Rowland v. Union Carbide Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation, 2019)

Our plain-English summary of In re Asbestos Litigation (Delaware Superior Court, April 24, 2019).

Jane Rowland and her husband Douglas sued several defendants, including Union Carbide, alleging that she developed mesothelioma from asbestos exposure. Her claimed exposure included laundering her husband's work clothes and helping clean up after four home renovation projects in Ohio between 1972 and 1976. The projects used Georgia-Pacific joint compound that Mr. Rowland bought. Union Carbide had sold Calidria chrysotile asbestos to Georgia-Pacific, but Georgia-Pacific also bought asbestos from other suppliers, mainly Philip Carey. Union Carbide moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Rowlands could not show the compound they used contained its asbestos. The Rowlands pointed to Georgia-Pacific formula cards showing Calidria was used in some ready mix products in 1972. The court found the extra card only confirmed a fact Union Carbide already conceded. It held that a jury could only speculate that the Rowlands' compound contained Union Carbide's asbestos, and granted summary judgment. The court did not reach the duty-to-warn or design arguments.

We wrote this summary from the court's opinion with the help of AI. It is not the court's wording, and it is not legal advice. The full opinion is below.

The decision

• Court: Delaware Superior Court
• Decided: April 24, 2019
• Stage: Summary judgment
• State: Delaware

Outcome. The Delaware Superior Court granted Union Carbide's motion for summary judgment against Jane and Douglas Rowland because they could not show that the joint compound they used contained Union Carbide's asbestos.

What the court held. A plaintiff must offer evidence, beyond speculation, that the product used actually contained the defendant's asbestos. Where the defendant was only one of several suppliers to the product's maker, that inference cannot reasonably be drawn.

Issues decided: Product Identification.

The people and their exposure

• Jane Rowland (family member): mesothelioma

Who	Work	Where	When	Products
Jane Rowland	homeowner assisting with home renovation clean-up	home renovation projects, Ohio	1972-1976	joint compound, industrial process materials, chrysotile, Georgia-Pacific dry mix joint compound, Georgia-Pacific ready mix joint compound, Calidria (Union Carbide)
Jane Rowland	launderer of her husband's work clothing; dust brought home	Plastolite
Jane Rowland	launderer of her father's work clothing; dust brought home	General Motors

The defendants

• Union Carbide Corporation (supplier)

Mines named here

Asbestos mines this opinion is about. Each mine's page says who ran it, when it worked, and what it produced.

• Santa Rita mine, Joaquin Ridge near Coalinga, California

All asbestos mines

Other decisions in this case

Other rulings from the same court in the same case, in our library:

• In re Asbestos Litigation (May 9, 2006). The court denied DaimlerChrysler's motion in limine to exclude the plaintiffs' experts on general causation, so the plaintiffs' experts may testify that automotive friction products increase the risk of asbestosis, lung cancer and mesothelioma.
• Grenier v. General Motors Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (April 8, 2009). On remand from the Delaware Supreme Court, the Superior Court concluded that, despite factual errors in its earlier opinion, it properly denied General Motors' and Ford's motion to exclude plaintiffs' general causation expert testimony, so Grenier's experts remained admissible.
• Freeman v. Georgia-Pacific (In re Asbestos Litigation) (January 13, 2011). The court denied Georgia-Pacific's motion for summary judgment because plaintiffs raised a genuine dispute of fact about whether Wilburn Freeman was exposed to Georgia-Pacific's asbestos-containing joint compound.
• Olson v. Crane Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (January 18, 2011). The Delaware Superior Court granted summary judgment to defendants Crane Co. and CBS Corp. (Westinghouse) against plaintiffs, holding Idaho law would not make them liable for other manufacturers' asbestos-containing parts.
• Cruz v. Georgia-Pacific (In re Asbestos Litigation) (January 19, 2011). The court granted Georgia-Pacific's motion for summary judgment, ruling that plaintiffs could not show under Texas law that exposure to its Ready Mix joint compound was a substantial factor in causing Cruz's mesothelioma.
• Ashworth v. Pneumo Abex (In re Asbestos Litigation) (February 14, 2011). The court granted Pneumo Abex's summary judgment motion on the survival action as time-barred, but denied it on the wrongful death claim, which was timely and had factual disputes on causation and product identification.
• James v. Albany Int'l (In re Asbestos Litigation) (February 16, 2011). The court granted Albany International's motion for summary judgment against plaintiff Charlene James because there was no non-speculative evidence that Robert James was exposed to an asbestos-containing Albany product.
• Newman v. Avocet Enterprises (In re Asbestos Litigation) (March 15, 2011). The court denied Avocet Enterprises' motion for summary judgment on the Newmans' remaining claims, because Newman's testimony about using Ventbestos raised a factual dispute on causation, and found the motion moot as to the withdrawn conspiracy claim.
• Henderson v. Dana Companies (In re Asbestos Litigation) (March 22, 2011). The court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' post-trial motion for costs against Dana and Zoom, awarding $14,597.12 in costs plus pre- and post-judgment interest.
• Foucha v. CertainTeed Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (May 31, 2011). The court granted CertainTeed Corp.'s motion for summary judgment, ruling against plaintiffs Raymond and Sussanah Foucha because they lacked evidence that he was exposed to an asbestos-containing CertainTeed product.
• Foucha v. Georgia-Pacific (In re Asbestos Litigation) (June 3, 2011). The court granted Georgia-Pacific's motion for summary judgment against Raymond and Sussanah Foucha because they could not show without speculation that Foucha was exposed to asbestos from Georgia-Pacific joint compound.
• Bowser v. Parker-Hannifin Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (June 3, 2011). The court granted Parker-Hannifin's summary judgment motion in part (strict liability count and helicopter brake exposures before 1967) and denied it as to the airplane brake claims, so Plaintiff Jenny Bowser's remaining claims proceed.
• Davis v. Crane Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (June 7, 2011). The court granted Crane Co.'s motion for summary judgment against plaintiff Wesley Davis, finding he had not shown Crane-supplied asbestos products were a substantial factor in causing his mesothelioma.
• Clineff v. BP Amoco Chemical Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (July 8, 2011). The court granted summary judgment to BP Amoco Chemical Company, BP Corporation North America Inc., and Kvaerner U.S. Inc. because the plaintiffs' claims were filed after the two-year limitations period expired.
• Gordon v. Dana Companies (In re Asbestos Litigation) (November 16, 2011). The court granted summary judgment to Dana (Victor gaskets) and UOP, and denied summary judgment to Elliott, Armstrong and Born, so the plaintiffs' claims against those three go forward.
• McCoy v. PolyVision Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (February 21, 2012). The court granted summary judgment to PolyVision Corp. against Janine and Marvin McCoy, predicting Pennsylvania law imposes no duty on an employer or premises owner to an employee's spouse for take-home asbestos exposure.
• Galliher v. R. T. Vanderbilt (In re Asbestos Litigation) (May 9, 2012). The court allowed plaintiff's late-disclosed geologist (Fitzgerald) to testify, excluded plaintiff's other late expert (Dr. Rigler), continued the trial to July 16, 2012 so defendant R. T. Vanderbilt could develop rebuttal evidence, and sanctioned defendant's out-of-state counsel $5000.
• Farrall v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 19, 2013). The court denied the plaintiff's motion for reargument, leaving in place its grant of summary judgment for Ford Motor Company on the failure to warn claim about asbestos-containing replacement parts.
