Knecht v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation, 2020)

Our plain-English summary of In re Asbestos Litigation (Delaware Superior Court, March 3, 2020).

Paula Knecht sued Ford Motor Company after her husband, Larry Knecht, died at 71 of mesothelioma. He had been an automobile mechanic who owned and ran Knecht Automotive in Los Alamos, New Mexico. She alleged he was exposed to asbestos from working with Ford's brakes and clutches. A jury found Ford 20% responsible and awarded $40.625 million in compensatory damages, so Ford's share was $8.125 million. It also awarded $1 million in punitive damages. The Delaware Supreme Court upheld the verdict on most points but sent the case back so the Superior Court could decide whether the compensatory award required a new trial or a reduction. On remand, the court again found no passion, prejudice or disregard of the evidence. It pointed to testimony about the pain of mesothelioma, Mr. Knecht's suffering, and the couple's 52-year marriage. It held the award, though large, did not shock its conscience, and denied Ford's motion for a new trial or remittitur.

We wrote this summary from the court's opinion with the help of AI. It is not the court's wording, and it is not legal advice. The full opinion is below.

The decision

• Court: Delaware Superior Court
• Decided: March 3, 2020
• Stage: Post-trial motions
• State: Delaware

Outcome. On remand from the Delaware Supreme Court, the Superior Court denied Ford Motor Company's motion for a new trial or remittitur, leaving the $40.625 million compensatory verdict for Paula Knecht in place.

What the court held. A jury's damages verdict is not disturbed unless it results from passion, prejudice, partiality or corruption, or manifestly disregards the evidence or law, or is so grossly excessive that it shocks the court's conscience and sense of justice.

Issues decided: Loss of Consortium, Compensatory Damages, Wrongful Death and Survival, Trial Procedure and Discovery.

The people and their exposure

• Larry W. Knecht: mesothelioma; died

Who	Work	Where	When	Products
Larry W. Knecht	automobile mechanic (auto mechanics and brake work)	Knecht Automotive, Los Alamos, New Mexico		brakes, clutches and friction materials, Ford brakes and clutches

The defendants

• Ford Motor Company (manufacturer)

Other decisions in this case

Other rulings from the same court in the same case, in our library:

• In re Asbestos Litigation (May 9, 2006). The court denied DaimlerChrysler's motion in limine to exclude the plaintiffs' experts on general causation, so the plaintiffs' experts may testify that automotive friction products increase the risk of asbestosis, lung cancer and mesothelioma.
• Grenier v. General Motors Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (April 8, 2009). On remand from the Delaware Supreme Court, the Superior Court concluded that, despite factual errors in its earlier opinion, it properly denied General Motors' and Ford's motion to exclude plaintiffs' general causation expert testimony, so Grenier's experts remained admissible.
• Freeman v. Georgia-Pacific (In re Asbestos Litigation) (January 13, 2011). The court denied Georgia-Pacific's motion for summary judgment because plaintiffs raised a genuine dispute of fact about whether Wilburn Freeman was exposed to Georgia-Pacific's asbestos-containing joint compound.
• Olson v. Crane Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (January 18, 2011). The Delaware Superior Court granted summary judgment to defendants Crane Co. and CBS Corp. (Westinghouse) against plaintiffs, holding Idaho law would not make them liable for other manufacturers' asbestos-containing parts.
• Cruz v. Georgia-Pacific (In re Asbestos Litigation) (January 19, 2011). The court granted Georgia-Pacific's motion for summary judgment, ruling that plaintiffs could not show under Texas law that exposure to its Ready Mix joint compound was a substantial factor in causing Cruz's mesothelioma.
• Ashworth v. Pneumo Abex (In re Asbestos Litigation) (February 14, 2011). The court granted Pneumo Abex's summary judgment motion on the survival action as time-barred, but denied it on the wrongful death claim, which was timely and had factual disputes on causation and product identification.
• James v. Albany Int'l (In re Asbestos Litigation) (February 16, 2011). The court granted Albany International's motion for summary judgment against plaintiff Charlene James because there was no non-speculative evidence that Robert James was exposed to an asbestos-containing Albany product.
• Newman v. Avocet Enterprises (In re Asbestos Litigation) (March 15, 2011). The court denied Avocet Enterprises' motion for summary judgment on the Newmans' remaining claims, because Newman's testimony about using Ventbestos raised a factual dispute on causation, and found the motion moot as to the withdrawn conspiracy claim.
• Henderson v. Dana Companies (In re Asbestos Litigation) (March 22, 2011). The court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' post-trial motion for costs against Dana and Zoom, awarding $14,597.12 in costs plus pre- and post-judgment interest.
• Foucha v. CertainTeed Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (May 31, 2011). The court granted CertainTeed Corp.'s motion for summary judgment, ruling against plaintiffs Raymond and Sussanah Foucha because they lacked evidence that he was exposed to an asbestos-containing CertainTeed product.
• Foucha v. Georgia-Pacific (In re Asbestos Litigation) (June 3, 2011). The court granted Georgia-Pacific's motion for summary judgment against Raymond and Sussanah Foucha because they could not show without speculation that Foucha was exposed to asbestos from Georgia-Pacific joint compound.
• Bowser v. Parker-Hannifin Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (June 3, 2011). The court granted Parker-Hannifin's summary judgment motion in part (strict liability count and helicopter brake exposures before 1967) and denied it as to the airplane brake claims, so Plaintiff Jenny Bowser's remaining claims proceed.
• Davis v. Crane Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (June 7, 2011). The court granted Crane Co.'s motion for summary judgment against plaintiff Wesley Davis, finding he had not shown Crane-supplied asbestos products were a substantial factor in causing his mesothelioma.
• Clineff v. BP Amoco Chemical Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (July 8, 2011). The court granted summary judgment to BP Amoco Chemical Company, BP Corporation North America Inc., and Kvaerner U.S. Inc. because the plaintiffs' claims were filed after the two-year limitations period expired.
• Gordon v. Dana Companies (In re Asbestos Litigation) (November 16, 2011). The court granted summary judgment to Dana (Victor gaskets) and UOP, and denied summary judgment to Elliott, Armstrong and Born, so the plaintiffs' claims against those three go forward.
• McCoy v. PolyVision Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (February 21, 2012). The court granted summary judgment to PolyVision Corp. against Janine and Marvin McCoy, predicting Pennsylvania law imposes no duty on an employer or premises owner to an employee's spouse for take-home asbestos exposure.
• Galliher v. R. T. Vanderbilt (In re Asbestos Litigation) (May 9, 2012). The court allowed plaintiff's late-disclosed geologist (Fitzgerald) to testify, excluded plaintiff's other late expert (Dr. Rigler), continued the trial to July 16, 2012 so defendant R. T. Vanderbilt could develop rebuttal evidence, and sanctioned defendant's out-of-state counsel $5000.
• Farrall v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 19, 2013). The court denied the plaintiff's motion for reargument, leaving in place its grant of summary judgment for Ford Motor Company on the failure to warn claim about asbestos-containing replacement parts.
