Causation in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on medical or specific causation: 1,200 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Maryland

• Barrett v. AW Chesterton Company (2021). Under Maryland law, a plaintiff or cross-plaintiff in an asbestos case must offer evidence that the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm; without such evidence, and with no opposition, summary judgment is proper.
• Coates v. Ford Motor Company (2020). A trial court has wide discretion to deny summary judgment and let a case go to trial, and a jury's weighing of conflicting expert evidence on exposure will not be disturbed. Res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply where an appellate reversal and remand left no final judgment on the issues.
• Hailey v. Air and Liquid Systems Corporation (2020). A plaintiff must show, for each defendant separately, regular and frequent (or substantial) exposure to that defendant's own product where the plaintiff actually worked; the mere presence of a defendant's product somewhere in the workplace is not enough. The court found the result the same under Maryland and maritime law.
• Ament v. John Crane-Houdalille, Inc. (2019). Under Maryland Rule 5-702, an expert's opinion needs a sufficient factual basis, and a trial court does not abuse its discretion in striking causation testimony when the expert cannot tie the fact witnesses' testimony to the defendant's product. The appellant must pinpoint specific errors on appeal.
• Dugger v. Union Carbide Corporation (2019). A jury could infer from several witnesses' testimony that they did not recall seeing warnings on brake boxes, despite their regular handling of the brakes, that no warnings were present, which creates a genuine dispute of material fact on whether the warnings were adequate.
• Dugger v. Union Carbide Corporation (2019). Even if late expert reports are not true supplements under Rule 26(e), they need not be excluded under Rule 37(c)(1) when the late disclosure is harmless, judged by factors such as surprise, ability to cure, trial disruption, importance and explanation.
• Dugger v. Union Carbide Corporation (2019). Expert opinion resting only on the 'each and every exposure' theory is inadmissible under Daubert. Opinions that consider the frequency, regularity and proximity of the plaintiff's specific exposure and rest on reliable studies are admissible, and challenges to the underlying studies go to weight.
• Sawyer v. Union Carbide Corporation (2019). Under Maryland law, a supplier invoking the sophisticated user defense must show it reasonably relied on the intermediary to warn users, which requires evidence that it warned the intermediary or knew a warning was unnecessary. An employer's failure to warn is not a superseding cause unless it was extraordinary and unforeseeable.
• Wallace & Gale Asbestos Settlement Trust v. Busch (2019). A plaintiff may prove through circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences that a defendant installed the asbestos-containing products at the specific site of exposure. A party that introduces evidence about a former co-defendant may open the door to telling the jury that the co-defendant was dismissed.
• Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc. v. Rossello (2018). Denial of summary judgment is reviewed only for abuse of discretion, and circumstantial evidence can suffice to identify a defendant as the contractor whose asbestos-containing product exposed a bystander. A trial court may exclude a witness as a sanction when a party violates the scheduling order and fails to educate its corporate designee under Md. Rule 2-412(d).
• Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Coates (2018). A jury instruction on a liability theory the evidence did not generate is reversible error when it prejudices the party, and pattern instructions must be tailored to the theories actually in the case. A party must object to allegedly inconsistent civil verdicts before the jury is discharged, and a party's out-of-court denial of liability is inadmissible hearsay even under the completeness doctrine.
• Wallace & Gale Asbestos Settlement Trust v. Busch (2018). A jury may infer from circumstantial evidence that a contractor installed asbestos-containing insulation at a site where the plaintiff was exposed, if the contractor did a large share of the insulation work there. Evidentiary rulings and jury instructions are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
• Wallace & Gale Asbestos Settlement Trust v. Busch (2018). A jury may use circumstantial evidence to infer that a defendant installed the asbestos-containing product to which a bystander plaintiff was exposed, and fiber drift theory is rejected in Maryland, so an instruction on it is not required when the evidence does not raise it.
