McCoy v. PolyVision Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation, 2012)

Our plain-English summary of In re Asbestos Litigation (Delaware Superior Court, February 21, 2012).

Janine McCoy and her husband Marvin sued PolyVision Corp. in Delaware Superior Court. Marvin McCoy worked at PolyVision in Dixonville, Pennsylvania, from 1968 to 2009. Between 1974 and 1983 he cut asbestos-cement board, which created clouds of dust. The plaintiffs alleged the dust collected on his work clothes and that he wore them home. Janine washed the clothes two to three times a week. She was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2010 and alleged the laundering caused it. PolyVision moved for summary judgment. The court had to apply Pennsylvania law, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had not decided whether an employer owes a duty to an employee's spouse in this situation. The court predicted that court would find no duty. It weighed five factors: relationship, social utility, foreseeability, consequences of imposing a duty, and public interest. Relationship, consequences and public interest favored no duty, and the other two were neutral. It granted summary judgment to PolyVision and did not reach causation.

We wrote this summary from the court's opinion with the help of AI. It is not the court's wording, and it is not legal advice. The full opinion is below.

The decision

• Court: Delaware Superior Court
• Decided: February 21, 2012
• Stage: Summary judgment
• State: Delaware

Outcome. The court granted summary judgment to PolyVision Corp. against Janine and Marvin McCoy, predicting Pennsylvania law imposes no duty on an employer or premises owner to an employee's spouse for take-home asbestos exposure.

What the court held. Applying Pennsylvania law, the court predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would hold that an employer or premises owner owes no duty to an employee's spouse for take-home asbestos exposure, based on a weighing of the relationship, social utility, foreseeability, consequences and public interest factors.

Issues decided: Choice of Law, Premises Owner Liability, Take-Home Exposure.

The people and their exposure

• Janine McCoy (family member): mesothelioma

Who	Work	Where	When	Products
Janine McCoy	wife of worker who laundered his work clothes (construction); dust brought home	PolyVision, Dixonville, Dixonville, Pennsylvania	1974-1983	asbestos-cement pipe and sheet, asbestos-cement board

The defendants

• PolyVision Corp. (employer)

Other decisions in this case

Other rulings from the same court in the same case, in our library:

• In re Asbestos Litigation (May 9, 2006). The court denied DaimlerChrysler's motion in limine to exclude the plaintiffs' experts on general causation, so the plaintiffs' experts may testify that automotive friction products increase the risk of asbestosis, lung cancer and mesothelioma.
• Grenier v. General Motors Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (April 8, 2009). On remand from the Delaware Supreme Court, the Superior Court concluded that, despite factual errors in its earlier opinion, it properly denied General Motors' and Ford's motion to exclude plaintiffs' general causation expert testimony, so Grenier's experts remained admissible.
• Freeman v. Georgia-Pacific (In re Asbestos Litigation) (January 13, 2011). The court denied Georgia-Pacific's motion for summary judgment because plaintiffs raised a genuine dispute of fact about whether Wilburn Freeman was exposed to Georgia-Pacific's asbestos-containing joint compound.
• Olson v. Crane Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (January 18, 2011). The Delaware Superior Court granted summary judgment to defendants Crane Co. and CBS Corp. (Westinghouse) against plaintiffs, holding Idaho law would not make them liable for other manufacturers' asbestos-containing parts.
• Cruz v. Georgia-Pacific (In re Asbestos Litigation) (January 19, 2011). The court granted Georgia-Pacific's motion for summary judgment, ruling that plaintiffs could not show under Texas law that exposure to its Ready Mix joint compound was a substantial factor in causing Cruz's mesothelioma.
• Ashworth v. Pneumo Abex (In re Asbestos Litigation) (February 14, 2011). The court granted Pneumo Abex's summary judgment motion on the survival action as time-barred, but denied it on the wrongful death claim, which was timely and had factual disputes on causation and product identification.
• James v. Albany Int'l (In re Asbestos Litigation) (February 16, 2011). The court granted Albany International's motion for summary judgment against plaintiff Charlene James because there was no non-speculative evidence that Robert James was exposed to an asbestos-containing Albany product.
• Newman v. Avocet Enterprises (In re Asbestos Litigation) (March 15, 2011). The court denied Avocet Enterprises' motion for summary judgment on the Newmans' remaining claims, because Newman's testimony about using Ventbestos raised a factual dispute on causation, and found the motion moot as to the withdrawn conspiracy claim.
• Henderson v. Dana Companies (In re Asbestos Litigation) (March 22, 2011). The court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' post-trial motion for costs against Dana and Zoom, awarding $14,597.12 in costs plus pre- and post-judgment interest.
• Foucha v. CertainTeed Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (May 31, 2011). The court granted CertainTeed Corp.'s motion for summary judgment, ruling against plaintiffs Raymond and Sussanah Foucha because they lacked evidence that he was exposed to an asbestos-containing CertainTeed product.
• Foucha v. Georgia-Pacific (In re Asbestos Litigation) (June 3, 2011). The court granted Georgia-Pacific's motion for summary judgment against Raymond and Sussanah Foucha because they could not show without speculation that Foucha was exposed to asbestos from Georgia-Pacific joint compound.
• Bowser v. Parker-Hannifin Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (June 3, 2011). The court granted Parker-Hannifin's summary judgment motion in part (strict liability count and helicopter brake exposures before 1967) and denied it as to the airplane brake claims, so Plaintiff Jenny Bowser's remaining claims proceed.
• Davis v. Crane Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (June 7, 2011). The court granted Crane Co.'s motion for summary judgment against plaintiff Wesley Davis, finding he had not shown Crane-supplied asbestos products were a substantial factor in causing his mesothelioma.
• Clineff v. BP Amoco Chemical Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (July 8, 2011). The court granted summary judgment to BP Amoco Chemical Company, BP Corporation North America Inc., and Kvaerner U.S. Inc. because the plaintiffs' claims were filed after the two-year limitations period expired.
• Gordon v. Dana Companies (In re Asbestos Litigation) (November 16, 2011). The court granted summary judgment to Dana (Victor gaskets) and UOP, and denied summary judgment to Elliott, Armstrong and Born, so the plaintiffs' claims against those three go forward.
• Galliher v. R. T. Vanderbilt (In re Asbestos Litigation) (May 9, 2012). The court allowed plaintiff's late-disclosed geologist (Fitzgerald) to testify, excluded plaintiff's other late expert (Dr. Rigler), continued the trial to July 16, 2012 so defendant R. T. Vanderbilt could develop rebuttal evidence, and sanctioned defendant's out-of-state counsel $5000.
• Farrall v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 19, 2013). The court denied the plaintiff's motion for reargument, leaving in place its grant of summary judgment for Ford Motor Company on the failure to warn claim about asbestos-containing replacement parts.
• Muse v. Honeywell Int'l (In re Asbestos Litigation) (December 31, 2014). The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for reargument, leaving in place summary judgment for Honeywell International Inc. against James Muse and Clarice Roberts-Muse.
• Harris v. Deere & Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (May 10, 2017). The court granted Deere & Company's motion for summary judgment, ruling for Deere against the plaintiff, because under North Carolina law the plaintiff offered no evidence beyond speculation that the asbestos-containing parts he worked on were made or sold by Deere.
• Kivell v. Air Prods. and Chemicals (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 30, 2017). The court granted Air Products and Chemicals Inc.'s motion for summary judgment on the negligence, strict liability and wrongful death claims, ruling against plaintiff Sandra Kivell.
• Kivell v. Union Carbide Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 30, 2017). The Delaware Superior Court granted Union Carbide's motion for summary judgment on Sandra Kivell's negligence and strict liability claims, so Union Carbide won and the plaintiff lost.
• Kivell v. Murphy Oil USA (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 30, 2017). The court granted Murphy Oil USA Inc.'s motion for summary judgment on the negligence and strict liability claims brought by Sandra Kivell, so the plaintiff lost.
• Walsh v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (October 27, 2017). The court granted summary judgment to Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (successor to Buffalo Pumps) against plaintiffs Phillip and Naomi Walsh, finding no evidence Mr. Walsh was exposed to asbestos parts the defendant was responsible for.
• Leathers v. Pneumo Abex (In re Asbestos Litigation) (November 8, 2017). The court denied Pneumo Abex LLC's motion for summary judgment, so plaintiff Raymond Leathers' claims against Abex go forward to trial.
• Walsh v. Aurora Pump Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (November 29, 2017). The court granted Aurora Pump Company's motion for summary judgment against Phillip and Naomi Walsh because they did not show that Mr. Walsh was exposed to asbestos from Aurora's products.
• Sykes v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (February 7, 2018). The Superior Court affirmed the Special Master's order excluding William Don Sykes's videotaped trial deposition at trial, a ruling for the defendants and against the plaintiff estate.
• Kivell v. Georgia Pacific Consumer Prods. LP (In re Asbestos Litigation) (March 26, 2018). The court granted Georgia Pacific's motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that Sandra Kivell's wrongful death and survival claims were time barred under Louisiana's one-year limit.
• Richards v. Copes-Vulcan (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 8, 2018). The court denied the Richards plaintiffs' motion for leave to supplement their expert's report and for reargument, leaving in place summary judgment for Copes-Vulcan, Fairbanks, Ford and Goodyear.
• Call v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (December 12, 2018). The court granted Ford Motor Company's motion for summary judgment against plaintiff Marilyn Kay Call, holding Indiana's "but for" causation standard applies and her expert's opinion did not meet it.
• Knecht v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (January 31, 2019). The Delaware Superior Court denied Ford Motor Company's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, its alternative motion for a new trial, and its motion for a new trial or remittitur, leaving the plaintiff's jury verdict in place.
• Rowland v. Union Carbide Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (April 24, 2019). The Delaware Superior Court granted Union Carbide's motion for summary judgment against Jane and Douglas Rowland because they could not show that the joint compound they used contained Union Carbide's asbestos.
• Knecht v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (March 3, 2020). On remand from the Delaware Supreme Court, the Superior Court denied Ford Motor Company's motion for a new trial or remittitur, leaving the $40.625 million compensatory verdict for Paula Knecht in place.
• Petit v. Hennessy Indus. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 31, 2020). The Delaware Superior Court granted Hennessy Industries' motion for summary judgment against the Petit plaintiffs, because plaintiff did not show exposure to asbestos-containing brakes or to friable asbestos with the AMMCO machines.
• Pearsons v. Heidelberg USA (In re Asbestos Litigation) (December 23, 2020). The court denied Heidelberg USA's summary judgment motion on causation, statute of repose and product misuse, and granted it only on the willful and wanton conduct claim, which Mrs. Pearsons did not contest.
• Jordonek v. Hennessy Indus. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (April 11, 2023). The court denied Hennessy Industries' motion for reargument, so its earlier oral denial of summary judgment on the duty-to-warn claim stood and the plaintiff, Lisa Estrada, prevailed on this motion.
• Jordonek v. Hennessy Indus. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (April 25, 2023). The Superior Court denied defendant Hennessy Industries' request to certify an interlocutory appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court of the earlier denial of its summary judgment motion, so plaintiff Estrada prevailed on this request.
• Braxton v. J-M Mfg. Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (December 17, 2024). The court granted defendant J-M Manufacturing's motion for leave to designate responsible third parties, rejecting plaintiff Braxton's objections on pleading sufficiency, limitations timing and bankruptcy proofs of claim.

