Punitive Damages in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on punitive or exemplary damages: 291 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Delaware

• Pruitt v. Deere & Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2020). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to each defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Georgia law requires proof that the product was a contributing factor and that the plaintiff was near its use. An unopposed motion still requires the court to find that the undisputed facts support judgment.
• Vocciante v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2020). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Minimal exposure, or mere presence of the product somewhere at the workplace, does not suffice without evidence of frequency, regularity or proximity.
• Mosher v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2019). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury; minimal exposure or the mere presence of a product aboard a ship is insufficient.
• Mosher v. ABB (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2019). Under maritime law and Colorado law, a plaintiff must show exposure to each defendant's asbestos-containing product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury; minimal or unidentified exposure is insufficient, and failure to oppose a motion does not alone justify summary judgment.
• Rogers v. Warren Pumps (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2019). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing injury; mere presence of a product at the workplace is insufficient. Under Delaware law, a plaintiff must show a product nexus, meaning proximity to the defendant's asbestos product when it was used.
• Johansen v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2019). Under Washington law a plaintiff must show asbestos exposure from the defendant's product was a substantial factor in causing injury, and about five brake jobs over seventeen years was de minimis exposure that did not meet that standard. A manufacturer generally has no duty to warn of dangers of another manufacturer's product, and Washington does not allow punitive damages unless the legislature authorizes them.
• Thomas-Fish v. Avborne Accessory Group, Inc. (2019). A plaintiff asserting successor liability must plead facts plausibly falling within an exception to the general rule that an asset purchaser is not liable for the seller's debts; conclusory allegations of corporate succession and bare claims of willful conduct do not suffice.
• Thomas-Fish v. Avborne Accessory Group, Inc. (2019). Under federal pleading standards, a complaint that makes collective allegations against all defendants, without facts tying a particular defendant to the exposure or to successor liability, fails to state claims for strict liability, negligence, warranty, failure to warn, conspiracy, or punitive damages. Marketing an 'ultra-hazardous product' is not an independent cause of action under New Jersey law.
• Evans v. John Crane (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2017). Summary judgment on punitive damages is improper where a genuine factual dispute exists about whether the defendant knew its asbestos products were harmful and sold them anyway with willful, wanton or reckless disregard. Credibility of a corporate witness cannot be judged at summary judgment.
• Tallman v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2017). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury, and the bare metal defense bars liability for asbestos materials the defendant did not make or supply. Speculation does not create a genuine factual dispute on these points.
• Hillyer v. Mine Safety Appliances Co. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2016). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing the injury. A manufacturer is not liable for asbestos-containing parts it did not make or supply, and speculation cannot create a fact issue on product identification.
• Martinez v. EI DuPont De Nemours and Co. (2012). A parent corporation cannot be sued for its subsidiary's workplace conduct without specific pleaded facts of its own tortious acts. An absent foreign subsidiary that employed the worker and owned the plant is an indispensable party under Rule 19. Delaware forum non conveniens dismissal was warranted where the defendant was wrongly named in place of the foreign employer.
• Bowser v. Parker-Hannifin Corp. (In re Asbestos Litigation) (2011). Under North Carolina law, a product's mere presence at a worksite does not show exposure, but a worker's testimony that he regularly used a brand's brakes, together with supporting context, can raise a triable issue of frequent, regular exposure over an extended period, without proof of specific instances.
• Owens Corning v. Credit Suisse First Boston (2005). Under Bankruptcy Code section 502(c), asbestos claims are estimated by their value in the state-law tort system as of the petition date, with historical settlement and verdict values adjusted for factors unlikely to recur, including punitive damages, which are subordinated in bankruptcy.

Florida

• Rothchild v. Crane Co. (2014). A motion to strike under Rule 12(f) is a disfavored, drastic remedy that is usually denied unless the allegations have no possible relation to the controversy and may prejudice a party.
• Honeywell International, Inc. v. Guilder (3rd District, 2009). A non-party's fault must go on the verdict form for apportionment when the defendant pleaded it and presented sufficient evidence. A child's parental consortium claim under section 768.0415 requires a negligent act on or after October 1, 1988, measured by the last exposure. Settlement proceeds are set off against the verdict.
• Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Ballard (1999). A punitive award above three times compensatory damages can overcome the statutory presumption of excessiveness under section 768.73(1) when clear and convincing evidence shows egregious misconduct; appellate courts review the denial of remittitur only for abuse of discretion.
• Baione v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (2nd District, 1992). When facts support both negligence and strict liability, a plaintiff may proceed on either or both, so dismissing strict liability counts in an asbestos case was error. A claim for punitive damages cannot be struck as a matter of law only because the defendant was previously assessed punitive damages in other cases.

