Petit v. Hennessy Indus. (In re Asbestos Litigation, 2020)

Our plain-English summary of In re Asbestos Litigation (Delaware Superior Court, August 31, 2020).

Priscilla Petit, individually and as representative of the estate of Raymond Petit, sued over his death from mesothelioma. Petit worked at A-1 Auto Parts from 1981 to 1986 and McLaughlin Auto and Body Shop from 1986 to 1989, using AMMCO brake lathe and arcing machines. Hennessy Industries, successor to AMMCO, moved for summary judgment. The plaintiff conceded the strict liability and punitive damages claims. The court (applying Rhode Island law) found Petit had sufficiently identified the AMMCO machines. It also rejected the bare metal defense, finding a fact issue on whether AMMCO had a duty to warn. However, it granted summary judgment on two other grounds. First, Bendix made both asbestos and non-asbestos brake products, and Petit did not show he worked with asbestos-containing ones; he only assumed the dust contained asbestos. Second, he gave no evidence of regular exposure to friable asbestos from using the machines, as the Rhode Island frequency, regularity and proximity test requires. Judgment went to Hennessy.

We wrote this summary from the court's opinion with the help of AI. It is not the court's wording, and it is not legal advice. The full opinion is below.

The decision

• Court: Delaware Superior Court
• Decided: August 31, 2020
• Stage: Summary judgment
• State: Delaware

Outcome. The Delaware Superior Court granted Hennessy Industries' motion for summary judgment against the Petit plaintiffs, because plaintiff did not show exposure to asbestos-containing brakes or to friable asbestos with the AMMCO machines.

What the court held. Under Stigliano, where a manufacturer made both asbestos and non-asbestos versions of a product, the plaintiff must present direct or circumstantial evidence of exposure to the asbestos-containing version. Under Rhode Island's frequency, regularity and proximity test, a plaintiff must show regular exposure to friable asbestos in connection with the defendant's product.

Issues decided: The Bare-Metal Defense, Causation, Choice of Law, Failure to Warn, Product Identification, Punitive Damages.

The people and their exposure

• Raymond A. Petit: mesothelioma; died

Who	Work	Where	When	Products
Raymond A. Petit	worked with AMMCO brake arcing and lathe machines (auto mechanics and brake work)	A-1 Auto Parts	1981-1986	brakes, clutches and friction materials, AMMCO brake lathe and arcing machines, Bendix, Wagner
Raymond A. Petit	worked with AMMCO brake arcing and lathe machines (auto mechanics and brake work)	McLaughlin Auto and Body Shop	1986-1989	brakes, clutches and friction materials, AMMCO brake lathe and arcing machines

The defendants

• Hennessy Industries, LLC (manufacturer)

Other decisions in this case

Other rulings from the same court in the same case, in our library:

• In re Asbestos Litigation (May 9, 2006). The court denied DaimlerChrysler's motion in limine to exclude the plaintiffs' experts on general causation, so the plaintiffs' experts may testify that automotive friction products increase the risk of asbestosis, lung cancer and mesothelioma.
• Grenier v. General Motors Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (April 8, 2009). On remand from the Delaware Supreme Court, the Superior Court concluded that, despite factual errors in its earlier opinion, it properly denied General Motors' and Ford's motion to exclude plaintiffs' general causation expert testimony, so Grenier's experts remained admissible.
• Freeman v. Georgia-Pacific (In re Asbestos Litigation) (January 13, 2011). The court denied Georgia-Pacific's motion for summary judgment because plaintiffs raised a genuine dispute of fact about whether Wilburn Freeman was exposed to Georgia-Pacific's asbestos-containing joint compound.
• Olson v. Crane Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (January 18, 2011). The Delaware Superior Court granted summary judgment to defendants Crane Co. and CBS Corp. (Westinghouse) against plaintiffs, holding Idaho law would not make them liable for other manufacturers' asbestos-containing parts.
• Cruz v. Georgia-Pacific (In re Asbestos Litigation) (January 19, 2011). The court granted Georgia-Pacific's motion for summary judgment, ruling that plaintiffs could not show under Texas law that exposure to its Ready Mix joint compound was a substantial factor in causing Cruz's mesothelioma.
• Ashworth v. Pneumo Abex (In re Asbestos Litigation) (February 14, 2011). The court granted Pneumo Abex's summary judgment motion on the survival action as time-barred, but denied it on the wrongful death claim, which was timely and had factual disputes on causation and product identification.
• James v. Albany Int'l (In re Asbestos Litigation) (February 16, 2011). The court granted Albany International's motion for summary judgment against plaintiff Charlene James because there was no non-speculative evidence that Robert James was exposed to an asbestos-containing Albany product.
• Newman v. Avocet Enterprises (In re Asbestos Litigation) (March 15, 2011). The court denied Avocet Enterprises' motion for summary judgment on the Newmans' remaining claims, because Newman's testimony about using Ventbestos raised a factual dispute on causation, and found the motion moot as to the withdrawn conspiracy claim.
• Henderson v. Dana Companies (In re Asbestos Litigation) (March 22, 2011). The court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' post-trial motion for costs against Dana and Zoom, awarding $14,597.12 in costs plus pre- and post-judgment interest.
• Foucha v. CertainTeed Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (May 31, 2011). The court granted CertainTeed Corp.'s motion for summary judgment, ruling against plaintiffs Raymond and Sussanah Foucha because they lacked evidence that he was exposed to an asbestos-containing CertainTeed product.
• Foucha v. Georgia-Pacific (In re Asbestos Litigation) (June 3, 2011). The court granted Georgia-Pacific's motion for summary judgment against Raymond and Sussanah Foucha because they could not show without speculation that Foucha was exposed to asbestos from Georgia-Pacific joint compound.
• Bowser v. Parker-Hannifin Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (June 3, 2011). The court granted Parker-Hannifin's summary judgment motion in part (strict liability count and helicopter brake exposures before 1967) and denied it as to the airplane brake claims, so Plaintiff Jenny Bowser's remaining claims proceed.
• Davis v. Crane Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (June 7, 2011). The court granted Crane Co.'s motion for summary judgment against plaintiff Wesley Davis, finding he had not shown Crane-supplied asbestos products were a substantial factor in causing his mesothelioma.
• Clineff v. BP Amoco Chemical Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (July 8, 2011). The court granted summary judgment to BP Amoco Chemical Company, BP Corporation North America Inc., and Kvaerner U.S. Inc. because the plaintiffs' claims were filed after the two-year limitations period expired.
• Gordon v. Dana Companies (In re Asbestos Litigation) (November 16, 2011). The court granted summary judgment to Dana (Victor gaskets) and UOP, and denied summary judgment to Elliott, Armstrong and Born, so the plaintiffs' claims against those three go forward.
• McCoy v. PolyVision Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (February 21, 2012). The court granted summary judgment to PolyVision Corp. against Janine and Marvin McCoy, predicting Pennsylvania law imposes no duty on an employer or premises owner to an employee's spouse for take-home asbestos exposure.
• Galliher v. R. T. Vanderbilt (In re Asbestos Litigation) (May 9, 2012). The court allowed plaintiff's late-disclosed geologist (Fitzgerald) to testify, excluded plaintiff's other late expert (Dr. Rigler), continued the trial to July 16, 2012 so defendant R. T. Vanderbilt could develop rebuttal evidence, and sanctioned defendant's out-of-state counsel $5000.
• Farrall v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 19, 2013). The court denied the plaintiff's motion for reargument, leaving in place its grant of summary judgment for Ford Motor Company on the failure to warn claim about asbestos-containing replacement parts.
