief engineer calls vendors' dust control layouts for Pittsburg "entirely too elaborate and much too expensive." Read the document
July 31, 1933. Pittsburg's manager doubts dust equipment is needed but backs it, citing the cost of a disease case and its "psychological effect." Read the document
August 29, 1933. Dr. Lanza tells J-M he doubts warning posters are justified, "especially" given "the extraordinary legal situation." Read the document
October 27, 1933. Laborer Bernard Dugan sues R. V. Aycock Company, whose assets J-M had bought, for lung disability from mixing asbestos. Read the document
November 28, 1933. J-M asks Dr. Lanza to extend Metropolitan Life's dust survey; Voorhees wants outside dust counts that, if favorable, would help in litigation. Read the document
December 29, 1933. J-M and Raybestos-Manhattan agree to have Metropolitan Life survey their plants, keep the results confidential, and seek an expert for court work. Read the document

1934

1934. Waukegan plant workers' dust-disease suits go forward after a federal court in Chicago denies J-M's motions to dismiss. Read the document
January 3, 1934. Waukegan's manager asks to X-ray the workers on the plant doctor's list, without buying X-ray equipment for the plant. Read the document
January 5, 1934. Vandiver Brown sends Raybestos-Manhattan the minutes of a joint meeting with Metropolitan Life's Dr. Lanza on dust surveys and dust counts. Read the document
April 4, 1934. A J-M laboratory report suggests long blue and amosite fibers could be more harmful than chrysotile, but doubts fibers readily reach the lungs. Read the document
April 25, 1934. Raybestos-Manhattan's president plans X-rays of Charleston workers, who had already sued, "with a little diplomacy" and not "in mass formation." Read the document
June 7, 1934. Johns-Manville and Raybestos-Manhattan share the salary of Otto L. Binder, hired to take dust counts at their plants. Read the document
August 17, 1934. J-M sends its Home Insulation Contractors bulletins on a new Mine Safety Appliances respirator, N. B. Sherrill tells Vandiver Brown. Read the document
October 1, 1934. Vandiver Brown has the asbestos industry's Code Authority call jobs "unsuitable" for minors rather than "unsanitary or hazardous." Read the document
October 13, 1934. Metropolitan Life finds heavy dust at Gretna's shingle mixers, and J-M approves a $107 dust collecting system modeled on Waukegan's. Read the document
October 23, 1934. An insurers' committee says asbestosis, like silicosis, is becoming a compensation problem and urges a scheduled-disease law to curb damage suits. Read the document
December 10, 1934. Vandiver Brown asks Dr. Lanza to restore passages of the Metropolitan Life report that were "favorable to the industry." Read the document
December 15, 1934. J-M's outside counsel seeks changes to Lanza's report, citing J-M's defense that medical knowledge was insufficient "until a very recent period." Read the document
December 18, 1934. Vandiver Brown sends Raybestos-Manhattan the Lanza galley proof and says Lanza will likely "accede to most of our requests." Read the document
December 24, 1934. Vandiver Brown tells Raybestos-Manhattan he and Hobart suggested changes to Lanza's report "beneficial from the Industry viewpoint" before publication. Read the document

1935

January 2, 1935. Raybestos-Manhattan tells Vandiver Brown it is content to leave approval of Metropolitan Life's asbestos report in his hands. Read the document
January 4, 1935. Metropolitan Life's study of U.S. asbestos plants is published, finding asbestosis in over half of 126 workers X-rayed and urging dust control and regular X-rays. Read the document
January 17, 1935. Illinois manufacturers, with J-M taking part, draft an occupational disease law that would replace lawsuits and limit asbestosis claims to three years after exposure. Read the document
January 18, 1935. Vandiver Brown reports on the Mellon Institute dust symposium, where industries agree to seek joint action on dust disease claims and compensation laws. Read the document
January 22, 1935. Vandiver Brown sends Raybestos-Manhattan his memorandum on the Mellon Institute dust symposium. Read the document
January 30, 1935. Raybestos-Manhattan tells Vandiver Brown it sees no need to join the Mellon Institute group, since it and J-M already have "a pretty definite program." Read the document
February 11, 1935. An insurers' trade group warns that compensating silicosis and asbestosis would load industry with liabilities for disease contracted years before. Read the document
February 14, 1935. Vandiver Brown explains that J-M wants an Illinois disease law because an industrial commission would treat it better than a jury. Read the document
February 28, 1935. Vandiver Brown passes J-M's officers an Illinois manufacturers' leader's view that dust disease suits are a racket run by lawyers and "quack doctors." Read the document
March 25, 1935. Vandiver Brown tells J-M's Lompoc plant that properly drawn disease laws are industry's "chief safeguard against future disaster" and lists what they should contain. Read the document
April 9, 1935. Sumner Simpson arranges for the American Tobacco Company to help Raybestos-Manhattan's Charleston plant with dust control. Read the document
June 10, 1935. J-M tells its home insulation contractors to issue dust masks against signed receipts "to escape the charge of negligence" in future suits. Read the document
June 27, 1935. J-M's officers direct a respirator procedure giving the company "maximum protection against the legal hazard" and defer dust control spending at Waukegan. Read the document
July 2, 1935. With no Illinois law passed, J-M's Waukegan plant asks headquarters what to do about four approved dust collecting projects. Read the document
July 3, 1935. Vandiver Brown reports that Illinois passed no occupational disease law, leaving workers with dust disease to sue under common law. Read the document
August 20, 1935. Drafting respirator rules for J-M's factories, Vandiver Brown writes that workers must be warned dust is hazardous without being alarmed. Read the document
August 23, 1935. A respirator maker advises Vandiver Brown that factory notices should merely tell workers respirators are available and ask them to wear them. Read the document
September 25, 1935. Asbestos magazine reminds Raybestos-Manhattan's president that at his request it has published nothing on asbestosis, and asks if it may now. Read the document
October 1935. A London pathologist publishes two autopsy cases of women asbestos workers who died with both asbestosis and lung cancer. Read the document
October 19, 1935. Sumner Simpson presses Metropolitan Life to let its chemist testify for Raybestos-Manhattan in the Charleston asbestosis suits. Read the document
October 30, 1935. A former J-M pipe coverer files a Massachusetts compensation claim for asbestosis naming J-M and other employers. Read the document

1936

January 7, 1936. J-M arranges to hire Metropolitan Life's dust technician Otto Binder to sample and count dust at J-M and Raybestos-Manhattan plants. Read the document
July 15, 1936. Vandiver Brown advises that J-M could avoid liability under Illinois's new law by dropping workers with early dust disease from the payroll before November 29, 1936. Read the document
August 18, 1936. Vandiver Brown proposes that J-M workers with early dust disease keep their jobs only by waiving half their future compensation. Read the document
September 16, 1936. J-M's Waukegan plant manager reports on an Illinois industry meeting about workers who are "doubtless hazards" and asks Brown what to do at Waukegan. Read the document
October 5, 1936. Vandiver Brown suggests an industry foundation's paper call asbestosis "a distinctive type of fibrosis" instead of "a serious type." Read the document
October 21, 1936. An unsigned J-M memo recommends settling thirteen Illinois dust disease claims cheaply, partly to avoid a ruling that asbestos dust is a "poison." Read the document
October 21, 1936. Vandiver Brown urges J-M to accept Illinois's compensation act, noting J-M has a dust disease hazard, and says moving sick workers out of dust would avoid liability. Read the document
October 27, 1936. Raybestos-Manhattan's North Charleston manager asks Simpson to let state and federal health officers make dust counts and X-ray every worker at the plant. Read the document
November 10, 1936. Sumner Simpson invites Thermoid Rubber to share the cost of Gardner's asbestos research at Saranac. Read the document
November 10, 1936. Sumner Simpson invites Keasbey & Mattison to help fund Gardner's asbestos research, with the sponsors to decide "whether we wish any publication or not." Read the document
November 20, 1936. Eleven asbestos companies agree to fund Gardner's asbestosis research at Saranac, with the results theirs and any manuscript subject to their approval before publication. Read the document
December 17, 1936. Vandiver Brown tells Union Asbestos & Rubber that experts sympathetic to industry are "insurance against wild-eyed legislation." Read the document

1937

1937. The Air Hygiene Foundation begins its monthly Industrial Hygiene Digest, abstracting occupational health literature for member companies. Read the document
May 10, 1937. Metropolitan Life's Lanza reports unusual X-ray shadows in long-serving Lompoc workers and hesitates to say diatomaceous earth dust is harmless. Read the document
May 11, 1937. Vandiver Brown sends Union Asbestos & Rubber Gardner's first progress report on the industry-funded asbestosis experiments at Saranac. Read the document
June 1, 1937. An insurer's engineering manual tells inspectors asbestosis can cause disability and death, while treating shipbuilding as free of occupational disease hazards. Read the document

1938

1938. The Saranac Laboratory's 1938 annual report publicly mentions results of Gardner's industry-funded asbestos dust experiments on animals. Read the document
January 1938. J-M tells its Manville workers it is company policy to make plants "safe, healthful places to work," without naming asbestos or any dust disease. Read the document
April 18, 1938. J-M's board learns its Canadian mill at Asbestos, Quebec, spreads about sixty tons of dust over the town, and that $215,000 is authorized to stop it. Read the document
August 1938. The U.S. Public Health Service publishes its study of asbestos textile workers and proposes 5 million particles per cubic foot as a tentative safe limit. Read the document
September 9, 1938. Bronson Batchelor alerts Vandiver Brown that the Public Health Service's asbestosis study of the textile industry has been listed in the Capitol Daily. Read the document

1939

1939. A Johns-Manville release on its Asbestos, Quebec, hospital says workers show "remarkable freedom from dust diseases" and that dust "is not a serious hazard." Read the document
January 27, 1939. Vandiver Brown has J-M's Newark lawyers watch for New Jersey bills that would make silicosis, asbestosis or pneumoconiosis compensable. Read the document
February 8, 1939. Vandiver Brown reviews New Jersey bills to make dust disease compensable, noting nearly ten years without a claim by a Manville employee: "I am keeping my fingers crossed." Read the document
April 5, 1939. The Air Hygiene Foundation offers Raybestos-Manhattan dust surveys by a "disinterested" authority, to help defend against workers' compensation claims. Read the document
May 3, 1939. Vandiver Brown reminds Raybestos-Manhattan that under the 1936 agreement the funding companies decide whether and how Gardner's asbestos results are made public. Read the document
May 4, 1939. Sumner Simpson tells Vandiver Brown that Gardner should not use asbestosis material "without our consent," since results could be "very embarrassing." Read the document
May 5, 1939. Sumner Simpson asks Leroy Gardner for the Saranac Laboratory's 1938 report and his February 1939 mining engineers' paper. Read the document
May 5, 1939. The mayor of Asbestos, Quebec, thanks Canadian Johns-Manville for new equipment to catch the mill dust that had spread over the town. Read the document
May 24, 1939. Vandiver Brown arranges for Metropolitan Life's Dr. W. J. McConnell to read X-rays of workers at J-M's new Jarratt, Virginia, plant. Read the document
July 12, 1939. Vandiver Brown assures the Budd company that J-M's Stonefelt insulation cannot cause silicosis, citing a Metropolitan Life survey of J-M plants. Read the document
August 3, 1939. Manville plant workers' families sue J-M over asbestos dust; a plant memo on one case says it "was not the policy of the Company" to warn employees of dust danger. Read the document
October 6, 1939. Vandiver Brown chides Aetna's Walter Paine for not visiting, promising to "raise no 'dusty' problems" next time. Read the document
December 14, 1939. Leroy Gardner tells the sponsoring asbestos companies his animal experiments have not produced the expected asbestosis and asks them to fund another year. Read the document
December 26, 1939. Vandiver Brown sends Raybestos-Manhattan Gardner's interim report and asks whether it will share $5,000 to finish the asbestos experiments. Read the document

The 1940s

1940

1940. An internal J-M report reviews 1938 to 1939, noting the company became self-insured for workers' compensation and counting the savings. Read the document
February 6, 1940. Reviewing Gardner's interim report, Canadian J-M's C. M. McGaw advises discussing it only confidentially at the producers' meeting and giving it no further publicity. Read the document
February 16, 1940. Manville plant manager J. E. Begert recommends retiring Edward Shanahan, who is not improving, and seeking total disability payments for him from Travelers. Read the document
April 17, 1940. A J-M purchasing bulletin lists respirator and goggle suppliers and prices for its district offices, plants and home insulation units. Read the document
May 10, 1940. Vandiver Brown complains to Sumner Simpson that Gardner is publishing results of the industry-funded experiments "without seeking our advance approval." Read the document
June 25, 1940. At Vandiver Brown's suggestion, the Manville plant manager asks the company doctor to keep Steve Kardos from learning of his probable asbestosis; the doctor refuses. Read the document
June 26, 1940. The Manville plant doctor reports examining the whole workforce, noting that "a great many" workers with asbestosis show no progress since their 1932 X-rays. Read the document
August 21, 1940. Vandiver Brown drafts J-M's answer to North American Aviation: Stonefelt may cause a slight rash but will not cause silicosis or any lung disorder. Read the document
September 4, 1940. J-M headquarters holds up its North American Aviation letter and narrows its claims about experience with Stonefelt and the Harvard tests. Read the document
September 12, 1940. Metropolitan Life's Dr. Lanza reads a Manville worker's X-ray as asbestosis; plant manager Begert calls it "a Class A problem" and worries about "shyster attorneys." Read the document
November 15, 1940. Metropolitan Life signals it will stop reading J-M's Jarratt pre-employment X-rays but will still help interpret films in dust disease claims. Read the document

1941

January 3, 1941. A lawyer for Manville worker Joseph Kopicki tells J-M he has proof of silicosis from his work; Vandiver Brown asks the plant for its records. Read the document
February 13, 1941. Begert calls a worker's claim one of "those annoying cases" and asks about a compensation bill J-M is preparing with other business interests. Read the document
March 12, 1941. The Air Hygiene Foundation asks J-M for figures showing industrial hygiene's value in dollars; a J-M note says it has none yet. Read the document
May 16, 1941. A. R. Fisher and Vandiver Brown draft a reply to the Manville Board of Health on local air conditions, telling Begert to make no admissions. Read the document
July 24, 1941. Begert tells Vandiver Brown that sick workers' cases "get troublesome only when they see their payments are going to run out." Read the document
September 18, 1941. Asked by Douglas Aircraft about workers' itching, Vandiver Brown drafts a reply saying J-M's Stonefelt insulation cannot cause silicosis or any lung disorder. Read the document
September 19, 1941. Vandiver Brown agrees J-M will help defend a shipyard insulation worker's suit, to avoid any court decision "establishing our material as a hazardous product." Read the document
October 17, 1941. Silva v. Hopeman Brothers, a shipyard insulation case J-M helped defend, ends in a hung jury after a twelve-day trial. Read the document
October 31, 1941. Sumner Simpson passes a letter from Asbestos magazine's editor to Vandiver Brown to handle, and asks whether Gardner has reported on the dust experiments. Read the document
November 3, 1941. Vandiver Brown asks Leroy Gardner for the final report on the industry-funded Saranac asbestos experiments; Gardner promises an update after the new year. Read the document
December 16, 1941. J-M's list of pending claims for its auditors includes a rock wool dust suit and lung disease claims at its Lompoc and Alexandria plants. Read the document
December 27, 1941. Lorenzo Valentino's lawyer seeks a settlement; J-M's records show its own 1932 X-rays found silicosis in him that had since progressed. Read the document

