Punitive Damages in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on punitive or exemplary damages: 291 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

About this issue

Punitive (or exemplary) damages punish especially wrongful conduct and deter others. They are not compensation for the injury. In asbestos cases they are usually sought on evidence that a company knew its products were dangerous and kept selling them without warning.

The rules depend on the law governing the claim, usually state law but sometimes federal law, such as maritime law. They differ on:

• the level of misconduct required (malice, gross negligence, reckless or conscious disregard);
• the standard of proof, often clear and convincing evidence;
• whether the misconduct must be tied to a manager or officer of the company;
• caps on the amount, or limits tied to compensatory damages;
• whether punitive damages are available at all. A few states allow them only where a statute authorizes them, and others bar them in particular claims. In a death case, the answer can differ between the family's wrongful death claim and the person's own survival claim.

The U.S. Constitution also limits punitive awards that are grossly excessive compared with the harm.

Alabama

• Bobo v. Agco Corporation (2013). A motion to amend filed after a scheduling order deadline must meet Rule 16(b)'s good cause standard, which requires diligence; a plaintiff who knew the underlying facts earlier and gave no reason for delay fails it. The Authority is immune from punitive damages and plaintiffs have no jury right against it.

Arizona

• Coulbourn v. Crane Co. (2018). Under Arizona law, where several defendants' asbestos products may have caused an indivisible injury, a defendant's product is a causal factor if it was a substantial factor, meaning it was independently sufficient to cause the disease. Evidence that a manufacturer knew its gaskets would expose workers to fatal dust can support punitive damages.

Arkansas

• Burnett v. American International Industries (2020). Arkansas does not recognize willful and wanton conduct or punitive damages as independent causes of action, and a fraud claim against multiple defendants must meet Rule 9(b) by stating each defendant's role with particularity.
• Thomas v. Borg-Warner Morse Tec LLC (2018). Under Arkansas law, a plaintiff must show frequent exposure to a defendant's asbestos product and causation, and market share liability is not allowed. A non-buyer warranty claimant must give the defendant pre-suit notice, and a design defect claim does not require proof of a safer alternative design.

