Bowser v. Parker-Hannifin Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation, 2011)

Our plain-English summary of In re Asbestos Litigation (Delaware Superior Court, June 3, 2011).

Gerald Bowser worked as an aircraft mechanic for decades from the early 1960s. He was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2009 and died in December 2010. His wife, Jenny Bowser, sued several companies, including Parker-Hannifin, whose predecessor made Cleveland brand aircraft brakes. Bowser testified that he removed and installed asbestos-containing airplane brakes, including Cleveland, at the Shelby, North Carolina airport from 1967 to 1973 and saw Cleveland brake boxes at other jobs. Parker moved for summary judgment, arguing that the evidence did not show regular exposure to its brakes over an extended period under North Carolina law. The court granted the motion on the strict liability count, which North Carolina does not recognize, and on helicopter brake exposures through 1967, which Plaintiff did not contest. It denied the motion on the airplane brake claims. It reasoned that Bowser did not rely merely on seeing boxes; he named Cleveland as one of four brands he regularly used, and exact instances need not be shown. The willful and wanton conduct claim also survived for now.

We wrote this summary from the court's opinion with the help of AI. It is not the court's wording, and it is not legal advice. The full opinion is below.

The decision

• Court: Delaware Superior Court
• Decided: June 3, 2011
• Stage: Summary judgment
• State: Delaware

Outcome. The court granted Parker-Hannifin's summary judgment motion in part (strict liability count and helicopter brake exposures before 1967) and denied it as to the airplane brake claims, so Plaintiff Jenny Bowser's remaining claims proceed.

What the court held. Under North Carolina law, a product's mere presence at a worksite does not show exposure, but a worker's testimony that he regularly used a brand's brakes, together with supporting context, can raise a triable issue of frequent, regular exposure over an extended period, without proof of specific instances.

Issues decided: Causation, Choice of Law, Design Defect, Product Identification, Punitive Damages.

The people and their exposure

• Gerald Bowser: mesothelioma; died

Who	Work	Where	When	Products
Gerald Bowser	aviation mechanic (aerospace and aviation)	Shelby airport, Shelby, North Carolina	1967-1973	brakes, clutches and friction materials, Cleveland Wheel & Brakes (Parker predecessor), Bendix, Goodyear, Goodrich
Gerald Bowser	director of maintenance (aerospace and aviation); worked near others using it	Fayetteville Aviation, Fayetteville, North Carolina	1976	brakes, clutches and friction materials, Cleveland Wheel & Brakes
Gerald Bowser	maintenance director performing airplane brake jobs (aerospace and aviation)	Beaunit Corporation	1973-1976	brakes, clutches and friction materials
Gerald Bowser	aircraft mechanic and maintenance director (aerospace and aviation)	Henry Wurst, Inc.	1976-1990	brakes, clutches and friction materials

The defendants

• Parker-Hannifin Corporation (manufacturer)

Other decisions in this case

Other rulings from the same court in the same case, in our library:

• In re Asbestos Litigation (May 9, 2006). The court denied DaimlerChrysler's motion in limine to exclude the plaintiffs' experts on general causation, so the plaintiffs' experts may testify that automotive friction products increase the risk of asbestosis, lung cancer and mesothelioma.
• Grenier v. General Motors Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (April 8, 2009). On remand from the Delaware Supreme Court, the Superior Court concluded that, despite factual errors in its earlier opinion, it properly denied General Motors' and Ford's motion to exclude plaintiffs' general causation expert testimony, so Grenier's experts remained admissible.
• Freeman v. Georgia-Pacific (In re Asbestos Litigation) (January 13, 2011). The court denied Georgia-Pacific's motion for summary judgment because plaintiffs raised a genuine dispute of fact about whether Wilburn Freeman was exposed to Georgia-Pacific's asbestos-containing joint compound.
• Olson v. Crane Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (January 18, 2011). The Delaware Superior Court granted summary judgment to defendants Crane Co. and CBS Corp. (Westinghouse) against plaintiffs, holding Idaho law would not make them liable for other manufacturers' asbestos-containing parts.
• Cruz v. Georgia-Pacific (In re Asbestos Litigation) (January 19, 2011). The court granted Georgia-Pacific's motion for summary judgment, ruling that plaintiffs could not show under Texas law that exposure to its Ready Mix joint compound was a substantial factor in causing Cruz's mesothelioma.
• Ashworth v. Pneumo Abex (In re Asbestos Litigation) (February 14, 2011). The court granted Pneumo Abex's summary judgment motion on the survival action as time-barred, but denied it on the wrongful death claim, which was timely and had factual disputes on causation and product identification.
• James v. Albany Int'l (In re Asbestos Litigation) (February 16, 2011). The court granted Albany International's motion for summary judgment against plaintiff Charlene James because there was no non-speculative evidence that Robert James was exposed to an asbestos-containing Albany product.
• Newman v. Avocet Enterprises (In re Asbestos Litigation) (March 15, 2011). The court denied Avocet Enterprises' motion for summary judgment on the Newmans' remaining claims, because Newman's testimony about using Ventbestos raised a factual dispute on causation, and found the motion moot as to the withdrawn conspiracy claim.
• Henderson v. Dana Companies (In re Asbestos Litigation) (March 22, 2011). The court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' post-trial motion for costs against Dana and Zoom, awarding $14,597.12 in costs plus pre- and post-judgment interest.
• Foucha v. CertainTeed Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (May 31, 2011). The court granted CertainTeed Corp.'s motion for summary judgment, ruling against plaintiffs Raymond and Sussanah Foucha because they lacked evidence that he was exposed to an asbestos-containing CertainTeed product.
• Foucha v. Georgia-Pacific (In re Asbestos Litigation) (June 3, 2011). The court granted Georgia-Pacific's motion for summary judgment against Raymond and Sussanah Foucha because they could not show without speculation that Foucha was exposed to asbestos from Georgia-Pacific joint compound.
• Davis v. Crane Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (June 7, 2011). The court granted Crane Co.'s motion for summary judgment against plaintiff Wesley Davis, finding he had not shown Crane-supplied asbestos products were a substantial factor in causing his mesothelioma.
• Clineff v. BP Amoco Chemical Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (July 8, 2011). The court granted summary judgment to BP Amoco Chemical Company, BP Corporation North America Inc., and Kvaerner U.S. Inc. because the plaintiffs' claims were filed after the two-year limitations period expired.
• Gordon v. Dana Companies (In re Asbestos Litigation) (November 16, 2011). The court granted summary judgment to Dana (Victor gaskets) and UOP, and denied summary judgment to Elliott, Armstrong and Born, so the plaintiffs' claims against those three go forward.
• McCoy v. PolyVision Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (February 21, 2012). The court granted summary judgment to PolyVision Corp. against Janine and Marvin McCoy, predicting Pennsylvania law imposes no duty on an employer or premises owner to an employee's spouse for take-home asbestos exposure.
• Galliher v. R. T. Vanderbilt (In re Asbestos Litigation) (May 9, 2012). The court allowed plaintiff's late-disclosed geologist (Fitzgerald) to testify, excluded plaintiff's other late expert (Dr. Rigler), continued the trial to July 16, 2012 so defendant R. T. Vanderbilt could develop rebuttal evidence, and sanctioned defendant's out-of-state counsel $5000.
• Farrall v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 19, 2013). The court denied the plaintiff's motion for reargument, leaving in place its grant of summary judgment for Ford Motor Company on the failure to warn claim about asbestos-containing replacement parts.
• Muse v. Honeywell Int'l (In re Asbestos Litigation) (December 31, 2014). The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for reargument, leaving in place summary judgment for Honeywell International Inc. against James Muse and Clarice Roberts-Muse.