Georgia

• Hanson v. Colgate-Palmolive Company (2018). Under Georgia law, a plaintiff must show actual exposure to asbestos from the defendant's product, at a level greater than de minimis. Evidence that some samples of a product contained asbestos, with nothing tying them to the plaintiff's own product, does not create a jury issue. Punitive damages fail when the underlying tort claims fail.
• Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Knight (2015). Where a plaintiff has multiple asbestos exposures involving multiple defendants, each defendant's conduct need only be a contributing cause, not a substantial one. Expert testimony that Scapa's exposures were substantial causes was reliable enough to be admitted, and a pretrial reliability hearing is discretionary, not mandatory.
• Kellogg Co. v. Pinkston (2001). An employee's damages claim against her employer for asbestos exposure arising out of employment is barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, so a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over it. A default judgment on new claims also requires written notice to the defaulting party.

Illinois

• Pelton v. John Crane, Inc. (2024). Under maritime law, a plaintiff may show substantial-factor causation through admissible general expert testimony plus circumstantial evidence of substantial exposure over a substantial period, without expert testimony specific to the defendant's product. The Second Restatement's consumer-expectations test still governs maritime strict liability, and punitive damages remain available as a remedy even though willful and wanton conduct is not a separate cause of action.
• Menssen v. Pneumo Abex Corporation (4th District, 2012). Parallel conduct plus evidence such as buyer-seller dealings, trade-group membership, shared directors and joint funding of a study was not clear and convincing proof of a conspiratorial agreement, so defendants were entitled to judgment n.o.v. on the civil conspiracy claim.
• Rodarmel v. Pneumo Abex, LLC (4th District, 2011). In 1953-1956 an employer owed no duty to warn of asbestos carried home on work clothing because such injury was not reasonably foreseeable, and parallel conduct plus trade-group membership, shared directors, and suppression of non-significant animal data did not clearly and convincingly prove a conspiratorial agreement.
• Hartman v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp. (5th District, 1994). Circumstantial evidence of regular exposure to the defendant's asbestos product over several months, together with medical evidence, can support an inference that the product probably caused mesothelioma. Trial courts keep discretion over sanctions for late expert disclosure under Rule 220, and a settlement may be allocated to a spouse who signed the releases, so that part is not set off against the verdict.
• US Gypsum Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co. (1st District, 5th Division, 1994). Under Illinois law, an insured's liability in the underlying cases need not be re-proved in the coverage action; asbestos-building-material property damage is covered, the own-product exclusions do not bar removal costs, and coverage is triggered continuously rather than at discovery. The number of occurrences depends on the cause of damage, and all triggered primary coverage must be exhausted before excess policies attach.
• Krull v. Celotex Corp. (1985). A corporation that survives a formal merger assumes all debts and liabilities of the merged-out predecessor, including contingent tort liabilities such as punitive damages, as if it had incurred them itself; the law of the surviving corporation's state of incorporation (Delaware) governs.
• Froud v. Celotex Corp. (1983). The Illinois Survival Act does not allow common law claims for punitive damages to survive the death of the injured person; only punitive claims created by a regulatory statute, such as the Public Utilities Act, survive. Mattyasovszky remained controlling and was not overruled.
• Froud v. Celotex Corporation (1st District, 1982). Under the Illinois Supreme Court's National Bank decision, the Survival Act neither authorizes nor prohibits punitive damages, so common law claims for punitive damages survive the death of the injured person.

Iowa

• Kinseth v. Weil-McLain (2018). A new trial is warranted when counsel's closing argument, viewed as a whole, repeatedly and deliberately violates an in-limine order and likely changed the result. Punitive damages under Beeman do not require proof that the defendant's conduct differed from its peers if the defendant had specific knowledge of the hazard.
• Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1994). Asbestos plaintiffs may prove causation under a flexible substantial-factor test, with circumstantial evidence of exposure to the defendant's product, without proving how much that product contributed to the disease. Punitive damages in asbestos cases are not per se unconstitutional, and the defendant bears the burden of showing a due process violation.
• Beeman v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Fund (1993). Evidence of cancer risk from asbestos is admissible to show a manufacturer's duty to warn and the reasonableness of a plaintiff's fear of cancer, and proof of exposure plus cumulative-effect expert testimony can create a jury question on proximate cause. Knowledge sufficient to trigger a duty to warn does not by itself support punitive damages, and Iowa law does not allow a separate award for lost opportunity to live out a full life expectancy.