• Muse v. Honeywell Int'l (In re Asbestos Litigation) (December 31, 2014). The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for reargument, leaving in place summary judgment for Honeywell International Inc. against James Muse and Clarice Roberts-Muse.
• Harris v. Deere & Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (May 10, 2017). The court granted Deere & Company's motion for summary judgment, ruling for Deere against the plaintiff, because under North Carolina law the plaintiff offered no evidence beyond speculation that the asbestos-containing parts he worked on were made or sold by Deere.
• Kivell v. Air Prods. and Chemicals (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 30, 2017). The court granted Air Products and Chemicals Inc.'s motion for summary judgment on the negligence, strict liability and wrongful death claims, ruling against plaintiff Sandra Kivell.
• Kivell v. Union Carbide Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 30, 2017). The Delaware Superior Court granted Union Carbide's motion for summary judgment on Sandra Kivell's negligence and strict liability claims, so Union Carbide won and the plaintiff lost.
• Kivell v. Murphy Oil USA (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 30, 2017). The court granted Murphy Oil USA Inc.'s motion for summary judgment on the negligence and strict liability claims brought by Sandra Kivell, so the plaintiff lost.
• Walsh v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (October 27, 2017). The court granted summary judgment to Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (successor to Buffalo Pumps) against plaintiffs Phillip and Naomi Walsh, finding no evidence Mr. Walsh was exposed to asbestos parts the defendant was responsible for.
• Leathers v. Pneumo Abex (In re Asbestos Litigation) (November 8, 2017). The court denied Pneumo Abex LLC's motion for summary judgment, so plaintiff Raymond Leathers' claims against Abex go forward to trial.
• Walsh v. Aurora Pump Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (November 29, 2017). The court granted Aurora Pump Company's motion for summary judgment against Phillip and Naomi Walsh because they did not show that Mr. Walsh was exposed to asbestos from Aurora's products.
• Sykes v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (February 7, 2018). The Superior Court affirmed the Special Master's order excluding William Don Sykes's videotaped trial deposition at trial, a ruling for the defendants and against the plaintiff estate.
• Kivell v. Georgia Pacific Consumer Prods. LP (In re Asbestos Litigation) (March 26, 2018). The court granted Georgia Pacific's motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that Sandra Kivell's wrongful death and survival claims were time barred under Louisiana's one-year limit.
• Richards v. Copes-Vulcan (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 8, 2018). The court denied the Richards plaintiffs' motion for leave to supplement their expert's report and for reargument, leaving in place summary judgment for Copes-Vulcan, Fairbanks, Ford and Goodyear.
• Call v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (December 12, 2018). The court granted Ford Motor Company's motion for summary judgment against plaintiff Marilyn Kay Call, holding Indiana's "but for" causation standard applies and her expert's opinion did not meet it.
• Knecht v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (January 31, 2019). The Delaware Superior Court denied Ford Motor Company's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, its alternative motion for a new trial, and its motion for a new trial or remittitur, leaving the plaintiff's jury verdict in place.
• Rowland v. Union Carbide Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (April 24, 2019). The Delaware Superior Court granted Union Carbide's motion for summary judgment against Jane and Douglas Rowland because they could not show that the joint compound they used contained Union Carbide's asbestos.
• Knecht v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (March 3, 2020). On remand from the Delaware Supreme Court, the Superior Court denied Ford Motor Company's motion for a new trial or remittitur, leaving the $40.625 million compensatory verdict for Paula Knecht in place.
• Pearsons v. Heidelberg USA (In re Asbestos Litigation) (December 23, 2020). The court denied Heidelberg USA's summary judgment motion on causation, statute of repose and product misuse, and granted it only on the willful and wanton conduct claim, which Mrs. Pearsons did not contest.
• Jordonek v. Hennessy Indus. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (April 11, 2023). The court denied Hennessy Industries' motion for reargument, so its earlier oral denial of summary judgment on the duty-to-warn claim stood and the plaintiff, Lisa Estrada, prevailed on this motion.
• Jordonek v. Hennessy Indus. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (April 25, 2023). The Superior Court denied defendant Hennessy Industries' request to certify an interlocutory appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court of the earlier denial of its summary judgment motion, so plaintiff Estrada prevailed on this request.
• Braxton v. J-M Mfg. Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (December 17, 2024). The court granted defendant J-M Manufacturing's motion for leave to designate responsible third parties, rejecting plaintiff Braxton's objections on pleading sufficiency, limitations timing and bankruptcy proofs of claim.