• Muse v. Honeywell Int'l (In re Asbestos Litigation) (December 31, 2014). The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for reargument, leaving in place summary judgment for Honeywell International Inc. against James Muse and Clarice Roberts-Muse.
• Harris v. Deere & Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (May 10, 2017). The court granted Deere & Company's motion for summary judgment, ruling for Deere against the plaintiff, because under North Carolina law the plaintiff offered no evidence beyond speculation that the asbestos-containing parts he worked on were made or sold by Deere.
• Kivell v. Air Prods. and Chemicals (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 30, 2017). The court granted Air Products and Chemicals Inc.'s motion for summary judgment on the negligence, strict liability and wrongful death claims, ruling against plaintiff Sandra Kivell.
• Kivell v. Union Carbide Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 30, 2017). The Delaware Superior Court granted Union Carbide's motion for summary judgment on Sandra Kivell's negligence and strict liability claims, so Union Carbide won and the plaintiff lost.
• Kivell v. Murphy Oil USA (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 30, 2017). The court granted Murphy Oil USA Inc.'s motion for summary judgment on the negligence and strict liability claims brought by Sandra Kivell, so the plaintiff lost.
• Walsh v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (October 27, 2017). The court granted summary judgment to Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (successor to Buffalo Pumps) against plaintiffs Phillip and Naomi Walsh, finding no evidence Mr. Walsh was exposed to asbestos parts the defendant was responsible for.
• Leathers v. Pneumo Abex (In re Asbestos Litigation) (November 8, 2017). The court denied Pneumo Abex LLC's motion for summary judgment, so plaintiff Raymond Leathers' claims against Abex go forward to trial.
• Walsh v. Aurora Pump Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (November 29, 2017). The court granted Aurora Pump Company's motion for summary judgment against Phillip and Naomi Walsh because they did not show that Mr. Walsh was exposed to asbestos from Aurora's products.
• Sykes v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (February 7, 2018). The Superior Court affirmed the Special Master's order excluding William Don Sykes's videotaped trial deposition at trial, a ruling for the defendants and against the plaintiff estate.
• Kivell v. Georgia Pacific Consumer Prods. LP (In re Asbestos Litigation) (March 26, 2018). The court granted Georgia Pacific's motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that Sandra Kivell's wrongful death and survival claims were time barred under Louisiana's one-year limit.
• Richards v. Copes-Vulcan (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 8, 2018). The court denied the Richards plaintiffs' motion for leave to supplement their expert's report and for reargument, leaving in place summary judgment for Copes-Vulcan, Fairbanks, Ford and Goodyear.
• Call v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (December 12, 2018). The court granted Ford Motor Company's motion for summary judgment against plaintiff Marilyn Kay Call, holding Indiana's "but for" causation standard applies and her expert's opinion did not meet it.
• Knecht v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (January 31, 2019). The Delaware Superior Court denied Ford Motor Company's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, its alternative motion for a new trial, and its motion for a new trial or remittitur, leaving the plaintiff's jury verdict in place.
• Knecht v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (March 3, 2020). On remand from the Delaware Supreme Court, the Superior Court denied Ford Motor Company's motion for a new trial or remittitur, leaving the $40.625 million compensatory verdict for Paula Knecht in place.
• Petit v. Hennessy Indus. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 31, 2020). The Delaware Superior Court granted Hennessy Industries' motion for summary judgment against the Petit plaintiffs, because plaintiff did not show exposure to asbestos-containing brakes or to friable asbestos with the AMMCO machines.
• Pearsons v. Heidelberg USA (In re Asbestos Litigation) (December 23, 2020). The court denied Heidelberg USA's summary judgment motion on causation, statute of repose and product misuse, and granted it only on the willful and wanton conduct claim, which Mrs. Pearsons did not contest.
• Jordonek v. Hennessy Indus. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (April 11, 2023). The court denied Hennessy Industries' motion for reargument, so its earlier oral denial of summary judgment on the duty-to-warn claim stood and the plaintiff, Lisa Estrada, prevailed on this motion.
• Jordonek v. Hennessy Indus. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (April 25, 2023). The Superior Court denied defendant Hennessy Industries' request to certify an interlocutory appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court of the earlier denial of its summary judgment motion, so plaintiff Estrada prevailed on this request.
• Braxton v. J-M Mfg. Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (December 17, 2024). The court granted defendant J-M Manufacturing's motion for leave to designate responsible third parties, rejecting plaintiff Braxton's objections on pleading sufficiency, limitations timing and bankruptcy proofs of claim.