• Davenport v. Mcic, Inc. (2017). A bystander plaintiff in an asbestos case must show actual exposure to the defendant's product that was regular, frequent and close by. General evidence that a contractor worked at a large shipyard, without evidence placing the plaintiff near its work at a specific time and place, would require speculation and does not create a jury question.
• Rhodes v. Mcic, Inc. (2017). A complaint that relies on conclusions and a formulaic recitation of negligence and strict liability, lumps all defendants together, and pleads no facts on frequency, regularity and proximity of exposure fails Rule 8(a) plausibility; fraud must also be pleaded with particularity under Rule 9(b).
• Rockman v. Union Carbide Corp. (2017). Expert opinions that any asbestos exposure, however small, causes mesothelioma, or that tie low-level chrysotile bystander exposure to peritoneal mesothelioma without supporting data, do not satisfy Rule 702 and Daubert. Under Maryland's Balbos factors, brief bystander exposures during three short home repairs were not a substantial factor in causing the disease as a matter of law.
• Rockman v. Union Carbide Corp. (2017). Where a plaintiff offers no opposition and no supporting evidence, Maryland law bars these claims: warranty claims accrue on tender of delivery, market share liability is not recognized, and punitive damages require clear and convincing proof of actual malice.
• Arbogast v. AW Chesterton Co. (2016). Under Maryland law a plaintiff must show exposure to respirable fibers from a specific defendant's asbestos-containing product with frequency, regularity and proximity. A manufacturer is liable for third-party asbestos used with its product only in the narrow circumstances described in May. A strict liability claim for a product sold before Phipps (1976) may proceed because the claim accrues at diagnosis.
• Arbogast v. AW Chesterton Co. (2016). A plaintiff must offer evidence from which a jury can reasonably infer that a defendant's product actually contained asbestos before Maryland's frequency, regularity, proximity test applies; an expert opinion resting on a worker's unsupported belief that a product contained asbestos lacks sufficient facts or data under Rule 702.
• Haney v. 3M Company (2015). Under Maryland's frequency, regularity and proximity test for bystander asbestos exposure, a worker who passed through areas where panels were installed eight to ten times for three to five minutes each time did not show substantial-factor causation. Claims a plaintiff does not defend in response to a summary judgment motion are treated as abandoned.
• Sherin v. John Crane-Houdaille, Inc. (2014). Under Maryland law, a supplier owes no duty to warn unless a better warning could feasibly and effectively have prevented the harm, and the plaintiff must offer evidence that improved warnings to intermediaries would have prevented the take-home exposure. Testimony about the manufacturer name on a product container is circumstantial evidence of the manufacturer, not hearsay.
• Dixon v. Ford Motor Company (2013). An expert's opinion that each exposure to asbestos contributed to mesothelioma need not undergo Frye/Reed review when it rests on evidence of repeated, high-intensity exposure to the defendant's product. A trial court abuses its Rule 2-535 discretion by overturning a jury verdict that the evidence reasonably supported.
• Dixon v. Ford Motor Company (2012). An expert's opinion that every asbestos exposure is a 'substantial contributing cause' of mesothelioma, with no estimate of exposure or risk, does not help the jury under Maryland Rule 5-702. Where probabilistic causation is the accepted scientific theory, quantitative epidemiological evidence is required.
• Georgia-Pacific v. Farrar (2012). A manufacturer of an asbestos-containing product owes a duty to warn those within the foreseeable zone of danger, including a household member exposed through dust on a bystander worker's clothing. Maryland's frequency, proximity and regularity test governs whether bystander exposure is a substantial factor.
• Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Saville (2011). Evidence of regular work within arm's length of the defendant's asbestos-containing felts can satisfy the frequency, regularity and proximity test for substantial-factor causation, and a bankruptcy trust is a joint tortfeasor for offset purposes only as its settlement agreement provides.