Kentucky

• Hayes v. Colgate-Palmolive Company (2021). A corporate representative's testimony about personal and family use of the company's product is irrelevant to the company's knowledge for punitive damages and unduly prejudicial under KRE 403. A scientific article is admissible under KRE 703 or 803(18) only if the testifying experts actually relied on it, not merely because it is reliable.
• Papineau v. Brake Supply Company, Inc. (2021). Under Kentucky's substantial-factor test, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the disease. A cumulative-dose opinion tied to the defendant's specific products, as distinct from the rejected each-and-every-exposure theory, can create a jury question. A seller that relines used brake shoes alters them and falls outside the Kentucky Middleman Statute.
• Surita v. Arvinmeritor, Inc. (2017). Under Kentucky law, negligence, strict liability, warranty and misrepresentation claims all require proof that each defendant's product was a substantial factor in causing the harm, meaning a probable rather than merely possible cause.
• Bruszewski v. Motley Rice, LLC (2012). Under Kentucky law, a malpractice claim for failing to file suit before the limitations period ran accrues when that period expires, even if the client could still recover from bankruptcy trusts. Kentucky law does not allow recovery of "lost" punitive damages in a legal malpractice action.

Louisiana

• Simoneaux v. Taylor Seidenbach, Inc. (2023). Former Louisiana Civil Code art. 2315.3 punitive damages require that the defendant actually stored, handled, or transported the toxic substance, so claims based on manufacturing and labeling do not qualify. A civil conspiracy to commit fraud is adequately pleaded if it identifies the alleged conspirators and specific overt acts with dates, even without attributing each act to a particular conspirator.
• Becnel v. Lamorak Insurance Co. (2022). Under Louisiana law, an intentional tort requires proof that the defendant desired the injury or knew it was substantially certain to follow, which is more than knowing a practice is dangerous. A fraud claim requires evidence of fraudulent intent, and conclusory allegations of silence do not supply it.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (2022). Under Rules 403 and 701, the court excluded prejudicial labels and marginally relevant evidence, but allowed lay witnesses who worked with asbestos-containing products to infer that the dust from them contained asbestos.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (2022). Under Louisiana law, an intentional tort requires proof that the injury was substantially certain, meaning inevitable, to follow from the defendant's conduct. Knowledge of asbestos hazards shows negligence at most, and a fraud claim needs evidence of fraudulent intent.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (2022). Punitive damages under former Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.3 were available only for conduct from September 1984 to April 1996, and an insurer is liable only for exposures during its policy period, so an insurer whose coverage ended before September 1984 cannot be liable for them.
• McAllister v. McDERMOTT, Inc. (2020). Under general maritime law and the Jones Act, a decedent's pre-death pain and suffering is treated as a pecuniary loss recoverable by the estate, and loss of support or household services damages go only to survivors who show they received such support or services.
• Gomez v. Aardvark Contractors, Inc. (2018). A plaintiff may plead asbestos exposure on information and belief when the facts, such as the composition of pipe insulation, are within the defendant's control. A premises owner owes a duty of reasonable care to an independent contractor's employees, and a strict liability claim is plausibly pleaded when it alleges custody of defective asbestos products that caused the plaintiff's disease.
• Bell v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. (2017). Under Louisiana's choice-of-law articles 3515 and 3542, Louisiana's policies would be most seriously impaired if its survival law were not applied to a Louisiana domiciliary's claim, and article 3545 requires Louisiana law, including on punitive damages, for a wrongful death claim by a Louisiana domiciliary injured in Louisiana by a product.
• Bell v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. (2017). Under Louisiana's choice of law rules, each issue is analyzed separately; the survival claim, a loss-compensating rule, follows the decedent's Louisiana domicile, while punitive damages, a conduct-regulating rule, follow the place where the conduct occurred.
• Hayes v. Asbestos, Corp., Ltd. (2014). For a defendant whose products the plaintiff first encountered after the LPLA took effect, the LPLA is the exclusive remedy, even if the plaintiff had earlier asbestos exposures from unrelated sources before the Act. A punitive damages claim under La. C.C. art. 2315.3 requires allegations that the conduct involved storage, handling or transportation of hazardous or toxic substances.
• Bonnette v. Conoco, Inc. (2003). Louisiana law does not allow compensatory damages for a slightly increased risk of future asbestos disease on less proof than medical monitoring requires. Emotional distress damages without manifest physical injury require proof of a particular likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress. Punitive damages under former art. 2315.3 require wanton or reckless conduct.
• Egan v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. (4th Circuit, 1996). A short exposure to a defendant's asbestos product can be a substantial contributing factor in mesothelioma, and circumstantial evidence can support an inference that the product came from that defendant. Louisiana law, which bars punitive damages here, governed a Louisiana resident's asbestos injury in Louisiana.

Maryland

• Hailey v. Air and Liquid Systems Corporation (2020). A plaintiff must show, for each defendant separately, regular and frequent (or substantial) exposure to that defendant's own product where the plaintiff actually worked; the mere presence of a defendant's product somewhere in the workplace is not enough. The court found the result the same under Maryland and maritime law.
• Fullen v. 3M Company (2019). A party relying on foreign law must give reasonable notice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1; notice given at the close of discovery, after earlier reliance on forum law, is unreasonable and waives foreign law. A late witness designation is not excluded where the surprise can be cured and no prejudice is shown.