• Muse v. Honeywell Int'l (In re Asbestos Litigation) (December 31, 2014). The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for reargument, leaving in place summary judgment for Honeywell International Inc. against James Muse and Clarice Roberts-Muse.
• Harris v. Deere & Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (May 10, 2017). The court granted Deere & Company's motion for summary judgment, ruling for Deere against the plaintiff, because under North Carolina law the plaintiff offered no evidence beyond speculation that the asbestos-containing parts he worked on were made or sold by Deere.
• Kivell v. Air Prods. and Chemicals (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 30, 2017). The court granted Air Products and Chemicals Inc.'s motion for summary judgment on the negligence, strict liability and wrongful death claims, ruling against plaintiff Sandra Kivell.
• Kivell v. Union Carbide Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 30, 2017). The Delaware Superior Court granted Union Carbide's motion for summary judgment on Sandra Kivell's negligence and strict liability claims, so Union Carbide won and the plaintiff lost.
• Kivell v. Murphy Oil USA (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 30, 2017). The court granted Murphy Oil USA Inc.'s motion for summary judgment on the negligence and strict liability claims brought by Sandra Kivell, so the plaintiff lost.
• Walsh v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (October 27, 2017). The court granted summary judgment to Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (successor to Buffalo Pumps) against plaintiffs Phillip and Naomi Walsh, finding no evidence Mr. Walsh was exposed to asbestos parts the defendant was responsible for.
• Leathers v. Pneumo Abex (In re Asbestos Litigation) (November 8, 2017). The court denied Pneumo Abex LLC's motion for summary judgment, so plaintiff Raymond Leathers' claims against Abex go forward to trial.
• Walsh v. Aurora Pump Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (November 29, 2017). The court granted Aurora Pump Company's motion for summary judgment against Phillip and Naomi Walsh because they did not show that Mr. Walsh was exposed to asbestos from Aurora's products.
• Sykes v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (February 7, 2018). The Superior Court affirmed the Special Master's order excluding William Don Sykes's videotaped trial deposition at trial, a ruling for the defendants and against the plaintiff estate.
• Kivell v. Georgia Pacific Consumer Prods. LP (In re Asbestos Litigation) (March 26, 2018). The court granted Georgia Pacific's motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that Sandra Kivell's wrongful death and survival claims were time barred under Louisiana's one-year limit.
• Richards v. Copes-Vulcan (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 8, 2018). The court denied the Richards plaintiffs' motion for leave to supplement their expert's report and for reargument, leaving in place summary judgment for Copes-Vulcan, Fairbanks, Ford and Goodyear.
• Call v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (December 12, 2018). The court granted Ford Motor Company's motion for summary judgment against plaintiff Marilyn Kay Call, holding Indiana's "but for" causation standard applies and her expert's opinion did not meet it.
• Knecht v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (January 31, 2019). The Delaware Superior Court denied Ford Motor Company's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, its alternative motion for a new trial, and its motion for a new trial or remittitur, leaving the plaintiff's jury verdict in place.
• Rowland v. Union Carbide Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (April 24, 2019). The Delaware Superior Court granted Union Carbide's motion for summary judgment against Jane and Douglas Rowland because they could not show that the joint compound they used contained Union Carbide's asbestos.
• Petit v. Hennessy Indus. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 31, 2020). The Delaware Superior Court granted Hennessy Industries' motion for summary judgment against the Petit plaintiffs, because plaintiff did not show exposure to asbestos-containing brakes or to friable asbestos with the AMMCO machines.
• Pearsons v. Heidelberg USA (In re Asbestos Litigation) (December 23, 2020). The court denied Heidelberg USA's summary judgment motion on causation, statute of repose and product misuse, and granted it only on the willful and wanton conduct claim, which Mrs. Pearsons did not contest.
• Jordonek v. Hennessy Indus. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (April 11, 2023). The court denied Hennessy Industries' motion for reargument, so its earlier oral denial of summary judgment on the duty-to-warn claim stood and the plaintiff, Lisa Estrada, prevailed on this motion.
• Jordonek v. Hennessy Indus. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (April 25, 2023). The Superior Court denied defendant Hennessy Industries' request to certify an interlocutory appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court of the earlier denial of its summary judgment motion, so plaintiff Estrada prevailed on this request.
• Braxton v. J-M Mfg. Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (December 17, 2024). The court granted defendant J-M Manufacturing's motion for leave to designate responsible third parties, rejecting plaintiff Braxton's objections on pleading sufficiency, limitations timing and bankruptcy proofs of claim.

