The Bare-Metal Defense in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on bare-metal defense: 218 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Delaware

• Evans v. CBS Corp. (2017). Under maritime law (and Colorado law for land-based claims), a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury, and a manufacturer is not liable for asbestos parts it did not make or distribute (the bare metal defense). Even an unopposed summary judgment motion requires the court to find the undisputed facts warrant judgment.
• Evans v. Flowserve US Inc. (2017). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Even when a motion is unopposed, the court must find that the undisputed facts support judgment.
• Walsh v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2017). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury; general testimony about replacement parts, without evidence they were made by the defendant, does not meet that burden.
• Charlevoix v. Caterpillar (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2017). Under maritime law and Michigan law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the particular defendant's asbestos-containing product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Under the bare metal defense, a manufacturer is not liable for asbestos parts it did not make or supply.
• Evans v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2017). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's own product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury, and under the bare metal defense a manufacturer is not liable for asbestos-containing parts it did not make or supply.
• Tallman v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2017). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury, and the bare metal defense bars liability for asbestos materials the defendant did not make or supply. Speculation does not create a genuine factual dispute on these points.
• Harris v. Deere & Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2017). Under North Carolina law, a plaintiff must show actual exposure to an asbestos-containing product made, sold or distributed by the defendant; without evidence beyond speculation that the replacement parts were Deere's and contained asbestos, summary judgment is proper.
• Denbow v. CBS Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2017). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Under the bare metal defense, a manufacturer is not liable for asbestos-containing parts it did not make or supply.
• Walls v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asebestos Litigation) (2017). An error in a ruling that a manufacturer had no duty to warn about third-party replacement parts is harmless where the jury found the manufacturer was not negligent in failing to warn about its own original and replacement parts. The court did not decide whether an automobile manufacturer has a duty to warn about third-party replacement brake parts.
• Hillyer v. Mine Safety Appliances Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2016). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing the injury. A manufacturer is not liable for asbestos-containing parts it did not make or supply, and speculation cannot create a fact issue on product identification.
• In re Asbestos Litigation Charlevoix v. CBS Corporation (2016). Under maritime and Michigan law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury; with no evidence identifying such a product, summary judgment is proper even when unopposed.
• Hillyer v. ABB (In re Asbestos Litigation Hillyer) (2016). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's own asbestos-containing product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Minimal exposure, or a manufacturer's product merely being present, is not enough, and a manufacturer is not liable for asbestos parts it did not make or distribute.
• Malone v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2016). Under Mississippi law a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity, even in a mesothelioma case. A manufacturer of bare-metal equipment has no duty to warn about asbestos insulation made and supplied by others, and foreseeability of such use alone does not create that duty.
• Winhauer v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2016). Under Mississippi law, the frequency, regularity and proximity test applies to mesothelioma claims without relaxation, and speculation about which product a plaintiff used or how often is not enough to avoid summary judgment. A manufacturer is not liable for asbestos-containing parts, such as replacement gaskets, that it did not make or sell.
• Winhauer v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2016). Under Mississippi's frequency, regularity and proximity test, a plaintiff must show exposure to a particular defendant's asbestos-containing product with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity to support causation. Under the bare metal defense, a manufacturer is not liable for asbestos products made by others that were used with its product.
• Farrall v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2013). Under Delaware law, a manufacturer has no duty to warn of dangers from replacement parts it did not manufacture or distribute, and a motion for reargument fails when it only rehashes arguments the court already decided.
• Phillips v. Hoffman/New Yorker (In re Asbestos Litigation Phillips) (2013). Under Virginia law as applied by this court (following Merritt), a manufacturer's duty of care can extend to exposure from replacement parts made by a third party. A court has discretion to deny summary judgment when the record is confusing or insufficiently developed.
• Pease v. Ford Motor Company (2012). A transferee MDL court's earlier summary judgment ruling rejecting the bare metal defense stood, and a defendant that did not seek reargument there could not relitigate the same arguments on remand. The MDL ruling would have been the same under Delaware or maritime law.
• Davis v. Crane Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2011). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show substantial exposure to asbestos from the defendant's own product; a valve maker is not liable for third-party asbestos packing, gaskets or insulation absent evidence it specified or required them.
• Olson v. Crane Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2011). Applying Idaho law, the court predicted that Idaho would not impose a duty to warn on a manufacturer for hazards arising from asbestos-containing products or replacement parts that it did not manufacture, distribute, or sell, even if its own product incorporated similar components.

