The Bare-Metal Defense in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on bare-metal defense: 218 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

About this issue

Much of the asbestos on ships and in industrial plants was in parts used with equipment: gaskets and packing inside pumps and valves, and insulation wrapped around turbines and boilers. Equipment makers have argued that they shipped "bare metal" and are not responsible for asbestos parts made and sold by others, including replacement parts installed years later.

In Air & Liquid Systems Corp. v. DeVries (2019), the U.S. Supreme Court held that under maritime law an equipment maker has a duty to warn when its product requires a part to be incorporated, the maker knows or has reason to know that the integrated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses, and it has no reason to believe users will realize the danger. That decision governs maritime cases, including many Navy cases.

Outside maritime law, the states are divided. Some apply a rule like DeVries; some generally protect equipment makers from liability for parts they did not make or sell; and others ask about the maker's closer connection to the asbestos parts, such as whether its design required them or it specified or supplied them. Supplying an original asbestos part does not necessarily make a maker responsible for later replacements. Even where a duty exists, the plaintiff must still prove exposure, an inadequate warning, and causation.

Alabama

• Holland v. Airco, Inc. (2016). Under Alabama law a plaintiff must first prove exposure to an asbestos-containing product for which the defendant is responsible. Evidence that a defendant's equipment sometimes contained asbestos parts, without proof that the specific parts the worker encountered were the defendant's, is not enough.
• Morgan v. Bill Vann Company, Inc. (2013). Predicting Alabama law, a pump manufacturer is not liable, and has no duty to warn, for asbestos-containing packing and gaskets made by others and used with its pump unless it manufactured, sold or distributed them or is sued for a defect in its own product.
• Morgan v. Bill Vann Company, Inc. (2013). Under Alabama law, asbestos claims based on last exposure before May 19, 1979 are time-barred. The court predicted Alabama would adopt the bare metal defense, under which a pump maker is not liable for third-party asbestos gaskets and packing it did not make, sell or distribute.

Arkansas

• Thomas v. Borg-Warner Morse Tec LLC (2018). A maker of a brake grinder that contains no asbestos is not liable in strict liability or negligence for mesothelioma from asbestos in brake pads ground on its machine, because the grinder itself was not unsafe under Arkansas's definition of 'defective condition'.

