Product Identification in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on product identification: 1,060 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

About this issue

Before a defendant can be held responsible, the plaintiff generally has to link the person's asbestos exposure to that defendant: to its product, its premises, or its work. For a worker this usually means showing they worked with or around the product; for a family member with take-home exposure, it means tracing the dust brought home to its source. Decades after the fact, this is often the hardest part of an asbestos case.

Evidence usually comes from:

• the person's own testimony, or a deposition taken before death;
• coworkers who remember brand names, packaging, or which contractor installed what;
• invoices, purchase records, specifications and ship or plant records;
• the defendant's own product lists and sales records.

Many courts weigh the frequency, regularity and proximity of exposure: how often, how consistently, and how close the person was to the product, and whether it actually released asbestos fibers they breathed. These are factors for judging the evidence, not fixed minimums. Some courts apply them more flexibly for mesothelioma, which can follow lighter exposures, but a lighter exposure is not automatically enough. A large share of the decisions in this section are summary-judgment rulings on whether the evidence of exposure was enough to go to a jury.

Alabama

• Holland v. Airco, Inc. (2016). Under Alabama law a plaintiff must first prove exposure to an asbestos-containing product for which the defendant is responsible. Evidence that a defendant's equipment sometimes contained asbestos parts, without proof that the specific parts the worker encountered were the defendant's, is not enough.
• Kruse v. Vanderbilt Minerals, LLC (2015). A summary judgment cannot rest on a failure of the non-movant's proof that the motion did not raise, because no burden shifts to the non-movant on an issue the motion does not challenge. Evidence of Vanderbilt's shipments and daily use of its talc where the worker was repeatedly present was enough on exposure.
• Morgan v. Bill Vann Company, Inc. (2013). In an asbestos case, exposure to a defendant's product does not require the plaintiff to have handled it; working in close enough proximity to the release of dust or fibers that he likely inhaled them is enough. Under Alabama's discovery rule, a claim based on exposure after the 1979-1980 cutoff accrues when the injury is or should be discovered.
• Morgan v. Bill Vann Company, Inc. (2013). Predicting Alabama law, a pump manufacturer is not liable, and has no duty to warn, for asbestos-containing packing and gaskets made by others and used with its pump unless it manufactured, sold or distributed them or is sued for a defect in its own product.
• Morgan v. Bill Vann Company, Inc. (2013). Under Alabama law, asbestos personal injury claims based on last exposure before May 19, 1979 were barred under the last-exposure rule and were not revived by the later discovery-rule statute. A plaintiff must also show post-1979 exposure to the specific defendant's product with evidence beyond speculation to benefit from the discovery rule.
• Morgan v. Bill Vann Company, Inc. (2013). Under Alabama law, asbestos claims based on last exposure before May 19, 1979 were time-barred and not revived by the later discovery-rule statute. A plaintiff cannot create a fact dispute by relying on evidence that contradicts his own sworn testimony.
• Morgan v. Bill Vann Company, Inc. (2013). Under Alabama law, asbestos claims based on last exposure before May 19, 1979 are time-barred. The court predicted Alabama would adopt the bare metal defense, under which a pump maker is not liable for third-party asbestos gaskets and packing it did not make, sell or distribute.
• Morgan v. Bill Vann Company, Inc. (2013). Under Alabama law, asbestos claims based on last exposure before May 19, 1979 were time-barred under the old last-exposure rule and were not revived by the later discovery statute. To use the discovery rule, a plaintiff must show post-1979 exposure to the specific defendant's product, and speculation about brand does not suffice.
• Morgan v. Bill Vann Company, Inc. (2013). Under Alabama law, asbestos claims based on a last exposure before May 19, 1979 are time-barred and not revived by the later discovery-rule statute. A plaintiff relying on the discovery rule must show post-1979 exposure to the specific defendant's asbestos-containing product, and speculation or guesswork does not meet that burden.