1942

1942. Two New York pathologists report lung cancer with asbestosis in two pipe coverers, bringing the recorded cases to ten. Read the document
1942. Unarco's lawyer and two plant managers meet J-M's Vandiver Brown, who, Roemer later swears, says J-M does not tell workers of their X-ray findings. Read the document
September 24, 1942. Vandiver Brown tells the Industrial Hygiene Foundation that complaints of infections from handling wet asbestos shingles sound like "a mare's nest." Read the document
October 8, 1942. The manager of J-M's Manville plant reports that workers are leaving because they are afraid of the dust in some departments. Read the document
November 2, 1942. Two workers ask about their chest X-rays; J-M's industrial relations manager sends the plates for Dr. Gardner's review and asks Vandiver Brown what to tell the men. Read the document
December 7, 1942. At a Maritime Commission and Navy conference, Philip Drinker warns shipbuilders that asbestosis is expected where asbestos is installed with little or no precaution. Read the document
December 29, 1942. Expecting an asbestosis suit by a former worker, Raybestos-Manhattan asks Metropolitan Life's Dr. Lanza for the help that had been "so invaluable" before. Read the document

1943

January 7, 1943. A shipyard doctor and Britain's Dr. Merewether agree that removing old asbestos from ships under repair is "a definite hazard." Read the document
February 24, 1943. Leroy Gardner sends J-M's Vandiver Brown an outline of his asbestosis findings that notes excess lung cancer, and proposes leaving the cancer question out of the report. Read the document
March 15, 1943. Leroy Gardner tells the National Cancer Institute he was "startled" to find lung cancer in most of his asbestos-dusted mice and asks for a grant to repeat the test. Read the document
March 20, 1943. The National Advisory Cancer Council invites Leroy Gardner to apply for a grant to study "the carcinogenic effect of asbestos dust." Read the document
June 3, 1943. Leroy Gardner applies to the National Cancer Institute for $10,000 to study the relationship of asbestosis to lung cancer. Read the document
June 14, 1943. A Seattle insulation trade group asks Washington State to delete its proposed asbestosis safety rule, calling the disease foreign and claimants "parasites." Read the document
June 17, 1943. Gardner's cancer grant application misses the Council's June meeting and is held over until the fall. Read the document
September 1943. A Yale pathologist counts 19 reported cases of lung cancer with asbestosis but finds no reliable answer yet on whether asbestosis causes the cancer. Read the document
September 13, 1943. The National Advisory Cancer Council asks Gardner for a short statement on asbestosis to put before its members with his grant application. Read the document
September 29, 1943. Leroy Gardner tells the National Advisory Cancer Council the Navy has "a real problem" with asbestos insulation and the cancer question cannot be neglected much longer. Read the document

1944

1944. A draft reply for Owens-Corning says glass fibers are harmless to the lungs and suggests blaming a worker's condition on asbestos products. Read the document
January 3, 1944. Vandiver Brown asks that a bibliography citing lung cancer in asbestos workers be cut from a report meant for Quebec's compensation authorities. Read the document
January 8, 1944. Leroy Gardner asks Vandiver Brown for J-M's series of chest X-rays on Manville workers to study how asbestosis progresses. Read the document
January 10, 1944. The National Advisory Cancer Council declines Gardner's request for $10,000 to study asbestosis and lung cancer in mice. Read the document
January 19, 1944. Sumner Simpson lets Leroy Gardner review Raybestos-Manhattan's Manheim X-rays on condition that the company is not named in his report. Read the document
January 28, 1944. Vandiver Brown tells Continental Can that Stonefelt rock wool irritates the skin only mechanically and that workers quickly become immune. Read the document
February 14, 1944. A J-M manager asks that workers' X-rays go quickly to Dr. Gardner in compensation cases and proposes educating Lompoc workers out of their fear of dust. Read the document
February 28, 1944. Gardner tells Ivan Sabourin that asbestosis does not predispose to tuberculosis, citing one U.S. plant where asbestosis rose from 40% to over 80% of workers. Read the document
March 7, 1944. Vandiver Brown drafts J-M's answer to an aircraft maker asking whether Stonefelt insulation causes dermatitis, saying workers quickly develop an "immunity." Read the document
May 17, 1944. Gardner asks to review Canadian J-M's X-rays; the Quebec manager approves, writing that the company's main interest is in "favorable findings" for Gardner's book. Read the document
July 1944. Saranac's doctors read Canadian J-M workers' chest X-rays, noting many lung changes but calling only a few compatible with early asbestosis. Read the document
July 15, 1944. After reading 200 to 300 X-rays at Asbestos, Quebec, Gardner reports only two questionable cases of asbestosis and calls the disease rare there. Read the document
July 25, 1944. A sponsoring company's president backs adding Gardner's Quebec X-ray findings to the final report, even at extra cost. Read the document
August 15, 1944. A company survey finds women in Canadian J-M's textile department have the plant's highest absence rate, blaming dust, poor ventilation and illness, including tuberculosis. Read the document
September 9, 1944. Bell Asbestos shares with Canadian J-M a union brief citing sick miners and denied compensation claims, and its own reply that dust is no appreciable hazard. Read the document
October 12, 1944. Vandiver Brown and Leroy Gardner agree that California's proposed warning label for asbestos and silica dust is "absurd." Read the document
October 27, 1944. A Quebec government survey finds dust in Canadian J-M's textile plant up to seven times the accepted limit and calls for better exhaust and housekeeping. Read the document
November 16, 1944. J-M, Raybestos-Manhattan and other asbestos textile makers form the Asbestos Textile Institute, with a first-year budget of $20,000. Read the document
November 17, 1944. New Jersey's health department finds dust problems in the Manville textile department and notes the fiber count may matter more than total dust. Read the document
November 21, 1944. A Toledo doctor tells Owens-Corning Fiberglas that a longtime insulation pipe coverer has asbestosis from years of asbestos dust, not from Fiberglas. Read the document
December 15, 1944. Vandiver Brown tells Keasbey & Mattison that Gardner still cannot write his promised asbestosis monograph but is continuing his experiments. Read the document
December 19, 1944. Canadian J-M's doctor reports that men cleaning bags of South African blue asbestos suffer almost constant asthma attacks and asks whether other plants have seen this. Read the document

1945

1945. Asked by New Jersey to survey Manville for the War Production Board, J-M's insurer Metropolitan Life finds the asbestosis hazard controlled, and the case is closed. Read the document
January 26, 1945. Headquarters tells Canadian J-M's doctor no other plant has had breathing problems from blue-fibre bags and suggests better instruction, then respirators. Read the document
March 12, 1945. J-M's Lompoc diatomaceous earth plant lists fifteen years of dust-control work and says employees must wear respirators "where the need is indicated." Read the document
June 5, 1945. Vandiver Brown reports that Gardner is still trying to learn why U.S. asbestos factories show more lung disease than the Canadian mines. Read the document
June 29, 1945. A J-M executive urges keeping the Quebec company doctor on as a consultant because of the number of asbestosis cases expected in the next few years. Read the document
August 1945. Britain's Chief Inspector of Factories warns that shipyard asbestos insulation work puts workers at risk of asbestosis and calls for respirators and dust control. Read the document
August 13, 1945. Vandiver Brown welcomes Gardner's theory on why textile dust is more harmful than mill dust and notes J-M has never had a medical director. Read the document
August 14, 1945. Canadian J-M reports that workers cleaning foreign-fibre jute bags still suffer hay-fever-like reactions and asks that factories stop sending the bags. Read the document

1946

1946. A J-M hiring guide for home insulation crews advises against hiring men who have had silicosis or other lung disease that job dust might aggravate. Read the document
1946. Manville plant worker Joseph Slovak sues J-M over pneumoconiosis, claiming it never warned him about the dust; J-M settles in 1947 for $500. Read the document
January 1946. A Navy-sponsored survey of 1,074 shipyard pipe coverers finds three asbestosis cases and concludes pipe covering is not a dangerous occupation. Read the document
April 5, 1946. Manville plant worker Benjamin Szymanski sues J-M for $50,000 over asbestosis; the plant doctor tells the company he thinks the cause is tuberculosis. Read the document
April 18, 1946. An asbestos textile maker urges Vandiver Brown to see that Gardner's final report says invisible dust caused no permanent injury and drops any mention of cancer. Read the document
May 8, 1946. Leroy Gardner tells J-M that over 80 percent of Saranac's asbestos-exposed mice developed lung tumors and urges an outside review of J-M workers' X-rays. Read the document
June 19, 1946. The Asbestos Textile Institute receives Dr. Vestal's plan for an industry medical department and sends it to its Dust Control Committee for study. Read the document
August 2, 1946. J-M's Manville plant asks for a new dispensary X-ray machine because the old one blurs chest films and could miss or misread lung lesions. Read the document
October 24, 1946. Saranac's field director tells Vandiver Brown that Leroy Gardner has died, leaving his asbestos study for the industry unfinished. Read the document

1947

January 21, 1947. J-M's doctor at Asbestos, Quebec, asks that a 35-year-old mill worker with 20 years' dust exposure be moved before he becomes "another case" of asbestosis. Read the document
January 21, 1947. Vandiver Brown tells Dr. Lanza he hopes the completed Gardner report will leave out any relation between asbestos dust and cancer. Read the document
January 31, 1947. A Manville plant manager tells Vandiver Brown that Metropolitan Life's new dust counts are above five million particles everywhere in the department. Read the document
March 12, 1947. Told that 81.8 percent of Gardner's long-fiber mice developed lung cancer, Vandiver Brown says he is "very much concerned"; Saranac shows he received the finding in 1943. Read the document
March 31, 1947. J-M's doctor at Asbestos, Quebec, agrees with Thetford Mines' Dr. Cartier to meet monthly and review X-ray films for uniform results in the two clinics. Read the document
April 26, 1947. The American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists adopts a limit of 5 million particles per cubic foot for asbestos dust. Read the document
June 18, 1947. An Industrial Hygiene Foundation engineer tells the asbestos textile industry that the five-million-particle dust limit may not prevent asbestosis and urges X-rays of all exposed workers. Read the document
July 10, 1947. J-M arranges a $25 million credit line with Metropolitan Life and Mutual Life and borrows $5 million on 20-year notes. Read the document
August 6, 1947. Dr. Lanza tells J-M officers that Lynch has written up Gardner's asbestos report but Saranac's new director, Vorwald, is reluctant to publish it. Read the document
September 2, 1947. J-M's doctor at Asbestos, Quebec, skips the Saranac Symposium, writing that his broad safety duties are "what J-M wants"; Vandiver Brown leads its management discussion. Read the document

1948

January 30, 1948. J-M plans a visit to the widow of Waukegan worker Dominic Bertogliat after Travelers pays a $5,000 death claim, and routes the case to its lawyers. Read the document
March 15, 1948. Worried by a Montreal magazine's issue on mining deaths in Quebec, J. P. Woodard presses Saranac for dates on its asbestos and diatomaceous earth reports. Read the document
March 19, 1948. Dr. Kenneth Smith reviews the Saranac asbestosis report for Canadian J-M and asks for an expert opinion on whether asbestos plays a role in cancer. Read the document
April 9, 1948. J-M decides how to describe Marinite to the American Medical Association, avoiding a statement that it is made from silica, lime and amosite fiber. Read the document
June 1, 1948. J-M's J. P. Woodard presses Saranac to finish its asbestosis monograph because of the "ferment" in Quebec over industrial health. Read the document
July 10, 1948. Canadian J-M's industrial hygiene committee goes on record that headquarters has failed to approve a mill dust project that would cut dust about 50%. Read the document
July 21, 1948. J-M's officers approve new projects that include dust control work, listed with the July 21, 1948, board agenda. Read the document
July 28, 1948. J-M asks Saranac's Arthur Vorwald to delay sending his findings on a dead Waukegan worker to the outside doctor while it handles the case at the plant. Read the document
July 28, 1948. J-M's Roger Hackney discusses how to fund Quebec compensation as Canadian managers expect asbestosis claims to mount and become a heavy burden. Read the document
August 16, 1948. Vandiver Brown asks New Jersey's Department of Labor to postpone its proposed asbestos code until the Saranac report is available. Read the document
September 14, 1948. Thomas Gatke urges Vandiver Brown to get the Saranac report finished to fight asbestosis claims, and hopes Gardner's mention of cancer will be stricken. Read the document
September 16, 1948. J-M's President's Bulletin No. 59 says improvements to substandard working conditions have been suspended because of costs, with only the most urgent needs considered. Read the document
October 12, 1948. Saranac sends J-M fifteen copies of the asbestos report, holding back a section on lung cancer because Gardner's notes on cancer in animals were unclear. Read the document
October 22, 1948. Vandiver Brown proposes removing the tumor findings from the Saranac report, noting that 9 of 11 mice exposed to long-fiber dust had lung tumors. Read the document
October 27, 1948. Vandiver Brown sends the sponsors the draft Saranac asbestos report in confidence and calls a meeting, writing it should be published if "speculative comments" are omitted. Read the document
November 12, 1948. After a meeting of the sponsors, Vandiver Brown writes that they unanimously agreed references to cancer and tumors must be deleted from the Saranac report. Read the document
November 16, 1948. Saranac's Arthur Vorwald tells Owens-Illinois that its Kaylo insulation produced asbestosis in animals and should be handled as a hazardous industrial dust. Read the document
November 27, 1948. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells J-M's Toronto plant that clean housekeeping is the best proof to workers of no hazard, while naming definite asbestos and silica hazards there. Read the document
December 1, 1948. Dr. Kenneth Smith warns that unloading silica flour at Asbestos raises hazardous dust and says the men should wear respirators. Read the document
December 6, 1948. Dr. Kenneth Smith advises Canadian J-M against more autopsies of asbestos workers for now, citing compensation awards to families at Thetford Mines. Read the document
December 8, 1948. J-M safety engineer H. M. Jackson writes that silica and asbestos are toxic materials in J-M's processes and that needed respirators must be worn. Read the document
December 14, 1948. Owens-Illinois asks the Industrial Hygiene Foundation to study Kaylo dust, including in customers' plants, after animal tests point to asbestosis. Read the document
December 31, 1948. After an autopsy on a Lompoc worker, J-M headquarters wants the information quickly but no views spread that would create "an alarmist attitude." Read the document

1949

1949. Testifying in 1976, Dr. Kenneth Smith recalls dust from J-M's Asbestos, Quebec, mine and mill blowing through the town in the late 1940s. Read the document
1949. A Canadian J-M survey of 708 mill workers finds 7 with asbestosis and 52 more with advanced fibrosis; the men with asbestosis have not been told. Read the document
1949. A Canadian Johns-Manville booklet says over $1 million has been spent on working conditions at Asbestos, Quebec, and that town dust is down more than 75 percent. Read the document
January 1949. Britain's Chief Inspector of Factories reports lung cancer in 13.2 percent of asbestosis deaths, against 1.32 percent of silicosis deaths. Read the document
January 14, 1949. Canadian Johns-Manville tells its Asbestos, Quebec, workers the strike, now in its 13th day, is illegal and urges them back to work. Read the document
January 31, 1949. Saranac Laboratory delivers its final report on Gardner's asbestos animal experiments to J-M; the lung tumors in mice reported in the 1948 draft do not appear. Read the document
February 1949. Massachusetts labels asbestos dust very harmful, sets a limit of 5 million particles per cubic foot and calls respirators a last resort. Read the document
February 3, 1949. Dr. Kenneth Smith's X-ray survey of 708 Quebec mill workers finds dust-caused lung changes in most and notes that men with asbestosis have not been told. Read the document
March 3, 1949. Vandiver Brown sends the sponsors the revised Saranac report, which he says adopts all their suggestions; the draft's mouse lung tumors no longer appear. Read the document
March 19, 1949. Reviewing the Saranac report, J-M's Quebec medical chief recommends asking Saranac for an expert opinion on whether asbestosis is linked to cancer. Read the document
April 7, 1949. Asbestos Textile Institute members decide a Scientific American article unjustifiably painted asbestos as a cancer cause and ask Dr. Lanza to clarify. Read the document
April 15, 1949. Woodard tells Foster that the Saranac finding that small amounts of long fibres damage lungs means J-M must find and eliminate them. Read the document
April 25, 1949. H. M. Jackson reports high perlite dust counts in asbestos pipe covering work and urges ventilation and dust control wherever perlite is used. Read the document
May 20, 1949. During the Asbestos strike, J-M's Quebec medical chief tells the public only two asbestosis cases have been recognized in Asbestos in fifty years. Read the document
May 24, 1949. At Canadian Johns-Manville's request, Quebec's government demographer argues that tuberculosis deaths in the asbestos towns are no higher than elsewhere. Read the document
June 15, 1949. Britain's senior factory medical inspector reports that 13.2% of asbestosis cases his department studied had lung cancer at autopsy, against 1.32% for silicosis. Read the document
June 27, 1949. A J-M bulletin tells contract crews and salesmen what insurance covers the company's insulation contract work, including workmen's compensation through Travelers. Read the document
August 8, 1949. Sending Dr. Smith's 708-man survey to L. C. Hart, Woodard writes that the dust is causing lung changes and many cases will likely become claims. Read the document
August 9, 1949. Facing a union demand that it eliminate dust, the Quebec asbestos companies prepare a fallback clause calling dust a "nuisance" to be eased as they see fit. Read the document
August 18, 1949. J-M approves more than $5.5 million to extend dust control at Asbestos, Quebec; Woodard says he made good use of Dr. Smith's 708-man study. Read the document
September 19, 1949. J-M managers and Dr. Pauly agree to review the Manville plant's list of special industrial hygiene cases every two years. Read the document
September 27, 1949. Ontario's industrial hygiene division sends J-M's Port Union plant dust counts and recommends better dust control at the Transite pipe charging end and saws. Read the document
September 30, 1949. J-M engineers find dust in the Waukegan Transite pipe plant at over ten times the allowable and warn it could cause costly claims. Read the document
October 3, 1949. A J-M engineering report proposes making Thermobestos amosite pipe covering after Sales reports over $2.2 million in 1948 contracts lost to Unibestos. Read the document
October 11, 1949. At J-M's Toronto plant, workers handling silica flour are ordered to wear respirators at all times, on pain of discharge. Read the document
October 15, 1949. Saranac's director asks J-M's Quebec doctor for years of worker X-rays to study lung cancer, a problem he calls "of great concern to us." Read the document

