The Bare-Metal Defense in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on bare-metal defense: 218 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Maryland

• Arbogast v. AW Chesterton Co. (2016). Under Maryland law a plaintiff must show exposure to respirable fibers from a specific defendant's asbestos-containing product with frequency, regularity and proximity. A manufacturer is liable for third-party asbestos used with its product only in the narrow circumstances described in May. A strict liability claim for a product sold before Phipps (1976) may proceed because the claim accrues at diagnosis.
• May v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (2015). A manufacturer has a duty to warn in negligence and strict liability about asbestos-containing replacement parts it did not supply when its product contains asbestos and no safer material is available, asbestos is critical to the product, periodic maintenance involving asbestos parts is required, and the manufacturer knows or should know of the risk.
• May v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2014). A manufacturer has no duty to warn of the hazards of asbestos-containing replacement parts (here, gaskets and packing) that it neither manufactured nor placed into the stream of commerce, even if it was foreseeable that such parts would be used with its product.

Massachusetts

• Cook v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corporation (2023). Asbestos exposure claims arising from repair and maintenance aboard a Navy ship on navigable waters fall within admiralty jurisdiction, so substantive maritime law applies, with state law only supplementing where maritime law is silent. General maritime law does not bar loss of consortium, punitive or survival damages against a manufacturer in such a case.
• Sebright v. General Electric Co. (2021). Under maritime law, a manufacturer's duty to warn under the DeVries test can reach asbestos insulation added to its bare-metal product if the product required insulation to function, and the court treats the sophisticated purchaser defense as unavailable where a risk and burden balancing weighs for the Navy sailor. A plaintiff must also show that a defendant's specific product contained asbestos, and loss of consortium and parental society claims are not available under general maritime law in this circuit.
• Whiting v. CBS Corporation (2013). To prove causation in an asbestos case, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's product contained asbestos and that the victim was exposed to the asbestos in that product. Without such evidence, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment.
• Morin v. AutoZone Northeast, Inc. (2010). A plaintiff in an asbestos case must show product identification, exposure, and that the exposure was a substantial contributing factor. Evidence of the defendant's product at the work site and of the plaintiff's close proximity to it is enough to reach a jury, but exposure that is only insignificant or de minimis is not.

Missouri

• Poage v. Crane Co. (Eastern District, 2nd Division, 2017). A plaintiff can show a valve maker's product was a substantial factor in causing mesothelioma through a co-worker's testimony about shared work on the valves, and the maker owes a duty to warn and to design safely where its valves required or specified asbestos gaskets and packing. Missouri's statutory cap on punitive damages does not apply to this wrongful death action, and a defendant's setoff under § 537.060 is limited to settlements actually reached, not possible future asbestos trust recoveries.

