Hopkins v. Buffalo Pumps, Inc. (2011)

Our plain-English summary of Hopkins v. Buffalo Pumps, Inc. (Rhode Island Superior Court, April 27, 2011).

Oliver Hopkins and his wife Mary sued several companies in two Rhode Island Superior Court cases. They alleged that Mr. Hopkins developed mesothelioma from exposure to the defendants' asbestos-containing products while he worked as a laborer and maintenance worker at Mobil Oil and Tucson Gas & Electric from 1946 through 1981. Defendant Foster Wheeler asked the court to consolidate the two cases. The first case was set for trial on May 9, 2011, while the second, filed in December 2010, had no trial date and discovery was not finished. The plaintiffs and some defendants objected, arguing that consolidation would cause prejudice. The court found that the cases involved identical claims and exposure sites, so trying them together would save time and effort. It decided that a short continuance of the trial date would remove the prejudice. The court granted the motion for trial purposes only, kept the cases separate with separate judgments, and said it would set a new trial date.

We wrote this summary from the court's opinion with the help of AI. It is not the court's wording, and it is not legal advice. The full opinion is below.

The decision

• Court: Rhode Island Superior Court
• Decided: April 27, 2011
• Stage: Other
• State: Rhode Island

Outcome. The court granted Foster Wheeler's motion to consolidate the two Hopkins cases for trial only, over the objections of the plaintiffs and several defendants, and continued the May 9, 2011 trial date.

What the court held. A trial justice may consolidate actions with common questions of law or fact for trial when it serves convenience and economy, and any prejudice from a close trial date can be cured by a short continuance. Consolidation is for trial only and the actions remain separate.

Issues decided: Trial Procedure and Discovery.

The people and their exposure

• Oliver M. Hopkins: mesothelioma

The defendants

• Foster Wheeler (manufacturer)
• Taco, Inc. (manufacturer)
• Browne & Sharpe, Inc. (manufacturer)
• General Electric (manufacturer)
• Buffalo Pumps, Inc. (manufacturer)

The court's opinion

The text below is Google Scholar's copy of the court's opinion, a public record. Numbers in brackets, such as [*921], mark where each page of the printed reporter begins.

OLIVER M. HOPKINS and MARY L. HOPKINS,

v.

BUFFALO PUMPS, INC., etal.

OLIVER M. HOPKINS and MARY L. HOPKINS,

v.

BROWNE & SHARPE, INC., etal.

C.A. Nos. PC 09-1221, PC 10-4675

April 27, 2011.

Superior Court of Rhode Island, PROVIDENCE, SC.

DECISION

GIBNEY, P.J.

Before this Court is Defendant Foster Wheeler's Motion to Consolidate. In its motion, Defendant Foster Wheeler (Foster Wheeler) moves to consolidate Oliver Hopkins and Mary Hopkins v. Buffalo Pumps, Inc., Inc. (Hopkins II), No. PC 09-1221 (filed Feb. 27, 2009) with Oliver Hopkins and Mary Hopkins v. Browne & Sharpe, Inc., Inc. (Hopkins III), No. PC 10-4675 (filed Dec. 22, 2010).[1] Plaintiffs Oliver M. Hopkins and Mary L. Hopkins (collectively, Plaintiffs) object to this motion. Hopkins III Defendants, Taco, Inc. and Browne & Sharpe, also object to this motion. Additionally, Hopkins III Defendant General Electric objects based on prejudice if the trial date is not continued but supports the motion, if the date is continued. I

Facts and Travel

In Hopkins II, Plaintiffs allege that Oliver Hopkins (Mr. Hopkins) was exposed to Defendant Foster Wheeler's asbestos-containing products, which caused and/or contributed to his development of mesothelioma. Mr. Hopkins was allegedly exposed to these products through his position as a laborer and maintenance worker at Mobil Oil and Tucson Gas & Electric from 1946 through 1981. Plaintiffs filed their complaint in Hopkins II on February 27, 2009. That case is set for trial on May 9, 2011.

Similarly, in Hopkins III, Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Hopkins was exposed to Defendants Taco, Inc., Browne & Sharpe, and General Electric's (collectively, Hopkins III Defendants) asbestos-containing products through his work as a laborer at Mobil Oil and Tucson Gas & Electric. Plaintiffs filed the complaint in this case on December 22, 2010. Hopkins III currently has no trial date, and the parties have yet to complete discovery.