The court's opinion

The text below is Google Scholar's copy of the court's opinion, a public record. Numbers in brackets, such as [*921], mark where each page of the printed reporter begins.

IN RE: ASBESTOS LITIGATION,

JANE ROWLAND, and DOUGLAS ROWLAND, her husband, Plaintiffs,

v.

AMERICAN BILTRITE, INC., Individually and as successor to AMTICO FLOORS et al., Defendants.

C.A. No. N16C-02-186 ASB.

Submitted: April 16, 2019.

Decided: April 24, 2019.

Superior Court of Delaware.

Upon Defendant Union Carbide Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment, GRANTED.

Ipek K. Medford, Esq., Bartholomew J. Dalton, Esq., Andrew C. Dalton, Esq., and Michael C. Dalton, Esq., of Dalton & Associates, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Adam Balick, Esq. and Patrick J. Smith, Esq. (argued), of Balick & Balick, LLC, Wilmington, Delaware; Weitz & Luxenberg, P.C., New York, New York (Of Counsel). Attorneys for Plaintiffs. Beth E. Valocchi, Esq., Joseph S. Naylor, Esq. (argued), and Bryan P. Smith, Esq., of Swartz Campbell, LLC, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorneys for Defendant Union Carbide Corporation.

OPINION

VIVIAN L. MEDINILLA, J.

INTRODUCTION

In this asbestos case, Jane and Douglas Rowland ("Plaintiffs") allege that Ms. Rowland developed mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos-containing products associated with multiple defendants, including Union Carbide Corporation ("Union Carbide" or "Defendant"). Union Carbide moves for summary judgment under Superior Court Civil Rule 56 arguing that Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden on the issue of product identification or, alternatively, that they fail to establish that a duty to warn is due to Plaintiffs under Ohio law. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Factual Background

Ms. Rowland married in 1966.[1] By way of general background only, for fifty years and at least up until the time she was deposed in 2016, she testified that she laundered her husband's clothes.[2] She described shaking out her husband's clothing, which produced dust.[3] Ms. Rowland testified that she was exposed to asbestos from laundering the clothing of her father and husband.[4] Other exposure could have been attributed through her husband when he performed automotive work, and she was with him about three or four times when he completed this work.[5] Ms. Rowland also testified that she believes she was exposed to asbestos through a carpet business that they had for approximately ten years.[6] As to the matter before the Court, the allegations of exposure are narrower and stem from a period of approximately four years that involved four home renovation projects.

As to Union Carbide, she believes she was exposed to asbestos from 1970 to 1977 because she laundered her husband's clothing and participated in the clean-up of certain home renovation projects in Ohio. It is undisputed that Mr. Rowland purchased one bag of Georgia-Pacific dry mix joint compound ("dry compound") and two buckets of Georgia-Pacific wet ready mix joint compound ("ready mix") in 1972 or 1973 for use on four separate home projects from 1972-1976.

Specifically, the dry mix joint compound was used for a garage project in 1972 or 1973, and the ready mix was used for shed wall and bathroom projects in 1973, with the remainder used for a garage project in 1976. The issue here focuses on whether the Plaintiffs can establish that the Georgia-Pacific compound they used in these projects contained the Union Carbide product.

Union Carbide sold raw asbestos to Georgia-Pacific, as one of the manufacturers of joint compound, for use in the products that may have been purchased by the Rowlands. Union Carbide mined this type of chrysotile asbestos fiber—Calidria—and sold it to sophisticated third-party manufacturers who then used it in their own products. It is undisputed the sales included production-level shipments of Calidria to certain product manufacturers that included, but were not limited to, Georgia-Pacific to its Chicago, Illinois plant from 1970-1977. There is also evidence that Georgia-Pacific obtained the majority of its asbestos from another supplier. Finally, Union Carbide provided its direct customers, like Georgia-Pacific, with health and safety information about asbestos, but did not participate in the product warnings that accompanied their finished products. Procedural Background

Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint on February 19, 2016 and allege Ms. Rowland developed mesothelioma from exposure to Union Carbide's Calidria. Their claims include negligence, willful and wanton conduct, strict product liability, and loss of consortium.[7] Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on January 14, 2019.[8] Oral arguments were heard on April 16, 2019.[9]