• Harris v. Deere & Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (May 10, 2017). The court granted Deere & Company's motion for summary judgment, ruling for Deere against the plaintiff, because under North Carolina law the plaintiff offered no evidence beyond speculation that the asbestos-containing parts he worked on were made or sold by Deere.
• Kivell v. Air Prods. and Chemicals (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 30, 2017). The court granted Air Products and Chemicals Inc.'s motion for summary judgment on the negligence, strict liability and wrongful death claims, ruling against plaintiff Sandra Kivell.
• Kivell v. Union Carbide Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 30, 2017). The Delaware Superior Court granted Union Carbide's motion for summary judgment on Sandra Kivell's negligence and strict liability claims, so Union Carbide won and the plaintiff lost.
• Kivell v. Murphy Oil USA (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 30, 2017). The court granted Murphy Oil USA Inc.'s motion for summary judgment on the negligence and strict liability claims brought by Sandra Kivell, so the plaintiff lost.
• Walsh v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (October 27, 2017). The court granted summary judgment to Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (successor to Buffalo Pumps) against plaintiffs Phillip and Naomi Walsh, finding no evidence Mr. Walsh was exposed to asbestos parts the defendant was responsible for.
• Leathers v. Pneumo Abex (In re Asbestos Litigation) (November 8, 2017). The court denied Pneumo Abex LLC's motion for summary judgment, so plaintiff Raymond Leathers' claims against Abex go forward to trial.
• Walsh v. Aurora Pump Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (November 29, 2017). The court granted Aurora Pump Company's motion for summary judgment against Phillip and Naomi Walsh because they did not show that Mr. Walsh was exposed to asbestos from Aurora's products.
• Sykes v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (February 7, 2018). The Superior Court affirmed the Special Master's order excluding William Don Sykes's videotaped trial deposition at trial, a ruling for the defendants and against the plaintiff estate.
• Kivell v. Georgia Pacific Consumer Prods. LP (In re Asbestos Litigation) (March 26, 2018). The court granted Georgia Pacific's motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that Sandra Kivell's wrongful death and survival claims were time barred under Louisiana's one-year limit.
• Richards v. Copes-Vulcan (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 8, 2018). The court denied the Richards plaintiffs' motion for leave to supplement their expert's report and for reargument, leaving in place summary judgment for Copes-Vulcan, Fairbanks, Ford and Goodyear.
• Call v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (December 12, 2018). The court granted Ford Motor Company's motion for summary judgment against plaintiff Marilyn Kay Call, holding Indiana's "but for" causation standard applies and her expert's opinion did not meet it.
• Knecht v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (January 31, 2019). The Delaware Superior Court denied Ford Motor Company's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, its alternative motion for a new trial, and its motion for a new trial or remittitur, leaving the plaintiff's jury verdict in place.
• Rowland v. Union Carbide Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (April 24, 2019). The Delaware Superior Court granted Union Carbide's motion for summary judgment against Jane and Douglas Rowland because they could not show that the joint compound they used contained Union Carbide's asbestos.
• Knecht v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (March 3, 2020). On remand from the Delaware Supreme Court, the Superior Court denied Ford Motor Company's motion for a new trial or remittitur, leaving the $40.625 million compensatory verdict for Paula Knecht in place.
• Petit v. Hennessy Indus. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (August 31, 2020). The Delaware Superior Court granted Hennessy Industries' motion for summary judgment against the Petit plaintiffs, because plaintiff did not show exposure to asbestos-containing brakes or to friable asbestos with the AMMCO machines.
• Pearsons v. Heidelberg USA (In re Asbestos Litigation) (December 23, 2020). The court denied Heidelberg USA's summary judgment motion on causation, statute of repose and product misuse, and granted it only on the willful and wanton conduct claim, which Mrs. Pearsons did not contest.
• Jordonek v. Hennessy Indus. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (April 11, 2023). The court denied Hennessy Industries' motion for reargument, so its earlier oral denial of summary judgment on the duty-to-warn claim stood and the plaintiff, Lisa Estrada, prevailed on this motion.
• Jordonek v. Hennessy Indus. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (April 25, 2023). The Superior Court denied defendant Hennessy Industries' request to certify an interlocutory appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court of the earlier denial of its summary judgment motion, so plaintiff Estrada prevailed on this request.
• Braxton v. J-M Mfg. Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (December 17, 2024). The court granted defendant J-M Manufacturing's motion for leave to designate responsible third parties, rejecting plaintiff Braxton's objections on pleading sufficiency, limitations timing and bankruptcy proofs of claim.