The court's opinion

The text below is Google Scholar's copy of the court's opinion, a public record. Numbers in brackets, such as [*921], mark where each page of the printed reporter begins.

IN RE: ASBESTOS LITIGATION

Limited to: PRISCILLA PETIT, Individually and as Personal Representative for the Estate of

RAYMOND A. PETIT, deceased.

C.A. No. N17C-10-146 ASB.

Submitted: May 27, 2020.

Decided: August 31, 2020.

Superior Court of Delaware.

Upon Defendant Hennessy Industries, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment:

Granted.

Adam Balick, Esq., Michael Collins Smith, Esq. and Patrick J. Smith, Esq., BALICK & BALICK, LLC, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Plaintiff.

Megan T. Mantzavinos, Esq., and Eileen M. Ford, Esq., MARKS, O'NEILL, O'BRIEN, DOHERTY & KELLY, P.C., Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ADAMS, J.

Pending before the Court is Defendant Hennessy Industries, LLC's ("Defendant") Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court held oral argument on May 5, 2020 and ordered additional briefing on the application of Stigliano v. Westinghouse[1] to the facts of this case. For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Background

Plaintiff Raymond Petit ("Plaintiff") died from mesothelioma, allegedly caused by exposure to asbestos over the course of Petit's career working with AMMCO brake arcing and lathe machines.[2] Plaintiff worked for A-1 Auto Parts from 1981 to 1986 and worked for McLaughlin Auto and Body Shop from 1986 to 1989.[3] Plaintiff worked with AMMCO machines at both shops. With regard to his work at A-1 Auto Parts, Plaintiff testified that he used the lathe to turn brake drums "several times a day" and would turn "maybe 20, 30 drums on a weekend."[4] Plaintiff also testified that "a couple of customers" liked to have the brake shoes fit to the drums and he would grind the brake shoes "occasionally."[5] Plaintiff defined "occasionally" as "a couple of times a day" or, depending on how busy the shop was, "maybe a couple of times a week."[6] Plaintiff also testified, however, that grinding shoes was "not a regular" occurrence and "happened once in a blue moon."[7] Plaintiff's process for turning a brake drum was to "sandpaper it down a little bit, get off whatever was left in there, and then measure, then start proceed [sic] to cutting."[8] Plaintiff would usually walk away to do other tasks once the drum or rotor was set up on the lathe, but sometimes he would watch to make sure the lathe was operating correctly.[9] Plaintiff testified that the cause of his asbestos exposure from using the lathe was from "stuff" in the drums and sanding them down.[10] Plaintiff testified that he breathed in dust from the brake drum "lining and stuff like that," which Plaintiff testified contained asbestos.[11] Plaintiff also testified that he was exposed to asbestos dust from cleaning the machines and emptying the dust collection bags.[12] When asked whether he could recall the manufacturers of the brake drums he was using on the lathe at A-1 Auto Parts, Plaintiff testified that he "used everything from Wagner, Bendix" and he could not remember them all.[13] Discussion

During oral argument, Plaintiff conceded that his strict liability and punitive damages claims were without merit. The Court therefore grants Defendant's Motion with respect to these claims.[14] The Court will address Defendant's remaining grounds for summary judgment in turn.

1. Product Identification

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's identification of AMMCO products is insufficient. Defendant takes issue with Plaintiff's error in spelling "AMMCO" incorrectly as "A-A-M-C-O" when identifying the machine's manufacturer and with Plaintiff's description of the machine as a single unit situated on a table, rather than two separate pieces. Plaintiff provided a physical description of the AMMCO machines and described his use of the machines throughout his testimony.[15] Plaintiff also submitted an AMMCO image and description of a machine that matches Plaintiff's descriptions, corroborating his testimony regarding the single-unit machines.[16] Plaintiff sufficiently identified working with AMMCO arcing and lathe machines. Therefore, Defendants' Motion on product identification grounds is denied.

2. Bare Metal Defense

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff's failure to identify an asbestos-containing product manufactured by Defendant warrants summary judgment. It is undisputed that the AMMCO machines, themselves, did not contain asbestos. Rhode Island jurisprudence, however, rejects the bare metal defense in favor of "a more fact-specific and nuanced analysis" and "supports recovery against a manufacturer of a product even where the manufacturer's original product did not contain asbestos."[17] A defendant has a duty to warn "if he had reason to know about the product's dangerous propensities which caused plaintiff's injuries."[18]

In Lindquist v. Buffalo Pumps, Inc., the court held that there were triable issues of fact with respect to the defendant's duty to warn, despite the fact that the defendant's product did not contain asbestos.[19] The record suggested "that the manufacturer knew exactly how the pump would be used in relation to the packing and gaskets."[20] The defendant was "not being asked to `anticipate every conceivable design' in which its pump can be used."[21] The Lindquist court found that the evidence created a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant "knew or should have known of the dangers posed by its pumps when serviced in the manner intended, and whether it breached a duty when it did not warn of those dangers."[22] Although the present case does not involve replacement parts, the reasoning of Lindquist is applicable. Plaintiff submitted evidence that AMMCO knew it was virtually guaranteed that its product would be used on asbestos-containing brake products, that the use of its machine on asbestos-containing brake products would result in the release of friable asbestos, and that the bag that was attached to the machine, for the express purpose of containing the asbestos dust, did not work. [23] This evidence is sufficient to create an issue of fact as to whether Defendant had a duty under Rhode Island law to warn of the dangers of asbestos exposure associated with the use of its arcing and lathe machines. The Court therefore denies Defendant's Motion based on the bare metal defense.