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Delaware Superior Court Civil Rule 56 mandates the granting of summary judgment where the moving party demonstrates that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." [10] "Once the movant meets its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-movant to demonstrate sufficiently an existence of one or more genuine issues of material fact."[11] Summary judgment will not be granted if there is a material fact in dispute or if it "seems desirable to inquire thoroughly into [the facts] in order to clarify the application of the law to the circumstances."[12] In considering the motion, "[a]ll facts and reasonable inferences must be considered in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party."[13] However, the Court shall not "indulge in speculation and conjecture; a motion for summary judgment is decided on the record presented and not on evidence potentially possible."[14]

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs argue that the issue of whether they were exposed to a Union Carbide Calidria product should go to the jury for two reasons. First, they argue there is evidence that Georgia-Pacific's Chicago, Illinois plant distributed products to the Midwest, including Ohio where the Rowlands purchased the products in question.[15] Second, they argue that there exist "formula cards" from Georgia-Pacific that establish not only that the ready mix product came out of Chicago, but that it contained Calidria during the relevant time period.[16] In support of their position, and during oral arguments, these formula cards were discussed in great detail and require further explanation.

Union Carbide included as exhibits certain formula cards for ready mix fillers and ready mix joint compounds that Georgia-Pacific produced at its Chicago, Illinois plant. Georgia-Pacific identified Calidria asbestos as "SG-210" on these formula cards. SG-210 was used in Ready Mix Filler C-978 (Filler "X"), and this Filler 978 was then used in the ready mix joint compound formulas. According to the formula cards provided by Union Carbide for Ready Mix Filler C-978 (Filler "X"), this filler was utilized in two Ready Mix Joint Compounds (C-979 and C-977); one a specialty product and the other generally available to purchasers such as Mr. Rowland.

Through these exhibits, Defendant maintains that there were seven total ready mix formulas available during the relevant time period and only two contained the Calidria filling. Since one ready mix is not at issue because there is no evidence that Mr. Rowland requested this specialty product, Defendant argues that one out of the six Georgia-Pacific ready mix formulas available to Mr. Rowland contained Calidria asbestos. Therefore, Defendant argues Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that Ms.

Rowland was exposed to the Georgia-Pacific ready mix that contained Union Carbide's Calidria asbestos as opposed to another supplier's asbestos.

In response, Plaintiffs produced another formula card that was not provided by Defendant in its exhibits. Plaintiffs argue that Defendant omitted this evidence to skew the statistical significance of its argument and then called into question the bases for Defendant's conclusions presented during oral arguments. Plaintiffs suggest that this new formula card represents additional evidence that Georgia-Pacific used Calidria in its ready mix in 1972, that the product was coming out of Chicago, and that it may increase the likelihood that Mr. Rowland purchased a Georgia-Pacific product that contained Union Carbide Calidria asbestos. They argue this evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact. This Court disagrees. Although the Court admits that the explanations offered during oral arguments regarding these formula cards were confusing at times, a review of the record makes clear that summary judgment is appropriate.

It became clear during oral arguments that there are approximately 1500 such formula cards from Georgia-Pacific. The formula card produced by Defendant for Ready Mix Filler C-978 (Filler "X") is dated January 17, 1972. The formula card produced by Plaintiffs is for the same Ready Mix Filler C-978 (Filler "X") dated April 14, 1972, and states that it supersedes formula number C-978 dated January 17, 1972. Therefore, this additional formula card merely supersedes Defendant's formula card for the same filler, and identifies that Calidria asbestos was used as an ingredient in the filler manufactured by Georgia-Pacific. This fact is not in dispute.

The existence of another formula card that reiterates that Calidria was being used in 1972 in the Georgia-Pacific product does not change what has already been conceded by Union Carbide—that Calidria was used in the Georgia Pacific ready mix in 1972. The issue is whether Plaintiffs can demonstrate that the two buckets of ready mix that Mr. Rowland purchased in 1972 or 1973 contained the Union Carbide Calidria asbestos. This additional formula card—one of thousands—does not serve as evidence to establish this critical point.

