Take-Home Exposure in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on duty to family members exposed to dust brought home (take-home: 238 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

About this issue

Spouses who shook out and laundered work clothes, and children who hugged a parent coming home from work, have developed mesothelioma from take-home (secondary or household) exposure. Their negligence claims against employers and premises owners turn first on whether the company owed a duty to people who never set foot at the workplace. Claims against product manufacturers may also be brought as product-liability claims, which raise different questions.

The states are divided on the duty question:

• Some recognize a duty, often limited to members of the worker's household, on the reasoning that harm to them was foreseeable.
• Some reject it, reasoning that there was no relationship between the company and the family member, or that recognizing a duty would expose companies to limitless claims.
• Some treat employers, premises owners and manufacturers differently, or ask when the company should have known about take-home risks.

Where a duty exists, the family must still prove exposure traceable to the defendant and causation, and meet the filing deadline, which can differ for injury and death claims. Read more about take-home asbestos exposure.

Alabama

• Bobo v. Tennessee Valley Authority (2017). Predicting Alabama law, the court held that an employer has a duty to prevent take-home asbestos exposure of an employee's household members when the injury is foreseeable and public policy supports a duty. The court also held that medical charges written off by providers under insurer agreements are not recoverable as damages.
• Bobo v. Tennessee Valley Authority (2015). Applying Alabama law as it predicted, the court held that an employer owes a duty of reasonable care to an employee's household member exposed to asbestos carried home on work clothes, and that substantial factor causation applies to asbestos negligence claims involving multiple exposures. It also held that TVA was not shielded by the discretionary function doctrine because it violated mandatory rules.
• Bobo v. Tennessee Valley Authority (2015). The court concluded that Alabama law has no controlling answer on whether a premises owner owes a duty to workers' family members for take-home asbestos exposure, or on whether but-for or substantial-factor causation applies to multiple asbestos exposures, so it certified both questions to the state supreme court.
• Bobo v. Agco Corporation (2013). The discretionary function doctrine applies to TVA's power-generation activities, but it does not shield TVA from claims that it violated mandatory OSHA regulations or its own mandatory policies, or that it negligently carried out safety procedures it had adopted. Decisions not to warn employees' spouses and on the content of training are discretionary and protected.
• Bobo v. Agco Corporation (2013). A motion to amend filed after a scheduling order deadline must meet Rule 16(b)'s good cause standard, which requires diligence; a plaintiff who knew the underlying facts earlier and gave no reason for delay fails it. The Authority is immune from punitive damages and plaintiffs have no jury right against it.
• Patterson v. Consolidated Aluminum Corporation (2012). To use Rule 9(h) and 15(c) relation back to substitute a named defendant for a fictitious one after limitations has run, the plaintiff must have exercised due diligence and promptly amended once the defendant's identity was known or should have been known; failure of any one requirement defeats substitution.

Arizona

• Quiroz v. Alcoa Inc. (2018). In Arizona, duty rests only on recognized special relationships or public policy (chiefly statutes), not on foreseeability or presumed risk creation. An employer therefore owes no duty to a worker's child for take-home asbestos, and the Third Restatement's duty framework is rejected.
• Quiroz v. Alcoa Inc. (1st Division, 2016). Under Arizona law, which does not use foreseeability to decide whether a duty exists, an employer owes no duty of care, based on relationship or public policy, to an employee's child who was exposed to asbestos carried home on the employee's work clothes.
• Perez v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co. (2nd Division, Dept. A, 1993). Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activity must be decided under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 factors as of the time the defendant engaged in the activity, not under the products-liability "hindsight" test of Dart v. Wiebe. The statute of repose, A.R.S. § 12-551, is unconstitutional and cannot bar the products claim.