California

• Marcus v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2024). Under maritime law, plaintiffs can reach a jury on substantial-factor causation with testimony about the work done on a product, evidence the product contained asbestos, and expert estimates of exposure from that work, without relying on an "every exposure" theory. The government contractor defense does not apply to federal maritime claims, and loss of consortium and punitive damages are unavailable under maritime law.
• Smargisso v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2024). Under maritime law, plaintiffs must show actual exposure to the defendant's asbestos products and that the exposure was a substantial contributing factor; circumstantial shipmate and records evidence can meet this. Non-pecuniary damages are not recoverable in a maritime wrongful death action based on negligence and strict liability absent historical support.
• Elorreaga v. Rockwell Automation, Inc. (2023). The Boyle government contractor defense rests on preemption of state law, so it does not apply to claims brought under federal maritime law. Plaintiffs' evidence of exposure to each defendant's products and of a substantial contributing factor was enough to create a genuine factual dispute.
• Toy v. Warren Pumps (In re Asbestos) (2021). Maritime law applies to naval shipyard asbestos claims where some exposure occurred aboard vessels in drydock, and plaintiffs must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos products that was a substantial factor in causing the disease. A pump maker may owe a duty to warn about asbestos in third-party parts its product requires, and conflicting evidence on exposure precludes summary judgment.
• Toy v. Armstrong Int'l (In re Toy Asbestos) (2021). Under California law, a product maker is not liable for asbestos in third-party gaskets or insulation used with its product unless its own product contributed substantially to the harm or it mandated or advised use of the asbestos parts. Foreseeability that such parts would be used is not enough.
• Spurlin v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2021). Under federal maritime law, a manufacturer has a duty to warn when its product requires incorporation of a part, it knows or has reason to know the integrated product is likely dangerous, and it has no reason to believe users will realize the danger. Punitive damages and loss of consortium are not available in a maritime negligence action.
• Schildknegt v. Air and Liquid Systems Corp. (2nd Appellate District, 4th Division, 2019). A defendant does not shift the summary judgment burden on asbestos exposure unless it negates every pleaded theory, including that it acted as a supplier of replacement parts. A brand name on packaging is nonhearsay circumstantial evidence of a product's source. Under Rutherford, a plaintiff needs threshold exposure plus expert testimony that the exposure contributed to the risk of disease, and need not show a particular length, intensity or frequency of exposure.
• Hilt v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2018). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to asbestos material the defendant manufactured or supplied and that the exposure was a substantial contributing factor in causing the injury. Here, deposition testimony and an expert declaration created genuine factual disputes on exposure to Foster Wheeler boilers and on the bare metal defense.
• Johnson v. ArvinMeritor, Inc. (1st Appellate District, 5th Division, 2017). A plaintiff must offer evidence that makes it probable, not just possible, that he was exposed to asbestos from the defendant's product. Evidence that a defendant was one of several suppliers of replacement brake linings does not meet that standard. Under O'Neil, a manufacturer is not strictly liable for a design defect merely because its product was used with, or specified, another maker's asbestos-containing parts.
• Petitpas v. Ford Motor Company (2nd Appellate District, 4th Division, 2017). An employer's or premises owner's duty to prevent take-home asbestos exposure extends only to members of the worker's household, and a vehicle maker is not liable in design defect for asbestos in other makers' replacement brakes merely because its vehicles were compatible with them. A service provider that does not sell the asbestos parts it installs is not within the stream of commerce for strict liability.
• Sandoval v. American Appliance Manufacturing Corp. (2nd Appellate District, 4th Division, 2017). Under Kesner, employers and property owners owe a duty to prevent take-home asbestos exposure to household members, and a defendant seeking summary judgment for lack of exposure evidence must show the plaintiff cannot obtain it. A dissolved corporation is not shielded from punitive damages claims, and a strict liability claim can rest on a bystander theory for defective components of the defendant's own product.
• Rondon v. Hennessy Industries, Inc. (1st Appellate District, 4th Division, 2016). A manufacturer of a product that releases asbestos dust from another maker's component may be liable if its intended use would inevitably expose the user to asbestos dust; the test is "inevitable use," not "exclusive use."
• Greenberg v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (2nd Appellate District, 4th Division, 2015). A manufacturer can be strictly liable for asbestos dust from another maker's product under the Tellez-Cordova exception if its product was intended to be used with that product for the very activity that inevitably created the hazard, even if the product could also be used with non-asbestos materials.
• Paulus v. Crane Co. (2nd Appellate District, 3rd Division, 2014). Expert testimony read in context, together with other evidence of frequent and repeated exposure, can support a finding that a defendant's own asbestos products were a substantial factor in increasing the risk of mesothelioma. A defendant gets no setoff for speculative future bankruptcy trust recoveries, because the statutory setoff applies only to settlements made before verdict or judgment.
• Willis v. Buffalo Pumps Inc. (2014). Under California law, a boiler maker can be liable for asbestos components it supplied or specified, and the sophisticated user defense turns on the plaintiff's own sophistication, not the employer's. A Restatement § 402B misrepresentation claim requires an affirmative misrepresentation, not just concealment.
• Lee v. Clark Reliance Corporation (2nd Appellate District, 3rd Division, 2013). A manufacturer is not liable in strict liability or negligence for harm caused by another manufacturer's asbestos-containing replacement parts used with its product, and a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's own asbestos-containing product to establish causation.