Where other suppliers were selling to Georgia-Pacific, the issue is not how many formula cards are available to demonstrate that Calidria was used in the ready mix but whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact that the ready mix that Mr. Rowland purchased contained Calidria. The fact that there is an additional card does not make it a material fact under Rule 56 for there is no factual dispute that the trier of fact would be asked to consider.

The Court finds Plaintiffs cannot satisfy their "affirmative duty" by offering evidence that creates a reasonable basis for establishing that the products Mr. Rowland worked with actually contained asbestos from Union Carbide. Fatal to Plaintiffs' claims is that Georgia-Pacific was not supplied by Union Carbide only. Another supplier during the relevant time period included Philip Carey, which Defendant identified as Georgia-Pacific's chief supplier. Union Carbide was one of several suppliers of asbestos to Georgia-Pacific, and it cannot reasonably be inferred that the asbestos to which Ms. Rowland was allegedly exposed was supplied by Union Carbide.[17] A reasonable jury could not determine, beyond pure speculation, that the ready mix product used by Mr. Rowland contained Union Carbide Calidria asbestos and that Union Carbide was responsible for Ms. Rowland's injuries.[18]

CONCLUSION

In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding Ms. Rowland's exposure to asbestos from Union Carbide's Calidria asbestos. The Court does not address the duty to warn or defective design arguments under Ohio substantive law because the Court finds that Plaintiffs' case fails under product identification. For the reasons stated, Defendant Union Carbide Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

[1] Video Deposition of Jane Rowland at 64:13-18.

[2] Id. at 64:16-23.

[3] Id. at 77:25-78:9.

[4] Id. at 27:8-22. Although it is unclear in what capacity her father and husband worked, she believed asbestos exposure came from laundering her father's clothing while he worked at General Motors, and her husband's clothing while he worked at Plastolite. [5] Video Deposition of Jane Rowland at 64:1-9.

[6] Id. at 27:17-19.

[7] See generally Compl.

[8] Union Carbide initially filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on March 12, 2018, but subsequently filed its Amended Motion for Summary Judgment on January 14, 2019.

[9] Because portions of Union Carbide's Motion for Summary Judgment were unopposed, this Court granted Union Carbide's Motion for Summary Judgment as to all claims alleging exposure from floor tiles manufactured by American Biltrite (Amtico's manufacturer), Armstrong, and Kentile. These claims related to Ms. Rowland's alleged exposure to asbestos through Mr. Rowland's work that included the installation of Amtico, Armstrong, and Kentile floor tile between 1971 through 1974. Therefore, the Court considers only the remaining claims related to the Georgia-Pacific products.

[10] Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c).

[11] Quality Elec. Co., Inc. v. E. States Const. Serv., Inc., 663 A.2d 488, 1995 WL 379125, at [*4] (Del. June 19, 1995) (TABLE). See also Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(e); Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 681 (Del. 1979).

[12] Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 470 (Del. 1962).

[13] Nutt v. A.C. & S. Co., 517 A.2d 690, 692 (Del. Super. 1986) (citing Mechell v. Palmer, 343 A.2d 620, 621 (Del. 1975); Allstate Auto Leasing Co. v. Caldwell, 394 A.2d 748, 752 (Del. Super. 1978)).

[14] In re Asbestos Litig., 509 A.2d 1116, 1118 (Del. Super. 1986), aff'd sub. nom. Nicolet, Inc. v. Nutt, 525 A.2d 146 (Del. 1987). [15] Pl.'s Resp. at 4.

[16] Id. at 8-9.

[17] See In re Asbestos Litig. (Sturgill), 2017 WL 6343519, at [*3] (Del. Super. Dec. 11, 2017) (citing Nutt, 517 A.2d at 690) (holding Union Carbide was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiffs were unable to establish that Mr. Sturgill was exposed to Union Carbide's asbestos) (citation omitted).

[18] See In re Asbestos Litig. (Aveni), 2017 WL 5594055, at [*2] (Del. Super. Nov. 8, 2017) (granting Union Carbide's motion for summary judgment for lack of product identification).

Sources

• The opinion on Google Scholar
• Delaware asbestos laws
• Delaware asbestos exposure sites