Florida

• Dugas v. 3M Company (2016). A dust mask not designed or marketed to protect against asbestos is not defectively designed for failing to do so, but a jury may find the manufacturer's warnings about its limits inadequate. A Florida fraud claim is barred when the last act of concealment fell outside the 12-year repose period.
• Waite v. Aii Acquisition Corp. (2016). Where the medical community accepts that asbestos causes mesothelioma, the court need not conduct an extensive general-causation Daubert analysis, and weight-of-the-evidence expert testimony may go to the jury. The bare metal defense does not bar liability where the plaintiff was exposed to the defendant's own original asbestos-containing parts.
• Oneal v. Alfa Laval, Inc. (2014). A maker of a product that contains no asbestos is not liable for injuries from asbestos that others supplied or used with its product (the bare metal defense), and plaintiffs must show exposure to asbestos the defendant itself made or supplied. Maritime law governed claims of exposure aboard Navy ships.
• Faddish v. Buffalo Pumps (2012). Under maritime law, applying Florida substantive law, a manufacturer that sold 'bare metal' equipment and was not in the chain of distribution of the asbestos-containing insulation, gaskets or packing used with it has no duty to warn, in negligence or strict liability, about hazards from those third-party products.

Georgia

• Davis v. John Crane, Inc. (2019). In Georgia a plaintiff must show exposure to asbestos-containing products for which the defendant is responsible, and a plaintiff's own testimony from personal knowledge can meet that burden. A pump manufacturer is not liable for design or failure to warn over asbestos-containing replacement parts made by others (bare metal defense).
• Farmer v. Air and Liquid Systems Corporation (2018). Under Georgia law, an asbestos plaintiff must show exposure to asbestos-containing products the defendant made or supplied, or to a defendant's product that required an asbestos component to function. A successor that agreed to provide maintenance or repair services for a predecessor's products may be liable for failing to warn under Restatement (Third) of Torts § 13.
• Thurmon v. Georgia Pacific, LLC (2016). Under Georgia law, negligent design and failure-to-warn claims both require proof that the defendant's own product, as originally sold, proximately caused the injury. Exposure to third-party asbestos gaskets used on the defendant's valves was not enough, and the court did not need to adopt a general 'bare metal defense'.
• Thurmon v. AW Chesterton, Inc. (2014). Predicting how the Georgia Supreme Court would rule, the court held that Georgia recognizes the bare metal defense, so a valve manufacturer is not liable for asbestos in replacement gaskets and packing it did not manufacture, supply or design, and plaintiffs must show exposure to the defendant's own product.
• Cabasug v. Crane Company (2013). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to each defendant's asbestos product, and a manufacturer is not liable for replacement parts it did not supply; a parent or successor is not liable for a subsidiary's acts absent facts supporting piercing the corporate veil.

Hawaii

• Cabasug v. Crane Company (2014). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to the particular defendant's asbestos product as a substantial factor, and a manufacturer is not liable for replacement parts it did not supply. A parent corporation or its successor is not liable for a subsidiary's acts absent a showing supporting veil-piercing.
• Cabasug v. Crane Company (2013). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show for each defendant that he was exposed to its product and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing his injury. A manufacturer has no duty to warn about, and is not liable for, asbestos-containing replacement parts it did not manufacture or distribute.

Illinois

• Hasenberg v. Asbestos Corporation Ltd. (2015). A plaintiff in an asbestos case may use circumstantial evidence to show exposure to a defendant's asbestos-containing products. Evidence that the defendant made the pumps and sold asbestos-containing replacement parts to the Navy was enough to create a genuine fact issue.
• Quirin v. Lorillard Tobacco Company (2014). Maritime law governs asbestos exposure during work on a Navy vessel. A valve maker may owe a duty to warn about asbestos gaskets and packing supplied by others where its valves needed asbestos components to function and those parts would be replaced with similar materials, but it owes no such duty for third-party insulation it did not supply.

Indiana

• Hedden v. CBS Corporation (2015). Maritime law applies to asbestos exposure aboard a Navy ship, and the two-disease rule governs under maritime law. Kentucky law governs the non-maritime claims, and its one-disease rule bars a mesothelioma suit after an earlier suit over asbestosis.