• Nelson v. Air and Liquid Systems Corp. (2013). Under California law, a plaintiff must present evidence of exposure to asbestos from the specific defendant's product; evidence supporting only conjecture that the decedent was near or used a defendant's asbestos-containing product is insufficient to survive summary judgment.
• Barker v. Hennessy Industries, Inc. (2nd Appellate District, 2nd Division, 2012). A manufacturer of a non-asbestos machine owes no duty to warn, in strict liability or negligence, about asbestos hazards from another maker's products used with it, where the machine's use with asbestos parts was only foreseeable and not necessary or inevitable.
• Bettencourt v. Hennessy Industries, Inc. (1st Appellate District, 5th Division, 2012). A manufacturer is generally not liable for harm caused by another manufacturer's product, but it can be liable when its own product contributes substantially to the harm. A machine whose sole intended use is to grind asbestos-containing brake linings, and which releases the fibers, falls within that exception.
• Brewer v. Crane Co. (2nd Appellate District, 2nd Division, 2012). Under O'Neil, a manufacturer is not liable in strict liability for harm from asbestos-containing replacement gaskets and packing it did not make or supply, unless its own product contributed substantially to the harm or it substantially participated in creating a harmful combined use; mere compatibility with asbestos parts is not a defect.
• Davis v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corporation (2nd Appellate District, 5th Division, 2012). A boiler manufacturer that did not make or sell asbestos-containing products is not liable for harm from other makers' asbestos insulation (O'Neil v. Crane Co.). Contradictory testimony that did not tie Foster Wheeler workers to the insulation removal raised no triable issue, and an argument about incomplete discovery that was not raised in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal.
• Nolen v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. (2nd Appellate District, 2nd Division, 2012). Under O'Neil v. Crane Co., a product manufacturer is not liable in strict liability or negligence for harm from another manufacturer's asbestos products unless its own product contributed substantially to the harm or it substantially participated in creating a harmful combined use. Here there was no evidence Foster Wheeler made or supplied the asbestos insulation or replacement parts, or specified asbestos use at the relevant sites in 1976-1979.
• O'neil v. Crane Co. (2012). A product manufacturer is not strictly liable or negligent for harm caused by another manufacturer's product or replacement parts used with its product, unless its own product contributed substantially to the harm or it participated substantially in creating a harmful combined use. Foreseeability alone does not create a duty to warn.
• Rollin v. Foster Wheeler, LLC (2nd Appellate District, 2nd Division, 2012). The sophisticated user defense does not bar a worker's claim merely because his employer was knowledgeable about asbestos, and the sophisticated intermediary doctrine applies only if the manufacturer gave adequate warnings to the intermediary. A new trial was proper so the parties could address the O'Neil limits on liability for other manufacturers' asbestos products.
• Shields v. Hennessy Industries, Inc. (1st Appellate District, 1st Division, 2012). Under O'Neil v. Crane Co., a manufacturer can be liable for harm involving another maker's asbestos product if its own product contributed substantially to the harm. Allegations that a machine's only intended use was grinding asbestos brake linings, and that this released the fibers, meet that test at the pleading stage.
• Woodard v. Crane Co. (2nd Appellate District, 4th Division, 2011). Following Taylor v. Elliott Turbomachinery, a valve manufacturer whose own product was not defective is not strictly liable for failing to warn of hazards of asbestos-containing gaskets, packing and insulation made and supplied by third parties. The component part doctrine and foreseeable-modification arguments did not change this.
• Hall v. Warren Pumps LLC (2nd Appellate District, 2nd Division, 2010). A manufacturer of pumps and valves is not strictly liable or negligent for failing to warn of asbestos hazards from third-party asbestos insulation, gaskets and packing used with its equipment, where it did not make or supply those products and its own equipment did not cause or create the risk.
• Merrill v. Leslie Controls, Inc. (2nd Appellate District, 3rd Division, 2009). A manufacturer is not strictly liable for failure to warn or design defect from asbestos products it did not make, supply or place in the chain of distribution, even if their use with its product was foreseeable. The component parts doctrine also bars liability absent proof that the defendant's own component caused the injury.
• Merrill v. Leslie Controls, Inc. (2nd Appellate District, 3rd Division, 2009). A valve manufacturer that did not make or supply the asbestos-containing packing, gaskets or insulation that caused the plaintiff's exposure is not in the chain of distribution of those products and has no strict liability duty to warn of their hazards. The same reasoning bars the design defect claim, and the component parts doctrine supports it.
• O'neil v. Crane Co. (2nd Appellate District, 5th Division, 2009). Makers of pumps and valves designed to be used with asbestos insulation and packing are not shielded by the component parts defense. They can be strictly liable for failure to warn and design defect when a user is injured by replacement asbestos used with their products during ordinary maintenance.
• Taylor v. Elliott Turbomachinery Co. Inc. (1st Appellate District, 5th Division, 2009). Under California law, a manufacturer has no duty to warn, in strict liability or negligence, of asbestos hazards in replacement gaskets, packing or insulation made or supplied by others and used with its equipment. The duty arises only when the manufacturer's own product causes or creates the risk of harm.
• Cunningham v. Buffalo Pumps, Inc. (2nd Appellate District, 7th Division, 2008). The consumer expectations test for design defect can apply to asbestos gaskets and packing in pumps and valves, and failure to warn is a distinct strict liability theory that cannot be made to depend on first finding a risk/benefit design defect. A maker of a finished product cannot escape liability by pointing to a component made by another.
• Norris v. Crane Company (2nd Appellate District, 5th Division, 2008). Under Rutherford's substantial factor test, exposure to asbestos from a defendant's product that adds to the cumulative dose can support causation. The consumer expectations test may be used for a design defect claim based on asbestos-containing valve gaskets and packing.

