The Bare-Metal Defense in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on bare-metal defense: 218 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

North Carolina

• Logan v. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. (2014). Under North Carolina law a plaintiff must show actual exposure to the defendant's product, and that rule is not relaxed for mesothelioma. A failure-to-warn claim about third-party replacement parts needs evidence that the manufacturer knew or should have known such parts would be used.

Ohio

• Brucker v. CBS Corporation (2019). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. The Sixth Circuit's bright-line bare-metal rule bars liability for asbestos-containing products attached to the defendant's product that the defendant neither made nor sold.
• Lindstrom v. AC Products Liability Trust (2003). Under maritime product liability law, a plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence must show substantial exposure to a particular defendant's asbestos-containing product for a substantial period. A general opinion that every asbestos exposure was a substantial factor does not meet that test, and a manufacturer is not liable for other makers' products attached to its equipment.

Oregon

• McKenzie v. AW Chesterson Co. (2016). Under Oregon's strict liability statute (ORS 30.920) and the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comments it incorporates, the product at issue is the pump as sold to the Navy with its asbestos-containing parts, so the bare-metal or no-duty defense does not bar a failure-to-warn claim as a matter of law. Plaintiff's evidence also sufficed on causation and foreseeability for negligence.

Other federal courts

• Air and Liquid Systems Corp. v. DeVries (2019). In maritime tort law, a product manufacturer has a duty to warn when its product requires incorporation of a part, it knows or has reason to know the integrated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses, and it has no reason to believe users will realize that danger. Mere foreseeability of use with another product is not enough, and the bare-metal defense is rejected.
• Devries v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation) (2017). Under maritime law, a manufacturer of a bare-metal product may be held liable in negligence for injuries from later-added asbestos materials if the injuries were a reasonably foreseeable result of its conduct. A bright-line rule that bare-metal manufacturers are never liable does not apply.
• Boyd v. Warren Pumps, LLC (2016). A pump maker can be liable only for asbestos-containing products it manufactured or supplied. Circumstantial evidence that spare asbestos packing and gaskets were supplied with original pumps and disturbed during servicing while the plaintiff was aboard was enough to reach a jury, while evidence tying the makers to the replacement parts was not.
• Lindstrom v. AC Product Liability Trust (2005). Under maritime products liability law, a plaintiff must show for each defendant that he was exposed to that defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. A generic expert opinion that every asbestos exposure contributed does not meet this requirement. A manufacturer is not responsible for asbestos in other companies' packing or gaskets attached to its equipment.