Decisions this opinion cites

Earlier decisions in our library that the court cited:

• Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber (Ohio Supreme Court, 2010). The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' summary judgment for Goodyear Tire & Rubber, so the executor of Mary Adams's estate and Clayton Adams lost their take-home asbestos claims against Goodyear.
• Riedel v. Ici Americas Inc. (Delaware Supreme Court, 2009). The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for ICI Americas, holding ICI owed no duty to Lillian Riedel, who lost her take-home asbestos exposure claim.
• Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (New Jersey Supreme Court, 2006). The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division's reversal of summary judgment for Exxon Mobil and remanded for further proceedings on whether the hazard-incident-to-the-work exception applies, so plaintiff Olivo's claim continued.
• Holdampf v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Matter of Nyc Asbestos Litig) (New York Court of Appeals, 2005). The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstated Supreme Court's summary judgment for the Port Authority, and held the Port Authority owed no duty of care to the wife of its employee, so the Holdampfs lost.

The court's opinion

The text below is Google Scholar's copy of the court's opinion, a public record. Numbers in brackets, such as [*921], mark where each page of the printed reporter begins.

IN RE ASBESTOS LITIGATION.

JANINE McCOY and MARVIN McCOY Limited to: PolyVision Corp.

C.A. No. N10C-04-203 ASB.

February 21, 2012.

Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County.

Ian Connor Bifferato, Esquire, David W. deBruin, Esquire, Bifferato LLC, Wilmington, Delaware, Counsel for Plaintiffs Janine McCoy and Marvin McCoy.