The 1950s

1950

January 3, 1950. Asked by Saranac's director about lung cancer among the Asbestos, Quebec, workers, J-M's doctor reports at least 11 asbestosis cases in 6,500 X-ray files and no known cancers. Read the document
January 28, 1950. J-M's Quebec doctor urges a study of asbestos and lung cancer, writing that "if we are to defend ourselves in the compensation courts we must have proof." Read the document
January 28, 1950. J-M's Quebec doctor recommends doing nothing, for now, about the province's new rule requiring doctors to report asbestosis cases, citing the risk of compensation claims. Read the document
January 30, 1950. A J-M plant doctor proposes further tests on a disabled Manville spinner "rather than merely accept liability" for his asbestosis. Read the document
January 30, 1950. Thetford's mining doctor questions Saranac's analysis of eight mill dust samples and notes that asbestosis cases come from the dustiest, most fibrous stages of milling. Read the document
January 31, 1950. A Canadian J-M manager circulates comments on the Saranac asbestosis report noting that a long-fiber finding could make respirators easier to wear. Read the document
February 3, 1950. A J-M headquarters manager calls for screening job applicants to avoid hiring men with silicosis and asks Dr. Smith whether lung cancer could be a hazard at J-M. Read the document
February 7, 1950. J-M's Quebec medical director tells headquarters that asbestos and silica are two hazards in J-M's operations that "may lead to pulmonary malignancy." Read the document
February 8, 1950. J-M's Quebec doctor sends Saranac the new Merewether article, writing that its "very definite conclusions do not agree with our operating experience." Read the document
February 8, 1950. J-M headquarters presses its Lompoc plant for a "highly confidential" list of workers whose examinations show changes serious enough to be watched. Read the document
February 10, 1950. J-M's Quebec doctor writes to the Toronto office that "the chief causes of lung cancer are dust and certain coal tar products." Read the document
March 1950. The industry's trade magazine reports surgeons using an asbestos paste as an "irritant" to join a patient's lung to the heart. Read the document
March 3, 1950. Woodard tells J-M's Quebec doctor that Dr. Lanza says Merewether's opinions "don't hold water" and would like to run an industry study of asbestos and lung cancer. Read the document
April 1950. California's Industrial Accident Commission finds that a Redwood City plant worker's dust disease arose from his J-M job and awards him $30 a week. Read the document
April 10, 1950. Thetford's mining doctor urges an industry study of cancer, reporting eight lung cancer cases among Thetford asbestos workers since 1946. Read the document
April 18, 1950. Saranac's director calls Merewether's paper on asbestosis and lung cancer "a dilly" and warns of "another storm" brewing in Quebec over a case of asbestosis with cancer. Read the document
May 17, 1950. Vandiver Brown writes that J-M is "very much concerned" about reports linking asbestos to lung cancer and is considering animal experiments to test the theory. Read the document
June 16, 1950. After an industry meeting in New York, J-M's Quebec doctor suggests no animal experiments "for publication" for now, and a cancer researcher writes that "serious problems in insurance and compensation are involved." Read the document
July 25, 1950. Saranac passes on an Owens-Illinois doctor's warning that burlap asbestos bags release undue dust; J-M replies that no producer has yet replaced them. Read the document
July 28, 1950. Planning the Quebec industry's lung cancer study, a Canadian J-M manager favors Saranac though "they have no cancer experts," and notes J-M will pay half the cost. Read the document
August 31, 1950. J-M's Quebec doctor notes that Dr. Lanza's proposed contract "appears to leave little choice to the Donor if the results of the study are unfavorable to Company interests." Read the document
September 1, 1950. Woodard presses for Lompoc's list of workers whose examinations show "very marked changes," estimating there may be 30 or 40 such cases. Read the document
September 21, 1950. Saranac proposes a study of asbestos and lung cancer for the Quebec mining association, with any manuscript submitted to the sponsor "for its review and approval" before publication. Read the document
September 27, 1950. Saranac reports that a Waukegan plant worker who died in April had both asbestosis and lung cancer, leaving the link between them to further study. Read the document
October 10, 1950. A Manville plant memo reports that the doctor will X-ray the 84 men on J-M's special list only every two years, not annually. Read the document
November 6, 1950. A British Ministry of National Insurance doctor tells Lanza that Britain does not compensate asbestosis without X-ray findings. Read the document
November 6, 1950. Quebec mine doctor Paul Cartier reports British findings that asbestosis may raise lung cancer rates and urges a study in the Quebec asbestos district. Read the document
November 7, 1950. Vandiver Brown complains that a new Saranac proposal lets J-M only "review" results before publication, unlike Gardner's promise of no publication without consent. Read the document
November 7, 1950. Planning the Quebec producers' lung cancer study at Saranac, J-M and its advisers agree the report will go only to the sponsoring companies until they review it. Read the document
November 10, 1950. J. P. Woodard asks Vandiver Brown to draft publication terms for the coming Quebec-funded Saranac study, quoting a 30-day review clause. Read the document
November 15, 1950. Vandiver Brown writes that J-M sought approval of Saranac publications so it could delay release until it made "defensive moves." Read the document
December 1, 1950. Testifying for J-M in a Manville worker's asbestosis claim, Drs. Vorwald and Lanza decline to say men with dust disease should be removed from exposure. Read the document
December 19, 1950. Turner Brothers' factory doctor tells the Quebec asbestos producers he found lung cancer with asbestosis in 10 of 100 worker autopsies. Read the document
December 19, 1950. Dr. Kenneth Smith warns that findings of asbestosis without X-ray signs "might change our whole examination program and seriously affect the field of compensation." Read the document

1951

1951. In a 1978 deposition, pathologist Alfred Angrist says his 1940s cases had convinced him asbestosis and lung cancer were associated. Read the document
January 1951. Saranac's long-delayed account of Gardner's asbestos experiments is published in the AMA's industrial hygiene journal, without discussion of cancer. Read the document
January 16, 1951. J-M decides that moving Lompoc men out of the dust, the one step Lanza recommended, would "in most cases" be "a detrimental proposition." Read the document
January 19, 1951. Canadian J-M decides that, given its "seriousness to the Company," asbestosis and lung cancer will be left out of future industrial hygiene minutes. Read the document
February 1, 1951. Dr. Kenneth Smith asks the Quebec Ministry of Health whether lung cancer is accepted as a cause of death on death certificates. Read the document
February 1, 1951. J. P. Woodard writes that J-M's main problem with aluminum therapy at Lompoc is how to explain it to the workers. Read the document
March 1, 1951. American Rock Wool's president thanks Vandiver Brown for J-M's help defending a lawsuit against Sears, Roebuck over rock wool products. Read the document
March 7, 1951. Johns-Manville's president Lewis H. Brown dies in late February 1951; the board issues a memorial tribute to stockholders. Read the document
April 10, 1951. After a West Coast trip on aluminum therapy for Lompoc, J. P. Woodard tells Lanza that eliminating dust is "the sure way" of preventing dust disease. Read the document
April 13, 1951. A Waukegan doctor writing on J-M letterhead invites Vorwald to see the J-M plant, "the manufacturer of asbestosis and silicosis" in Waukegan. Read the document
April 16, 1951. J. P. Woodard proposes giving aluminum therapy to the whole Lompoc plant so the mill would not "appear more hazardous" than other departments. Read the document
April 17, 1951. Dr. Vorwald tells J-M he was "astounded" by the asbestosis on Waukegan X-rays and urges cleanup before outsiders act against the industry. Read the document
May 29, 1951. A Saranac survey of Owens-Illinois's Kaylo plant at Sayreville, New Jersey, finds hazardous quartz and asbestos dust in some areas and urges respirators and yearly chest X-rays. Read the document
June 11, 1951. Dr. Smith advises holding off publicity on the Saranac report in case cancer research on asbestos proves "not entirely favorable." Read the document
June 27, 1951. Vandiver Brown drafts a reply telling Pratt & Whitney it is "inconceivable" that asbestos in J-M's adhesive and Insulkote could create a dust hazard. Read the document
June 30, 1951. A Redwood City plant official writes that he will keep ailing worker Jack Leahy "on his feet as long as possible and say nothing." Read the document
July 9, 1951. Dr. Lanza reads X-rays of sixteen Manville workers for the plant doctor and finds asbestosis or signs of it in ten. Read the document
July 17, 1951. J-M's A. S. Elsenbast writes to J. P. Woodard about a Lompoc compensation award and the case for aluminum therapy. Read the document
July 27, 1951. J-M's safety engineer asks Dr. Vorwald whether one million fibers per cubic foot would be a safe standard, since 0.8 million had affected Saranac's animals. Read the document
September 1951. A British abstract of Hueper's survey of environmental lung cancer lists asbestos among the dusts condemned as causes of cancer. Read the document
September 5, 1951. Dr. Lanza reports X-ray changes in 426 of 617 Lompoc workers and doubts the dust standard, proposing aluminum therapy to prevent diatomaceous earth disease. Read the document
September 25, 1951. Vandiver Brown assures General Electric that dust from J-M's Spintex mineral wool insulation is "definitely NOT" a hazard because it has no free silica. Read the document
October 11, 1951. Dr. Smith reports to C. M. McGaw on Dr. Wright's examinations of J-M men and on Saranac's cancer research after a Quebec miners' meeting. Read the document
October 19, 1951. A Canadian J-M memo reports that annual examinations at Asbestos, Quebec, are three to four years behind and that Dr. Kenneth Smith has left. Read the document
December 1951. A New York hospital reports another case of lung cancer with asbestosis and reviews the growing literature linking the two. Read the document

1952

1952. Testifying in 1976, Dr. Kenneth Smith recalls that J-M executives, asked in the early 1950s to put caution labels on asbestos insulation, weighed the cost and the liability. Read the document
January 7, 1952. Citing state laws, J-M begins putting caution labels on bags of diatomaceous earth and presses Saranac for its overdue inhalation study results. Read the document
January 30, 1952. J-M's lawyers draft a caution label for asbestos fiber bags under Illinois rules; the Canadian fiber division asks whether there is "no other way out." Read the document
January 30, 1952. Saranac's final report tells Owens-Illinois that long inhalation of Kaylo insulation dust produces asbestosis-type lung scarring in guinea pigs. Read the document
February 8, 1952. A surgeon asks J-M for asbestos powder to place in the heart sac; J-M quotes prices, declines to vouch for it, and refers him to Saranac. Read the document
February 13, 1952. J-M's legal department answers a homeowner's injury claim by saying its rock wool insulation is not toxic and the man may be allergic to it. Read the document
April 1, 1952. J-M tells a railroad that rashes from Stonefelt rock wool are mechanical, pass within weeks, and that the material is not toxic. Read the document
April 29, 1952. J-M's lawyers report that former Lompoc worker Howard Winn says respirators did not keep out the dust and J-M never told him his work caused his illness. Read the document
April 29, 1952. A California health official sends J-M's consultant a state bulletin calling diatomaceous earth dust disabling and often fatal, saying his office would have postponed it. Read the document
May 7, 1952. Saranac's first interim report to the Quebec miners finds more lung tumors in asbestos-dusted mice than controls, a trend not yet statistically significant. Read the document
May 12, 1952. J-M, Dicalite and health officials agree the U.S. Public Health Service will lead a study of whether diatomaceous earth causes lung disease. Read the document
May 14, 1952. J-M tells its plant managers that Celite bags now carry a caution label and that workers handling them should wear respirators. Read the document
May 19, 1952. Answering a customer about a worker's rash, J-M's legal department says Quinterra asbestos paper's ingredients have never caused dermatitis. Read the document
June 17, 1952. A J-M headquarters memo recommends respirators wherever shop cutting of high temperature insulation throws off fine dust, with any instructions cleared by the legal staff. Read the document
June 20, 1952. J-M sends a California woman's doctor its notes on four kinds of skin rash seen among the few workers "allergic to rock wool." Read the document
June 23, 1952. Answering an Idaho lung fibrosis claim, J-M's Arthur Fisk says the company has never heard of a worker getting silicosis from its rock wool. Read the document
July 2, 1952. J-M tells Union Oil that its calcined Celite filter aid may be 20 to 50 percent cristobalite and that workers handling the bags should wear respirators. Read the document
July 15, 1952. The U.S. Public Health Service sends J-M its plan and draft agreement for a study of lung disease in the California diatomaceous earth industry. Read the document
August 5, 1952. Under an understanding with a claimants' firm, Herbert Miller's asbestosis petition is held back while J-M's doctors review his records and find no asbestosis. Read the document
September 2, 1952. A claims firm urges Union Asbestos & Rubber to trace its former occupational disease claimants and learn how they fared after leaving the dust. Read the document
September 5, 1952. J-M's safety engineer rules that New Jersey workers moved out of dust because of X-ray changes alone are not to be reported to the state. Read the document
September 22, 1952. J-M's president creates a company-wide Medical Director to oversee examinations of all employees; Dr. Kenneth W. Smith takes the post. Read the document
September 24, 1952. At the Saranac Symposium, Merewether reports that 16.2 percent of British asbestosis deaths involved lung cancer, with J-M's medical director attending. Read the document
October 1, 1952. J-M tells its salesmen never to say diatomaceous earth is harmless and to advise customers to keep dust down or use respirators. Read the document
October 1, 1952. Reviewing a dust training talk for Lompoc, a J-M researcher warns workers will ask whether the doctor will discuss their X-ray results with them. Read the document
October 31, 1952. Notes from a J-M industrial relations conference give, as an example, dropping a 10% respirator allowance once asbestos fiber is shipped in paper bags. Read the document
November 11, 1952. Sending a Travelers dust survey to the Marrero plant, Jackson gives J-M's tentative limit for asbestos as 800,000 fibers per cubic foot, based on Saranac research. Read the document
December 3, 1952. J-M's safety engineer studies dust from its Hy-Sorb floor absorbent at customer plants and plans tests for crystalline silica. Read the document
December 11, 1952. In a California widow's compensation claim, her doctor testifies that lung fibrosis and lung cancer together caused her husband's death, citing a study of asbestosis deaths. Read the document