California

• Marcus v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2024). Under maritime law, plaintiffs can reach a jury on substantial-factor causation with testimony about the work done on a product, evidence the product contained asbestos, and expert estimates of exposure from that work, without relying on an "every exposure" theory. The government contractor defense does not apply to federal maritime claims, and loss of consortium and punitive damages are unavailable under maritime law.
• Sarjeant v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2024). A later declaration naming specific products does not count as a sham affidavit unless it clearly and unambiguously contradicts earlier testimony. Disputed evidence about whether a defendant's talc went into the products the plaintiff used is for the jury.
• Smargisso v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2024). Under maritime law, plaintiffs must show actual exposure to the defendant's asbestos products and that the exposure was a substantial contributing factor; circumstantial shipmate and records evidence can meet this. Non-pecuniary damages are not recoverable in a maritime wrongful death action based on negligence and strict liability absent historical support.
• Speck v. CBS Corporation (2024). Under federal maritime law a plaintiff must show actual exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product and that the exposure was a substantial contributing factor in causing the injury, and expert testimony is not required to prove this. The government contractor defense fails where the product was substantially the same as one sold commercially or the contractor did not show the Navy required asbestos.
• Elorreaga v. Rockwell Automation, Inc. (2022). Under the Atlantic Sounding and Batterton framework, punitive damages are unavailable under general maritime law where plaintiffs show no historical basis for them, and Ninth Circuit precedent (Smith v. Trinidad) bars loss of consortium damages under general maritime law.
• Putt v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Laosd Asbestos Cases) (2nd Appellate District, 2nd Division, 2021). Where the jury found Ford's brake pads defective and a substantial factor in causing mesothelioma, and it was undisputed that other makers' brake pads were identical and also exposed the plaintiff, the evidence compelled apportioning some nonzero fault to those others, and a defendant need not prove precise percentages to overturn a 100 percent apportionment.
• Morgan v. JM Manufacturing Co., Inc. (2nd Appellate District, 1st Division, 2021). A plaintiff seeking punitive damages against a corporation must offer clear and convincing evidence that an officer, director or managing agent had the required state of mind, whether shown directly or by piecing together managing agents' knowledge and acts; the company's size does not relax that burden.
• Pizarro v. National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (2021). A contractor asserting Yearsley or Boyle government contractor defenses must show it complied with the government's specifications, and a genuine dispute over that compliance requires a jury. Under California law, evidence that a retailer knew of asbestos dangers and sold asbestos-containing brakes without warning can create a jury question on malice for punitive damages.
• Spurlin v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2021). Under federal maritime law, a manufacturer has a duty to warn when its product requires incorporation of a part, it knows or has reason to know the integrated product is likely dangerous, and it has no reason to believe users will realize the danger. Punitive damages and loss of consortium are not available in a maritime negligence action.
• Barr v. Parker-Hannifin Corp. (1st Appellate District, 3rd Division, 2020). Expert and lay testimony that a plaintiff's father may have brought shipyard asbestos home was properly excluded because it rested on speculation about actual exposure. Punitive damages were supported by substantial evidence that the manufacturer knew of asbestos hazards, warned its own employees, and did not warn its customers.
• Mata v. Liberty Utilities (park Water) Corp. (2nd Appellate District, 3rd Division, 2020). Punitive damages against a corporation require clear and convincing evidence that an officer, director or managing agent had actual knowledge of the risk and willfully and consciously disregarded it; a failure to follow safety regulations, without evidence management knew asbestos was present, is not malice.
• Malek v. Chevron U.S.A. (In re Laosd Asbestos Cases) (2nd Appellate District, 4th Division, 2019). A defendant that did not own, operate or control a premises, was not a joint venturer or principal of the operator, and did not undertake responsibility for worker safety owes no duty of care; workers who only incidentally benefit from a contract are not intended third party beneficiaries.
• Lopez v. the Hillshire Brands Company (1st Appellate District, 5th Division, 2019). CACI No. 435, the asbestos substantial-factor instruction based on Rutherford, applies to an asbestos claim against a premises owner that is not a manufacturer or supplier, and a 'but-for' causation instruction is not required where there may be multiple sources of exposure.
• Williams v. the Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack OF California (1st Appellate District, 4th Division, 2018). Damages in a survival action by a decedent's personal representative or successor in interest are limited to loss the decedent sustained or incurred before death and exclude 'lost years' damages. A Doe amendment relates back only if the plaintiff was actually ignorant of the facts establishing a claim against the defendant when the original complaint was filed.
• Phillips v. Honeywell International Inc. (5th Appellate District, 2017). An expert may testify that each identified, significant asbestos exposure contributed to a person's cumulative dose and risk of mesothelioma without relying on the rejected every-exposure theory. Substantial evidence supported the failure-to-warn finding and the finding of malice supporting punitive damages.
• Saller v. Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc. (2nd Appellate District, 1st Division, 2017). A supplier asserting the sophisticated intermediary defense must present evidence that it actually and reasonably relied on the intermediary to warn end users. A punitive damages award requires evidence of the liable defendant's own financial condition, and evidence about its corporate parent does not suffice.
• Sandoval v. American Appliance Manufacturing Corp. (2nd Appellate District, 4th Division, 2017). Under Kesner, employers and property owners owe a duty to prevent take-home asbestos exposure to household members, and a defendant seeking summary judgment for lack of exposure evidence must show the plaintiff cannot obtain it. A dissolved corporation is not shielded from punitive damages claims, and a strict liability claim can rest on a bystander theory for defective components of the defendant's own product.
• Casey v. Kaiser Gypsum Co. Inc. (1st Appellate District, 4th Division, 2016). A trial court may order a retrial limited to malice and punitive damages before a new jury after the first jury deadlocks on malice, and Civil Code section 3295(d)'s 'same trier of fact' language does not forbid this. Punitive damages must also satisfy due process limits, which here required reducing the award to a 2.5-to-1 ratio against Kaiser Gypsum's share of compensatory damages.
• Kordestani v. ExxonMOBIL Oil Corporation (2nd Appellate District, 4th Division, 2016). Summary adjudication of one claim or one issue of duty (premises liability, strict product liability) does not preclude other negligence theories based on different duties, such as a special relationship arising from contract or an undertaking to give technical advice. A party not aggrieved by an appealable order lacks standing to cross-appeal.