Decisions this opinion cites

Earlier decisions in our library that the court cited:

• Dana Companies, LLC v. Crawford (Delaware Supreme Court, 2011). The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed denial of Dana's and Zoom's motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, but reversed in part the denial of the plaintiffs' additur motion and remanded for reconsideration of the damages awards.

Amounts in the opinion

• $40.625 million (compensatory)
• $1 million (punitive)
• $9.125 million (total)
• $8.125 million (compensatory)

The court's opinion

The text below is Google Scholar's copy of the court's opinion, a public record. Numbers in brackets, such as [*921], mark where each page of the printed reporter begins.

IN RE: ASBESTOS LITIGATION.

PAULA KNECHT, Individually, and as Independent Executrix of the estate of, LARRY W. KNECHT,

deceased, Plaintiff,

v.

FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant.

C.A. No. N14C-08-164 ASB.

Submitted: December 18, 2019.

Decided: March 3, 2020.

Corrected: June 11, 2020 (Numeration only).

Superior Court of Delaware.

Decision on Remand upon Defendant Ford Motor Company's Motion for a New Trial on in the Alternative, Remittitur, DENIED.

Adam Balick, Esquire, Michael Collins Smith, Esquire, Patrick J. Smith, Esquire, Balick & Balick, LLC, 711 King Street, Wilmington, Delaware 19801; Bartholomew J. Dalton, Esquire, Ipek K. Medford, Esquire, Andrew C. Dalton, Esquire, Michael C. Dalton, Esquire, Dalton & Associates, Cool Spring Meeting House, 1106 West Tenth Street, Wilmington, Delaware 19806; Danny R. Kraft, Esquire, Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C., 700 Broadway, New York, New York 10003, Of Counsel; Attorneys for Plaintiff, Paula Knecht, Individually, and as Independent Executrix of the estate of Larry Knecht, deceased.

Christian J. Singewald, Esquire, Rochelle L. Gumapac, Esquire, White and Williams LLP, Courthouse Square, 600 N. King Street, Suite 800, Wilmington, Delaware 19801, Attorneys for Defendant Ford Motor Company.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

FERRIS W. WHARTON, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Paula Knecht is the widow of Larry Knecht, who died at the age of 71 from mesothelioma, an incurable asbestos related disease. During most of his working life, Larry Knecht was an automobile mechanic, owning and operating Knecht Automotive in Los Alamos, New Mexico. In her lawsuit against Ford Motor Company, Mrs. Knecht brought claims of negligence and strict liability, alleging that Mr. Knecht was exposed to asbestos from working with Ford's asbestos-containing brakes and clutches. She sought compensatory and punitive damages. The cage went to trial on May 13, 2018. After 16 days of testimony and argument and three days of deliberation, the jury returned its verdict on June 8, 2018. The jury awarded Mrs. Knecht $40.625 million in compensatory damages, for which it found Ford 20% responsible. It also awarded her $1 million in punitive damages. In total Ford's liability to Mr. Knecht was $9.125 million. Ford's appeal to Delaware Supreme Court was unsuccessful with one exception. This Court's denial of Ford's Motion for a New Trial or, in the Alternative, Remittitur was reversed and the case remanded to this Court for it to decide, "whether the jury's compensatory damages verdict of $40.625 million warrants a new trial or remittitur."[1]

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL CONTEXT[2]

After trial, Ford filed two motions. The first renewed Ford's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law under Rule 50(b), previously denied by the Court at the end of Plaintiff's case and again at the conclusion of the evidence.[3] Ford raised six arguments in that motion, primarily focusing on issues related to causation and sufficiency of evidence. Alternatively, Ford sought a new trial. The second motion separately moved for a new trial, or alternatively, remittitur.[4] In its second motion,

Ford argued that the jury's verdict was irreconcilably inconsistent and the amount of damages awarded shocked the conscience.[5] The Court denied both motions.[6] The scope of remand is limited to the second motion, specifically the jury's compensatory damages award.