1953

1953. A Canadian Johns-Manville account describes its Quebec hospital and regular X-ray examinations of all employees. Read the document
January 8, 1953. J-M's medical director sorts several hundred Manville workers on the no-dust list and decides those with slight disease "will not be told of their condition." Read the document
January 12, 1953. Finding that a 1939 study on J-M's own materials went unnoticed, Elsenbast urges a company library of medical literature on occupational hazards. Read the document
February 27, 1953. A company doctor lists the dusty departments, including shingles, textile and pipe covering, where "B - No Dust" workers are not to be placed. Read the document
March 4, 1953. At a planning meeting for an insulation job, a J-M representative tells Electric Boat that J-M insulation dust "is not toxic." Read the document
March 11, 1953. With J-M's medical director present, asbestos textile makers note that their dust surveys counted particles, while Saranac research shows fibers are what matter. Read the document
April 29, 1953. J-M's board hears that Lompoc's diatomaceous earth dust is "a very real hazard" and gives top priority to a $2 million dust abatement program. Read the document
June 10, 1953. Asbestos textile makers agree their past particle-count dust surveys are "practically without value" and that they will follow both the state limit and their own fiber standard. Read the document
September 9, 1953. Asbestos textile doctors agree there is no cure for asbestosis and recommend moving workers with X-ray changes to less dusty jobs. Read the document
September 14, 1953. J-M headquarters approves giving the union and the Public Health Service copies of Lompoc's housekeeping manual. Read the document
October 13, 1953. Citing poor results in Boston compensation courts, Dr. Kenneth Smith arranges a medical symposium he calls "actually" a Johns-Manville meeting. Read the document
October 28, 1953. At a Boston symposium J-M helped organize, the state labor commissioner reports insulator deaths from asbestosis and Dr. Kenneth Lynch reports lung cancer with asbestosis. Read the document
November 18, 1953. Lompoc's manager reports that he asked government surveyors to note unfinished dust projects in their report; counts show much work is needed. Read the document
November 20, 1953. Manville engineers ask to replace dust collectors at the shingle and Transite machines, citing dust over Travelers' limit and the cost of disability claims. Read the document
December 15, 1953. Asked about Thermobestos skin rashes, Dr. Kenneth Smith declines to recommend barrier cream as standard practice because it "might associate dermatitis with our product." Read the document

1954

1954. Testifying in 1980, Gerrit Schepers recalls urging J-M's Dr. Kenneth Smith from 1954 on to warn the public of the hazards of asbestos. Read the document
January 25, 1954. Dr. Kenneth Smith writes that when one of J-M's products has an established toxic hazard, everyone working with it should be warned and told how to prevent it. Read the document
February 11, 1954. J-M decides to add caution labels to Transite gas vent cement cans ("Avoid breathing dust") and to Ring-Tite lubricant. Read the document
April 1, 1954. H. M. Jackson orders respirators at Waukegan feeding operations where fiber counts exceed J-M's limit, noting amosite seems to cause fibrosis faster than chrysotile. Read the document
April 6, 1954. J-M adopts the 1953 ACGIH limits except for asbestos, setting its own tentative limit of 1 million fibers per cubic foot based on Saranac research. Read the document
April 29, 1954. I. H. Sloane outlines a respirator cleaning and issue program for the Asbestos, Quebec, mine and mill, with personal respirators for each man. Read the document
May 13, 1954. Raybestos-Manhattan's B. W. Luttenberger proposes that asbestosis information be released only through a medical group that would not make the industry look hazardous. Read the document
May 17, 1954. Answering Bethlehem Steel, Harvey Elkins quotes a 1943 finding that "a definite hazard exists" in ripping out old asbestos aboard ships at Quincy. Read the document
July 13, 1954. Raybestos-Manhattan sends J-M confidential testimony from a compensation case over asbestosis and lung cancer and plans to "offset" the claimant's doctor. Read the document
July 28, 1954. Warned confidentially that expanded perlite dust promotes tuberculosis, Dr. Kenneth Smith orders X-rays and work restrictions for J-M's exposed employees. Read the document
August 3, 1954. Asked whether to warn Fibrocel installers about perlite, Dr. Kenneth Smith says J-M will consider caution labels only if the finished product proves toxic. Read the document
August 25, 1954. After weaver Mary Lukasiewicz dies of asbestosis and probable lung cancer, J-M's counsel advises disclaiming liability for her family's claim. Read the document
September 10, 1954. A union doctor tells J-M's Dr. Kenneth Smith that Waukegan workers complain of dust and are not told their chest X-ray results. Read the document
September 24, 1954. J-M's lawyer warns a fibre salesman that calling asbestos non-toxic is a warranty, since Grade 7R fibre "would be a bad offender" in causing asbestosis. Read the document
September 29, 1954. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells the Waukegan plant that doctors have a "moral and legal responsibility" to give employees their examination results, starting immediately. Read the document
October 6, 1954. At an Asbestos Textile Institute meeting, doctors hear that asbestosis was entered as "pulmonary fibrosis" on insurance forms, and Schepers reports on asbestos and lung cancer. Read the document
October 15, 1954. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells J-M's Quebec physician that blood oxygen falls in asbestosis before X-rays show it, and seeks a simple early test. Read the document
December 3, 1954. Jackson explains J-M's tentative asbestos limit of one million fibers per cubic foot and writes that amosite seems to cause asbestosis faster than chrysotile. Read the document

1955

1955. A Manville plant doctor later testifies that Dr. Smith had abnormal chest X-rays held back for a review meeting with the safety department before any formal report. Read the document
1955. J-M's medical director writes that asbestos may be a carcinogen but that the chrysotile workers he followed had no excess lung cancer. Read the document
1955. Saranac publishes its animal studies of an asbestos-containing calcium silicate insulation, finding lesions like those of asbestosis. Read the document
January 1955. J-M's Manville plant tells headquarters it is denying a worker's compensation claim on the advice of its lawyers, citing his short exposure. Read the document
January 24, 1955. J-M's plant engineers issue a manual on running and maintaining the dust collectors used in the company's plants. Read the document
February 21, 1955. J-M's medical director sends fiber for animal tests after new data suggest shorter asbestos fibers may also scar the lungs. Read the document
March 24, 1955. J-M's medical director backs paying for more Lompoc men to be tested in the Public Health Service survey, partly for use in compensation cases. Read the document
March 30, 1955. A Canadian J-M memo reports that Travelers found ten times more fibers than the company's own clinic in duplicate mill samples. Read the document
April 15, 1955. A J-M draft bulletin offers district units a standard shop for cutting insulation fittings, with a dust collector and respirators for the workers. Read the document
May 2, 1955. An engineer reports asbestos dust above J-M's own limit in the Manville textile building and proposes changes to reach it. Read the document
May 4, 1955. Lompoc's industrial hygienist reports on a battery-powered dust sampler the plant built, modeled on a U.S. Public Health Service instrument. Read the document
June 9, 1955. The Asbestos Textile Institute rejects an autopsy study as ill-advised because it implies a link between asbestosis and cancer. Read the document
June 10, 1955. Company doctors meeting with the Asbestos Textile Institute's hygiene committee agree that asbestos workers need yearly examinations and chest X-rays. Read the document
June 13, 1955. J-M orders "task teams" to evaluate every dust and fume control project and sets its own asbestos limit of one million fibers per cubic foot. Read the document
July 8, 1955. J-M's medical director tells the Nashua plant that men with signs of lung disease are unaware of their X-ray results and should not be told yet. Read the document
July 8, 1955. J-M's medical director finds 43 Nashua workers with occupational lung disease and estimates how many will become compensation claims. Read the document
August 1955. J-M's medical director publishes his survey of 708 mill workers, reporting 91 percent with normal X-rays and few cases of asbestosis. Read the document
August 4, 1955. J-M's medical director tells the Toronto plant to move men with X-ray changes out of the dust carefully, without alarming workers or losing production. Read the document
August 13, 1955. The Industrial Hygiene Foundation tells J-M it chose not to answer in writing an insulators' union official who reported members dying of lung disorders. Read the document
September 7, 1955. Quebec mining association guests tell the textile makers' hygiene committee that cancer and heart disease are now the industry's major health questions. Read the document
October 4, 1955. Lompoc's industrial relations office asks J-M's lawyers how to defend a worker's dust claim and reports a trend of departing workers filing claims. Read the document

1956

February 1, 1956. The Manville plant doctor reports 333 employees on the "No Dust" list and five deaths in two years attributed to occupational dust. Read the document
February 3, 1956. J-M's Manville medical department lists 175 workers barred from dusty jobs for conditions "occupational in origin" and 145 more as a precaution. Read the document
February 14, 1956. B. F. Stanton warns that dust at the Manville No. 4 roofing machine is "a serious health hazard" and that workers' threats to walk off are justified. Read the document
February 21, 1956. Waukegan managers agree the plant doctor will tell men with possible lung disease of their condition only if they ask. Read the document
March 1956. A doctor examining a J-M Redwood City worker for the company's lawyers finds lung fibrosis consistent with asbestosis caused by his asbestos exposure. Read the document
March 5, 1956. B. F. Stanton reports that someone choked a dust sampler at the Manville stamping press, where workers had complained of dust, and urges severe discipline. Read the document
May 21, 1956. The Industrial Hygiene Foundation proposes a $17,500 study for the asbestos textile industry to prove or disprove a link between asbestos and lung cancer. Read the document
June 4, 1956. Asbestos textile makers discuss a ruling linking asbestosis and lung cancer, but cannot agree whether to fund the Industrial Hygiene Foundation's lung cancer study. Read the document
June 6, 1956. A J-M executive bulletin notes courts holding manufacturers liable for missing warnings and orders caution labels for combustible and flammable products. Read the document
June 12, 1956. Owens-Illinois tells a consultant Saranac found no silicosis hazard in Kaylo and only a mild asbestosis reaction in animals. Read the document
June 14, 1956. An insurer's notes on three pipe covering contractors record a death claim and a handful of asbestosis claims among insulation workers. Read the document
June 18, 1956. Noting Manville plant sickness benefits running at 111 percent of premiums, Dr. Kenneth Smith asks for the insurer's help finding the diseases behind the losses. Read the document
June 22, 1956. An insulation worker's widow wins a California asbestosis death award; Johns-Manville Sales Corporation is among the companies joined as defendants. Read the document
June 25, 1956. A customer asks J-M about the health hazards of Colorlith dust; the Research Center explains the product is "really steam cured Transite" containing asbestos and silica. Read the document
August 22, 1956. Asked by a customer's doctor about Thermobestos and Superex insulation, H. M. Jackson discusses silica and perlite dust but does not mention their asbestos. Read the document
September 18, 1956. Answering a customer, H. M. Jackson says Colorlith contains silica and asbestos that can cause silicosis and asbestosis, and recommends dust sampling and respirators. Read the document
October 18, 1956. Dr. Kenneth Smith recommends an X-ray machine for J-M's Stockton plant because workers there will handle "two potentially toxic dusts, silica and asbestos." Read the document
November 26, 1956. J-M arranges to borrow New York State X-ray films of talcosis for a doctor to review before testifying in a case. Read the document
November 30, 1956. Armstrong Cork tells its broker that insulators' asbestosis claims "are on the increase" and wonders whether insulation makers will help defend them. Read the document
December 6, 1956. The Industrial Hygiene Foundation's medical director sends H. M. Jackson published evidence linking asbestos to lung cancer, as "ammunition" for persuading the textile industry. Read the document
December 18, 1956. A Travelers survey finds excessive dust and asbestos fiber at the Manville pipe department's swing saw and other jobs; H. M. Jackson recommends required respirators. Read the document

1957

January 7, 1957. Manville engineers ask for more dust control at the shingle forming machine, noting a disability claim from the "serious exposure" would cost about $18,000. Read the document
January 15, 1957. The Manville union complains that textile workers are "eating more dust"; J-M agrees to a dust survey but advises giving the union no copy of the results. Read the document
February 6, 1957. Manville plant managers urge J-M to fund a New Jersey lung function laboratory to judge a growing number of claims; headquarters gives $2,500. Read the document
March 7, 1957. Asbestos textile makers vote down a lung cancer study of their workers, some fearing it would "stir up a hornet's nest" and put the industry under suspicion. Read the document
March 15, 1957. H. M. Jackson tells a customer that cutting and fitting J-M's 85% magnesia insulation may pose a health hazard from its asbestos content. Read the document
March 18, 1957. J-M's Manville plant doctor asks for dust studies of the work areas of employees placed on the "No Dust" list after X-ray findings. Read the document
April 1957. Speaking to life insurance underwriters, J-M's medical director says asbestos workers' lives are not shortened by their work. Read the document
April 5, 1957. J-M's president orders the company's dust-control program widened to all industrial wastes, citing pollution cases and their legal and public relations costs. Read the document
April 18, 1957. Dr. Kenneth Smith drafts a reply telling a customer there is no silicosis hazard in asbestos cement work, and says the General Attorney must approve all health statements to customers. Read the document
April 26, 1957. The Asbestos Textile Institute tells the Industrial Hygiene Foundation it has rejected its proposed lung cancer study, without giving reasons. Read the document
May 1, 1957. Dr. Kenneth Smith proposes that J-M doctors record no diagnosis of suspected occupational disease, and not tell the worker, until a conference weighs the legal and compensation implications. Read the document
May 9, 1957. Owens-Corning's consultant warns that the insulators' union is telling its members about asbestosis deaths and urges sales offices to watch for unrest in the locals. Read the document
May 9, 1957. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells a Canadian insulation firm that J-M's mines and mills are "developing no cases of asbestosis today." Read the document
May 19, 1957. James Whitcomb Riley, a California insulator, is disabled by dust disease of the lungs; his 1961 death benefit award names J-M among his employers. Read the document
June 10, 1957. A research pathologist reports to J-M's medical director that tissue from an unnamed case shows asbestosis and metastatic cancer. Read the document
June 21, 1957. Dr. Paul Gross plans to call asbestosis non-progressive in a manuscript and to send it to J-M's medical director for approval before submitting it. Read the document
August 23, 1957. Dr. Daniel Braun tells J-M's Hugh Jackson that the medical literature points to a lung cancer link mainly among asbestos factory workers, not miners. Read the document
September 1957. The Industrial Hygiene Foundation's report for the Quebec mines finds no excess lung cancer overall, but more lung cancer among miners with asbestosis. Read the document
September 6, 1957. The first three months of J-M's X-ray conferences find eight cases of mixed pneumoconiosis among 109 Transite pipe workers at Manville. Read the document
September 30, 1957. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells a fireproofing company that J-M's mines and mills have had no new asbestosis cases for many years. Read the document
October 1, 1957. J-M cancels a planned dust survey at its Zelienople, Pennsylvania, plant to hold down expenses and conserve cash. Read the document
October 11, 1957. An insurer's engineer predicts that two-thirds of spooling workers at UNARCO's Marshville textile plant would develop asbestosis after more than 15 years. Read the document
October 22, 1957. J-M answers a sanitation testing laboratory's question whether Marinite 36 is toxic by pointing to Dr. Smith's reply and a sales brochure. Read the document
December 2, 1957. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells Whirlpool that J-M's mineral wool insulation causes no lung fibrosis and is "innocuous." Read the document
December 5, 1957. Asbestos Textile Institute dust committee discusses respirators; H. M. Jackson's paper calls them the last line of defense and urges telling workers the hazard. Read the document
December 30, 1957. Dr. Kenneth Smith accepts the Quebec miners' association's deletion of every reference linking asbestosis and lung cancer from the study to be published. Read the document