California

• Williams v. JM Manufacturing Company, Inc. (1st Appellate District, 2nd Division, 2024). The limit in Kesner on the duty of care for take-home asbestos exposure, which reaches only household members, applies to negligence and premises claims. It does not bar a strict liability claim, which requires no proof of duty, by a non-household family member against a product supplier.
• Mata v. Liberty Utilities (park Water) Corp. (2nd Appellate District, 3rd Division, 2020). Punitive damages against a corporation require clear and convincing evidence that an officer, director or managing agent had actual knowledge of the risk and willfully and consciously disregarded it; a failure to follow safety regulations, without evidence management knew asbestos was present, is not malice.
• Lopez v. the Hillshire Brands Company (1st Appellate District, 5th Division, 2019). CACI No. 435, the asbestos substantial-factor instruction based on Rutherford, applies to an asbestos claim against a premises owner that is not a manufacturer or supplier, and a 'but-for' causation instruction is not required where there may be multiple sources of exposure.
• Foglia v. Moore Dry Dock Company (1st Appellate District, 2nd Division, 2018). A defendant can shift the burden on summary judgment through plaintiffs' factually devoid discovery responses and other evidence, and an expert opinion resting on assumed facts with no admissible evidentiary support (here, that the father worked around asbestos at the shipyard) lacks foundation and cannot raise a triable issue.
• Rudolph v. Rudolph and Sletten, Inc. (1st Appellate District, 5th Division, 2018). Where an employee's occupational asbestos exposure substantially contributed to his mesothelioma, the injury is covered by workers' compensation, and a separate non-occupational exposure (such as take-home exposure) does not create a separate injury outside the exclusive remedy.
• Beckering v. Shell Oil Company (2nd Appellate District, 3rd Division, 2017). Under Kesner, employers and premises owners that use asbestos owe a duty of ordinary care to prevent take-home exposure to members of a worker's household, and this duty extends no further than the household.
• DeLOOF v. Ace Hardware Corp. (2nd Appellate District, 4th Division, 2017). A defendant can meet its summary judgment burden by showing through factually devoid discovery responses that the plaintiff cannot prove exposure to its asbestos-containing product, and by expert testimony that no respirable fibers were released. The plaintiff must then produce evidence of a triable issue, and causation cannot rest on speculation.
• Petitpas v. Ford Motor Company (2nd Appellate District, 4th Division, 2017). An employer's or premises owner's duty to prevent take-home asbestos exposure extends only to members of the worker's household, and a vehicle maker is not liable in design defect for asbestos in other makers' replacement brakes merely because its vehicles were compatible with them. A service provider that does not sell the asbestos parts it installs is not within the stream of commerce for strict liability.
• Sandoval v. American Appliance Manufacturing Corp. (2nd Appellate District, 4th Division, 2017). Under Kesner, employers and property owners owe a duty to prevent take-home asbestos exposure to household members, and a defendant seeking summary judgment for lack of exposure evidence must show the plaintiff cannot obtain it. A dissolved corporation is not shielded from punitive damages claims, and a strict liability claim can rest on a bystander theory for defective components of the defendant's own product.
• Baeza v. Special Electric Company, Inc. (2nd Appellate District, 4th Division, 2016). Under the consumer expectation test, the jury may consider the circumstances of a product's use, including the warnings, safety equipment and information given to the workers who were its ordinary users, and defense counsel may argue that evidence.
• Kesner v. Superior Court and Haver (2016). Employers and premises owners that use asbestos owe a duty of ordinary care to prevent take-home exposure to asbestos carried on workers' bodies and clothing, but the duty extends only to members of the worker's household.
• Hendricks v. Armstrong International, Inc. (2015). A resident defendant is fraudulently joined only if it is obvious under settled state law that the plaintiff cannot state a claim against it, and doubts about removal are resolved in favor of remand; all properly joined, non-nominal defendants must join in removal.
• Melendrez v. Ameron International Corporation (2nd Appellate District, 4th Division, 2015). If employment substantially contributed to a disease, the disease is covered by workers' compensation even if a nonindustrial cause such as home exposure also contributed, so the exclusive remedy rule bars a tort suit against the employer for the whole injury.
• Beckering v. Shell Oil Co. (2nd Appellate District, 3rd Division, 2014). Applying the Rowland factors and following Campbell v. Ford Motor Co., a premises owner owes no duty to protect a family member from secondary (take-home) asbestos exposure off the premises from asbestos-contaminated work clothes.
• Haver v. BNSF Railway Co. (2nd Appellate District, 5th Division, 2014). Following Campbell v. Ford Motor Co., a premises owner owes no duty of care to family members of workers who are secondarily exposed to asbestos off the premises, whether the worker was employed by the owner or by a contractor.
• Kesner v. Superior Court of Alameda County (1st Appellate District, 3rd Division, 2014). An employer's duty of reasonable care extends at least to members of an employee's household and to long-term, frequent guests likely to be affected by toxic materials brought home on the worker's clothing. Premises-liability no-duty rules such as Campbell do not control a negligence claim about the employer's own manufacturing conduct.
• Klinger v. Alderete (2nd Appellate District, 2nd Division, 2013). A malicious prosecution claim arising from the filing of an underlying lawsuit is subject to the anti-SLAPP statute, and it fails if the underlying suit had probable cause, meaning it was legally tenable and based on facts the plaintiff reasonably believed true when it was filed. Later-decided cases do not make a suit untenable at the time it was filed.
• Swanson v. Simpson Timber Company (2nd Appellate District, 3rd Division, 2013). Under the Rowland factors, a premises owner owes no duty to an employee secondarily exposed to asbestos off the premises through a family member and fellow employee's work clothes. An employee's secondary exposure from wearing his own work clothes home is a derivative injury barred by workers' compensation exclusivity.
• Campbell v. Ford Motor Company (2nd Appellate District, 7th Division, 2012). Under the Rowland factors as clarified in Cabral, an employer or premises owner has no duty to protect employees' family members from secondary (take-home) asbestos exposure. New Jersey's statute of repose did not bar the claim because it excludes persons in possession and control as owner.
• Haver v. BNSF Railroad Co. (2nd Appellate District, 5th Division, 2012). Collateral estoppel requires that the issue be identical to one actually litigated in the prior case; a prior judgment on locomotive-exposure allegations does not bar a later wrongful death claim based on different, non-locomotive asbestos exposures that were never raised or decided.
• Fontes v. Interstate Brands Corporation (2nd Appellate District, 5th Division, 2011). A defendant can shift the burden on summary judgment by showing through discovery responses and deposition testimony that plaintiffs cannot prove asbestos was present at the work site. An expert declaration lacking foundation for that point is properly excluded, and a new trial motion based on excluded expert opinions fails because the evidence is not material.
• Haver v. BNSF Railway Company (2nd Appellate District, 4th Division, 2010). Pleadings delimit the issues on summary judgment, so a plaintiff cannot defeat the motion with a new unpleaded factual theory raised in opposition without seeking leave to amend the complaint. Claims based on asbestos in locomotives are preempted by the federal Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act.
• Honer v. Ford Motor Company (2nd Appellate District, 7th Division, 2007). Under Code of Civil Procedure section 361, a California-citizen plaintiff who held the cause of action from accrual is not barred by another state's statute of repose. A premises owner was not entitled to summary judgment where the record on its knowledge and control was disputed.
• Franklin v. Usx Corp. (1st Appellate District, 3rd Division, 2001). A corporation that buys a predecessor's assets for adequate cash consideration under an unambiguous, integrated agreement disclaiming liabilities is not liable as successor under assumption, de facto merger or mere continuation theories. The product line successor rule applies only to strict product liability claims, not to negligence or premises claims.

