Cruz v. Georgia-Pacific (In re Asbestos Litigation, 2011)

Our plain-English summary of In re Asbestos Litigation (Delaware Superior Court, January 19, 2011).

Victor Cruz was diagnosed with mesothelioma, and he and his co-plaintiffs sued several defendants they said exposed him to asbestos. This order addressed only Georgia-Pacific, which asked for summary judgment. The claim against it rested on Cruz's use of Georgia-Pacific Ready Mix joint compound during summers and some weekends from 1968 to 1972, when he worked on construction projects with his father as a high school student. In his deposition Cruz could not say how often he worked with his father or whether Georgia-Pacific was the only joint compound brand used. Applying Texas law, the court relied on the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Borg-Warner v. Flores, which requires evidence of at least an approximate dose from the defendant's product. The plaintiffs offered studies on joint compound and a report on the Ready Mix product, but nothing linking that data to an estimate of Cruz's own dose. The court therefore granted summary judgment to Georgia-Pacific.

We wrote this summary from the court's opinion with the help of AI. It is not the court's wording, and it is not legal advice. The full opinion is below.

The decision

• Court: Delaware Superior Court
• Decided: January 19, 2011
• Stage: Summary judgment
• State: Delaware

Outcome. The court granted Georgia-Pacific's motion for summary judgment, ruling that plaintiffs could not show under Texas law that exposure to its Ready Mix joint compound was a substantial factor in causing Cruz's mesothelioma.

What the court held. Under Texas law (Borg-Warner v. Flores), a plaintiff must offer defendant-specific evidence of at least an approximate dose of exposure to prove substantial-factor causation; evidence of some exposure, or of its frequency and regularity, is not enough.

Issues decided: Causation, Choice of Law.

The people and their exposure

• Victor Cruz: mesothelioma

The defendants

• Georgia-Pacific LLC (manufacturer)

Other decisions in this case

Other rulings from the same court in the same case, in our library:

• In re Asbestos Litigation (May 9, 2006). The court denied DaimlerChrysler's motion in limine to exclude the plaintiffs' experts on general causation, so the plaintiffs' experts may testify that automotive friction products increase the risk of asbestosis, lung cancer and mesothelioma.
• Grenier v. General Motors Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (April 8, 2009). On remand from the Delaware Supreme Court, the Superior Court concluded that, despite factual errors in its earlier opinion, it properly denied General Motors' and Ford's motion to exclude plaintiffs' general causation expert testimony, so Grenier's experts remained admissible.
• Freeman v. Georgia-Pacific (In re Asbestos Litigation) (January 13, 2011). The court denied Georgia-Pacific's motion for summary judgment because plaintiffs raised a genuine dispute of fact about whether Wilburn Freeman was exposed to Georgia-Pacific's asbestos-containing joint compound.
• Olson v. Crane Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (January 18, 2011). The Delaware Superior Court granted summary judgment to defendants Crane Co. and CBS Corp. (Westinghouse) against plaintiffs, holding Idaho law would not make them liable for other manufacturers' asbestos-containing parts.
• Ashworth v. Pneumo Abex (In re Asbestos Litigation) (February 14, 2011). The court granted Pneumo Abex's summary judgment motion on the survival action as time-barred, but denied it on the wrongful death claim, which was timely and had factual disputes on causation and product identification.
• James v. Albany Int'l (In re Asbestos Litigation) (February 16, 2011). The court granted Albany International's motion for summary judgment against plaintiff Charlene James because there was no non-speculative evidence that Robert James was exposed to an asbestos-containing Albany product.
• Newman v. Avocet Enterprises (In re Asbestos Litigation) (March 15, 2011). The court denied Avocet Enterprises' motion for summary judgment on the Newmans' remaining claims, because Newman's testimony about using Ventbestos raised a factual dispute on causation, and found the motion moot as to the withdrawn conspiracy claim.
• Henderson v. Dana Companies (In re Asbestos Litigation) (March 22, 2011). The court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' post-trial motion for costs against Dana and Zoom, awarding $14,597.12 in costs plus pre- and post-judgment interest.
• Foucha v. CertainTeed Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (May 31, 2011). The court granted CertainTeed Corp.'s motion for summary judgment, ruling against plaintiffs Raymond and Sussanah Foucha because they lacked evidence that he was exposed to an asbestos-containing CertainTeed product.
• Foucha v. Georgia-Pacific (In re Asbestos Litigation) (June 3, 2011). The court granted Georgia-Pacific's motion for summary judgment against Raymond and Sussanah Foucha because they could not show without speculation that Foucha was exposed to asbestos from Georgia-Pacific joint compound.
• Bowser v. Parker-Hannifin Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (June 3, 2011). The court granted Parker-Hannifin's summary judgment motion in part (strict liability count and helicopter brake exposures before 1967) and denied it as to the airplane brake claims, so Plaintiff Jenny Bowser's remaining claims proceed.
• Davis v. Crane Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (June 7, 2011). The court granted Crane Co.'s motion for summary judgment against plaintiff Wesley Davis, finding he had not shown Crane-supplied asbestos products were a substantial factor in causing his mesothelioma.
• Clineff v. BP Amoco Chemical Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (July 8, 2011). The court granted summary judgment to BP Amoco Chemical Company, BP Corporation North America Inc., and Kvaerner U.S. Inc. because the plaintiffs' claims were filed after the two-year limitations period expired.
• Gordon v. Dana Companies (In re Asbestos Litigation) (November 16, 2011). The court granted summary judgment to Dana (Victor gaskets) and UOP, and denied summary judgment to Elliott, Armstrong and Born, so the plaintiffs' claims against those three go forward.
• McCoy v. PolyVision Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (February 21, 2012). The court granted summary judgment to PolyVision Corp. against Janine and Marvin McCoy, predicting Pennsylvania law imposes no duty on an employer or premises owner to an employee's spouse for take-home asbestos exposure.
• Galliher v. R. T. Vanderbilt (In re Asbestos Litigation) (May 9, 2012). The court allowed plaintiff's late-disclosed geologist (Fitzgerald) to testify, excluded plaintiff's other late expert (Dr. Rigler), continued the trial to July 16, 2012 so defendant R. T. Vanderbilt could develop rebuttal evidence, and sanctioned defendant's out-of-state counsel $5000.
• Farrall v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 19, 2013). The court denied the plaintiff's motion for reargument, leaving in place its grant of summary judgment for Ford Motor Company on the failure to warn claim about asbestos-containing replacement parts.
• Muse v. Honeywell Int'l (In re Asbestos Litigation) (December 31, 2014). The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for reargument, leaving in place summary judgment for Honeywell International Inc. against James Muse and Clarice Roberts-Muse.
• Harris v. Deere & Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (May 10, 2017). The court granted Deere & Company's motion for summary judgment, ruling for Deere against the plaintiff, because under North Carolina law the plaintiff offered no evidence beyond speculation that the asbestos-containing parts he worked on were made or sold by Deere.
• Kivell v. Air Prods. and Chemicals (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 30, 2017). The court granted Air Products and Chemicals Inc.'s motion for summary judgment on the negligence, strict liability and wrongful death claims, ruling against plaintiff Sandra Kivell.
• Kivell v. Union Carbide Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 30, 2017). The Delaware Superior Court granted Union Carbide's motion for summary judgment on Sandra Kivell's negligence and strict liability claims, so Union Carbide won and the plaintiff lost.
• Kivell v. Murphy Oil USA (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 30, 2017). The court granted Murphy Oil USA Inc.'s motion for summary judgment on the negligence and strict liability claims brought by Sandra Kivell, so the plaintiff lost.
• Walsh v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (October 27, 2017). The court granted summary judgment to Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (successor to Buffalo Pumps) against plaintiffs Phillip and Naomi Walsh, finding no evidence Mr. Walsh was exposed to asbestos parts the defendant was responsible for.
• Leathers v. Pneumo Abex (In re Asbestos Litigation) (November 8, 2017). The court denied Pneumo Abex LLC's motion for summary judgment, so plaintiff Raymond Leathers' claims against Abex go forward to trial.
• Walsh v. Aurora Pump Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (November 29, 2017). The court granted Aurora Pump Company's motion for summary judgment against Phillip and Naomi Walsh because they did not show that Mr. Walsh was exposed to asbestos from Aurora's products.
• Sykes v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (February 7, 2018). The Superior Court affirmed the Special Master's order excluding William Don Sykes's videotaped trial deposition at trial, a ruling for the defendants and against the plaintiff estate.
• Kivell v. Georgia Pacific Consumer Prods. LP (In re Asbestos Litigation) (March 26, 2018). The court granted Georgia Pacific's motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that Sandra Kivell's wrongful death and survival claims were time barred under Louisiana's one-year limit.
• Richards v. Copes-Vulcan (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 8, 2018). The court denied the Richards plaintiffs' motion for leave to supplement their expert's report and for reargument, leaving in place summary judgment for Copes-Vulcan, Fairbanks, Ford and Goodyear.
• Call v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (December 12, 2018). The court granted Ford Motor Company's motion for summary judgment against plaintiff Marilyn Kay Call, holding Indiana's "but for" causation standard applies and her expert's opinion did not meet it.
• Knecht v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (January 31, 2019). The Delaware Superior Court denied Ford Motor Company's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, its alternative motion for a new trial, and its motion for a new trial or remittitur, leaving the plaintiff's jury verdict in place.
• Rowland v. Union Carbide Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (April 24, 2019). The Delaware Superior Court granted Union Carbide's motion for summary judgment against Jane and Douglas Rowland because they could not show that the joint compound they used contained Union Carbide's asbestos.
• Knecht v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (March 3, 2020). On remand from the Delaware Supreme Court, the Superior Court denied Ford Motor Company's motion for a new trial or remittitur, leaving the $40.625 million compensatory verdict for Paula Knecht in place.
• Petit v. Hennessy Indus. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 31, 2020). The Delaware Superior Court granted Hennessy Industries' motion for summary judgment against the Petit plaintiffs, because plaintiff did not show exposure to asbestos-containing brakes or to friable asbestos with the AMMCO machines.
• Pearsons v. Heidelberg USA (In re Asbestos Litigation) (December 23, 2020). The court denied Heidelberg USA's summary judgment motion on causation, statute of repose and product misuse, and granted it only on the willful and wanton conduct claim, which Mrs. Pearsons did not contest.
• Jordonek v. Hennessy Indus. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (April 11, 2023). The court denied Hennessy Industries' motion for reargument, so its earlier oral denial of summary judgment on the duty-to-warn claim stood and the plaintiff, Lisa Estrada, prevailed on this motion.
• Jordonek v. Hennessy Indus. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (April 25, 2023). The Superior Court denied defendant Hennessy Industries' request to certify an interlocutory appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court of the earlier denial of its summary judgment motion, so plaintiff Estrada prevailed on this request.
• Braxton v. J-M Mfg. Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (December 17, 2024). The court granted defendant J-M Manufacturing's motion for leave to designate responsible third parties, rejecting plaintiff Braxton's objections on pleading sufficiency, limitations timing and bankruptcy proofs of claim.