Decisions this opinion cites

Earlier decisions in our library that the court cited:

• Wilder v. Amatex Corp. (North Carolina Supreme Court, 1985). The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the summary judgments for Owens-Corning and for the other defendant appellees, ruling for plaintiff J.W. Wilder against Owens-Corning, Eagle-Picher, Pittsburgh Corning, Celotex, Keene and Starr-Davis.
• Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp. (U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, 1986). The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment for the defendants: directed verdicts for Raymark, Celotex and Pittsburgh Corning, a jury verdict for the other four defendants, and the challenged evidentiary rulings and jury instructions, against plaintiff Lohrmann.

The court's opinion

The text below is Google Scholar's copy of the court's opinion, a public record. Numbers in brackets, such as [*921], mark where each page of the printed reporter begins.

In re ASBESTOS LITIGATION Limited to: Bowser, Gerald.

C.A. No. N10C-05-104 ASB.

June 3, 2011.

Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County.

PEGGY L. ABLEMAN, Judge.

Gerald Bowser ("Bowser") worked as an aircraft mechanic for several decades, beginning in the early 1960s. In 2009, Bowser was diagnosed with mesothelioma, which led to his death in December 2010. Plaintiff Jenny Bowser, his wife, alleges that the defendants in this case each manufactured, distributed, sold, or installed asbestos-containing products that caused Bowser's mesothelioma. Plaintiff's claims against Parker-Hannifin Corporation ("Parker") relate to Bowser's alleged exposures to asbestos-containing aircraft brakes distributed under the brand name Cleveland Wheel & Brakes ("Cleveland"). Cleveland brakes were produced by a predecessor to Parker.

Bowser, who was deposed prior to his death, testified to using Cleveland brakes or seeing Cleveland brake boxes during his employment at three different locations. From 1965 to 1967, Bowser worked on a fleet of three helicopters at Doan Helicopter in Daytona Beach, Florida. Bowser recalled seeing unopened Cleveland brake boxes at Doan, but did not believe that his work there exposed him to any asbestos.[1] Bowser next worked as an aviation mechanic at the Shelby, North Carolina airport from 1967 to 1973, where he recalled removing and installing four different brands of asbestos-containing airplane brakes: Cleveland, Bendix, Goodyear, and Goodrich.[2] Although he could not remember specific instances in which he used Cleveland brakes, he saw unused Cleveland brake boxes on the parts shelves and open Cleveland boxes on the floor as he was working.[3] He estimated that he performed seventy-five airplane brake jobs during his six years at the Shelby airport.[4] The forty-seven airplanes for which he was responsible at Shelby included a Mooney, as well as a Cessna 150, a Cessna 172, and a Cessna 182.[5] The Cessna 150 was used for training and therefore required frequent brake work.[6]

Finally, Bowser remembered seeing unopened Cleveland brake boxes in the parts room of Fayetteville Aviation in Fayetteville, North Carolina, where he worked as the director of maintenance for six months in 1976.[7] Although he serviced approximately forty planes, he did not remember the brand name of any brakes he installed or removed while at Fayetteville.[8] Nevertheless, he stated that Fayetteville had "Cessna and Beech airplanes, and they wouldn't have had the Cleveland there if they did not go on the airplanes."[9]

Bowser also testified to performing airplane brake jobs while working as maintenance director at Beaunit Corporation from 1973 to 1976, and as an aircraft mechanic and maintenance director at Henry Wurst, Inc. from 1976 to 1990. Bowser could not identify the manufacturers of the brakes he used at either job. At Beaunit, he thought that he "most likely" used "one of the same companies because that was the most popular of the four" brands he had previously identified.[10] Without explicitly stating which of the four brand names he meant, he added that "It was used on the Beech and the Cessna."[11] Bowser explained that throughout his work as an airplane mechanic, he used brakes recommended or specified by the airplane manufacturer for a given airplane. Multiple brake manufacturers could produce brakes compatible with an airplane, provided the brakes went through a certification process.[12] He did not possess any memory of a specific occasion on which he installed or removed Cleveland brakes, but expressed a belief that he had used Cleveland brakes throughout his career as an aviation mechanic.[13]

By its motion for summary judgment, Parker argues that that Plaintiff cannot establish that Bowser was exposed to asbestos from Cleveland brakes on a regular basis over an extended period of time, as required by North Carolina law, which the parties agree is applicable to this case. Parker urges that Plaintiff must show more than that its products were present at Bowser's worksites. As to Bowser's work at Doan, Parker provides a declaration from an employee of its Aircraft Wheel & Brake Division stating that neither Parker nor its predecessor, Van Sickle Industries, manufactured or distributed helicopter brakes under the Cleveland brand name until 1983.[14]