Colorado

• Mestas v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the court predicted that Colorado courts would not reject a take-home asbestos exposure claim simply because the plaintiff lacked direct contact with the defendants' products. Foreseeability, public policy and the alleged exposure to fibers from those products supported a duty of reasonable care.

Delaware

• Salvemini v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2025). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to the particular defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in the injury, and vague testimony that cannot separate that defendant's product from others fails. General maritime law did not reach a spouse's land-based take-home exposure when the plaintiffs did not show the maritime connection test was met.
• Reed v. Nosroc Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2017). To survive summary judgment in a take-home asbestos case, plaintiffs must produce evidence from which a jury could infer, without speculation, that the worker was in specific proximity to the defendant's product while it was being used (and, where friability is properly raised, while it was friable).
• McCoy v. PolyVision Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2012). Applying Pennsylvania law, the court predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would hold that an employer or premises owner owes no duty to an employee's spouse for take-home asbestos exposure, based on a weighing of the relationship, social utility, foreseeability, consequences and public interest factors.
• Price v. EI DuPont de Nemours & Co. (2011). Claims that an employer failed to prevent a worker from carrying asbestos home or failed to warn the family are nonfeasance, not misfeasance. Absent a special relationship between the employer and the spouse, the employer owes her no duty of care.
• Riedel v. Ici Americas Inc. (2009). Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, an employer owes no duty to an employee's spouse absent a legally significant special relationship for a nonfeasance claim, and a party cannot argue on appeal a misfeasance theory not fairly presented to the trial court. The court declined to adopt the Restatement (Third) of Torts duty provisions.