Iowa

• Beverage v. Alcoa, Inc. (2022). Iowa Code section 686B.7(5) codifies a broad component-parts (bare-metal) defense that applies only to products liability claims, shielding manufacturers or sellers from liability for products or parts made or sold by third parties. It does not bar premises liability claims or claims against a seller of the offending product.
• Fankhauser v. Honeywell International, Inc. (2022). Iowa Code section 686B.7(5) bars liability only for exposures from products or component parts made or sold by a third party; it does not limit liability to those who mine, mill, refine or process asbestos. A defendant that made or sold the asbestos-containing product is not protected.
• Fankhauser v. Honeywell International, Inc. (2022). Under Beverage v. Alcoa, Iowa Code section 686B.7(5) protects a defendant only from exposures caused by a product or part made or sold by a third party. It does not limit liability to those who mine, mill, refine or process asbestos, and it does not shield a defendant that made or sold the asbestos-containing product.
• Beverage v. Alcoa, Inc. (2021). Iowa Code section 686B.7(5), which says a defendant in an asbestos action is not liable for exposures from a product or component part made or sold by a third party, applies to any entity sued in an asbestos action, not only manufacturers, and is not merely a codification of the bare metal defense. Constitutional claims not raised and ruled on in the district court are not preserved for appeal.

Kentucky

• Stallings v. Georgia-Pacific Corporation (2015). Under both maritime law and Kentucky law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product at a level high enough to make a finding of substantial causation more than conjecture. A manufacturer is not liable for asbestos in other makers' replacement parts, and an expert opinion that any exposure is a substantial cause does not meet that standard.

Louisiana

• Legendre v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (2024). Under Louisiana law, a bare-metal product manufacturer that contemplated or specified asbestos-containing insulation for its product can be held liable for injuries from that insulation. A design defect claim fails without evidence that the product's design required asbestos insulation. Sophisticated-user and superseding-cause defenses raise fact questions that cannot be decided on summary judgment.
• Robichaux v. Huntington Ingalls Inc. (2023). In a Louisiana asbestos case, a plaintiff opposing summary judgment need only show a reasonable jury could find it more likely than not that he inhaled the defendant's asbestos fibers, even if the exposures were slight, and that this exposure was a substantial factor in causing his disease.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Ins. Co. (2022). Under pre-LPLA Louisiana law, a turbine maker can be liable for asbestos gaskets it supplied or specified as component parts, and slight exposures can suffice for substantial-factor causation. It has no duty to warn about, and no design liability for, asbestos insulation that others made and applied to its turbines.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (2022). Under Louisiana law a plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's asbestos product, and a deceased father's out-of-court statements about where he worked are hearsay not covered by the Rule 804(b)(4) family-history exception. A manufacturer has no duty to warn of dangers of a third party's asbestos insulation it did not make, sell, specify or recommend, but may be liable if it supplied or specified asbestos gaskets.
• Reulet v. Lamorak Ins. Co. (2022). Under Air & Liquid Systems v. DeVries, a manufacturer may have a duty to warn when its product requires an asbestos part and it knows the integrated product is likely dangerous, even if it did not supply the part; slight exposures suffice to create a fact dispute on exposure.
• Lopez v. McDERMOTT, Inc (2020). Under Louisiana Code of Evidence art. 804(B)(1), a deceased plaintiff's deposition can be used against a defendant who was absent if other defendants present, such as gasket and packing makers, had a similar motive and opportunity to cross-examine. Testimony about exposure and an expert's opinion that above-background exposures were a substantial cause create a fact question on causation.
• Lopez v. McDERMOTT, Inc. (2020). A deceased plaintiff's deposition testimony is admissible against a defendant who was absent if other defendants present had a similar motive and opportunity to cross-examine him. Whether a valve maker had a duty to warn about asbestos gaskets used with its valves depends on disputed facts, and the Supreme Court's DeVries decision was treated as instructive outside maritime law.
• Bell v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. (2017). Under the court's narrowed bare metal defense, a component maker can be liable under general maritime law if it substantially participated in integrating its part with asbestos products or recommended asbestos for use with its part. A manufacturer is not liable merely because asbestos ended up on its product, or because asbestos use was foreseeable.
• Bell v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. (2016). Under maritime law, a manufacturer is not liable merely because its product might foreseeably be used with asbestos; liability depends on whether it added the asbestos, took part in design integration, negligently entrusted a component, or negligently recommended asbestos use. The court rejected both the Sixth Circuit's absolute bare metal defense and the broader exceptions other courts have adopted.
• Vedros v. Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc. (2014). A turbine manufacturer is not liable for asbestos-containing insulation made and attached by third parties, and plaintiffs' conclusory statements about Westinghouse's involvement in installing it did not create a fact issue.
• Vedros v. Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc. (2014). A turbine manufacturer is not liable for asbestos-containing insulation that third parties made and applied to its bare metal turbines after delivery, absent evidence that it made, sold, supplied or distributed the insulation or that its employees attached it.