1958

1958. Under oath, J-M says it knows of no asbestosis in insulation applicators, dates its first worker's case to 1946, and sees no reason to warn others. Read the document
1958. The U.S. Public Health Service reports pneumoconiosis in diatomite workers, worst where the dust holds cristobalite, and urges caution labels on such products. Read the document
1958. J-M sets out a dust abatement program for its Manville plants, applying a company limit of 1 million asbestos fibers per cubic foot, to cut compensation costs. Read the document
January 6, 1958. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells Hamilton Manufacturing that Colorlith board contains silica and asbestos, both hazardous with long exposure. Read the document
January 24, 1958. Manville plant doctors agree to route workers who need dust-restricted jobs through the Safety Department before they return to work. Read the document
January 24, 1958. Finding lung disease where none was expected, Dr. Kenneth Smith has J-M test finished products; the Research Center finds quartz in Transite pipe and cristobalite in fire brick. Read the document
March 13, 1958. H. M. Jackson tells Brush Beryllium Company that J-M's Cerafelt is not toxic and may only irritate the skin. Read the document
March 18, 1958. J-M drafts a caution label for Marinite board dust but decides against it, partly over competition, relying instead on a line about dust control in its instruction book. Read the document
March 18, 1958. H. M. Jackson tells lawyers handling a worker's asbestosis claim that J-M's experience shows asbestosis stops progressing once exposure ends. Read the document
April 15, 1958. Harry Burris's wife says he was never told his X-rays showed fibrosis; J-M's doctors agree he has asbestosis first diagnosed in 1947. Read the document
May 6, 1958. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells A. O. Smith Corporation that J-M's rock wool contains no free silica and causes no lung disease, only occasional skin irritation. Read the document
June 1958. The industry-funded Quebec miners study is published, concluding asbestos miners have no excess lung cancer, without the draft's finding on asbestosis and lung cancer. Read the document
July 17, 1958. J-M's medical director sends Raybestos-Manhattan's insurer the industry-funded Quebec study to defend a claim linking asbestosis and lung cancer. Read the document
September 5, 1958. Dr. Kenneth Smith asks that results of Lompoc workers' lung tests not be reported until J-M discusses them, and that test subjects not disturb contract talks. Read the document
September 5, 1958. J-M's standard practices manual lists the 5 million particle limit for asbestos and a company standard of 1 million asbestos fibers per cubic foot. Read the document
October 15, 1958. A J-M plant doctor examines retired Manville worker Walter Burek, finds extensive lung disease, and asks whether the company will accept responsibility for his care. Read the document
October 21, 1958. In answers for LeGrande v. Johns-Manville, J-M says about twelve of its employees have contracted asbestosis since 1946 and it never ventilated applicators' work. Read the document
December 15, 1958. Planning J-M's defense in LeGrande, its lawyer notes a 1954 manual warning applicators not to breathe dust and an X-ray study of applicators never carried out. Read the document
December 30, 1958. Hugh Jackson tells J-M plant managers how to apply exposure limits to dusts that mix asbestos or silica with other materials. Read the document

1959

1959. Manville plant dust surveys count particles and asbestos fibers at hundreds of stations and flag those above the allowable limit as needing control. Read the document
January 9, 1959. Dr. Kenneth Smith outlines for Lompoc workers' briefing that J-M knew from the early 1940s its diatomaceous earth dust caused disabling lung disease. Read the document
February 19, 1959. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells Detroit Edison that Thermobestos dust up to about 50 million particles per cubic foot would hold no excess asbestos. Read the document
March 5, 1959. The Asbestos Textile Institute's hygiene committee hears that one member's insurer wants a far stricter dust program, and compares members' X-ray and examination practices. Read the document
March 26, 1959. After asking six other companies, J-M's Dr. David DuBow recommends continuing to release employees' X-rays to their own doctors with their consent. Read the document
April 2, 1959. J-M's insurance brokers confirm that Travelers has added no asbestosis surcharge to J-M's workmen's compensation rates. Read the document
April 8, 1959. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells a mother her son's rash from J-M rock wool batts was a mechanical skin irritation, not an allergy. Read the document
April 8, 1959. Dr. Kenneth Smith asks the Marrero plant for the maker's health information on barium metaborate, a new compound for fungus-resistant asbestos shingles. Read the document
April 27, 1959. J-M's assistant general attorney tells a lawyer that J-M rock wool contains no asbestos or free silica and causes no lung fibrosis. Read the document
May 26, 1959. At J-M's Manville friction materials department, dust counts at a bandsaw run to more than double the limit, and respirators are recommended for three machines. Read the document
June 22, 1959. H. M. Jackson tells a Navy shipyard hygienist he knows of only two asbestosis cases among insulation installers, and that brief heavy exposures on ships are poorly understood. Read the document
July 14, 1959. Dr. Kenneth Smith finds lung disease on 21 of 30 Pittsburg plant X-rays and warns of "very serious financial exposure" if the cases progress. Read the document
September 25, 1959. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells an Army arsenal that 85% magnesia's hazard is minimal and that he knows of no lung hazard among insulation installers. Read the document
September 29, 1959. H. M. Jackson approves setting Waukegan's dust limits for asbestos-cement products from the share of each substance in the raw material mix. Read the document
October 16, 1959. Weighing dust collectors for its mill dryers, a Canadian J-M manager writes that dust in the town of Asbestos is a public relations problem as well as a possible health hazard. Read the document
October 26, 1959. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells Michigan's occupational health division that long inhalation of the asbestos in Marinite may damage the lungs, and advises dust control. Read the document
November 5, 1959. Asked to tell a customer that asbestos is no more hazardous than limestone, Dr. Kenneth Smith refuses, calling it "a very definite health hazard when improperly handled." Read the document
December 15, 1959. J-M drops its plan to sell asbestos for coal mine rock dusting after Bureau of Mines tests find it cakes more than limestone. Read the document
December 21, 1959. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells General Motors and Firestone that long inhalation of asbestos may cause lung changes but J-M mines and mills have had no new asbestosis cases for years. Read the document

The 1960s

1960

1960. J. C. Wagner and colleagues report 33 mesothelioma cases in South Africa's crocidolite district, many among people who only lived near the mines. Read the document
January 13, 1960. Seventeen insulation makers, J-M among them, meet as the National Insulation Manufacturers Association to coordinate specifications and an industry publicity campaign. Read the document
January 21, 1960. Dr. Kenneth Smith complains that Toronto plant workers with silicosis, ordered out of dust in 1955, are still working in dust five years later. Read the document
February 15, 1960. J-M's insurer, Travelers, refuses full coverage for damage to neighboring property unless dust collectors are installed at the No Agua mill and Antonito. Read the document
May 10, 1960. J-M's Manville plant decides against requiring respirators for 714 overexposed workers, partly because marking dusty areas would be "legally admitting evidence of exposure." Read the document
May 18, 1960. Dr. Kenneth Smith drafts a reply for a customer saying J-M has long recognized that inhaling asbestos fiber can damage the lungs. Read the document
May 25, 1960. H. M. Jackson backs a Nashua dust collector, saying conditions there are causing lung disease, and suggests citing compensation costs to justify the expense. Read the document
June 1, 1960. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells Westinghouse that J-M's 450 insulating cement has so little asbestos that normal use should not cause lung fibrosis. Read the document
July 1, 1960. A J-M sales manual tells staff to answer customers' questions about diatomaceous earth dust verbally, and to send any request for a written answer to headquarters. Read the document
July 8, 1960. Answering R. J. Reynolds, J-M's H. M. Jackson says Marinite board is 25% to 50% asbestos, which over time may damage the lungs. Read the document
July 11, 1960. J-M confidentially tells Los Angeles health officials that Marinite, Colorlith, Asbestocite and Transite are 25% to 50% asbestos and potentially hazardous. Read the document
July 19, 1960. J-M's president tells managers that compensation costs are up 78% in five years and dust control at J-M plants has fallen to 77% acceptable. Read the document
August 8, 1960. Waukegan's plant management concedes it mishandled a compensation case and blames a part-time doctor, while praising its low-cost settlements with sick workers. Read the document
October 10, 1960. J-M staff ask Dr. Kenneth Smith urgently for data for a warning message on bags of J-Spray, its new asbestos spray-on fireproofing. Read the document
October 28, 1960. A Waukegan medical department memo reports late doctors, unread X-rays and workers who have gone three to five years without an examination. Read the document
November 3, 1960. J-M rules as company policy that bags of J-Spray asbestos fireproofing will carry no caution label, putting dust precautions only in product literature. Read the document
November 30, 1960. J-M management turns down a request to rebuild inadequate dust control in the Manville rigid shingle building, where 64 to 102 workers were exposed. Read the document
December 4, 1960. At an industrial relations meeting, Dr. Kenneth Smith admits Lompoc was dusty and men were disabled because "the emphasis was on production and the profit picture." Read the document

1961

January 24, 1961. Waukegan reports 232 workers with known, possible or other lung disease, none properly placed away from harmful dust, and keeps its plan to move them confidential. Read the document
February 16, 1961. Waukegan's managers review 224 workers with known, possible or other lung disease and reaffirm a 1956 policy that did nothing for the possible cases. Read the document
February 23, 1961. An insulator's family sues J-M in federal court in New Jersey, saying its asbestos products killed him and carried no adequate warning. Read the document
March 1961. An insulator's widow in Louisiana sues J-M and other insulation makers, saying they failed to warn her husband of the dangers of their products. Read the document
April 5, 1961. J-M's insulation contracting subsidiary reports a 60-year-old worker's disability from chronic bronchitis and shortness of breath to its insurer, Aetna. Read the document
June 8, 1961. J-M's Dr. Kenneth Smith urges asbestos textile makers to ask the Public Health Service for an impartial survey of asbestosis and cancer. Read the document
June 12, 1961. Dr. Kenneth Smith briefs the asbestos textile industry on evidence linking asbestos and cancer and urges inviting a federal study. Read the document
June 19, 1961. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells J-M's division managers that a federal meeting found "a problem exists" with asbestos and cancer, and urges joining a government study. Read the document
July 7, 1961. J-M's Manville plant decides to release workers' medical records only as required by law, citing "embarrassing questions" and compensation claims. Read the document
August 8, 1961. A New Jersey state doctor sends Dr. Kenneth Smith a confidential outline of Dr. Selikoff's planned asbestosis and cancer study in Passaic County. Read the document
September 12, 1961. At an Asbestos Textile Institute meeting, Dr. Kenneth Smith urges a federal study so that "irresponsible reporting" on cancer does not raise compensation and liability costs. Read the document
October 17, 1961. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells J-M managers that at Lompoc the company "saw the signs" of dust disease for twenty years while stressing production and profit. Read the document
November 30, 1961. J-M tells its plant managers not to give unions dust counts or medical records, which "could be readily misinterpreted, and adversely utilized." Read the document

1962

February 2, 1962. The autopsy of a retired J-M Manville worker finds asbestosis and mesothelioma, three years after his compensation claim was dismissed as late. Read the document
March 20, 1962. Dr. Kenneth Smith advises an insurer to stress smoking in an insulator's cancer claim, and says J-M settles cancer claims quietly to keep them out of law journals. Read the document
March 21, 1962. Union Carbide's hygienist finds that sawing J-M Thermobestos blocks is a health hazard; the plant stops using them and J-M disputes the results. Read the document
May 3, 1962. J-M's insurance manager sends a lung claim to Travelers for defense and asks Lompoc for a copy of the 1957 warning label. Read the document
July 5, 1962. Marrero's plant manager sets up a floor tile dust task team, saying past conditions no longer meet J-M's tightened cleanliness standards. Read the document
July 26, 1962. J-M's claims agent contests an insulator's Ohio silicosis claim, noting he worked for J-M two weeks and the rules require total disability. Read the document
November 6, 1962. Waukegan's plant doctor writes that men with occupational chest disease are told only once a dust free job is arranged, and recommends using the T.B. sanatorium. Read the document
November 6, 1962. Sheckler reports 27 of 34 Parkersburg survey stations over the limit and says respirators alone will not prevent occupational disease. Read the document

1963

January 28, 1963. A Waukegan memo reports 25 men diagnosed with occupational lung disease were never told; managers approve telling them gradually and destroying pink slip records. Read the document
January 31, 1963. Waukegan's plant doctor tells Dr. Kenneth Smith that 24 men diagnosed with lung disease have not been told or moved from dusty jobs. Read the document
February 14, 1963. Dr. Kenneth Smith explains his X-ray survey was mainly to estimate compensation liability, and that he put nothing in the workers' records. Read the document
February 26, 1963. Dr. Kenneth Smith advises the Manville plant to buy a shredder so medical copies are destroyed and J-M's compensation position "cannot be doubted." Read the document
April 29, 1963. At a J-M managers' meeting, Dr. Smith blames rising occupational disease on past dirty conditions; Sheckler says dust surveys also serve litigation. Read the document
May 10, 1963. An internal audit finds Manville plant workers without respirators in high-dust areas; the plant asks again whether to make respirators mandatory. Read the document
May 23, 1963. Philip Carey's medical consultant, Dr. Mancuso, warns of growing evidence linking asbestos to lung cancer and mesothelioma and calls the industry's study weak. Read the document
June 6, 1963. Told that Dr. Selikoff will report high lung cancer among insulators, the Asbestos Textile Institute committee notes "it will be damaging to the industry." Read the document
October 7, 1963. Dr. Kenneth Smith writes that a man could not work 26 years in J-M's textile department "without some evidence of asbestosis." Read the document
October 16, 1963. A Manville plant official sends Dr. Kenneth Smith a worker's autopsy showing mesothelioma and asbestosis and asks him to "dampen" a doctor's interest in it. Read the document

1964

January 2, 1964. J-M's Industrial Insulations Division tells Dr. Kenneth Smith it is about to begin putting caution labels on cements, millboard, molded insulations and boards. Read the document
January 28, 1964. Dr. Kenneth Smith sends the U.S. Public Health Service draft caution labels for J-M asbestos products that release fiber when cut or handled. Read the document
February 25, 1964. J-M's insulation division proposes caution labels, writing that given the Asbestos Workers Union's concern it should use anything that "could lessen our exposure to claims." Read the document
April 6, 1964. Selikoff, Churg and Hammond report that insulation workers die of lung cancer at nearly seven times the expected rate, and four of mesothelioma. Read the document
April 14, 1964. J-M tells the insulation makers' trade association it is printing an asbestos caution on cartons of calcium silicate, magnesia and asbestos cements. Read the document
May 6, 1964. The Manville plant reports 19 occupational disease claims since March 20, mostly from textile workers, and suspects an organized effort to identify and file them. Read the document
May 11, 1964. J-M fixes the caution wording for its asbestos insulations, to be printed on bags and cartons and "fully legible, but not conspicuous." Read the document
May 13, 1964. Facing group filing of disease claims at Manville, C. L. Sheckler proposes trying most of them, quietly, to backlog the courts and pressure the workers' attorneys. Read the document
May 13, 1964. With disease claims rising at Manville, Sheckler advises delaying the usual offer of treatment and benefits to a worker J-M's doctor found had early asbestosis. Read the document
June 25, 1964. A memo on a Manville grievance notes that a 10% respirator time allowance added to dryer-unloading jobs in 1959 was cut back in 1964. Read the document
June 29, 1964. Harry A. Burris dies at the Bedford, Massachusetts, veterans hospital; the physician's statement lists asbestosis among his conditions. Read the document
July 29, 1964. J. V. Miles of the Marrero plant tells headquarters that, whatever the official survey showed, the pipe plant's Wet End has "a very serious dust problem." Read the document
September 14, 1964. Dr. Kenneth Smith objects to a gummed caution label that caused "a small furor" at Manville and asks that the caution wait for newly printed cartons. Read the document
October 8, 1964. The Asbestos Textile Institute talks of answering Selikoff's cancer findings through a public relations man and has its lawyers draft a warning letter to him. Read the document
October 13, 1964. J-M's medical director calls Selikoff "unscrupulous" but advises against denying his findings too emphatically, lest J-M be put "in an untenable position." Read the document
December 3, 1964. Answering an insulation contractor, Dr. Kenneth Smith writes that he does not believe the use of asbestos carries "a serious health hazard." Read the document