Post-trial, Ford sought remittitur on the grounds that the amount of the verdict was objectively excessive, Plaintiff's counsel improperly incited bias, passion, or prejudice throughout his closing argument, and the admission of cumulative evidence of notice inflamed the jury and likely impacted the verdict.[7] For her part, Plaintiff argued that her counsel's closing argument was entirely proper and that remittitur was unwarranted because them was a fair basis for the compensatory damages award, and that award did not shock the conscience.[8]

A. Standard and Scope of Review

The rule for determining whether a jury's verdict is excessive is set out as follows:

A verdict will not be disturbed as excessive unless it is so clear as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice, partiality or corruption; or that it was manifestly the result of disregard of the evidence or applicable rules of law. Otherwise stated: A verdict should not be set aside unless it is so grossly excessive as to shock the Court's conscience and sense of justice; and unless the injustice of allowing the verdict to stand is clear. [9] B. Discussion Ford sought a new trial, or alternatively remittitur, in part, because it claimed that the jury's verdict was the result of bias, passion, or prejudice caused by Plaintiff's counsel during closing argument, and that the admission of cumulative notice evidence inflamed the jury and likely impacted the verdict.[10] The Court found no merit in Ford's argument that the compensatory damages award was rendered by a jury inflamed by impermissible comments made by counsel in summation or by cumulative notice evidence.[11] The Court also found that there was no reason to believe that the jury's verdict otherwise resulted from passion, prejudice, partiality, or corruption; or that the jury manifestly disregarded the evidence or the law.[12]

The jury was able to parse both of the theories of liability presented by Plaintiff, finding for her on one and against her on the other, and apportion culpability rationally. Mr. Knecht testified that he worked with parts from all three major American automobile manufacturers. All three were assigned equal fault. Mr. Knecht had the least exposure to asbestos from construction work, and the verdict reflected that fact. Finally, the jury placed the greatest responsibility for his mesothelioma on Mr. Knecht, himself. It is difficult to believe that a jury consumed by passion, prejudice, partiality, or corruption, or one which manifestly disregarded the evidence or law could find Mr. Knecht more culpable than Ford.[13]

On remand, after considering the parties' arguments anew, the Court continues to adhere to its view that the jury's verdict was not the product of passion, prejudice, partiality, or corruption for the reasons set forth at some length in its earlier opinion.[14] Moreover, had the jury been so inflamed, it had available to it the option of punitive damages to express any passion, prejudice, partiality, or corruption it might have harbored.

Next, the Court re-considers whether the jury's total award of $40.625 million, and not merely the effective award of $8.125 million, was the result of the jury manifestly disregarding the evidence or the law. Stated another way, was the $40.625 million verdict so grossly excessive so as to shock the Court's conscience and sense of justice so that it would be clearly unjust to allow the verdict to stand? In answering that question, the Court keeps in mind that "[T]his Court interferes with the verdict of the jury only with great reluctance."[15]

Consistent with New Mexico law, the Court instructed the jury on compensatory damages:

This lawsuit has been brought by Paula Knecht, individually and on behalf of the surviving beneficiaries of Larry Knecht, who is now deceased.

The law allows damages to be awarded to the surviving spouse and beneficiaries if the death or the related damages described in this instruction were caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of another. If you should find for Paula Knecht on the question of liability, you must then fix the amount of money you deem fair and just for the life of Larry Knecht, including in your award compensation for any of the following elements of damages proved by the evidence:

1. The pain and suffering experienced by Mr. Knecht between the time of injury and death;

2. The value of Mr. Knecht's life apart from his earning capacity;

3. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending the wrongful act, neglect, or default;

4. The emotional distress to Paula Knecht caused by the loss of society, companionship, and sexual relations enjoyed with Mr. Knecht;

5. You may consider the loss to the beneficiaries of other expected benefits that have a monetary value. While the presence or absence of a measurable monetary loss to the beneficiaries is a factor for

consideration, damages may be awarded even where monetary loss to the surviving beneficiaries cannot be shown.

The property or wealth of the beneficiaries or of the defendant is not a legitimate factor for your

consideration.