Arkansas

• Thomas v. Borg-Warner Morse Tec LLC (2018). Under Arkansas law, a plaintiff must show frequent exposure to a defendant's asbestos product and causation, and market share liability is not allowed. A non-buyer warranty claimant must give the defendant pre-suit notice, and a design defect claim does not require proof of a safer alternative design.
• Thomas v. Borg-Warner Morse Tec LLC (2018). A maker of a brake grinder that contains no asbestos is not liable in strict liability or negligence for mesothelioma from asbestos in brake pads ground on its machine, because the grinder itself was not unsafe under Arkansas's definition of 'defective condition'.
• Chavers v. General Motors Corp. (2002). Arkansas adopts the 'frequency, regularity, and proximity' test for causation in asbestos cases. The plaintiff must show exposure to a particular defendant's asbestos-containing product, with sufficient frequency and regularity, near where the plaintiff worked, so that it is probable the exposure caused the injury.

California

• Marcus v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2024). Under maritime law, plaintiffs can reach a jury on substantial-factor causation with testimony about the work done on a product, evidence the product contained asbestos, and expert estimates of exposure from that work, without relying on an "every exposure" theory. The government contractor defense does not apply to federal maritime claims, and loss of consortium and punitive damages are unavailable under maritime law.
• Sarjeant v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2024). A later declaration naming specific products does not count as a sham affidavit unless it clearly and unambiguously contradicts earlier testimony. Disputed evidence about whether a defendant's talc went into the products the plaintiff used is for the jury.
• Sarjeant v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2024). Under Rule 26 relevance and proportionality, records about a defendant's equipment on ships repaired at a shipyard where the plaintiff worked were discoverable, because the defendant identified no specific burden.
• Smargisso v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2024). Under maritime law, plaintiffs must show actual exposure to the defendant's asbestos products and that the exposure was a substantial contributing factor; circumstantial shipmate and records evidence can meet this. Non-pecuniary damages are not recoverable in a maritime wrongful death action based on negligence and strict liability absent historical support.
• Speck v. CBS Corporation (2024). Under federal maritime law a plaintiff must show actual exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product and that the exposure was a substantial contributing factor in causing the injury, and expert testimony is not required to prove this. The government contractor defense fails where the product was substantially the same as one sold commercially or the contractor did not show the Navy required asbestos.
• Williams v. JM Manufacturing Company, Inc. (1st Appellate District, 2nd Division, 2024). The limit in Kesner on the duty of care for take-home asbestos exposure, which reaches only household members, applies to negligence and premises claims. It does not bar a strict liability claim, which requires no proof of duty, by a non-household family member against a product supplier.
• Elorreaga v. Rockwell Automation, Inc. (2023). The Boyle government contractor defense rests on preemption of state law, so it does not apply to claims brought under federal maritime law. Plaintiffs' evidence of exposure to each defendant's products and of a substantial contributing factor was enough to create a genuine factual dispute.
• Ochoa v. Spx Cooling Technologies, Inc. (1st Appellate District, 1st Division, 2023). In an asbestos injury case, a plaintiff must show threshold exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing products; evidence that the worker may have worked on some tower that might have had asbestos parts, without evidence that his work disturbed asbestos, is speculation and does not create a triable issue.
• Hahn v. New York Air Brake LLC (1st Appellate District, 5th Division, 2022). Under Code of Civil Procedure section 474, whether a plaintiff may substitute a Doe defendant depends on the facts the plaintiff actually knew when filing the complaint, not facts the plaintiff should have known; there is no duty of reasonable diligence.
• Ann Strobel v. Johnson & Johnson (1st Appellate District, 4th Division, 2021). An expert may not relay an absent expert's case-specific test results as hearsay, but may rely on generally reliable third-party sources. Long-term product use, asbestos in the source talc ore, and reasonable inferences from the expert evidence were enough to create a triable issue on exposure to asbestos in the product.
• Benavidez v. Fluor Corp. (2nd Appellate District, 7th Division, 2021). A plaintiff's deposition testimony that he regularly worked near a defendant's workers and recognized the asbestos materials they used can create a triable issue of exposure. Inconsistent testimony about the workers' job duties goes to credibility and does not require disregarding all of the testimony.