Armand J. Della Porta, Jr., Esquire, Ana Marina McCann, Esquire, Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, Wilmington Delaware, Counsel for Defendant PolyVision Corp.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOHN A. PARKINGS, JR., Judge.

This is a take home asbestos exposure case in which the court must apply Pennsylvania law. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not ruled on whether a duty applies in take home asbestos exposure cases. For the reasons discussed below, the court predicts that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not find that a premises owner/employer owes a duty to its employee's spouse for take home asbestos exposure. Therefore, summary judgment is GRANTED.

FACTS

Plaintiff, Marvin McCoy, worked at PolyVision in Dixonville, Pennsylvania from 1968-2009. Between 1974-1983 Mr. McCoy cut asbestos-cement board creating asbestos-containing clouds of dust. Plaintiffs allege that asbestos dust collected on Mr. McCoy's work clothes and he wore them home. Janine McCoy, his wife, washed his clothes two to three times a week. She was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2010 and alleges it was caused by laundering her husband's work clothes. ANALYSIS

The issue before the court is whether the premises owner owes a duty to an employee's spouse in a take home asbestos exposure case.[1] The facts are not in dispute. In considering a motion for summary judgment the court views the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and will only grant summary judgment when "the moving party has demonstrated that there are no material issues of fact in dispute and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."[2] The question of whether a legal duty exists "is a question of law for the Court to determine."[3] A. Pennsylvania Duty Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not determined whether a duty exists for a premises owner/employer to the spouse of an employee for take home asbestos exposure. Defendant's directed the court to a decision by a federal magistrate judge that was affirmed by the district court judge.[4] After examining in some detail, the Restatement (Second) of Torts and Pennsylvania cases considering duty,[5] the court concluded that under Pennsylvania law a premises owner owed no duty to third persons arising from take home asbestos exposure.[6]

Plaintiffs cite two cases from the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas on this issue—neither offers extensive analysis. In Hudson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. Plaintiff alleged asbestos exposure from doing her father's laundry.[7] The court found no duty existed basing its finding on a review of available literature at the time and concluding "we can find no evidence that Bethlehem Steel could have reasonably forseen that [Plaintiff] would be affected by the asbestos-containing products during

the time periods in issue."[8] In contrast another trial court found a duty did exist.[9] The court determined evidence existed in the record that the defendant knew or should have known of the danger to the Plaintiff and distinguished the case from Hudson.[10] The court also refused to follow decisions of other jurisdictions finding a duty did not exist and without citation to any authorities stated that matter should be left to the appellate courts.[11] The absence of analysis in these two decisions limits their usefulness in predicting how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would rule on this issue.

Pennsylvania courts look to many factors in considering duty. "[T]he legal concept of duty of care is necessarily rooted in often amorphous public policy considerations, which may include our perception of history, morals, justice and society."[12] The determination of whether a duty exists requires courts to weigh several factors "include[ing]: (1) the relationship between the parties; (2) the social utility of the actor's conduct; (3) the nature of the risk imposed and foreseeability of the harm incurred; (4) the consequences of imposing a duty upon the actor; and (5) the overall public interest in the proposed solution."[13]

1. Relationship Analysis

Plaintiffs offer no evidence that Janine McCoy ever set foot on PolyVision's site or that she was exposed to asbestos at its site. The extent of her relationship appears to be that she was married to an employee of PolyVision. In a case similar to the one at bar, this court has previously opined that "[w]here the duty analysis focuses on the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, and not simply the foreseeability of injury, the courts uniformly hold that an employer/premises owner owes no duty to a member of a household injured by take home exposure to asbestos."[14] In the same case the Delaware Supreme Court found a premises owner which provided a newsletter about staying safe at home to employees and their families did not have a "legally significant relationship" to which a duty would attach.[15] Other courts have found, "no relationship" between a premises owner/employer and the employee's spouse.[16] Mrs. McCoy and PolyVision "are `legal strangers in the context of negligence.'"[17] This factor weighs heavily against a duty existing.

2. Social Utility Analysis

The court next looks to the social utility of PolyVision and its actions as it relates to asbestos use and Mrs. McCoy's exposure. PolyVision made and sold building panels. As an employer and profit generator for shareholders, PolyVision's business activities provide "a valuable and useful activity to society," which disfavors extending a duty.[18] On the other hand, society has an interest in being protected from exposure to disease causing toxins, specifically asbestos here, which favors extending a duty. This factor does not tip the scale in either direction.