Georgia

• Certainteed Corporation v. Fletcher (2016). A manufacturer's design-defect liability is judged under the Banks risk-utility test, not the CSX v. Williams employer-duty rule, and a defendant seeking summary judgment must show an absence of any evidence of defect. A manufacturer owes no duty to warn third parties, such as family members laundering a worker's dusty clothes, because the scope and mechanism of such warnings would be endless.
• Fletcher v. Water Applications Distribution (2015). A manufacturer's duty in a design defect case is judged by risk-utility analysis, which is not limited to particular classes of people, so a household-exposure plaintiff's design and failure-to-warn claims against the manufacturer can go to a jury. A distributor lacking knowledge of the hazard and never possessing the product has no continuing duty to warn.
• Union Carbide Corporation v. Fields (2012). A defendant cannot have fault allocated to a nonparty under OCGA § 51-12-33 unless it presents competent evidence that the nonparty's product actually contributed to the plaintiff's injury; inference, unverified allegations, or settled status alone are not enough. An employer owes no duty for take-home exposure, so it bears no allocable fault.
• Williams v. Flintkote Co. (2002). To survive summary judgment, an asbestos plaintiff must show that the defendant's asbestos-containing product was used at the job site and that the plaintiff was in proximity to it while it was used; the court declined to adopt a presumption of exposure from merely working at a site where the defendant's products were used.
• Hoffman v. AC&S, Inc. (2001). A plaintiff in an asbestos case must present non-speculative evidence that the defendant's asbestos-containing product was used at the job site while the exposed person was nearby; testimony that a defendant's products were used at the site at some unspecified time during the 1960s is insufficient. An expert's general opinion that workers were exposed to asbestos products does not supply the missing link to a particular defendant.

Idaho

• Stephens v. Union Pacific R. Co. (2019). Under Idaho's substantial-factor test, applied as in the Ninth Circuit's asbestos cases, a plaintiff must show substantial exposure to the defendant's asbestos over a substantial period. Expert opinions that rest on assumptions the record does not support cannot create a genuine factual dispute.
• Stephens v. Union Pacific Railroad Company (2018). Field preemption under the Locomotive Inspection Act is an affirmative defense that is waived if not pleaded, not a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction. A plaintiff must prove exposure as a threshold matter and must produce evidence that the defendant's asbestos was a substantial factor in causing the disease.

Illinois

• Neumann v. Borg-Warner Morse Tec LLC (2016). Because Illinois courts had not recognized a duty running to family members in take-home asbestos cases, the court, choosing the narrower reading of state law that restricts liability, found no duty owed to the plaintiff and applied that ruling equally to all defendants.
• Neumann v. Borg-Warner Morse Tec LLC (2016). Predicting Illinois law without guidance from the state supreme court, a federal court chose the narrower view and held that a product manufacturer owes no duty to a worker's family member in a take-home asbestos case, given the burden of guarding against the injury and the consequences of imposing that burden.
• Simpkins v. CSX Transp., Inc. (2012). Whether a defendant owed a duty depends on whether it contributed to a risk of harm to the plaintiff and on four factors (foreseeability, likelihood, burden, consequences), without a separate 'direct relationship' requirement. A complaint that only conclusorily alleges the defendant knew or should have known of the danger is insufficient in a fact-pleading jurisdiction.
• In re Estate OF Holmes v. Pneumo Abex, LLC (4th District, 2011). No duty was owed to a household member for take-home asbestos exposure where the danger was not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the husband's work (1962-1963), so the civil conspiracy claim based on a duty to disclose could not stand.