Plaintiff's response contends that Bowser's testimony establishes that he had frequent, actual exposure to asbestos-containing Cleveland brakes over numerous years. Although Bowser was unable to recall specific instances on which he used a particular brand of brake, Plaintiff suggests that his testimony supports that he "generally used" four brands of brakes, including Cleveland, throughout his career, and that he identified those brakes as asbestos-containing.[15] Building upon Bowser's statements that he always used brakes specified by an airplane's manufacturer, Plaintiff has also presented materials showing that Parker produces brakes under the Cleveland name for several of the makes and models of airplanes on which Bowser performed brake work.[16] In addition, Plaintiff provides deposition testimony given by a Parker employee in a New York case, which indicates that Cleveland brand brakes contained asbestos until 1988 and that "[a]t varying times" Cleveland made asbestos-containing brakes for Cessna models 150, 172, and 182, as well as Mooney aircraft.[17] When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court examines the record to ascertain whether genuine issues of material fact exist and to determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.[18] Initially, the burden is placed upon the moving party to demonstrate that its legal claims are supported by the undisputed facts.[19] If the proponent properly supports its claims, the burden "shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate that there are material issues of fact for resolution by the ultimate fact-finder."[20] Summary judgment will not be granted if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there are material facts in dispute, or if judgment as a matter of law is not appropriate.[21]

As an initial matter, Plaintiff has failed to address Parker's argument that helicopter brakes did not enter the market under the Cleveland brand until 1983, and Bowser's own testimony indicates that he did not believe he was exposed to asbestos while working at Doan. Parker's motion will therefore be granted in part as to any exposures alleged to have resulted from the use of Cleveland helicopter brakes at Doan, or during Bowser's earlier helicopter work performed while he was in the U.S. Army from 1961 to 1963. Plaintiff has also conceded that Count III of the Complaint, alleging strict liability, must be dismissed because strict liability in tort is not recognized under North Carolina law.

The parties dispute whether North Carolina courts would apply Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp.,[22] which held that a plaintiff seeking to establish a reasonable inference of substantial causation must show "evidence of exposure to a specific product on a regular basis over some extended period of time in proximity to where the plaintiff actually worked."[23] At least one federal circuit decision, Jones v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., applied Lohrmann's so-called "frequency, regularity, and proximity" standard to a case brought pursuant to North Carolina law, on the theory that there was "nothing to indicate that Lohrmann conflicts with North Carolina law."[24]

Upon review of the record, the Court finds that Parker's liability for Bowser's alleged exposures to Cleveland airplane brakes is a triable issue, even assuming for the sake of argument that Lohrmann would apply. The Lohrmann standard is intended as "a de minimis rule" requiring that a plaintiff prove "more than a casual or minimum contact with the product."[25] Here, Bowser testified that he knew he removed and installed asbestos-containing Cleveland brakes during his six years working at the Shelby airport, and that he believed that he also used Cleveland airplane brakes throughout his lengthy career as an aviation mechanic. At the Shelby airport, Cleveland was one of the four brake brands Bowser used most frequently over the six-year time period in which he performed approximately seventy-five brake jobs. Bowser's testimony supports the existence of more than casual contact with Cleveland airplane brakes. Furthermore, Plaintiff has provided some evidence that Cleveland brakes were available for use with several of the make and models of aircraft Bowser specifically recalled from the Shelby airport, although the record is unclear as to whether the airplane manufacturers specified the Cleveland brand product and what timeframes the Cleveland brakes were available on the market. This information does not establish definitively that Bowser used Cleveland brakes on those airplanes, but it suggests the possibility that Cleveland brakes could have been the manufacturer-recommended parts for certain of the aircraft he serviced.

Parker argues that "simply establishing that open Cleveland boxes were present during unspecified time periods at some of [Bowser's] employers' facilities is insufficient as a matter of law" to prove exposure.[26] Parker relies upon Wilder v. Amatex Corp., one of the few North Carolina cases to address the quantum of asbestos-exposure evidence required of a plaintiff outside the workers' compensation context. In Wilder, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that in an asbestos-exposure case, the plaintiff's evidence at trial "must demonstrate that [the decedent] was actually exposed to the alleged offending products."[27] Such "actual" exposure cannot be established merely by showing that the defendant's products were "shipped to various job sites" where the decedent worked.[28]