• Harris v. Thomas Dee Engineering Co., Inc. (1st Appellate District, 5th Division, 2021). Under D'Amico, a declaration that contradicts earlier deposition testimony is not inadmissible. Whether it creates a triable issue is reviewed de novo, and a declaration with a reasonable explanation for the discrepancy cannot be given no weight.
• Toy v. Warren Pumps (In re Asbestos) (2021). Maritime law applies to naval shipyard asbestos claims where some exposure occurred aboard vessels in drydock, and plaintiffs must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos products that was a substantial factor in causing the disease. A pump maker may owe a duty to warn about asbestos in third-party parts its product requires, and conflicting evidence on exposure precludes summary judgment.
• Toy v. Warren Pumps (In re Asbestos) (2021). Under Rule 702, an expert's testimony must rest on sufficient facts or data, so an expert with no knowledge of the specific products a plaintiff worked with, beyond the plaintiff's own deposition, cannot testify about them, and the plaintiffs bear the burden of showing the expert is qualified on a subject.
• Toy v. Armstrong Int'l (In re Toy Asbestos) (2021). Under California law, a product maker is not liable for asbestos in third-party gaskets or insulation used with its product unless its own product contributed substantially to the harm or it mandated or advised use of the asbestos parts. Foreseeability that such parts would be used is not enough.
• Leavitt v. Johnson & Johnson (1st Appellate District, 5th Division, 2021). A plaintiff alleging mesothelioma from asbestos-contaminated talc must show it is more likely than not the product was contaminated when used, and that exposure was a substantial factor in contributing to the risk of disease; no dose-level estimate or testing of the plaintiff's own container is required. An appellant must show both error and prejudice.
• Morgan v. JM Manufacturing Co., Inc. (2nd Appellate District, 1st Division, 2021). A plaintiff seeking punitive damages against a corporation must offer clear and convincing evidence that an officer, director or managing agent had the required state of mind, whether shown directly or by piecing together managing agents' knowledge and acts; the company's size does not relax that burden.
• Rathbun v. Barretts Minerals, Inc. (2021). A removing defendant must show that the plaintiff cannot possibly state a claim against the non-diverse defendant, including through amendment; if a claim is possible, joinder is not fraudulent and the case must be remanded for lack of complete diversity.
• Sabetian v. Fluor Enterprises, Inc. (2nd Appellate District, 7th Division, 2021). A jury's asbestos causation finding stands if substantial evidence shows exposure to the defendant's product substantially contributed to the plaintiff's aggregate dose. An expert may rely on case reports for a very rare disease, and a request to apply foreign law must be timely. Under California's governmental interest test, California law governed compensatory damages.
• Spurlin v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2021). Under federal maritime law, a manufacturer has a duty to warn when its product requires incorporation of a part, it knows or has reason to know the integrated product is likely dangerous, and it has no reason to believe users will realize the danger. Punitive damages and loss of consortium are not available in a maritime negligence action.
• Vanni v. Honeywell International, Inc. (2nd Appellate District, 8th Division, 2021). In an asbestos case, causation requires proof of exposure and that the exposure was a substantial factor in contributing to the risk of disease. Expert opinion that is speculative is not substantial evidence, but under substantial-evidence review the jury resolves conflicts between experts and the evidence is viewed in the prevailing party's favor.
• Viale v. Foster Wheeler, LLC (2021). Plaintiffs must present non-speculative evidence that the defendant's asbestos-containing product or conduct was a substantial factor in causing the disease; a hirer of an independent contractor is presumptively not liable absent affirmative contribution to the injury, such as supplying unsafe equipment or exercising retained control.
• Webb v. General Cable Corp. (1st Appellate District, 1st Division, 2021). A plaintiff must prove threshold exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product, and evidence showing only a possibility or speculation of such exposure is not substantial evidence. Without it there is no causation and no liability.
• Booker v. Imerys Talc America, Inc. (1st Appellate District, 3rd Division, 2020). A jury may find a worker was exposed to asbestos-contaminated talc from the manufacturer's own laboratory reports, internal documents and coworker testimony, without expert analysis of the manufacturer's samples. A party seeking to allocate fault to nonparties on a verdict form must point to evidence of their wrongdoing. A buyer that broadly assumes all liabilities relating to a business's assets takes on liability for the seller's earlier product sales.