New Jersey

• Losurdo v. Viacomcbs Inc. (2025). Under maritime law and DeVries, a manufacturer's duty to warn turns on whether it directed incorporation of asbestos parts, knew the integrated product was dangerous, and had no reason to believe the sailors using it would know of the danger. Under Miles, punitive and loss-of-consortium damages are not available in a maritime wrongful death action.
• Hammell v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2020). Under the DeVries test applied in maritime law, whether a manufacturer had a duty to warn about asbestos-containing parts made by others depends on factual questions: whether its product required the part, whether it knew the integrated product was dangerous, and whether it had reason to think users would realize the danger. Disputed facts about what the Navy knew also defeated summary judgment on the government contractor defense.
• Whelan v. Armstrong International Inc. (2019). A manufacturer or distributor can be strictly liable for failing to warn about its product's asbestos-containing components and a third party's replacement components, if the original components were integral to the product, routine maintenance required replacing them with similar asbestos-containing parts, and exposure was a substantial factor in causing the disease.
• Whelan v. Armstrong International Inc. (2018). A manufacturer has a strict-liability duty to warn when its product as marketed contained asbestos components integral to its function and it reasonably knew routine maintenance would require replacing them with other asbestos components. The duty extends to the danger from those replacement parts even if the manufacturer did not make or supply them.
• Whelan v. Armstrong Int'l (2016). A manufacturer has a strict-liability duty to warn about asbestos in replacement parts it did not make or sell if its product as marketed contained asbestos components integral to its function and it was reasonably aware routine maintenance would replace them with other asbestos-containing parts. The court disagreed with Hughes v. A.W. Chesterton, and plaintiff must still show frequent, regular and close exposure to the complete product, including necessary replacement parts.
• Fuoco v. 3M Company (2015). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to an asbestos-containing product made or supplied by the defendant and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury; speculation that the worker was around the defendant's pump does not defeat summary judgment.
• Hammell v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2015). Under maritime law, a manufacturer is not liable for, and owes no duty to warn about, asbestos-containing parts it did not manufacture or supply, and a plaintiff must show exposure to an asbestos product made or supplied by that defendant. The government contractor defense could not be resolved on summary judgment where there was a factual dispute over whether the Navy controlled warnings.
• Shearer v. AW Chesterton Company (2015). Under maritime law, which governed work aboard a dry-docked Navy ship, a manufacturer owes no duty to warn about asbestos products it neither made nor distributed, so a turbine maker is not liable for insulation applied after the turbine left its control.
• Barnes v. Foster Wheeler Corp. (2014). Under New Jersey law, a plaintiff must identify an asbestos-containing product manufactured or supplied by the defendant to which the plaintiff was exposed; presence of asbestos insulation made by an unidentified party around the defendant's turbines is not enough, even in a mesothelioma case.