In its motion, Defendant Foster Wheeler avers that consolidation of Hopkins II and Hopkins III is warranted because the matters share identical issues of fact and law and consolidation will preserve judicial economy. Plaintiffs, however, object because Hopkins II is close to trial, while Hopkins III, they note, has yet to have completed discovery. Therefore, they contend that consolidation of the matters will prejudice the Hopkins III Defendants and Plaintiffs. Hopkins III Defendants similarly argue that prejudice will result from consolidation because of the upcoming trial date in Hopkins II. Moreover, Plaintiffs opine that third party demands, instead of consolidation, are the proper method to handle Foster Wheeler's complaints.

II

Analysis

Pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 42,

"[w]hen actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court. . . it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or

delay." Super. R. Civ. P. 42(a)

A trial justice may consolidate matters in her discretion when it will further the interests of convenience and economy of administration. Mendes v. Mendes, 111 R.I. 571, 577-78, 305 A.2d 97, 101 (1973); Giguere v. Yellow Cab Co., 59 R.I. 248, 259, 195 A. 214, 216 (1937); Robert B. Kent et al., 1 Rhode Island Rules of Civil Procedure with Commentaries § 42:2 (2010). Despite any identical issues of fact and law, consolidation of matters will, nevertheless, be inappropriate when it might result in confusion or prejudice. Sciarra v. Hillelsohn, 87 R.I. 8, 10, 137 A.2d 417, 419 (1957).

All interested parties recognize that Hopkins II and Hopkins III share identical issues of fact and law because the claims and alleged exposure sites within each matter are identical. Thus, Plaintiffs' and Hopkins III Defendants' objections are based on the potential resulting prejudice. Specifically, Hopkins III Defendants maintain that they are not prepared for the Hopkins II trial date and, therefore, will be unduly prejudiced by consolidation. Plaintiffs also contend that they would be prejudiced by consolidation if the case were continued to allow Hopkins III Defendants to prepare.

Nevertheless, consolidation of Hopkins II and Hopkins III would further the interests of judicial economy and convenience because the issues of fact and law are identical. This Court remains aware of the previous confusion regarding the trial date for Hopkins II, and the continuances of that date. Given such a case travel, this Court finds that a short continuance is appropriate in this circumstance. Continuing the trial to a date in the near future eliminates the prejudice to both the Hopkins III Defendants, who will then have time to adequately prepare for trial, and Plaintiffs, who will still have their trial without undue delay. This Court is satisfied that consolidation, along with a continuance, will further the interests of judicial economy by trying matters involving the same issues and transactions together, while not prejudicing the substantial rights of any party.[2] See Giguere, 59 R.I. at 259, 195 A. at 216-17.

A consolidation, this Court makes clear, is for trial purposes only and does not result in the merger of these matters into one action. Martin v. Lilly, 505 A.2d 1156, 1159 (R.I. 1986). Indeed, in Rhode Island, it is axiomatic that each cause of action remains distinct within a consolidation. School Comm. of the City of Cranston v. Bergin-Andrews, 984 A.2d 629, 647 (R.I. 2009) (citing Giguere, 59 R.I. at 251, 195 A. at 216); see Kent, 1 Rhode Island Rules of Civil Procedure with Commentaries, § 42:2. Thus, despite their consolidation for trial, Hopkins II and Hopkins III will remain separate, and judgments will be entered under their respective docket numbers. See Martin, 505 A.2d at 1159.

III

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, this Court grants Defendant Foster Wheeler's Motion to Consolidate Hopkins II, No. PC 09-1221, with Hopkins III, No. PC 10-4675, for trial. The trial date of May 9, 2011 for Hopkins II will be rescheduled. This Court will set a trial date for these consolidated matters on May 4, 2011. Counsel shall submit an appropriate judgment for entry. [1] In its motion, Foster Wheeler included Oliver Hopkins and Mary Hopkins v. A.O. Smith Corporation ("Hopkins I"), No. PC 09-1222 (filed Feb. 27, 2009). Since the filing of Foster Wheeler's motion, all claims within Hopkins I have been resolved. Accordingly, Foster Wheeler has conceded that this Court need not consider Hopkins I for consolidation.

[2] Recognizing that judicial economy is served by trying these matters together, this Court also notes that the within decision does not bar any party from making third party demands pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 14, as Plaintiffs propose.

Sources

• The opinion on Google Scholar
• Rhode Island asbestos laws
• Rhode Island asbestos exposure sites