• Collantes v. Elementis Chemicals, Inc. (2nd Appellate District, 7th Division, 2020). A defendant moving for summary judgment on exposure must show the plaintiff cannot obtain evidence of exposure. Where the defendant's asbestos is undisputedly present at the work site and prevalent enough to support an inference of exposure, ambiguous or conflicting evidence of later changes to the site leaves a triable issue.
• Hart v. Keenan Properties, Inc. (2020). A witness's testimony that invoices bore a company's name and logo was circumstantial evidence of the source of delivered goods, not hearsay, because it was relevant regardless of the truth of the invoice's content; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the invoices sufficiently authenticated.
• Gibbons v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer (Laosd Asbestos Cases) (2nd District, Division 4, 2020). When a talc manufacturer supports summary judgment with expert testimony that its talc is asbestos-free, the plaintiff must produce competent evidence, in practice expert testimony, that the products she used were more likely than not contaminated with asbestos. Documents and an attorney's characterizations do not suffice.
• Viale v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (2020). A defendant is entitled to summary judgment where plaintiffs lack admissible evidence that the decedent was exposed to its product; a lay witness's belief without a sufficient factual basis is inadmissible opinion, and an expert opinion resting on such testimony assumes facts not in evidence.
• Viale v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (2020). A defendant is entitled to summary judgment where the plaintiffs offer no evidence that the decedent was exposed to asbestos from its product, and expert opinions resting on unsupported factual assumptions do not create a triable issue.
• Viale v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (2020). A defendant that shows the plaintiffs have no evidence of exposure to its product is entitled to summary judgment. A witness's belief without personal knowledge is inadmissible lay opinion, and an expert opinion resting on that testimony assumes an unsupported fact.
• Viale v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (2020). A defendant that points to an absence of evidence of exposure to its asbestos-containing product is entitled to summary judgment when the plaintiffs identify no evidence creating a triable issue on that exposure.
• Berg v. Colgate-Palmolive Company (1st Appellate District, 1st Division, 2019). A plaintiff opposing summary judgment must present evidence from which a jury could find it more likely than not that the specific product used contained asbestos; evidence showing only a possibility of exposure is insufficient.
• Harris v. Triple A Machine Shop, Inc. (1st Appellate District, 5th Division, 2019). In an asbestos case a plaintiff must show a probability, not merely a possibility, of exposure, and circumstantial evidence that supports a reasonable inference of exposure creates a triable issue that defeats summary judgment. An expert declaration giving a more detailed explanation of re-entrainment does not contradict his deposition.
• Friedman v. American Biltrite (In re Laosd Asbestos Cases) (2nd Appellate District, 4th Division, 2019). Asbestos exposure may be shown through a plaintiff's testimony about breathing dust from an asbestos-containing product, and expert testimony that any exposure above background can increase mesothelioma risk can support substantial factor causation without a dose estimate. A minor difference between a study's method and the case facts goes to weight, not admissibility.
• Schildknegt v. Air and Liquid Systems Corp. (2nd Appellate District, 4th Division, 2019). A defendant does not shift the summary judgment burden on asbestos exposure unless it negates every pleaded theory, including that it acted as a supplier of replacement parts. A brand name on packaging is nonhearsay circumstantial evidence of a product's source. Under Rutherford, a plaintiff needs threshold exposure plus expert testimony that the exposure contributed to the risk of disease, and need not show a particular length, intensity or frequency of exposure.
• Foglia v. Moore Dry Dock Company (1st Appellate District, 2nd Division, 2018). A defendant can shift the burden on summary judgment through plaintiffs' factually devoid discovery responses and other evidence, and an expert opinion resting on assumed facts with no admissible evidentiary support (here, that the father worked around asbestos at the shipyard) lacks foundation and cannot raise a triable issue.
• Hart v. Keenan Properties, Inc. (1st Appellate District, 5th Division, 2018). A witness's testimony about supplier names seen on invoices or delivery tickets that were not produced is hearsay offered for its truth. It is not admissible as a party admission, under the secondary evidence rule, or through authentication, and without it nothing showed the defendant supplied the pipe.
• Hilt v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2018). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to asbestos material the defendant manufactured or supplied and that the exposure was a substantial contributing factor in causing the injury. Here, deposition testimony and an expert declaration created genuine factual disputes on exposure to Foster Wheeler boilers and on the bare metal defense.