New York

• McWilliams v. AO Smith Water Prods. Co. (2023). A verdict is set aside as against the weight of the evidence only if no valid line of reasoning could lead rational jurors to it, and pain-and-suffering awards receive great deference. Counsel who submit false discovery responses and let an expert give false testimony uncorrected engage in sanctionable frivolous conduct under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1.
• Phelps v. CBS Corporation (2021). Under maritime law and Air & Liquid Systems v. DeVries, a boiler manufacturer has a duty to warn about third-party asbestos parts only if its product requires incorporation of the part, and plaintiff offered no admissible evidence that the boilers required asbestos insulation.
• Stock v. Jenkins Bros. (Matter of Eighth Judicial District Asbestos Litigation) (4th Dept., 2020). A plaintiff need not quantify exposure precisely or use dose-response data to prove specific causation; evidence that the plaintiff was exposed to levels of the agent known to cause the harm, including expert opinion drawing on studies of similar work, suffices. A verdict sheet need not list loss of services and loss of society as separate items.
• Stock v. Jenkins Bros. (IN the Matter of the Eighth Judicial District Asbestos Litigation) (Erie, 2019). A manufacturer has a duty to warn of dangers from the known and reasonably foreseeable use of its product with a third-party product needed for it to function as intended. Specific causation does not require precise quantification of dose, only evidence that the plaintiff was exposed to levels of the agent known to cause the harm.
• Macaluso v. A.O. Smith Water Prods. Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). A jury verdict is set aside only if it could not be reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence, but damages that deviate materially from reasonable compensation must be reduced. A boiler maker has a duty to warn of asbestos hazards from foreseeable removal of its boilers and the asbestos components used with them.
• Holzworth v. Alfa Laval Inc. (2016). A plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's own asbestos-containing product, and a pump maker has no duty to warn about third-party asbestos parts used with its pumps absent evidence it had an active role, interest or influence in their use. Under maritime and New York law alike, wrongful death claims fail if the underlying liability claims fail.
• DeMartino v. Aurora Pump Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2016). A defendant seeking summary judgment must affirmatively show that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury; a conclusory affidavit from a witness lacking personal knowledge of the relevant period, or pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof, does not meet that burden.
• Hackshaw v. Crane Co. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation) (1st Dept., 2016). Applying the Court of Appeals' 2016 standard, a manufacturer may be liable for failing to warn of asbestos hazards in insulation used with its products where it promoted and sold that insulation and its products needed insulation to operate safely and efficiently.
• Mtr OF Nyc Asbestos Litig. (2016). A manufacturer has a duty to warn of the danger from the known and reasonably foreseeable use of its product together with a third-party product that, by design, mechanics or economic necessity, is necessary for the manufacturer's product to function as intended. Foreseeability alone does not create the duty.
• Gonzales v. AO Smith Water Prods. Co. (2015). A manufacturer of a safe (bare metal) product may have a duty to warn about asbestos components used with it if it had a sufficiently significant role, interest, or influence in the type of component used after the product entered the stream of commerce; evidence of such a role raises a triable issue.
• Hernandez-Vega v. Fisher Controls Int'l (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2015). A defendant moving for summary judgment in an asbestos case must unequivocally show its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury, and personal jurisdiction defenses not raised in a pre-answer motion or the answer are waived under CPLR 3211(e). A valve maker with a sufficiently significant role, interest or influence in the asbestos parts used with its valves may be liable even if the valve was "bare metal."
• Ricci v. Crane Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2015). A valve maker has no duty to warn about other makers' asbestos components unless it had a sufficiently significant role, interest or influence in the components used with its product. A defendant seeking summary judgment must unequivocally show that its product could not have contributed to the injury, and weighing equivocal identification testimony is for the jury.
• Hackshaw v. Crane Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2015). A verdict may be set aside only where no valid line of reasoning could support it. A manufacturer with a significant role, interest or influence in the asbestos components used with its products may owe a duty to warn, and evidence of that role supported the failure-to-warn and recklessness findings. Awards that deviate materially from reasonable compensation are reduced under CPLR 5501(c).
• Vellucci v. Borg-Warner Corp. (2015). A manufacturer of a brake-grinding machine, whose intended use necessarily creates asbestos-containing dust from brake shoes, has a duty to warn of asbestos hazards; Rastelli's rule limiting the duty to warn about other makers' products does not apply.
• Crews v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2014). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show for each defendant that he was exposed to its product and that the product was a substantial factor in causing the injury. A plaintiff who cannot tell which of two similarly named companies supplied the product offers only speculation, and the defendant has no duty to warn about third-party products used with its valves.
• Hockler v. The William Powell Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2014). Foreseeability of use or misuse of a product is generally a fact question for trial, and a manufacturer that sells asbestos-containing gaskets and packing for its valves may have a duty to warn of asbestos hazards whether or not it made those components.
• Konstantin v. Tishman Liquidating Corp. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (1st Dept., 2014). Consolidation of asbestos cases under CPLR 602(a) rests in the trial court's discretion, applying the Malcolm factors flexibly. A manufacturer that has a sufficiently significant role, interest or influence in the asbestos components used with its product after sale may have a duty to warn about them, though foreseeability alone does not create that duty.
• Barawa v. Acker Drill Co. (2013). Plaintiff's testimony of exposure over twenty-plus years to new and old clutches and head gaskets, with documents showing Ford sold asbestos-containing components from suppliers, lets a jury reasonably infer exposure to original Ford parts. An unsupported affidavit first submitted in reply cannot meet the defendant's burden.
• Kelly v. Airco Welders Supply (2013). In an asbestos case a plaintiff need only show facts from which the defendant's liability may be reasonably inferred. A movant seeking summary judgment must itself prove, with admissible evidence, that its valves' original packing was asbestos-free.
• Logan v. AP Moller-Maersk, Inc. (2013). In New York asbestos cases, a defendant seeking summary judgment must first unequivocally show its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury; failing that, the motion is denied regardless of the opposition, and the court need not reach choice of law.
• Lowe v. Aerco Intl., Inc. (2013). A plaintiff need only show facts and conditions from which a defendant's liability may be reasonably inferred, so a co-worker's testimony that Crane valves were among those worked on raised a fact issue. A valve maker that designed and supplied its valves for use with asbestos-containing insulation, gaskets and packing has a duty to warn of asbestos hazards.
• McDonald v. CBS Corp. (2013). A manufacturer seeking summary judgment cannot rely on a conclusory, unsupported affidavit that asbestos-containing replacement pads were not required for its presses, particularly where catalogs show it advertised and supplied asbestos pads, and summary judgment is not granted where a triable issue of fact exists.
• Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. Ronald Dummitt v. AW Chesterton (2012). A valve manufacturer may owe a duty to warn about asbestos gaskets, packing and insulation made by others when it meant its valves to be used with them or knew or should have known they would be. Under CPLR Article 16, the Navy is not counted in apportioning fault because Feres and the grave-injury rule bar suit against it.
• Romero v. AC & S., Inc. (2012). A plaintiff can reach a jury on product identification by showing facts from which exposure to asbestos from the defendant's product can reasonably be inferred. A valve maker that designed and supplied its products for use with asbestos-containing gaskets, packing and insulation has a duty to warn of asbestos hazards, even if it did not make or specify those components.
• Defazio v. Chesterton (2011). A manufacturer may have a duty to warn about third-party asbestos components such as packing and insulation when it knew or should have known its product would foreseeably be used with them. Rastelli and Berkowitz are consistent applications of that foreseeability principle.
• Surre v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2011). Under New York law, a boiler manufacturer has no duty to warn of dangers of a third party's asbestos insulation that it did not make, supply or select, and foreseeability alone does not create such a duty. A duty may arise where the product needs the third-party product to function or the third-party product is specified by contract.
• Stewart v. AO Smith Water Products (2010). A plaintiff must show actual exposure to fibers from the defendant's own asbestos-containing product; a manufacturer is not liable to warn about other manufacturers' replacement parts used with its product where the connection is too attenuated and speculative.