Wilder indicates that a product's mere presence at a job site is not independently sufficient to support an inference of exposure. But Plaintiff has not attempted to show exposure by "simply establishing that open Cleveland boxes were present" at Bowser's workplaces. Bowser did not blindly assume that he was exposed to Cleveland brakes because he saw Cleveland brake boxes somewhere at his worksites without any other recollection of the brand. Rather, he named the Cleveland brand as one of the four major brake brands he used on a regular basis when following airplane manufacturers' specifications for replacement parts. He drew an association between Cleveland and certain makes of airplane he serviced (Cessna and Beech). He saw Cleveland boxes in the particular locations from which he retrieved replacement brakes and in work areas at his Shelby and Fayetteville jobsites. Taken in the context of Bowser's full testimony, the presence of the Cleveland boxes at his workplaces offers reasonable support for his assertions that he knew he used Cleveland brakes despite being unable to remember particular jobs or plane models that utilized Cleveland products; however, it was clearly not the sole basis for Bowser's product identification.

Neither Lohrmann nor Wilder require evidence of specific instances or numbers of exposures, and the absence of such precise evidence is often understandable in mesothelioma cases due to the lengthy latency period of that disease. Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the record provides sufficient evidence that Bowser received frequent and regular exposures to asbestos from Cleveland airplane brakes over an extended period of time to render summary judgment regarding Plaintiff's airplane brake-related claims inappropriate.[29] Therefore, Parker's motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED IN PART as to Count III of the Complaint and Plaintiff's allegations that Bowser was exposed to asbestos from Cleveland helicopter brakes between 1961 and 1967, and DENIED IN PART as to Plaintiff's remaining claims. IT IS SO ORDERED.

[1] Gerald C. Bowser Video Dep. Tr., July 27, 2010, at 35:10-20; Gerald C. Bowser Discovery Dep. Tr., July 27, 2010, at 189:2-9. [2] Gerald C. Bowser Video Dep. Tr. 43:21-44:14. During his time at the Shelby airport, Bowser worked as an airplane mechanic and as a helicopter mechanic for two separate employers.

[3] Id.

[4] Id. at 42:6-18.

[5] Gerald C. Bowser Discovery Dep. Tr. 69:14-72:2.

[6] Id. at 72:7-73:13.

[7] Id. at 190:25-191:6.

[8] Id. at 86:25-87:3.

[9] Id. at 191:7-20.

[10] Gerald C. Bowser Video Dep. Tr. 55:7-9.

[11] Id.

[12] Gerald C. Bowser Discovery Dep. Tr. 188:1-13.

[13] Id. at 150:12-15; 178:25-179:9.

[14] Sandra L. Shickel Decl. ¶ 3.

[15] Pl.'s Opp'n to Def. Parker's Mot. for Summ. J. 9.

[16] Pl.'s Opp'n to Def. Parker's Mot. for Summ. J., Exs. 4, 6.

[17] Pl.'s Opp'n to Def. Parker's Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 9 at 116:9-117:1; 119:12-23.

[18] Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c).

[19] E.g., Storm v. NSL Rockland Place, LLC, 898 A.2d 874, 879 (Del. Super. 2005).

[20] Id. at 880.

[21] Id. at 879-80.

[22] 782 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1986).

[23] Id. at 1162-63.

[24] 69 F.3d 712, 716 n.2 (4th Cir. 1995).

[25] Lohrmann, 782 F.2d at 1162.

[26] Def. Parker's Reply Br. 4-5.

[27] 336 S.E.2d 66, 68 (N.C. 1985).

[28] Id.

[29] Parker's motion sought summary judgment as to Plaintiff's willful and wanton conduct claim on the basis that she had not adduced evidence that Parker engaged in willful, wanton, malicious, or fraudulent conduct. Plaintiff has presented evidence that Parker manufactured and distributed asbestos-containing products during the time period of Bowser's alleged exposures. Plaintiff's willful and wanton conduct claim requires further inquiry into Parker's level of knowledge about the potential hazards of its products, which neither party has focused on in its briefing. The Court will deny summary judgment given the parties' failures to develop their arguments and the fact that evidence of Parker's knowledge and conduct will be relevant to Plaintiff's other claims, but the issue may need to be revisited at the close of Plaintiff's evidence.

Sources

• The opinion on Google Scholar
• Delaware asbestos laws
• Delaware asbestos exposure sites