Pennsylvania

• Warrington v. 3M Company (2023). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. A bare-metal failure-to-warn claim also requires proof under DeVries that the manufacturer directed or required incorporation of the asbestos part and knew or had reason to know it was dangerous.
• Data v. Joy Global Underground Mining (2022). Under Pennsylvania's frequency, regularity and proximity test, a plaintiff must show actual inhalation of fibers from the defendant's product, and mere presence of asbestos nearby is not enough. A manufacturer that sells a product with an asbestos component installed has a duty to warn about aftermarket replacement parts of that type.
• Hilster v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2022). Under either maritime or Connecticut law, a pump maker is not liable for asbestos in third-party external gaskets and insulation it did not require, and a plaintiff must offer non-speculative evidence of exposure to the defendant's own asbestos-containing product. The government contractor defense under Boyle also barred the design defect and failure-to-warn claims on this record.
• Hilster v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2022). Under either maritime or Connecticut law, a pump maker is not liable for third-party external asbestos gaskets it did not specify, supply or require, and a plaintiff needs non-speculative evidence of exposure to the defendant's own asbestos-containing product. The government contractor defense also applied, because the Navy approved the specifications and warnings and knew of the asbestos hazards.
• Rogers v. AO Smith Corp. (2022). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to each defendant's asbestos-containing product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Under DeVries, the bare metal defense defeats a claim over asbestos insulation added to a turbine unless the turbine required that asbestos insulation.
• Data v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under Pennsylvania law a plaintiff must show frequent, regular and proximate exposure to the specific defendant's asbestos product, and mere presence of the product or de minimis exposure is not enough. Under maritime law the plaintiff must show exposure to the product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury, and the bare-metal defense is not available.
• Gay v. AO Smith Corporation (2021). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. A general recollection of a product's name, its presence on a ship, or a generic expert report does not create a genuine dispute on exposure.
• Schrader v. Ameron International Corporation (2020). A trial court abuses its discretion when it denies a jury's specific request to view a duly admitted exhibit based only on a general preference and speculation about prolonged deliberations, and the error requires a new trial where it could have affected the verdict. The court also found that Delaware law does not necessarily bar a negligence claim against pump makers who specified asbestos-containing replacement parts.
• Walker v. Blackmer Pump Co. (2019). A deceased witness's deposition is not admissible under the former-testimony hearsay exception against defendants who had no meaningful opportunity to cross-examine him. Maritime law governs shipboard Navy exposure, and under it the bare-metal defense turns on foreseeability, which makes circumstantial exposure evidence enough to reach a jury.
• Walker v. Viad Corp. (2019). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury, and the bare-metal defense is a foreseeability standard rather than a bright-line rule. A summary judgment movant may not raise a new argument and evidence for the first time in a reply brief.
• Gilbert v. Advance Auto Parts (2018). In an asbestos case a plaintiff must produce evidence that exposure to the specific defendant's product was frequent, regular and proximate; general testimony that a parts store or vehicle make was used at the workplace, without evidence tying the decedent to that product, is too speculative to survive summary judgment.
• Rabovsky v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2016). Under the law of the case doctrine, a prior ruling in the same case that the manufacturer could be liable under Schwartz was not reopened. Under Schwartz, a manufacturer may be liable for negligent failure to warn about asbestos components it neither made nor supplied if it knew its product would be used with such components, knew asbestos was hazardous, and gave no adequate warning.
• Schwartz v. Abex Corp. (2015). Under Pennsylvania law, a product manufacturer is not strictly liable for aftermarket asbestos-containing component parts it neither made nor supplied. It can be liable in negligence for failing to warn only if it knew its product would be used with that type of asbestos component and knew when it sold the product that asbestos was hazardous.
• Groover v. CBS Corporation (2014). Under the frequency, regularity and proximity standard, a plaintiff must make some affirmative showing that the plaintiff or decedent breathed dust from the particular defendant's product; working with or around the product is not enough.
• Schott v. Viad Corp. (In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation) (2014). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to asbestos in a product the defendant made or supplied, and expert speculation that the defendant probably supplied original or replacement parts is not enough. A manufacturer is not liable for asbestos parts it did not make or supply.
• Krauss v. Trane US Inc. (2014). A plaintiff must produce evidence that the defendant's product contained asbestos and was present at the worksite before the frequency, regularity and proximity test is reached. Lay affidavits based on 'knowledge and belief' rather than actual knowledge are speculative and cannot defeat summary judgment.
• Conner v. Alfa Laval, Inc. (2012). Under maritime law, a manufacturer is not liable for harm caused by, and has no duty to warn of the hazards of, asbestos products that it did not manufacture or distribute, even if it was foreseeable that those products would be used with its own.
• Faddish v. CBS Corporation (2010). Under Florida law, a plaintiff need only raise a genuine factual issue that the defendant's product was a substantial factor in causing the asbestos injury. Whether a sophisticated intermediary such as the Navy discharged a manufacturer's duty to warn is a jury question that weighs several factors.
• Peter & Elpis Constantinides v. Alfa Laval, Inc. (2010). Under Florida law a plaintiff must show that asbestos exposure from the defendant's product was a substantial contributing factor; a bare-metal defense not squarely argued before the magistrate panel is waived. Circumstantial and expert evidence of the defendant's valves aboard ship and work on their packing and gaskets can create a genuine issue on product identification.
• Peter & Elpis Constantinides v. CBS Corporation (2010). Under Florida law a plaintiff must show that the defendant's product was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Whether a sophisticated intermediary such as the Navy discharged a supplier's duty to warn of asbestos is a jury question that weighs several factors.
• Peter & Elpis Constantinides v. CBS Corporation (2010). Under Florida law, a plaintiff must show a defendant's product was a substantial factor in the injury, and a sophisticated intermediary's knowledge does not automatically end a supplier's duty to warn, which is a jury question weighing several factors.
• Peter & Elpis Constantinides v. Leslie Controls, Inc. (2010). Evidence that Leslie valves were among only two valve types in the boiler room, were specified for asbestos gaskets, packing and insulation, and were likely worked on near the plaintiff raised a genuine fact issue on causation. The unsettled Florida law on the bare-metal defense was left to the transferor court.
• Peter & Elpis Constantinides v. Leslie Controls, Inc. (2010). Expert and co-worker testimony that Leslie valves were in the boiler room, used asbestos gaskets, packing and insulation, and were worked on near the plaintiff raised a genuine fact issue on causation. Whether a Florida component maker is liable for asbestos added by others was left for the transferor court.
• Kummer v. Allied Signal, Inc. (2008). Under general maritime law, using the Pennsylvania-based "regularity, frequency and proximity" test, direct evidence that the decedent worked on a defendant's asbestos-insulated turbine is enough to create a fact question on causation, and a design defect theory can survive summary judgment where the product was specified to use asbestos insulation.
• Chicano v. General Electric Company (2004). Under Pennsylvania law, a component manufacturer's duty to warn turns on factors including foreseeability and whether the part was designed for a particular finished product, so a turbine maker that knew its turbines would be insulated with asbestos may owe a duty to warn; the government contractor defense fails at summary judgment where a fact issue exists on conformity to specifications.