North Carolina

• Barkley v. 4520 Corp., Inc. (2022). Under North Carolina law, a plaintiff must show frequent, regular and proximate exposure to an asbestos-containing product for which the defendant is responsible. Prior depositions from cases in which the defendant was not present cannot be used against it, and an affidavit lacking personal knowledge or contradicting earlier deposition testimony may be disregarded.
• Walls v. Ford Motor Company (2022). Under North Carolina law, an asbestos plaintiff can show causation with direct or circumstantial evidence of regular exposure to a defendant's product over an extended period, without expert testimony specific to that defendant. Punitive damages require clear and convincing evidence that corporate managers actually understood the specific risk.
• Settlemyer v. Borg-Warner Morse Tec, LLC (2021). Under North Carolina law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's own asbestos-containing product with frequency, regularity and proximity (Lohrmann). A truck or trailer assembler is not liable for third parties' replacement parts, and North Carolina has no exception for parts the assembler specified or recommended.
• Woolard v. Carrier Corporation (2020). Under North Carolina law, an asbestos plaintiff must show actual exposure to the defendant's own asbestos-containing product, on a regular basis over an extended period and near where he worked; the court applied this same test to mesothelioma. A manufacturer was not liable for third-party asbestos parts used with its equipment absent evidence that such use was intended or foreseeable.
• Finch v. BASF Catalysts LLC (2018). Under North Carolina law as applied through the Lohrmann frequency, regularity and proximity test, a plaintiff must show regular exposure to asbestos fibers from the defendant's specific product. The mere presence of encapsulated or static asbestos in a product is not enough to support an inference of causation.
• Harris v. Ajax Boiler, Inc. (2014). Under North Carolina products liability law, a boiler maker is not liable where the plaintiff cannot show the boiler left the factory with asbestos cement or that the asbestos mud he removed was the maker's. Nor is the maker liable for an asbestos cement the worker applied that was not part of the boiler when made, since liability rests with that product's manufacturer.