No fixed standard exists for determining fair and just damages. You must use your judgment to decide a reasonable amount. Your verdict must be based on evidence, not on speculation, guess, or conjecture. You must not permit the amount of damages to be influenced by sympathy or prejudice.[16]

Plaintiff did not introduce any evidence of monetary damages such as medical bills or lost wages. The jury was aware that Mr. Knecht, who was 71 at the time of his death, had a life expectancy of 82.35 years of age.[17] The jury assigned Ford 20% of the negligence leading to Mr. Knecht developing mesothelioma, resulting in the compensatory award of $8.125 million against Ford.

The parties offered citations to damages awards in Delaware and elsewhere in an effort to convince the Court that the award either should or should not shock the Court's conscience.[18] As the Court has noted, while these types of comparisons can be helpful, they are imperfect proxies. Apart from the obvious facts that no two cases are factually identical and people suffer pain and loss of consortium unequally, multiple other factors make comparisons difficult. Such other factors include, but are far from limited to, the jurisdiction whose substantive law applies to the case, the jury instruction on damages of that jurisdiction, whether the plaintiff was deceased or living at the time of trial, the life expectancy of the plaintiff, the length of illness before death if the plaintiff is deceased, the number and degree of kinship of plaintiffs seeking damages for loss of consortium, and the closeness of the personal relationships of plaintiffs seeking loss of consortium damages with the deceased.

Assigning compensatory damages for pain and suffering and loss of consortium necessarily is a subjective endeavor. In effect a jury is asked to monetize pain and suffering and loss of consortium, losses which have no price tags or commonly accepted dollar value. New Mexico's jury instruction on damages, much like Delaware's, provides no definite or fixed standard for determining fair and just pain and suffering and loss of consortium damages.[19]

Here the jury knew that Mr. Knecht had been diagnosed with mesothelioma. It also knew, as Mr. Knecht knew, that mesothelioma is always fatal. Mr. Knecht's wife and son knew his diagnosis and the hopelessness of his fate as well. The only uncertainty was when the disease would kill him.

The jury also knew that death by mesothelioma is a particularly awful death, apart from the mental suffering it causes. The jury heard from Dr. Mark Ginsberg about mesothelioma and the course it takes in causing death. In particular Dr. Ginsberg described, through Mr. Knecht's medical records, the progress of the disease in Mr. Knecht. Dr. Ginsberg described mesothelioma as a "miserable, horrible, painful disease."[20] He explained that tumors growing along the pleura, like mesothelioma, invade or irritate the nerves running from the spine to the front of the body, causing severe pain in all of the nerves running up and down the chest wall.[21] Even with medication, the excruciating pain often is uncontrollable.[22] At

some point, once the disease advances, Dr. Ginsberg testified, patients with mesothelioma "suffer horribly because of the loss of lung function. They can't breathe ... they develop intractable pain. It's a miserable way to go."[23] Dr. Ginsberg testified that if too much pain medication is given, the patient cannot breathe.[24] Patients cannot eat and the pain is never controlled — a "horrible combination," according to Dr. Ginsberg.[25]

"It was just — it was a very, very difficult time" testified Paula Knecht, who was by her husband's side throughout his illness. [26] The Knechts had been together since high school and had been married almost as long, a total of 52 years.[27] After Mr. Knecht was diagnosed, their life was "very traumatic."[28] Even having his dog on his lap was too painful for Mr. Knecht and he would make the dog lay down beside him.[29] Mrs. Knecht testified that her husband's weight went from around 200 pounds to about 130 during the course of his illness.[30] At some point, even chemotherapy did not help, and Mrs. Knecht watched her husband "deteriorate day by day."[31] Eventually, he could not do things for himself MN. Knecht described an incident when Mr. Knecht, who was wearing a diaper, wanted to use the bathroom. She and her daughter-in-law tried to help him by each taking an arm, but "he cried out because it hurt him so badly."[32] It made them feel "horrible."[33] Mrs. Knecht testified "... he was so frail, but it hurt so bad. And I've never seen anybody in so much pain in my life. I would never wish that on anybody."[34] In the end, she signed a do not resuscitate order because, "I couldn't stand it ... I couldn't stand to watch him suffer. He suffered an awful lot."[35] Describing her life without Mr. Knecht, she said she lost her "soulmate," her "rock" the family's "rock."[36] In addition, it has been very difficult for her because she does not "have the money ... that he brought in"[37] She described her life now as "lonely"[38]