3. Stigliano

Following oral argument on the Motion, the Court requested additional briefing on the issue of whether Stigliano extends to manufacturers of third party machines that are used in connection with other users' products. Unsurprisingly, the parties differ on Stigliano's application to such a situation. The Court agrees with Defendant that Stigliano applies to such a situation, but not for the reasons Defendant suggests.

In Stigliano v. Westinghouse, this Court ruled:

When the record reveals that a defendant manufactured both asbestos-containing and non asbestos-

containing versions of a product during the time period of alleged exposure, in the absence of evidence directly or circumstantially linking the plaintiff to the asbestos-containing product, the Court cannot draw the inference of exposure and summary judgment on product nexus must be granted.

Once a defendant puts forth evidence that it manufactured both asbestos-containing and non asbestos-containing versions of a product, the plaintiff must put forth evidence that he or she was exposed to the asbestos-containing version of the product in order to overcome a motion for summary judgment. In other words, in order for Plaintiff to defeat summary judgment in this action, he must show that he was exposed to an asbestos-containing brake while using the AMMCO machine.

Contrary to Defendants' argument, Stigliano does not limit the use of reasonable inferences by the Court or the trier of fact. Pursuant to Delaware's summary judgment standard, the Court must view the record, "including any reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom," in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.[24] Stigliano simply requires "evidence directly or circumstantially linking the plaintiff to the asbestos-containing product" in cases where the plaintiff worked with both asbestos-containing and non-asbestos-containing versions of a product.[25] Plaintiff failed to submit such evidence. Plaintiff submitted Bendix interrogatory responses from 2006 to support his assertion that he was exposed to asbestos-containing dust from his work with the AMMCO machines. Plaintiff testified generally that he used Bendix brake products, but was unable to identify particular brands of drums as he worked because he was not the person removing the drums from the vehicles.[26] Plaintiff did not know, but "assumed," that the dust from the drums contained asbestos.[27] Defendant submitted another set of Bendix interrogatory responses from 2014 showing that Bendix also produced non-asbestos-containing products during the relevant time period. Plaintiff failed to submit any evidence showing that the specific Bendix products he worked with in conjunction with the AMMCO machines contained asbestos, or any evidence that any of the brake products he used with the AMMCO machines released friable asbestos.[28] Plaintiff, therefore, fails to meet the standard under Stiglano and the Court will grant Defendant's Motion on this basis.

4. Sweredoski Causation

The Rhode Island Superior Court adopted the Lohrmann frequency, regularity and proximity test in Sweredoski v. Alfa Laval, Inc.[29] In order to satisfy the causation standard under Sweredoski, a plaintiff must present evidence showing exposure to a particular product on a regular basis, over an extended period of time, in proximity to where the plaintiff actually worked.[30] " [M]ere proof that the plaintiff and a certain asbestos product are at the same location at the same time, without more, does not prove exposure to that product."[31] The plaintiff must prove "more than a casual or minimum connection with the product."[32]

In support of his claims of friable asbestos exposure, Plaintiff cites a New York Times article from 1982 about the ubiquity of asbestos in automotive parts and the testimony of Craig Mountz, AMMCO's corporate representative. The New York Times article highlights the use of asbestos in the industry in general, but does not aid Plaintiff in satisfying the Sweredoski standard. The Mountz testimony supports Plaintiff's arguments regarding AMMCO's knowledge about the use of its products generally, but does not provide the necessary connection between Plaintiff's alleged exposure to friable asbestos and his actual work with AMMCO machines.