Rhode Island

• Wallace v. Trane Company (2021). Under Maine law, an asbestos plaintiff must show product nexus, meaning exposure to asbestos that originated with the defendant's own product, before medical causation is reached. Evidence of third-party sealants or replacement materials used on a defendant's boilers does not establish that nexus.
• Wallace v. Trane Company (2020). Applying Maine law, a plaintiff must show exposure to asbestos that originated with the defendant's product (product nexus). Evidence that the defendant's catalog sold the same kind of third-party sealant is not enough without proof that the actual sealant used was sold or recommended by the defendant.
• Stevens v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2017). Under an exception to the bare metal defense, a manufacturer may be liable where its product necessarily contained asbestos components essential to its function that would necessarily be replaced with other asbestos materials. Genuine factual disputes also barred summary judgment on the sophisticated user and government contractor defenses, and general maritime law does not bar loss of consortium damages.
• Baumgartner v. American Standard, Inc. (2015). Under Rhode Island's interest-weighing choice-of-law approach, Ohio law governed an Ohio resident's claim over Ohio-centered exposures. Under Ohio law, a bare-metal valve maker is not liable absent proof it supplied or specified asbestos, and boilers and turbines installed as improvements to real property fall under the ten-year statute of repose.
• Sweredoski v. Alfa Laval, Inc. (2013). A valve maker can face strict liability, failure-to-warn and implied warranty claims where evidence shows it designed valves with asbestos packing and gaskets, knew they would be replaced with similar products, and sold such replacements. A civil conspiracy claim requires a valid underlying intentional tort, here intentional misrepresentation with reliance, which was not shown.

South Carolina

• Chesher v. 3M Company (2017). Under maritime law, an equipment manufacturer can owe a duty to warn about asbestos-containing replacement parts it did not supply if it actually incorporated asbestos components into its original product and either specified asbestos replacements or they were essential to the product's proper functioning (the Quirin approach).
• Dandridge v. Crane Co. (2016). Under maritime law, a valve manufacturer is not liable for asbestos in gaskets it did not make or supply. Even if the Quirin exception applies, it must be read narrowly and requires that the manufacturer actually incorporated asbestos-containing parts into its product, making exposure inevitable.
• Sparkman v. Goulds Pumps, Inc. (2015). A federal court predicted that the South Carolina Supreme Court would reject the bare metal defense and would hold a manufacturer subject to a duty to warn about asbestos parts of its product that it did not make or supply, at least where it specified asbestos parts for the product. A state trial judge's ruling that the court had overlooked was treated as persuasive evidence of how the state's highest court would rule.
• Sparkman v. AW Chesterton Company (2014). Applying South Carolina law, the frequency, regularity and proximity test governs causation in mesothelioma cases. The court predicted the South Carolina Supreme Court would adopt the bare metal defense, so a manufacturer has no duty to warn about parts of its product that it did not make or supply.

Tennessee

• Coffman v. Armstrong International, Inc. (2021). Under the Tennessee Products Liability Act, a manufacturer or seller has a duty to warn only about the condition of its own product when it left its control, so it has no duty to warn about asbestos-containing products made and sold by others and added after sale.
• Coffman v. Armstrong International, Inc. (2019). Daily removal and reinstallation of insulation at an industrial plant is repair or replacement, not construction of an improvement to real property, so the construction repose statute does not apply. Under Tennessee's Satterfield duty analysis, equipment makers can owe a duty to warn about asbestos parts added to their equipment after sale, and Tennessee does not follow the bare-metal defense.

Utah

• Hipwell v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (2022). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos-associated product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury, and a boiler maker may owe a duty to warn under DeVries if it directed that asbestos be incorporated. The court treated the substantiality of exposure, the duty to warn, the government contractor defense and warning causation as disputed fact questions, with Utah's heeding presumption applying to the causation question.
• Anderson v. Ford Motor Company (2014). A party may not obtain leave to file a dispositive motion that repeats an argument already rejected by the MDL court and by the transferee court on reconsideration; the court would not revisit that ruling or define Utah law on liability for other makers' asbestos products.

Virginia

• Gehant v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corporation (2022). Under Air & Liquid Systems v. DeVries, a manufacturer's duty to warn depends on whether its product required incorporation of an asbestos-containing part, not merely heat insulation generally. Disputed facts on each DeVries prong, on the Boyle/Sawyer government contractor test, and on substantial-factor causation preclude summary judgment.

Washington

• Wineland v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (2021). Maritime law governed, and under it plaintiffs must show substantial exposure to asbestos from the defendant's own products, including the amount and duration of exposure. A manufacturer has no duty for third-party replacement parts unless its product required their use. State-law causation rules could not supplement maritime law where they conflict.
• Wineland v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2021). Under maritime law, plaintiffs must show exposure to a defendant's asbestos products was a substantial contributing factor, with evidence of the amount and duration of exposure. A manufacturer owes a duty to warn about third-party replacement parts only if its product requires the part to function as intended.
• Wineland v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2021). Under maritime law, plaintiffs must show with evidence of the amount and duration of exposure that asbestos from the defendant's products was a substantial contributing factor in the injury. A manufacturer has no duty to warn about third-party replacement parts unless its product requires them to function as intended.