1965

January 14, 1965. On Dr. Kenneth Smith's advice, J-M's Toronto office asks that the asbestos caution be kept off Superex products shipped into Canada. Read the document
January 29, 1965. J-M headquarters keeps the asbestos caution on all its insulation cartons but says the Canadian plant may cover the label before reshipping to customers. Read the document
February 1965. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells J-M's industrial relations managers he steered the industry to a federal survey because no federal agency would "incriminate an entire industry." Read the document
February 1, 1965. Citing Dr. Kenneth Smith's assurance, J-M's Toronto office asks that the asbestos caution be sanded off cartons of Thermobestos and Superex sent to Canada. Read the document
February 9, 1965. A Chicago customer, never told of a dust hazard, becomes "exceedingly alarmed" by J-M's new caution label on Superex and considers dropping the product. Read the document
February 16, 1965. Waukegan presses headquarters for an answer: ship Superex to Canada with caution labels, or remove them as the Manville plant is doing. Read the document
April 25, 1965. J-M's hygiene chief finds dust over the limits at mines and plants and, at Manville, withholds a respirator recommendation for fear of stimulating mass claim filing. Read the document
June 4, 1965. At an asbestos industry meeting in Quebec, Dr. Kenneth Smith urges companies to open their health records to the Public Health Service study. Read the document
June 16, 1965. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells a J-M division the insulator cancer study is wrong and that he sees no serious health hazard from using asbestos. Read the document

1966

January 10, 1966. Dr. Kenneth Smith tells J-M managers the company has "numerous potential health hazards" but that he has seen no concrete evidence linking asbestos to cancer. Read the document
January 10, 1966. At a J-M managers' conference, every discussion group reports adverse working conditions at its plants, blaming low priority and unwillingness to spend money. Read the document
February 7, 1966. Joe Goldfield of J-M's research center reports on his visit to Turner Brothers in England, whose health program dates from the 1931 British regulations. Read the document
February 24, 1966. J-M's hygiene staff report that the Marrero pipe plant's wet end looked "quite dusty" even though most dust counts fell below the limit. Read the document
March 21, 1966. After visiting Turner Brothers, Joe Goldfield urges J-M to set up health committees and treat asbestos fiber as a harmful material in all its plants. Read the document
April 5, 1966. After a doctor tells Marrero worker Steve Cedotal to leave his job, the plant instructs its doctors to report such findings to the company instead. Read the document
May 11, 1966. Answering Joe Goldfield, J-M's health staff reject a health committee and warn against pressing the "panic button" about how dangerous asbestos is. Read the document
June 28, 1966. J-M's health task force finds no written record behind claims of low cancer rates among its workers and asks Dr. Smith to compile one to counter Selikoff. Read the document
July 8, 1966. California insulator Vernon Lumbattis, found totally disabled by probable asbestosis, settles his claim against J-M and dozens of other employers for $30,000. Read the document
July 26, 1966. An asbestosis and lung cancer death claim is filed for Kenneth Frederick, whose employers include J-M; it settles in 1972 for $13,500. Read the document
August 18, 1966. Dr. Kenneth Smith assures a customer's research center that asbestos hazards can be eliminated by simple controls and dismisses the insulator cancer study. Read the document
August 22, 1966. Dr. Kenneth Smith asks Saranac's Dr. Leonard Bristol to read the chest X-rays of about 2,500 workers at J-M's Jeffrey mine in Quebec. Read the document
September 30, 1966. J-M's public relations staff record a dinner with Dr. Selikoff, who says he is holding back asbestos papers for fear of sensational press coverage. Read the document
October 24, 1966. J-M's public relations department issues a position paper saying the asbestos–lung cancer theory is unproved and should be regarded with skepticism. Read the document
December 21, 1966. J-M's insurer tells the company it has nothing to contradict Dr. Selikoff's testimony linking asbestos to cancer, after an insulator's colon cancer death is held compensable. Read the document

1967

January 1967. Forwarding an insulator's compensation summons, a J-M manager writes, "It looks as though the wave is breaking. Is there anything we can do?" Read the document
January 30, 1967. A California insulator's widow claims his 1966 lung cancer death came from asbestos; a doctor's report calls the evidence "almost overwhelming," and the claim settles in 1969. Read the document
March 17, 1967. Preparing to defend an insulator's claim, J-M's lawyer finds a reference to a 1954 J-M manual warning applicators not to breathe the dust, but cannot locate it. Read the document
September 5, 1967. J-M's Lompoc plant reports that its Celite silica dust caution notice is printed on domestic bags but not used on export shipments. Read the document
October 12, 1967. J-M's research center tells 14 plant managers that everyone entering dusty or noisy areas, including visitors, must be given a respirator or ear muffs. Read the document
October 16, 1967. J-M plans silica caution labels for its diatomaceous earth insulation products, but notes that labels should not go on products shipped to Canada or abroad. Read the document
October 16, 1967. A J-M district sales bulletin tells salesmen to sell to private architects and engineers rather than to federal agencies. Read the document

1968

1968. Boston University doctors report a fatal mesothelioma in a factory worker exposed, as far as was known, only to chrysotile asbestos. Read the document
January 29, 1968. A J-M salesman reports that a sprayed-fiber competitor has labeled its asbestos bags for years and that J-M's own J-Spray bags carried a caution. Read the document
February 15, 1968. J-M's fiber division orders stronger 3-ply paper bags for asbestos shipments in February, then returns to 2-ply bags in May. Read the document
February 22, 1968. At a Manville union meeting, a union official protests that J-M does not tell workers their examination results until it is too late to act. Read the document
March 15, 1968. C. L. Sheckler warns J-M's general counsel that plants are selling uncleaned asbestos fiber bags that buyers reuse for cattle feed and nursery stock. Read the document
March 20, 1968. H. M. Jackson approves the wording of a caution label for J-M's bags of raw asbestos fiber. Read the document
March 22, 1968. Reviewing the draft fiber-bag label, Deutsch says it should go on the front of the bag, not the back, and carry J-M's name. Read the document
March 25, 1968. J-M's Manville pipe plant makes respirators mandatory at fiber-handling and dusty jobs from April 1. Read the document
April 8, 1968. Selikoff, Hammond and Churg report that insulators who smoke have about 92 times the lung cancer risk of men who neither smoke nor work with asbestos. Read the document
April 22, 1968. J-M's senior officers order vacuuming, sealed disposal of used fiber bags, and an end to paving with Transite pipe scrap. Read the document
May 3, 1968. Hutcheson tells Hendry that J-M will put a caution label on its asbestos fiber bags whether or not the other Quebec mining companies do. Read the document
May 16, 1968. Sheckler drafts silica and asbestos caution labels for J-M insulation products and assumes international shipments will not be labeled. Read the document
May 24, 1968. J-M's Texas defense lawyer asks why, if the insulator hazard was recognized in 1962, the industry waited until 1964 to put warnings on its products. Read the document
July 25, 1968. J-M's legal department expects asbestosis lawsuits to grow over the next decade and proposes an "Asbestosis Defense Task Force." Read the document
July 30, 1968. J-M managers recommend quietly settling two workers' lung cancer compensation claims to avoid publicity and keep them off the public record. Read the document
August 1968. The insulators' union president reports a J-M commitment to fund Selikoff's research, saying the union had talked about the same problems "for forty years." Read the document
August 2, 1968. J-M's legal department names the members of its proposed Asbestosis Defense Task Force, including C. L. Sheckler as "our overall asbestos expert." Read the document
August 20, 1968. Dr. George Wright tells J-M's general counsel to expect twenty-five years of asbestos cases, including lung cancer and mesothelioma in all divisions. Read the document
September 19, 1968. J-M's public relations firm plans the announcement of Selikoff's insulator research, stressing cooperation and steering questions away from mesothelioma, brake linings and public risk. Read the document
September 19, 1968. An outside X-ray reader tells J-M he found an "unforeseen relatively large number of abnormalities" in chest films of Billerica plant workers. Read the document
October 1, 1968. After British importers protest, Canadian Johns-Manville drops its plan to put caution labels on asbestos fiber bags for overseas customers, and its sales manager urges dropping them at home too. Read the document
October 17, 1968. For marine Marinite panels, a J-M manager proposes "the smallest possible label," on the sheet edge, saying asbestos "may or may not be hazardous." Read the document
October 26, 1968. In a worker's compensation case, J-M's Long Beach plant tells its lawyers it will not present dust counts: "we do not want any information as a matter of public record." Read the document
November 7, 1968. Before a compensation hearing, J-M's Long Beach plant sends its dust records to headquarters so they "will not be available" there, and suggests a post-dated request for them. Read the document
November 15, 1968. J-M headquarters orders the Manville plant to send it every outside request for medical information, and calls workers' exposure histories for internal use only. Read the document
November 19, 1968. A customer asks Canadian Johns-Manville to leave the new caution label off its fiber bags, calling it "unduly alarming to our employees." Read the document
December 17, 1968. After British objections, J-M's health policy committee decides to put caution labels on fiber bags only for U.S. and Canadian customers; overseas buyers get a leaflet. Read the document
December 23, 1968. After J-M announces caution labels on its fiber bags, customer Hooker Chemical asks J-M to explain what precautions it should take; J-M offers its environmental control director. Read the document

1969

1969. A Selikoff and J-M research paper finds few insulation workers ever wear masks and reports field trials of a J-M prototype respirator designed for them. Read the document
January 7, 1969. J-M's Advocate asbestos mine reports 23 of 53 dust stations over the limit in 1968, up from 12 the year before; headquarters cannot say why. Read the document
January 15, 1969. J-M's board is told plant doctors have found X-ray lung changes in 295 current workers, "potential claims over a number of future years." Read the document
January 29, 1969. J-M International reports that short-fiber export bags sometimes break in transit, and that dust control in many overseas customers' factories gets little attention. Read the document
February 10, 1969. A J-M plant manager asks headquarters whether he may tell a worker that his chest X-ray "did show a deviation." Read the document
February 10, 1969. J-M tells its plant managers it will begin measuring asbestos dust by the membrane filter method, which British producers had used "for many years." Read the document
February 17, 1969. J-M's scientific subcommittee hears that chest X-rays show asbestosis in 30% of current Billerica workers and 24% of 500 Manville workers. Read the document
February 18, 1969. J-M's health policy committee hears that the Industrial Hygiene Foundation is distrusted for its industry ties, and tells British producers it will keep caution labels in North America. Read the document
February 18, 1969. A J-M division manager notes that Marinite, high in asbestos, carries no warning label, and asks that the situation be "completely" corrected by March 15. Read the document
February 19, 1969. J-M's public relations staff circulates a transcript of a taped talk with Dr. George Wright on mesothelioma, to build a "work book" and a Hill & Knowlton background paper. Read the document
February 20, 1969. Because J-M has no stated labeling policy, a manager recommends no health hazard labels "at this time" on Marinite, Flat Transite and other asbestos sheet products. Read the document
February 25, 1969. After visiting General Dynamics at Groton, J-M tells the company's medical director its insulation fabrication does not appear to create "any substantial asbestosis hazard." Read the document
March 3, 1969. Asked about foreign labeling laws, J-M's lawyer lists dockworkers, customers' workers and neighbors as exposed to export fiber and urges consulting counsel abroad. Read the document
March 7, 1969. J-M sets the end of 1969 as the deadline to move its last loose jute bag customers, including Bendix and Raybestos, to pressure-packed fiber. Read the document
March 18, 1969. J-M's environmental control subcommittee expresses "great concern" that its dust stations out of control are increasing rather than decreasing. Read the document
March 21, 1969. J-M's lawyers confirm there will be no caution labels on fiber shipped outside North America for now, and plan how to answer a federal asbestos worker safety bill. Read the document
April 23, 1969. J-M asks the Public Health Service what "significant data" from its asbestos worker study will go to workers' own doctors, citing compensation claims, and urges sending findings to company doctors. Read the document
May 19, 1969. J-M's first fiber-count survey of its Manville textile plant finds 79 of 89 stations above the company's own limit, and 33 above the national limit. Read the document
May 25, 1969. Lou Hemerda circulates to J-M health and legal staff Dr. Selikoff's letter on an insulator's death, flagging a passage on mesothelioma from light exposure. Read the document
May 27, 1969. J-M headquarters sends its Denver sales office stockholder reports stating company asbestos-health policy, after a Colorado state official raises the issue. Read the document
June 6, 1969. Waukegan's medical department, unchanged since 1935, is running routine examinations every 28 months instead of the scheduled 19 to 24, with a 25-year-old X-ray unit. Read the document
June 13, 1969. A J-M survey of the Manville textile plant finds many jobs above 12 fibers/cc and recommends holding off on mandatory respirators pending a pay-standards review. Read the document
July 25, 1969. C. L. Sheckler calls mass compensation filings at the Manville plant a problem of major importance and seeks a plan to "retard the number of claims filed." Read the document
August 7, 1969. E. M. Fenner proposes labeling J-M insulation products that give off harmful asbestos or silica dust, listing which products would and would not carry labels. Read the document
August 18, 1969. J-M's health policy committee proposes a profitability study of the Marshville textile plant before buying costly dust control, and decides to handle plant health problems without union help. Read the document
September 8, 1969. A California insulator's asbestosis claim, filed in 1966 against J-M and some 30 other employers, ends in an award for 64 percent permanent disability. Read the document
September 11, 1969. W. M. Deutsch proposes New York's sanitary code definition of "hazard" as J-M's guide to which asbestos insulation products need warning labels. Read the document
September 16, 1969. In notes of a meeting with J-M's Cliff Sheckler, he is recorded saying "we have had a dirty house and now we have to pay for it" and that respirators work less well than thought. Read the document
September 16, 1969. J-M issues revised Executive Bulletin 312-3, requiring new or rebuilt dust control systems to keep asbestos below a company limit of 2 fibers per cubic centimeter. Read the document
October 2, 1969. J-M's Environmental Control Subcommittee reviews new full-shift dust samples, with a Manville card room worker at up to 27 fibers/cc and a Jeffrey mine bulldozer operator at 125. Read the document
October 3, 1969. E. M. Fenner writes that J-M has a "moral responsibility" to warn customers of product hazards, noting that Superex and Thermobestos have carried warning labels for years. Read the document
October 10, 1969. H. M. Jackson tells J-M's president that plant doctors at most plants are under-reading workers' X-rays and that past dust levels have caused "a substantial frequency of disease." Read the document
October 20, 1969. Insulator Clarence Borel sues Johns-Manville, Fibreboard and nine other insulation makers in federal court in Beaumont, Texas, for asbestosis and failure to warn. Read the document
November 5, 1969. H. M. Jackson sends Dr. Bristol's X-ray readings to the Marrero plant, telling it to act on newly found occupational disease rather than file the reports. Read the document
December 16, 1969. J-M attorney R. R. Standel Jr. rejects a small "short form" Marinite caution label as legally unacceptable and proposes asking customers to relabel faced boards. Read the document
December 18, 1969. C. L. Sheckler proposes that J-M's insulation labels warn of dust when products are "machined, installed, or dismantled" and add "avoid breathing the dust." Read the document
December 22, 1969. After Eternit complains of labeled fiber bags, J-M International says that as standard procedure no shipment to overseas customers should carry caution labels. Read the document