Delaware

• Salvemini v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2025). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to the particular defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in the injury, and vague testimony that cannot separate that defendant's product from others fails. General maritime law did not reach a spouse's land-based take-home exposure when the plaintiffs did not show the maritime connection test was met.
• Jordonek v. Hennessy Indus. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2023). Interlocutory review under Supreme Court Rule 42 was not warranted because no exceptional circumstances existed and the benefits of review did not outweigh the inefficiency, disruption and costs of an interlocutory appeal.
• Jordonek v. Hennessy Indus. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2023). Predicting Ohio law, the court held that Ohio would recognize an exception to the bare metal rule. A manufacturer may have a duty to warn where its product is necessarily used with another product and the danger results from the two products used together.
• Droz v. Hennessy Industries, LLC (2022). Under Rule 56 and Stigliano, once a defendant shows it made both asbestos-containing and asbestos-free products at the time of exposure, the plaintiff need only show by direct or circumstantial evidence a genuine issue whether she was exposed to the asbestos-containing product; exclusive use or direct evidence is not required.
• Thorne v. Crane Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2022). Under Iowa law, a valve attached to real property remains an improvement after it is detached and refurbished, so the statute of repose bars claims based on exposure during that work. Iowa Code § 686B.7(5) also shields a defendant from liability for exposures from a product or component part made or sold by a third party.
• Cox v. Foster Wheeler (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2021). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product, that it was a substantial factor in the injury, and that the defendant made or sold it; and a manufacturer may have a duty to warn about asbestos parts incorporated into its equipment under the DeVries test, which here raised genuine fact issues.
• Cox v. Foster Wheeler (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2021). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury, and a manufacturer may owe a duty to warn about third-party replacement parts when its product requires them, it knows or has reason to know of the danger, and it has no reason to believe users will realize that danger. Disputed facts on these elements and on the Boyle elements preclude summary judgment.
• Thorne v. Crane Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2021). Applying Delaware choice-of-law rules, the court predicted Delaware would use the manifestation approach to locate the place of injury in an asbestos case, so the presumption favoring the law of the place of injury applied and was not overcome.
• Petit v. Hennessy Indus. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2020). Under Stigliano, where a manufacturer made both asbestos and non-asbestos versions of a product, the plaintiff must present direct or circumstantial evidence of exposure to the asbestos-containing version. Under Rhode Island's frequency, regularity and proximity test, a plaintiff must show regular exposure to friable asbestos in connection with the defendant's product.
• Pruitt v. Deere & Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2020). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to each defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Georgia law requires proof that the product was a contributing factor and that the plaintiff was near its use. An unopposed motion still requires the court to find that the undisputed facts support judgment.
• Vocciante v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2020). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Minimal exposure, or mere presence of the product somewhere at the workplace, does not suffice without evidence of frequency, regularity or proximity.
• Rogers v. Warren Pumps (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2019). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing injury; mere presence of a product at the workplace is insufficient. Under Delaware law, a plaintiff must show a product nexus, meaning proximity to the defendant's asbestos product when it was used.
• Johansen v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under Washington law a plaintiff must show asbestos exposure from the defendant's product was a substantial factor in causing injury, and about five brake jobs over seventeen years was de minimis exposure that did not meet that standard. A manufacturer generally has no duty to warn of dangers of another manufacturer's product, and Washington does not allow punitive damages unless the legislature authorizes them.