• The Marley-Wylain Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (2nd Appellate District, 1st Division, 2016). Under California's governmental interest analysis, the law of the state where the asbestos exposure occurred (Michigan) applies to the claims against the defendant, because that state's interest would be more impaired than California's, to which the plaintiff later moved.
• Soto v. BorgWarner Morse Tec Inc. (2nd Appellate District, 4th Division, 2015). A punitive damages award cannot stand without meaningful evidence of the defendant's financial condition, and revenue figures alone are not enough. A minor is 'dependent' under Code Civ. Proc. § 377.60(c) only if financially reliant on the decedent for the necessaries of life, not merely for niceties.
• Grande v. Borg-Warner Morse Tec, Inc. (2014). Under California law, a plaintiff may show exposure to a defendant's asbestos-containing product through circumstantial evidence that supports a reasonable inference of exposure. Punitive damages go to the trier of fact unless no reasonable jury could find clear and convincing proof of malice, fraud or oppression.
• Izell v. Union Carbide Corp. (2nd Appellate District, 3rd Division, 2014). In an asbestos cancer case, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos, and then in reasonable medical probability that the exposure was a substantial factor in increasing the risk of disease. A reduction of compensatory damages does not by itself require a new trial on punitive damages; the award is tested under the State Farm due process guideposts.
• Izell v. Union Carbide Corporation (2nd Appellate District, 3rd Division, 2014). A plaintiff can prove legal causation in an asbestos cancer case through expert testimony that respirable exposures contribute to cancer risk, but exposure to one supplier's asbestos cannot rest on speculation where a manufacturer had several suppliers. A large reduction of compensatory damages does not by itself require retrial of punitive damages, and an award of about 4.6 times the defendant's share of compensatory damages, against a net worth of $4.2 billion and highly reprehensible conduct, satisfies due process.
• Izell v. Union Carbide Corporation (2nd Appellate District, 3rd Division, 2014). A plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos beyond speculation, and then that the exposure was a substantial factor contributing to his risk of cancer. A large cut in compensatory damages does not by itself require a new trial on punitive damages. The question is whether the resulting ratio and the defendant's reprehensibility satisfy due process.
• Olds v. 3M Company (2014). Summary judgment is warranted where the plaintiff has no evidence of exposure to asbestos from a product made, sold or distributed by the defendant; without it, negligence, strict liability, warranty and punitive damages claims fail.
• Scott v. Ford Motor Company (1st Appellate District, 1st Division, 2014). The sophisticated user defense did not bar a failure to warn claim because Ford did not prove that service station owners knew or should have known of automotive asbestos risks during the early part of Scott's career. Under California's governmental interest analysis, Michigan has no interest in having its ban on punitive damages applied in California courts, so no true conflict exists and California law applies.
• Whalen v. General Electric Corporation (2014). Under maritime law, a complaint alleging that a defendant designed and manufactured asbestos-containing ships need not identify specific vessels at the pleading stage, and the Mack rule that a Navy ship is not a product was left open for the summary judgment or trial stage.
• Willis v. Buffalo Pumps Inc. (2014). Under California law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in the aggregate dose causing disease; equivocal product-identification testimony and evidence of corporate knowledge of asbestos hazards create fact disputes that preclude summary judgment, including on punitive damages.
• Willis v. Buffalo Pumps Inc. (2014). Under California law, a boiler maker can be liable for asbestos components it supplied or specified, and the sophisticated user defense turns on the plaintiff's own sophistication, not the employer's. A Restatement § 402B misrepresentation claim requires an affirmative misrepresentation, not just concealment.
• Willis v. Buffalo Pumps Inc. (2014). Under California law, an asbestos plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product that was a substantial factor in the aggregate dose; conflicting evidence on whether defendant supplied the product creates a jury question. Punitive damages require clear and convincing evidence of malice, oppression or fraud by an officer, director or managing agent, which was lacking here.
• Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2nd Appellate District, 4th Division, 2013). When a supplier sells hazardous goods to a sophisticated intermediary that passes them to its employees, the supplier can still be liable for failing to warn those employees unless it has reason to believe the ultimate users know or should know of the hazards. The intermediary's sophistication alone does not shield the supplier.
• Bankhead v. ArvinMeritor, Inc. (1st Appellate District, 4th Division, 2012). Punitive damages need not be measured against a defendant's net worth, and no 10 percent of net worth ceiling exists; a roughly 2.4-to-1 punitive-to-compensatory ratio for highly reprehensible conduct did not violate federal due process.
• Bankhead v. Pneumo Abex LLC (1st Appellate District, 4th Division, 2012). A defendant that stonewalls discovery on its financial condition cannot complain about the exclusion of its unverified financial statement. Indemnity evidence admitted for a limited purpose, even if erroneous, does not require reversal when substantial evidence of the defendant's own wealth supports the punitive award.
• Kelemen v. John Crane, Inc. (2nd District, Division 2, 2011). Punitive damages require evidence of the defendant's financial condition, and a defendant that refuses a court order to produce its financial records cannot then argue the plaintiff lacked such evidence. A future pain and suffering award is excessive when it is based on life expectancy without the disease rather than the plaintiff's actual short prognosis.
• Stewart v. Union Carbide Corporation (2nd Appellate District, 5th Division, 2010). A raw asbestos supplier that gave no warning cannot rely on a sophisticated purchaser or intermediary to give warnings, and the sophisticated-user rule in Johnson turns on the user's own knowledge, not the purchaser's. A defendant seeking to shift fault to other asbestos suppliers bears the burden of proving their fault and its percentage.
• Walmach v. Wheeler (2nd Appellate District, 3rd Division, 2009). A judgment stands if an independent ground, here the unchallenged design defect verdict, supports it, so the sophisticated intermediary defense to the failure to warn claims did not need to be reached. Substantial evidence supported the apportionment of fault, and due process did not bar punitive damages for conduct that was directed at the decedent and occurred partly outside California.
• Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court (1980). Workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for an employee's initial injury, including injury from an employer's knowing failure to make the workplace safe. An employee may still sue at law for aggravation of the disease caused by the employer's fraudulent concealment of the condition and its work-related cause.