The Court has carefully reconsidered the parties' arguments in light of the direction of the Delaware Supreme Court. It finds that the jury's damage award of $40.625 million, while considerable, was not the result of the jury manifestly disregarding the evidence or the law. Further, the Court finds that the award was not so grossly excessive so as to shock the Court's sense of justice so that it would be clearly unjust to allow the verdict to stand. The Court has no reason to believe that this jury, which carefully and appropriately followed the Court's instructions in finding the facts and applying the law to those facts in determining liability, abruptly abandoned the law and evidence when it awarded damages. In the Court's view, the jury did not disregard the evidence in assessing compensatory damages, but rather considered the evidence of the unendurable pain and suffering Mr. Knecht sustained, the considerable value of his like to his loved ones, especially Mrs. Knecht, and the terrible emotional distress suffered by Mrs. Knecht. The Court's conscience is not shocked and the Court will not interfere with the jury's considered verdict.[39]

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth in this Memorandum Opinion, on remand, Ford Motor Company's Motion for a New Trial, or in the Alternative Remittitur is DENIED.

[1] In re Asbestos Litig., 2019 WL 6463089 (Del. Dec. 2, 2019) at [*3].

[2] The relevant factual and procedural history of the case is found in this Court's opinion denying Ford's post-trial motions and only is supplemented here as necessary. See In re Asbestos Litig., 2019 WL 413660 (Del. Super. Jan. 31, 2019). [3] D.I. 360.

[4] D.I. 363.

[5] Id.

[6] In Re: Asbestos Ling., 2019 WL 413660 (Del. Super. Jan. 31, 2019).

[7] D.I. 363.

[8] D.I. 366.

[9] In re Asbestos Litig., 2019 WL 6463089 at [*2] (Del. Dec. 2, 2019) (citing Storey v. Castner, 314 A.2d 187, 193 (Del. 1973)). [10] Def.'s Br. Mot. New Tr., at 20,26, D.I. 363.

[11] In re Asbestos Litig., 2019 WL 413660 at [*8]-13 (Del. Super. Jan. 31, 2019).

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] Id.

[15] Dana Companies, LLC v. Crawford, 35 A.3d 1110, 1113 (Del. 2011), quoting Burns v Del. Coca-Cola Bott, Co., 224 A.2d 1234, 1236 Del. 1997).

[16] Jury Instructions, at 40-41, D.I. 352.

[17] Id., at 42.

[18] Def.'s Br. Mot. New Tr., at 16-19., D.I. 363; Plf.'s Br. Opp. Mot. New Tr., at 26-29.

[19] See. Del.P.J.I. Civil § 22.1 (2000).

[20] Tr., May 17, 2018 at 97.

[21] Id.

[22] Id. at 98.

[23] Id. at 111-12.

[24] Id.

[25] Id.

[26] Tr., May 16, 2018 at 58.

[27] Id. at 9, 10, 27.

[28] Id. at 53.

[29] Id. at 54.

[30] Id.

[31] Id. at 55-56.

[32] Id. at 56.

[33] Id.

[34] Id.

[35] Id. at 59.

[36] Id.

[37] Id. at 60, 61.

[38] Id. at 61.

[39] The fact that the compensatory damages award was not a round number — $40 million — but, rather $40.65 million, seems to demonstrate that the jury employed a formula or calculation of some sort, lending further support to the conclusion that the award was based on the evidence.

Sources

• The opinion on Google Scholar
• Delaware asbestos laws
• Delaware asbestos exposure sites