Decisions this opinion cites

Earlier decisions in our library that the court cited:

• Borg-Warner Corporation v. Flores (Texas Supreme Court, 2007). The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment, which had affirmed Arturo Flores's jury verdict, and rendered judgment for Borg-Warner because the causation evidence was legally insufficient.
• Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Stephens (Texas Court of Appeals, 2007). The court of appeals reversed the judgment on the jury verdict for Fred and Betty Stephens and rendered judgment for Georgia-Pacific, because the expert causation testimony was legally insufficient.

The court's opinion

The text below is Google Scholar's copy of the court's opinion, a public record. Numbers in brackets, such as [*921], mark where each page of the printed reporter begins.

In re ASBESTOS LITIGATION Limited to: Cruz, Victor.

C.A. No. 09C-10-088ASB.

Decided: January 19, 2011.

Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County.

PEGGY L. ABLEMAN, Judge.

This 19th day of January, 2011, it appears to the Court that:

1. After Plaintiff Victor Cruz ("Cruz") was diagnosed with mesothelioma, Plaintiffs instituted this action against various defendants they allege caused Cruz's disease by exposing him to asbestos. Defendant Georgia-Pacific LLC ("Georgia-Pacific") has moved for summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiffs have not produced evidence sufficient to prove under Texas law that exposure to its products constituted a substantial factor in causing Cruz's mesothelioma. 2. Plaintiffs' claims against Georgia-Pacific are based upon Cruz's use of Georgia-Pacific Ready Mix joint compound during summers and certain weekends from 1968 to 1972, when he worked with his father on construction projects while a high school student. During deposition testimony, Cruz was unable to offer any particular estimate as to how often he worked with his father on weekends or during the summer, although he recalled that he did not work every weekend or every summer work day. He also could not specify whether Georgia-Pacific was the only brand of joint compound his father used. 3. In Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores, the Texas Supreme Court held that a plaintiff in an asbestosis case can establish substantial-factor causation by presenting "[d]efendant-specific evidence relating to the approximate dose to which the plaintiff was exposed, coupled with evidence that the dose was a substantial factor in causing the asbestos-related disease."[1] In meeting this standard, "proof of. . . frequency, regularity, and proximity [of exposure to a defendant's asbestos-containing product] is necessary but not sufficient, as it provides none of the quantitative information necessary."[2] Although the Flores court emphasized that "mathematical precision" is not required (nor generally achievable), it nonetheless found that mere evidence of "some exposure" to asbestos is insufficient.[3] In the absence of any evidence as to dose, a plaintiff proceeding under Texas law has not presented a triable question as to substantial-factor causation.[4] In subsequent decisions, Texas courts have applied the principles of Flores to mesothelioma cases.[5]

2. Upon review of the record, the Court agrees with Georgia-Pacific that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the Texas substantial-factor causation standard under Flores. Although Plaintiffs have provided epidemiological studies regarding the release of friable asbestos associated with joint compounds generally, as well as a report authored by Dr. William Longo and others addressing the particular Ready Mix product at issue in this case, Plaintiffs have not constructed the necessary link between this data and any calculation of an estimated dose particular to Cruz. Because Cruz's deposition offers no specific information regarding how frequently he assisted his father in construction work, let alone how frequently he and his father used Georgia-Pacific Ready Mix as opposed to other products during that work, it offers no basis for a non-speculative approximation of dose attributable to Georgia-Pacific Ready Mix. Although Flores does not demand mathematical precision, it does require at least quantitative approximation of dose. Plaintiffs have not met that standard, and Georgia-Pacific's Motion for Summary Judgment must therefore be GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

[1] 232 S.W.3d 765, 773 (Tex. 2007).

[2] Id. at 772.

[3] Id. at 773

[4] Id. at 771-72.

[5] See, e.g., Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Stephens, 239 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. App. 2007).

Sources

• The opinion on Google Scholar
• Delaware asbestos laws
• Delaware asbestos exposure sites