Colorado

• Fenton v. Fibreboard Corp. (5th Division, 1991). In a strict liability case the focus is on the product, not the manufacturer's knowledge, so evidence of what the manufacturer knew bears only on punitive damages. A set-off for a settlement not yet paid may be handled by ordering any later payment applied to the judgment, with the defendants remaining liable if it is never collected.

Delaware

• Salvemini v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2025). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to the particular defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in the injury, and vague testimony that cannot separate that defendant's product from others fails. General maritime law did not reach a spouse's land-based take-home exposure when the plaintiffs did not show the maritime connection test was met.
• Roadarmel v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2023). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Bystander testimony about dust from repairs of the defendant's engines was enough to create a genuine factual dispute.
• Thorne v. Crane Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2022). Under Iowa law, a valve attached to real property remains an improvement after it is detached and refurbished, so the statute of repose bars claims based on exposure during that work. Iowa Code § 686B.7(5) also shields a defendant from liability for exposures from a product or component part made or sold by a third party.
• Cox v. Nash Engineering Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2021). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must first show exposure to the specific defendant's product before substantial factor causation is reached; without product identification evidence, strict liability, wrongful death, consortium and punitive damages claims fail.
• Thorne v. Crane Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2021). Applying Delaware choice-of-law rules, the court predicted Delaware would use the manifestation approach to locate the place of injury in an asbestos case, so the presumption favoring the law of the place of injury applied and was not overcome.
• Pearsons v. Heidelberg USA (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2020). Under Vermont law, a plaintiff shows substantial factor causation with evidence of more than de minimis exposure, and a right to recover that vested through exposure before the 1967 enactment of the asbestos-related statute of repose is not barred by it.
• Petit v. Hennessy Indus. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2020). Under Stigliano, where a manufacturer made both asbestos and non-asbestos versions of a product, the plaintiff must present direct or circumstantial evidence of exposure to the asbestos-containing version. Under Rhode Island's frequency, regularity and proximity test, a plaintiff must show regular exposure to friable asbestos in connection with the defendant's product.