Defendant contends that the dust Plaintiff was exposed to was created by metal-on-metal friction and there is no evidence supporting Plaintiff's testimony that this dust contained asbestos. Plaintiff testified to sanding down the brake drums prior to using the AMMCO machine.[33] Plaintiff did not rebut Defendant's argument that the dust created by Plaintiff's use of the AMMCO lathe would have been composed of metal shavings and not asbestos. Plaintiff did not submit any evidence or testimony providing more than a self-described assumption that the dust created or collected by the AMMCO machines contained asbestos.

The evidence in the record is not sufficient under the Sweredoski standard because it does not provide a basis for a reasonable inference as to the frequency and regularity of Plaintiff's exposure to friable asbestos. Plaintiff submitted evidence of the frequency and regularity of his use of the AMMCO machines during his career. This evidence does not extend, however, to the frequency and regularity of Plaintiff's exposure to friable asbestos in connection with his use of the AMMCO machines.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Hennessy Industries, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

[1] 2006 WL 3026171 (Del. Super. Oct. 18, 2006).

[2] Hennessy is the successor-in-interest to AMMCO Tools, Inc., a brake lathe and arcing machine manufacturer. [3] Pl.'s Ex. A at 72:10-14, 78:24-79:6. All references to exhibits are from either Defendant Hennessy Industries, LLC's Opening Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment or Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Hennessy Industries, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment.

[4] Pl.'s Ex. A at 74:23-75:2.

[5] Pl.'s Ex. A at 75:7-19.

[6] Pl.'s Ex. A at 75:17-23.

[7] Def.'s Ex. A at 230:14-18.

[8] Def.'s Ex. A at 215:21-216:1.

[9] Def.'s Ex. A at 226:18-25.

[10] Def.'s Ex. A at 227:19-24.

[11] Pl.'s Ex. A at 81:7-19.

[12] Pl.'s Ex. B at 223:13-17, 229:3-7, 234:20-235:3.

[13] Pl.'s Ex. A at 72:9, 74:11-15.

[14] See Oral Arg. Tr. 57:10-16, 74:1-8.

[15] See Pl.'s Ex. B at 128:17-220:14.

[16] Pl.'s Ex. E.

[17] See Baumgartner v. American Standard, Inc., 2015 WL 4523476 (citing Sweredoski v. Alfa Laval, Inc., 2013 WL 3010419, at [*5]); See also Lindquist v. Buffalo Pumps, Inc., 2006 WL 3456346 (R.I. Super. Nov. 28, 2006).

[18] Thomas v. Amway Corp., 488 A.2d 716, 722 (R.I. 1985) (citing Scittarelli v. Providence Gas Co., 415 A.2d 1040, 1043 (R.I. 1980)). [19] 2006 WL 345346, at [*3].

[20] Id. at [*3].

[21] Id. at [*3].

[22] Id. at [*2].

[23] See Pl.'s Ex. D at 20:5-12, 62:2-21, 93:11-19, 194:6-195:8.

[24] Stayton v. Clariant Corp., 2014 WL 28726, [*1] (Del. 2014) (quoting LaPoint v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., 970 A.2d 185, 191 (Del. 2009)).

[25] Stigliano v. Westinghouse, 2006 WL 3026171 (Del. Super. Oct. 18, 2006).

[26] Def.'s Ex. A at 227:19-228:5.

[27] Def.'s Ex. A at 227:19-228:5.

[28] This lack of evidence is contrasted with In re Asbestos Litig. (Henderson), 2011 WL 684164 (Del. Super. Feb. 2, 2011), cited by Plaintiff, where plaintiffs produced evidence linking plaintiffs to exposure from asbestos-containing gaskets.

[29] 2013 WL 3010419 (R.I. Super. June 13, 2013). Delaware courts refer to Sweredoski when undergoing a causation analysis in an asbestos case under Rhode Island substantive law. "The Rhode Island Supreme Court has not established a set standard for causation in the state, and the well analyzed decision in Sweredoski lays out exactly why the Superior Court of Rhode Island applied the frequency, regularity, and proximity test." In re: Asbestos Litigation (Leathers), 2017 WL 5593522, at [*1] (Del. Super. Nov. 8, 2017). [30] Leathers, 2017 WL 5593522, at [*1] (citing Sweredoski, 2013 WL 3010419, at [*5]).

[31] Id.

[32] Id.

[33] Def.'s Ex. A at 215:21-216:1.

Sources

• The opinion on Google Scholar
• Delaware asbestos laws
• Delaware asbestos exposure sites