The 1970s

1970

1970. The ACGIH keeps its asbestos limit at 5 million particles per cubic foot and proposes a new limit of 5 fibers per milliliter. Read the document
February 2, 1970. J-M's Environmental Control Subcommittee recommends cutting the company's respirator level for asbestos dust from 12 to 5 fibers per cubic centimeter. Read the document
February 18, 1970. H. M. Jackson asks Dr. Davison to find out whether J-M plants tell employees with occupational lung disease about their condition. Read the document
February 25, 1970. A J-M representative reports W. R. Grace is seeking an asbestos substitute for medical reasons and suggests J-M is "over doing it" on dust control. Read the document
February 27, 1970. A survey of J-M plants finds many workers with pneumoconiosis never told; Billerica says the philosophy had been "to withhold this info." Read the document
March 11, 1970. Manville plant managers voice "tremendous concern" over workmen's compensation and occupational disease costs rising "at an astronomical rate." Read the document
April 27, 1970. Unable to improve dust in the old section of the Asbestos, Quebec, plant, Hutcheson avoids enforcing respirators for fear of public "discussion of the entire health question." Read the document
May 1970. J-M researchers publish tests of dust respirators against a chrysotile test dust; all but one let through less than 1% of the fiber. Read the document
May 7, 1970. An incentive-pay audit of Min-K panel pressing finds a station rated an out-of-line dust condition, where respirators were not being worn. Read the document
May 11, 1970. J-M's Celite Division, whose asbestos-containing products carried no asbestos warning, proposes caution notices after being told one is required. Read the document
May 27, 1970. Billerica's Paul Chapman reports he tried to keep a worker with signs of asbestosis from learning he might have an industrial disease claim. Read the document
June 9, 1970. Pundsack recommends a caution label for J-M's Micro-Fibers after animal studies found mesothelioma tumors and granulomas from injected fibers. Read the document
July 1, 1970. J-M's Industrial Insulations Division orders caution labels on its asbestos products, warning that breathing the dust over long periods "may be harmful." Read the document
July 7, 1970. J-M International asks whether export shipments must carry the asbestos warning labels just ordered for domestic shipments. Read the document
July 13, 1970. Breese advises that export shipments "legally" should carry caution labels, but notes possible "policy and/or business considerations." Read the document
July 23, 1970. Burleson orders that customer questions about the health hazards of asbestos products go to C. L. Sheckler, to "protect the company." Read the document
August 1970. J-M compiles a history of its health research, from the 1928 Saranac animal studies to twelve current asbestos projects, for use with the press. Read the document
September 28, 1970. A J-M management report concedes asbestos causes disease, counts a sharp rise in compensation claims, and orders uncontrollable dust operations closed by April 1971. Read the document
October 8, 1970. Travelers warns J-M's counsel that news of settling an asbestos claim may stir up "many dormant claims that we know are in the bushes." Read the document
October 13, 1970. Massachusetts occupational hygiene officials ask Billerica for employees' X-ray dates and a list of asbestosis-related claims; J-M agrees to provide them. Read the document
November 5, 1970. Eight companies led by J-M form the Asbestos Information Association/North America to inform the public about "the asbestos/health problem." Read the document
November 20, 1970. J-M's Toronto plant asks Dr. Davison what a "no dust" restriction means for workers with pneumoconiosis, given the company's and ACGIH's differing limits. Read the document
November 24, 1970. Dr. Bristol's X-ray readings for J-M are tabulated: 30% of Billerica workers' sets show pneumoconiosis, with Nashua and Pittsburg above 10%. Read the document
December 8, 1970. A marine customer threatens to cancel orders unless J-M stops putting asbestos caution labels on Marinite sheets, which take ten minutes each to sand off. Read the document
December 10, 1970. After a customer complaint, J-M switches its Marinite marine sheets from stick-on caution labels to a red rubber stamp with the same asbestos warning. Read the document
December 11, 1970. J-M's company-wide X-ray review finds severe lung disease problems at seven plants, with 30% of Billerica X-rays read as pneumoconiosis. Read the document

1971

January 4, 1971. Dr. Davison defends a procedure under which J-M arranges a worker's job transfer before telling him he has pneumoconiosis. Read the document
February 17, 1971. A J-M-funded study of the company's retirees finds lung cancer deaths at two and a half times the normal rate, and four times among maintenance men. Read the document
February 18, 1971. Manville plant staff tell J-M headquarters of difficulties in carrying out the new procedure for restricting and counseling workers with pneumoconiosis. Read the document
February 25, 1971. J-M arranges a meeting at its Marrero plant with Tulane's Dr. Hans Weill on how to estimate workers' past exposures for his study. Read the document
March 17, 1971. Dr. Enterline tells J-M that lung cancer is also higher among Quebec plant workers and among maintenance men at its "non-exposure" plants. Read the document
April 12, 1971. Tulane's Dr. Hans Weill sends J-M revised charts grading past dust exposures by job at the Marrero plant, worked out with company staff. Read the document
April 14, 1971. Waukegan's union learns that workers found to be "dusted" are being moved to other jobs, and seeks to protect their pay. Read the document
April 27, 1971. Dr. Davison presses to set up a way of counseling Marrero plant workers found to have pneumoconiosis "as expeditiously as possible." Read the document
May 7, 1971. J-M hires Boston University's Dr. Gaensler to examine Billerica workers, with lawyers' requests for results to be referred to the company. Read the document
May 11, 1971. A J-M regional manager finds the industry's asbestos insulation safety brochure was never sent to J-M's own branch and job site staff. Read the document
May 12, 1971. J-M headquarters tells the Manville plant to report every possible cancer case, including mesothelioma, and to hold off on exams and lawyers pending review. Read the document
May 21, 1971. J-M managers agree to resign from Selikoff's insulation research board over an article finding the 5-fiber limit too high, and refuse him workers' health records. Read the document
June 28, 1971. Dr. Selikoff, at the request of the Manville plant union, asks J-M for employment data and past X-rays to study whether its dust controls protect workers. Read the document
June 28, 1971. Finding Waukegan workers with pleural calcification on file but unrestricted, J-M's doctors put them on a "blue slip" no-dust restriction. Read the document
July 1, 1971. A J-M research report notes Public Health Service findings of possible asbestos disease among older textile workers, and the industry's opposition to asbestos product bans. Read the document
July 16, 1971. J-M agrees to give Dr. Selikoff data on Manville plant workers, and asks how he would handle employees who come to him for advice. Read the document
July 23, 1971. The Manville plant doctor counts 505 pneumoconiosis diagnoses among its workers since 1932, and says many unexplained pleural changes would likely prove to be asbestosis. Read the document
September 20, 1971. J-M's Pittsburg plant is told not to inform former employees of hazards they were exposed to before the OSHA rules of August 1971. Read the document
October 1, 1971. J-M's environmental control department tells plants that dust stations exactly at the limit will now count as under it, following OSHA's wording. Read the document
November 16, 1971. J-M's lawyers agree not to revise the warning label on its asbestos products until the Borel appeal is decided, so as not to suggest it was inadequate. Read the document
December 7, 1971. OSHA issues an emergency standard cutting the asbestos limit from 12 to 5 fibers per milliliter, finding the old level a "grave danger." Read the document
December 27, 1971. J-M's environmental control department notes that full dust survey record books stopped being kept at the plants two years earlier, at the legal department's request. Read the document

1972

January 4, 1972. J-M agrees to estimate past dust levels at its Manville plant for Dr. Selikoff's study, before seeing the union's own estimates. Read the document
January 5, 1972. J-M's legal department advises that asbestos fiber exported to Britain and Europe should carry caution labels, despite a fiber division policy against them. Read the document
January 13, 1972. A J-M lawyer writes that without the 1964 caution labels the company's position in pending asbestos suits "would be all but indefensible." Read the document
January 25, 1972. J-M's fiber sales side recommends postponing warning labels on exported asbestos fiber "indefinitely," citing customers' resistance and competition. Read the document
February 14, 1972. A former J-M plant manager testifies that until about 1970 to 1972, company doctors did not tell workers their examination findings. Read the document
March 3, 1972. A J-M fiber division manager urges new dust-tight packaging and shipping, saying safe handling could raise J-M's share of the asbestos market. Read the document
March 16, 1972. At the federal asbestos hearings, Fred Pundsack of J-M argues that a label warning of asbestosis and cancer is "unnecessarily frightening" and would destroy the industry. Read the document
March 16, 1972. J-M's executives and consultant testify against OSHA's proposed 2-fiber asbestos limit, one urging a return to 12 fibers. Read the document
April 24, 1972. A survey finds every dust station at J-M's Reeves fiber plant over the limit, some above 100 fibers, and plans no further surveys before the plant closes. Read the document
May 1972. Waukegan's medical department lists 174 red slip dust-disease cases since 1945, with the date each was diagnosed and the date he was told. Read the document
June 21, 1972. J-M asks its Waukegan and Manville plants to measure what the new OSHA standard's respirator rules will cost in job rates and incentive pay. Read the document
June 26, 1972. A J-M division asks which packing and friction products need OSHA caution labels, having labeled none so far, to meet a July 7 deadline. Read the document
June 27, 1972. J-M's Manville plant begins a survey of how respirator and protective clothing rules under the OSHA standard will affect job rates and incentive pay. Read the document
July 7, 1972. A Boston University physician reports eight cases of moderately advanced asbestosis among 65 workers examined at J-M's Billerica plant. Read the document
July 12, 1972. The asbestos industry's trade association advises members not to ask OSHA about labeling borderline products, since OSHA would likely require labels. Read the document

1973

1973. Dr. George Wright writes that J-M left World War II without an adequate health program and "Pace was not kept with what was known." Read the document
January 26, 1973. Men unloading a boxcar of crocidolite at J-M's Waukegan plant are measured at 107 to 170 fibers per cubic centimeter, against a 5-fiber limit. Read the document
April 12, 1973. J-M lawyer J. A. McKinney urges ending crocidolite and amosite use and dust over 5 fibers, warning of "excessive future liabilities." Read the document
April 17, 1973. A J-M-funded researcher reports that chrysotile slows the clearing of a cigarette-smoke carcinogen from hamster lungs, and offers J-M his manuscript first. Read the document
May 10, 1973. The Quebec mining association reports on Selikoff's Toronto lectures, where industry speakers argue Canadian miners' experience differs from that of U.S. insulators. Read the document
July 24, 1973. A J-M salesman reports a "horribly dusty mess" at customer Proko's Dallas plant, which drops dust control after its insurer's air samples pass. Read the document
July 26, 1973. Planning a silica-asbestos study of the Stockton and Manville plants, Reitze writes that J-M has "a very strong moral obligation to our people to find some answers." Read the document
July 31, 1973. Hendry replies that J-M's "problems should be minimal" if its fiber reaches Proko undamaged and is handled within OSHA limits. Read the document
August 20, 1973. Dr. Wright finds Billerica has one of J-M's poorest asbestosis and cancer records and that masks are being substituted for proper dust control. Read the document
September 20, 1973. Defense counsel in Borel write that their "principal practical ambition" is to delay publication of the Fifth Circuit opinion "before the deluge starts." Read the document
December 6, 1973. Pittsburg plant sends headquarters a confidential list of 96 workers with pneumoconiosis findings on X-ray, including a mesothelioma case. Read the document

1974

January 21, 1974. J-M's industrial hygienists report that plants neglect stations already under the TLV and that some plants are "playing games" with dust surveys. Read the document
February 5, 1974. J. A. McKinney proposes telling overseas customers about asbestos with a label that is not a "warning label," expecting a future legal duty to inform users. Read the document
March 1974. At customer seminars, J-M says it is responsible for telling customers and their employees about asbestos hazards and how to control them. Read the document
March 14, 1974. Citing Pittsburg's medical history and "the possible litigation that can result," Reitze approves costlier outside medical care for the plant. Read the document
May 20, 1974. The Fifth Circuit denies rehearing in Borel; Fibreboard's lawyer expects new suits once the decision is publicized. Read the document
June 11, 1974. Reitze writes that in 1947 J-M's health research "was handled by our Legal Department on a hush-hush basis." Read the document
June 14, 1974. W. C. Streib proposes a talc label saying only that it "may contain fibrous tremolite," without the amount. Read the document
June 14, 1974. J-M attorney R. B. Von Wald calls it "indefensible" to label asbestos products in the United States but not abroad. Read the document
June 17, 1974. At J-M's Nashua plant, three sanding-line workers again refuse to wear dust samplers during the industrial hygiene survey. Read the document
June 18, 1974. J-M counsel G. E. Parker tells managers their delays in labeling talc containing free tremolite are "not defensible" and must end. Read the document
August 22, 1974. Reitze agrees that J-M has "a definite liability" for leaving labels off products sold abroad: "We know of the hazards." Read the document
September 5, 1974. Touring Waukegan, W. B. Reitze finds broken dust controls, primitive bag opening and broom sweeping, calling the pipe operation among the worst in J-M. Read the document
September 16, 1974. Although OSHA's final standard drops the ban, W. B. Reitze orders J-M plants to stop sweeping asbestos waste with brooms. Read the document
September 27, 1974. Reitze reports Advocate Mine stations "almost out of control" at 23 and 53 f/cc and urges mandatory respirators. Read the document
November 7, 1974. Dr. Paul Kotin warns J-M executives that R. T. Vanderbilt objects to J-M's asbestos caution labels on talc, which J-M believes contains fibrous asbestos. Read the document
December 12, 1974. Former J-M sales official Ward Burleson tells J-M's lawyer he was told in the late 1940s that asbestos lung fibrosis was "really not harmful." Read the document

1975

January 17, 1975. Seeking help for J-M's defense in insulators' lawsuits, Dr. George Wright tells Cape Asbestos that in hindsight warnings "probably should have" come earlier. Read the document
February 12, 1975. In the Toronto Sun, Dr. Paul Kotin says J-M must handle asbestos safely or get out of the business; Toronto plant workers say they were never told. Read the document
February 19, 1975. Answering a rumor that the Manville plant hid 200 disease cases, Dr. R. M. Liss reports about 20 new cases a year in the 1960s and 7 since. Read the document
February 28, 1975. Dr. George Wright tells Dr. Kotin the evidence that crocidolite is more dangerous is not conclusive but "provocative," possibly justifying a stricter standard. Read the document
March 3, 1975. At a Canadian government meeting on asbestos rules, J-M says it uses crocidolite in pipe and gives it no special in-plant handling. Read the document
March 19, 1975. J-M's London office recommends no physical warning labels on products for Britain until rules are settled; warnings on invoices and literature should "suffice." Read the document
May 12, 1975. W. B. Reitze reports that asbestos bags reaching J-M's Toronto plant from its Canadian mines carry no OSHA caution label. Read the document
May 29, 1975. J-M's Toronto plant tells employees of the "direct link" between asbestos disease and smoking and bans smoking in its asbestos pipe buildings. Read the document
June 2, 1975. J-M's Toronto plant manager urges Ontario not to cut the crocidolite limit to 0.2 f/cc, offering 0.5 and citing cost and lack of evidence. Read the document
June 6, 1975. CBC reports on dust at J-M's Advocate Mine in Newfoundland; the mine manager sends transcripts of each broadcast to J-M's Quebec headquarters. Read the document
July 29, 1975. Filming a J-M health film at the Jeffrey mill, W. A. Cooper finds the bagging floor "shocking," with fiber everywhere and workers without respirators. Read the document
July 31, 1975. A J-M survey of the Toronto plant finds weak dust suction on one line and notes workers "are being told more regarding their health than in the past." Read the document
August 1, 1975. J-M's outside lawyers write that they obtained a plaintiff's X-rays without a court order, though they had "no right to these films." Read the document
August 11, 1975. J-M makes respirators mandatory above 2 f/cc in plants and 5 f/cc in Canadian mines, admitting enforcement had been "rather lax." Read the document
August 21, 1975. Asked by the Wall Street Journal whether its plant doctor was to inform only J-M, not the patient, J-M's researchers note "Apparently J-M would concur." Read the document
September 10, 1975. After visiting the Advocate Mine, W. B. Reitze reports counts over the limit, deep dust, and evergreens for two miles white with asbestos from the tailings. Read the document
September 12, 1975. J-M's former medical director, Dr. Kenneth Smith, records that non-medical officials in New York decided whether workers were told their X-ray results. Read the document
November 11, 1975. W. B. Reitze warns that equipment planned for J-M's Mexican venture with Peñoles, which produced 50–100 f/cc at Reeves, will endanger the workers' lives. Read the document
November 26, 1975. W. B. Reitze sends J-M's legal staff Manville plant records showing pneumoconiosis diagnosed since 1932, some after only a few years' exposure. Read the document
November 27, 1975. J. R. M. Hutcheson forms a task force on dust from handling asbestos fiber, writing that "lack of it could mean our demise." Read the document
December 15, 1975. A University of Toronto doctor reports that J-M's Advocate Mines misled workers and doctors about asbestos hazards and contaminated the town of Baie Verte. Read the document
December 15, 1975. W. B. Reitze writes that after J-M's U.S. experience it cannot morally keep making asbestos Thermobestos in Brazil, and backs switching to Thermo-12. Read the document