3. Foreseeability Analysis

There is much debate among the courts as to the role of foreseeability analysis in duty analysis. "In nearly every instance where courts have recognized a duty of care in a take home exposure case, the decision turned on the court's conclusion that the foreseeability of risk was the primary (if not only) consideration in the duty analysis."[19] In Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.[20] the New Jersey Supreme Court focused on foreseeability analysis and determined a duty existed. It found that the plaintiff's employer "should have foreseen that whoever performed that task would come into contact with the asbestos that infiltrated his clothing while he performed his contracted tasks."[21] The Court ruled the employer similarly "owed a duty to spouses handling the workers' unprotected work clothing based on the foreseeable risk of exposure from asbestos borne home on contaminated clothing."[22]

In Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.,[23] perhaps the causation case best known among America's law students, then Chief Judge Cardozo performed foreseeability analysis. The Court explained the injured party "does not sue derivatively, or by right of subrogation, to vindicate an interest invaded in the person of another. . . . He sues for breach of a duty owing to himself."[24] Therefore relationship and foreseeability an inextricable intertwined. Judge Slights applied this concept from Palsgraf to the issue currently before the court:

Even when the foreseeability prong is incorporated into the duty analysis, the Court cannot discern a

relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant that would support a legal duty. [Defendant] clearly owed a duty to [its employee] just as the conductor in Palsgraf owed a duty to the passengers he was helping onto the train. But, just as in Palsgraf, the duty owed to [employee] does not vicariously pass on to [his spouse] in the absence of some independent relationship between [Defendant] and [spouse] that would justify the

imposition of the duty. Her position at the time of the alleged wrong, far removed from [Defendant's] property, is such that she cannot be considered a reasonably foreseeable victim of the alleged breach of the duty [Defendant] owed to [employee] (in failure to warn and/or implement safety precautions).[25]

As shown through Olivo and Riedel courts have found weight for and against applying a duty under foreseeability analysis. The court does not find this factor to tip the scale in either direction.

4. Consequence of Imposing a Duty

The court also considers the consequences of burdening employers such as PolyVision with a duty of care beyond their employees. Learned Hand's risk/benefit analysis offers an economic approach to this factor. Judge Hand considered three variables: 1. the probability of injury (P); 2. "the gravity of the resulting injury" (L); and 3. the burden on Defendant to take adequate precautions (B).[26] Under this analysis liability extends or a duty exists if "B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B less than PL."[27] Judge Hand incorporates a business focused economic analysis to his duty analysis. The burden to be considered is not just to take adequate precautions for the employee's spouse. The court must consider the effect of its ruling if it were to find a duty exists. Certainly that duty would not be limited to spouses. Family members, babysitters, housekeepers, and laundry mat personnel would have a credible argument that the duty extended to them if they washed the employees clothes.[28] "The `specter of limitless liability' is banished only when `the class of potential plaintiffs to whom the duty is owed is circumscribed by the relationship.'"[29] Taken a step farther, "there is no principled basis in the law" to distinguish the claim of a spouse who launders a household members clothes and is exposed to asbestos from a car pool passenger, bus driver, or neighbor who is exposed to asbestos from the employee's clothing.[30] "All have been exposed to asbestos from the employee's clothing; all arguably have intersected with the asbestos-covered employee in a foreseeable manner; and all would have viable claims of negligence against the employer/landowner if the take home exposure cause of action is permitted." Returning to Judge Hand, "[t]he burden upon the defendant to undertake to warn or otherwise protect every potentially foreseeable victim of off-premises exposure to asbestos is simply too great; the exposure to potential liability would be practically limitless." The consequences are economically infeasible under Judge Hand's analysis and as such this factor weighs against extending a duty.

5. Overall Public Interest

Public interest supports plaintiffs having their day in court. But there are also public policy considerations supporting limitation on an injured person's ability to seek redress. Statutes of limitation, which exists in every jurisdiction in this country, are but one manifestation of these policy considerations.

Much of duty analysis is based on public policy. The public policy interests of states in the same region are likely to coincide more so than for states across the country from one another. For that reason, the court finds the rulings of courts of last resort in Pennsylvania's region most persuasive.