1976

January 7, 1976. A Toronto plant manager warns that hygiene surveys listing many busy machines as "did not operate" invite suspicion that dusty stations were shut down. Read the document
January 22, 1976. Dr. Paul Kotin of J-M argues before a Labor Department committee against OSHA's proposal to cut the asbestos limit to 0.5 fibers per cc. Read the document
February 3, 1976. W. B. Reitze tells J-M's Toronto plant that maintenance men in a trench with 30 to 50 fibers per cc are not wearing respirators. Read the document
April 1976. A J-M employee writes that a worker's disability papers could start "a new comp suit" and that it is "better to let sleeping dogs lie." Read the document
April 1, 1976. Dr. Paul Kotin protests that J-M holds back health and safety controls until an operation proves profitable. Read the document
April 21, 1976. Preparing lawsuit answers, J-M staff worry about "another 'Kenneth Smith' situation" at plants where company physicians were fired. Read the document
April 22, 1976. A J-M talc manager tells Johnson & Johnson that a new study clears pure talc but makes asbestos-bearing talcs harder to defend. Read the document
July 2, 1976. W. B. Reitze orders that a dying 40-year employee's asbestos claim not be contested, and asks for discretion about who learns of his condition. Read the document
July 27, 1976. As OSHA's 2-fiber limit takes effect, W. B. Reitze asks J-M plants to list stations over or near it and their plans to comply. Read the document
September 2, 1976. J-M tests show that sawing Thermobestos as in the 1960s produced 18 to 28 times the 1965 dust limit. Read the document
November 5, 1976. W. B. Reitze tells J-M's Markusson that real job-site cement mixing ran 30 to 80 fibers per cc, far above J-M's simulated tests. Read the document
November 19, 1976. J-M makes it policy that hygiene surveys reflect maximum normal exposures and that hygienists report imminent dangers to plant managers at once. Read the document
December 1976. NIOSH tells OSHA there is no safe level of asbestos exposure and recommends a limit of 0.1 fibers per cc. Read the document

1977

January 14, 1977. Dr. Paul Kotin reports to J-M's president that X-rays at Denison and Stockton show pleural changes but no definite asbestosis attributable solely to those plants. Read the document
February 11, 1977. W. A. Cooper tells Dr. Kotin that before 1973 J-M's education of employees about asbestos and health was "erratic." Read the document
February 24, 1977. An Aetna review finds about 90% of union workers at J-M's Manville plant have filed or will file asbestosis or hearing-loss claims. Read the document
May 2, 1977. W. B. Reitze reports asbestos hanging "in garlands" at a Brazilian affiliate and urges J-M to end Thermobestos there. Read the document
May 11, 1977. A Manville plant manager protests that protective clothing ordered by Dr. Kotin seven months earlier still has not been issued. Read the document
June 10, 1977. W. B. Reitze reports that staying in Asbestos de Mexico without a cleanup would be "immoral, if not criminal," with 900 to 1,200 workers at risk. Read the document
June 22, 1977. Dr. Kotin rewrites J-M's president's letter to Nicolet to drop his view that crocidolite causes mesothelioma and to tone down the Manville plant's record. Read the document
August 1, 1977. J-M's president orders an end to company tobacco promotions and plans a smoking ban for employees exposed to asbestos. Read the document
August 1, 1977. At the Zelienople plant, Dr. William Paul counsels workers after four learn from outside X-rays of lung abnormalities the company doctors had not told them about. Read the document
August 12, 1977. J-M staff conclude it is in the company's interest to delay OSHA's asbestos hearings for years, and weigh whether a smoking-ban petition would speed them up. Read the document
September 13, 1977. J-M's outside counsel objects to every interrogatory in Fearn v. Johns-Manville and promises to make it "difficult for plaintiff to obtain any further information." Read the document
September 20, 1977. Dr. Paul Kotin calls J-M's Jeffrey textile plant "an embarrassment" that has missed company dust standards for years and proposes shutting it if not cleaned up. Read the document
September 20, 1977. Launching a survey of fiber customers, J-M's J. F. Reis writes, "we know that there are health problems" from excessive asbestos exposure. Read the document
September 26, 1977. Visiting a retired Texas couple who complained about J-M fiber glass ducts, A. E. Bentz dismisses them as worriers but suggests J-M pay to replace the ducts. Read the document
September 28, 1977. J-M's Manville paper mill makes respirators mandatory for dusty asbestos and Celite work, with discharge for a third offense. Read the document
October 6, 1977. Deposed in Burows v. Johns-Manville, Dr. Paul Kotin agrees asbestosis can appear long after exposure and says he has known the 1930 Merewether report for 20 years. Read the document
November 1977. A J-M legal review finds the Long Beach plant still leaving asbestos waste uncovered while appealing its second OSHA citation for the same violation. Read the document
November 15, 1977. J-M requires protective clothing and respirators where fiber levels exceed 1.2 f/cc, saying counts near OSHA's 2.0 limit can be off by 70 percent. Read the document
December 2, 1977. Dr. William Paul finds Marrero's medical program deficient, with poor sputum samples, an old X-ray machine and a workforce many of whom show occupational disease. Read the document
December 8, 1977. At a Waukegan meeting on compensation claims, J-M staff ask whether to tell flagged workers now or "wait until is disabled." Read the document
December 22, 1977. With Pittsburg plant medical files showing undiagnosed disease, W. B. Reitze argues J-M must tell former employees, though it could bring "an onslaught" of compensation cases. Read the document

1978

January 13, 1978. J-M's Toronto plant asks for funds for an automatic bag opener, saying manual opening keeps exposure above the TLV and leaves the company open to claims. Read the document
January 16, 1978. J-M's top management and lawyers agree that Pittsburg workers found to have disease in old medical files must be told, despite the liability. Read the document
February 23, 1978. J-M's W. R. Curtner suggests that in some states workers be encouraged to file disease claims early, locking in lower benefit schedules. Read the document
March 14, 1978. J-M managers plan a smoking ban at the company's Belgian asbestos-cement plants and ask headquarters for material to persuade the unions. Read the document
June 12, 1978. An internal review finds J-M's export fiber bags and woven poly bags went without caution labels for years after domestic paper bags were labeled. Read the document
July 10, 1978. J-M's C. G. Linke warns managers that ABC's special "Asbestos: The Way to Dusty Death" will air July 14 and bring "more unfavorable publicity." Read the document
July 11, 1978. W. B. Reitze tells Dr. Kotin that children write their names in asbestos dust near the Advocate mine, and tailings dust has blown around three J-M mining towns for decades. Read the document
August 11, 1978. J-M attorney James K. Green learns Dr. Kenneth Smith told insulation contractors in 1964 they were not at risk, and asks that the papers not be circulated among counsel. Read the document
September 12, 1978. Dr. Paul Kotin defends telling employees that 2 f/cc is safe alone but hazardous with smoking, despite concern over customers and legal position. Read the document
October 10, 1978. Citing legal reasons among others, H. M. Jackson asks J-M's employee relations managers for any minutes of their meetings back to 1937. Read the document
November 2, 1978. Interviewed by J-M's lawyers, Hugh Jackson recalls a plant doctor saying management did not want him to discuss problems fully with employees. Read the document
December 29, 1978. Defense counsel in the Beaumont, Texas asbestosis cases tells J-M and Travelers the judge went duck hunting with plaintiffs' counsel before a pretrial conference. Read the document

1979

January 12, 1979. A J-M public relations executive tells the chairman the company's public positions on asbestos do not match the facts and it must stop "playing semantic games." Read the document
March 12, 1979. J-M's senior attorney suggests that a letter from Dr. William E. Smith not be mentioned to other counsel before Smith's further deposition. Read the document
March 19, 1979. At a Toronto plant meeting, workers ask why new hires are not told of health hazards and say they were not told for months that they had asbestosis. Read the document
March 22, 1979. A defense lawyer notes it is established that in 1965 J-M did not let its doctors tell a worker about his condition; the report went to the company. Read the document
April 11, 1979. Waukegan's J. W. Szcygielski reports 35 pneumoconiosis cases never entered on the OSHA log and asks headquarters how to resolve it. Read the document
April 16, 1979. W. B. Reitze tells J-M plant managers, "once again," that posting industrial hygiene survey reports in the plants is mandatory. Read the document
April 17, 1979. Dr. Paul Kotin warns that Waukegan's failure to log occupational disease cases since 1972 appears willful and urges reporting them to OSHA at once. Read the document
April 19, 1979. J-M's associate general counsel recommends adding 23 unrecorded Waukegan disease cases to the OSHA logs without telling OSHA. Read the document
April 20, 1979. An outside lawyer assures J-M's associate general counsel that no one will inspect the articles his firm holds until J-M's medical library bibliography arrives. Read the document
June 12, 1979. Dr. Paul Kotin warns that a J-M executive's 1972 testimony, denying knowledge of hazards in 1949, conflicts with company testimony that the industry knew. Read the document
June 25, 1979. J-M's chairman sets a smoking policy at World Headquarters and extends a quit-smoking subsidy to staff who had worked at asbestos processing plants. Read the document
July 26, 1979. J-M Canada warns pipe contractors not to cut asbestos-cement pipe dry with abrasive saws, while calling the pipe otherwise "perfectly safe." Read the document
August 6, 1979. Dr. Paul Kotin announces a study of illness among workers at all J-M asbestos-using locations, with medical records to be abstracted from September. Read the document
September 24, 1979. J-M managers conclude the company is "better off not labeling" Transite pipe, since a label would bring California notice and inspection rules. Read the document
September 27, 1979. A J-M chart of hourly workers' diagnoses shows most were told within months, but some diagnosed between 1958 and 1962 waited more than a year. Read the document
October 11, 1979. Retired and disabled workers and their wives picket the Manville plant over compensation; one sign reads "Give me back my husband." Read the document
November 16, 1979. Reviewing Lompoc records for a lawsuit, a J-M defense memo notes "two potential smoking guns" that fall outside the plaintiff's document request. Read the document

The 1980s

1980

February 4, 1980. J-M chairman John McKinney tells Dr. Irving Selikoff that extreme scientists may leave J-M no choice but to "destroy the credibility of such scientists." Read the document
February 4, 1980. A J-M attorney's history of the Brazil Thermobestos plant finds no dust collection in 1970 and still no way to monitor dust in 1977. Read the document
February 26, 1980. S. W. McCallie warns that a proposed EPA rule could expose health studies "kept from plaintiffs' counsel" and calls for a strategy to deal with it. Read the document
March 14, 1980. Waukegan workers say they were never told their examination results; one learns only in 1980 of a medical problem dating from 1957. Read the document
March 25, 1980. After a NIOSH study reports that J-M missed two of three cases at Waukegan, angry workers tell Dr. Paul they were not told their X-ray results. Read the document
April 7, 1980. A California lawyer handling a widow's claim for J-M writes that the company will settle only for everything, or "stonewall her." Read the document
April 16, 1980. A J-M chairman's bulletin says properly handled asbestos poses no health hazard and pledges to defend it against "unjustified regulation." Read the document
May 13, 1980. J-M's J. P. Leineweber challenges a U.S. Geological Survey mineralogist's claim that chrysotile is harmless; the mineralogist accuses J-M of downplaying blue asbestos. Read the document
May 30, 1980. Dr. Paul Kotin tells J-M's president the company has no firm asbestos policy and asks to be told if asbestos has "no future" so a phase-out can be planned. Read the document
July 3, 1980. G. Earl Parker reports that conditions at J-M's Mexican affiliate have worsened and that J-M may have to stop selling it fiber or sell its stake. Read the document
September 11, 1980. W. B. Reitze says J-M should tell Ontario that its 2-fiber limit is safe and that crocidolite and amosite are no more hazardous than chrysotile. Read the document
December 11, 1980. M. A. Tappin directs that no union get retired J-M employees' medical records despite OSHA's new rule, preferring to litigate. Read the document
December 14, 1980. W. B. Reitze tells M. A. Tappin that ordering a plant to withhold retirees' medical records from the union would violate a federal regulation, and HS&E does not concur. Read the document

1981

February 2, 1981. An inspection at J-M's Waukegan plant finds workers sweeping spilled asbestos with push brooms and leaving respirators on open asbestos bags. Read the document
March 11, 1981. J-M attorney George Evans suggests it might be worth paying a plaintiff to bring in co-defendants who would not share in settlements. Read the document
April 30, 1981. J-M's outside counsel proposes refusing to admit facts in the Hirst claim that J-M could admit, judging any sanctions would be small. Read the document
May 13, 1981. J. F. Reis drafts J-M's answer on why it never warned Nashua dump site owners about asbestos: the hazard was thought limited to high workplace exposures. Read the document
July 14, 1981. S. W. McCallie circulates an EPA case plan on Nashua, obtained from a confidential source, and asks that J-M not discuss having it. Read the document
September 25, 1981. Reviewing a Utah study of asbestos-cement pipe and cancer, S. W. McCallie prefers a short news item quoting its favorable conclusion to printing the whole study. Read the document
December 18, 1981. A J-M attorney lists why the company's lawyers fought discovery of plant workers' compensation files, including fear they showed disease from low or indirect exposure. Read the document
December 25, 1981. Searching for early workers' compensation claims, a J-M lawyer finds the company's records differ from what its asbestos litigation group had told him. Read the document

1982

January 7, 1982. J-M's outside counsel advises on the formal steps needed if the company is to defend and indemnify Vandiver Brown, its former attorney, in the asbestos suits. Read the document
January 18, 1982. J-M's Illinois counsel notes Hugh Jackson testified the Celite warning label began in 1957 and asks for proof it began in 1952. Read the document
February 1, 1982. J-M tells its New Jersey counsel not to name Tom Williams, who knew of sales to refineries, in interrogatory answers. Read the document
February 12, 1982. Answering a union request under OSHA's records rule, J-M counsel releases a substance list but offers Long Beach medical data only with each worker's consent. Read the document
February 12, 1982. J-M attorney George Evans tells outside counsel that the company's sworn answers about asbestos use at Lompoc are probably wrong. Read the document
February 19, 1982. A J-M claims official asks that a doctor rewrite his report on Samuel Rubbico to remove all references to colon cancer; the reply says the doctor will cooperate. Read the document
May 6, 1982. J-M's Minnesota counsel writes that the company brought third-party claims mainly to get Judge Miles Lord off an asbestos case, and that it worked. Read the document
June 3, 1982. J-M's lawyers learn their longtime safety witness Cliff Sheckler never attended Rutgers as he testified, and decide to withdraw him as a witness. Read the document
June 11, 1982. After J-M limits a mesothelioma plaintiff's bid for an early trial, its counsel writes that the plaintiff "will probably expire" before year's end. Read the document
June 28, 1982. J-M asks an outside epidemiologist not to give a town citizens' group a study analysis on asbestos-cement water pipe while a lawsuit is pending. Read the document
June 29, 1982. J-M attorney George Evans urges outside counsel to do everything possible to block the deposition of Dr. Merrill, the Manville plant's physician. Read the document
October 4, 1982. A Manville draft letter asks the Health and Human Services Secretary to investigate Dr. Selikoff's research and says he appears to lack a medical diploma. Read the document

1983

February 23, 1983. Manville's new medical manual says TLVs protect only "clinically normal" workers and requires that abnormal findings be disclosed to employees in writing. Read the document

1985

July 3, 1985. Manville's Earl Parker writes The New Yorker to attack Paul Brodeur's asbestos articles and defend Senator Hart's compensation legislation. Read the document

This page is provided for general informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice. Every asbestos case turns on its own facts, exposure history, diagnosis, deadlines, available evidence, and applicable law. Reviewing this page does not create an attorney-client relationship. For advice about your specific situation, call 833-4-ASBESTOS for a free case review.