• As mentioned previously New York found no duty based on the lack of relationship between the parties and expressed special concern for the risk of "limitless liability."[31]

• Legislatures are in the business of public policy and in Ohio the legislature codified this limitation on duty. [32] Interpreting the statute the Ohio Supreme Court concluded "a premises owner is not liable in tort for claims arising from asbestos exposure originating from asbestos on the owner's property unless the

exposure occurred at the owner's properly."[33]

• In considering a different toxic tort, the Maryland court relied in part on a lower court decision finding no duty in a take home asbestos exposure case and expressed an unwillingness to create a duty of care to an

"indeterminate class of potential plaintiffs."[34]

• The Delaware Supreme Court focused its analysis on the Restatement (Second) of Torts and determined

no duty existed because there was not a special relationship between the parties.[35]

• The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the public policy argument that limitless liability would exist stating "[t]he duty we recognize in these circumstances is focused on the particularized foreseeability of harm to plaintiff's wife, who ordinarily would perform typical household chores that would include laundering the work clothes worn by her husband."[36]

Five of the states adjacent to Pennsylvania have considered the issue of take home liability and four of them have rejected it. The court finds the majority of the border states make the stronger argument and limitless liability is serious public policy concern of finding that a duty exists. Therefore, this factor weighs against a duty in this case.

CONCLUSION

Relationship analysis, consequence of imposing a duty, and overall public policy favor a finding of no duty. Social utility analysis and foreseeability analysis do not tip the scale in either direction. The court finds the relationship analysis the most persuasive factor. In weighing the factors as a whole the scale tips in favor of no duty existing. Therefore, the court finds under Pennsylvania law an employer/premises owner does not owe a duty to the spouse of an employee in the take homes asbestos exposure context. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

[1] Defense Counsel also argued for summary judgment based on causation. Given the court's ruling on the duty issue, it is not necessary for the court to address causation and thus it is not addressed.

[2] Bantum v. New Castle County Co-Tech Educ. Ass'n, 21 A.3d 44, 48 (Del. 2011) (citations omitted).

[3] Riedel v. ICI Americas Inc., 968 A.2d, 17, 20 (Del. 2009) (citing New Haverford P'ship v. Stroot, 772 A.2d 792, 798 (Del. 2001)). [4] Jesensky v. A-Best Products, Co., C.A. No. 96-680 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2003), aff'd, 2004 WL 5267498, [*2] (W.D. Pa. 2004). [5] Id. at 18-20.

[6] Id. at 20.

[7] 1995 WL 17778064, at [*1] (Pa. Com. Pl).

[8] Id. at [*3] (noting that the no duty finding was in part based on foreseeability analysis).

[9] Siemon v. A.O. Smith Corp., Oct. 19, 2006 slip op. (C.P. Alleg. Co. No. GD 06-9079) (ORDER).

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] Althaus v. Cohen, 756 A.2d 1166, 1169 (Pa. 2000).

[13] Id.

[14] In re Asbestos Litig. Ltd. to Lillian Riedel, 2007 WL 4571196, at [*8] (Del. Super), aff'd, ICI Americas, 968 A.2d 17 (Del. 2009). [15] ICI Americas, 968 A.2d at 26.

[16] Holdamph v. A.C.&S., Inc., 840 N.E.2d 115, 120 (N.Y. 2005).

[17] ICI Americas, 968 A.2d at 26-27 (quoting 2007 WL 4571196, at [*12]).

[18] Althaus, 756 A.2d at 1170.

[19] Riedel, 2007 WL 4571196, at [*11].

[20] 895 A.2d 1143 (N.J. 2006).

[21] Id. at 1149.

[22] Id.

[23] 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).

[24] Id. at 101.

[25] Riedel, 2007 WL 4571196, at [*12] (citations omitted).

[26] United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2nd Cir. 1947).

[27] Id.

[28] See Holdamph, 840 N.E.2d at 122.

[29] Id. (quoting Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1061 (N.Y. 2001)).

[30] See Riedel, 2007 WL 4571196, at [*12].

[31] Holdamph, 840 N.E. 2d. at 122.

[32] R.C. 2307.941(A).

[33] Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 929 N.E.2d 448, 449 (Ohio 2010).

[34] Doe v. Pharmacia & Upjohn Co., Inc., 879 A.2d 1088, 1096 (Md. 2005).

[35] ICI Americas, 968 A.2d at 26-27.

[36] Olivo, 895 A.2d at 1150.

Sources

• The opinion on Google Scholar
• Delaware asbestos laws
• Delaware asbestos exposure sites