• Crane v. Linkus (2010). Expert testimony that a defendant's unencapsulated asbestos product released respirable fibers above ambient levels is not required; lay testimony of visible dust from regular handling, plus expert testimony on dose-response and no safe threshold, can let a jury infer substantial-factor causation. A defendant is not credited for payments from bankrupt entities absent proof of tortfeasor status or trust terms providing a reduction.
• Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Saville (2010). A defendant seeking to reduce a verdict for payments from bankruptcy trusts under Maryland's contribution act must prove the trusts are joint tort-feasors. JNOV in a jury trial requires a motion for judgment at the close of all evidence. A manufacturer's duty to warn can continue after the plaintiff's exposure, so later-dated evidence of its knowledge can be relevant.
• Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Saville (2009). Circumstantial evidence of regular, close-range exposure to a defendant's asbestos product meets Maryland's frequency-regularity-proximity test for substantial-factor causation. A party seeking a verdict reduction for payments by claimed joint tort-feasors, such as bankruptcy trusts, must prove their joint tort-feasor status. A duty to warn can continue after exposure ends, so later-dated evidence of the defendant's knowledge can be relevant.
• John Crane, Inc. v. Puller (2006). A claim for asbestosis and a claim for mesothelioma are separate claims, so the voluntary dismissal of the earlier asbestosis suit did not bar the later suit by collateral estoppel because no fact was actually litigated. In asbestos cases a loss of consortium claim arises when the underlying injury claim arises (the exposure test), so Maryland's non-economic damages cap does not apply to it when it does not apply to the underlying survival action.
• Garlock v. Gallagher (2003). Plaintiffs are not parties to defendants' cross-claims, so the actual parties could stipulate to dismiss them under Rule 2-506 and the trial court could not nullify the dismissal. A defendant that settled by a pro tanto release and is not a party to the primary case is not counted as a share when dividing the verdict among joint tort-feasors.
• Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Pransky (2002). The Balbos frequency, proximity and regularity test for substantial-factor causation applies to any bystander, whether the exposure is occupational or non-occupational. A cause of action for an asbestos-related disease arises before July 1, 1986 if the last exposure was undisputedly before that date, so the non-economic damages cap does not apply.
• Hollingsworth v. Connor (2000). A nonresident component maker that sold its product to another company outside the forum, and did not direct activity at the forum, lacks minimum contacts even if it knew the product would be sold there. For Maryland's noneconomic damages cap, a mesothelioma cause of action arises when the disease is contracted, not at the first cellular change.
• ACandS v. Abate (1998). A plaintiff may use other witnesses to identify the asbestos products he was exposed to, but must show regular, frequent exposure near the specific product's use, and fiber drift across a workplace is not enough. A contractor in a mixed sale-and-service transaction is not strictly liable if its predominant purpose was service, so the jury must be instructed on that test.
• Adams v. Owens-Illinois (1998). A trial judge's rulings on juror challenges, new trial motions and evidence are reviewed only for abuse of discretion, and the appellate court does not reweigh the evidence or expert credibility. Absent a showing of prejudice, and given a verdict that is not irreconcilably defective, the judgments stand.
• Ford Motor v. Wood (1998). A bystander plaintiff must show frequent, regular exposure to the defendant's own asbestos products, and a vehicle maker has no duty to warn about replacement brake parts it did not make, sell or place in commerce. Evidence of exposure to other asbestos products is admissible as an alternative cause only if the proffered exposures could have caused the disease.
• Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw (1997). The Maryland cap on noneconomic damages applies to asbestos wrongful death claims arising after October 1, 1994. For personal injury claims, the cause of action arises when the disease develops, not at exposure or at diagnosis. Substantial-factor causation requires evidence of the frequency, regularity and proximity of the plaintiff's exposure to the defendant's product.
• ACandS Inc. v. Asner (1996). Threshold limit value evidence is relevant state of the art evidence in negligence and strict liability failure-to-warn claims, and evidence of exposure to non-parties' asbestos products is not per se irrelevant. Punitive damages require clear and convincing proof that the defendant, when the product left its control, actually knew of the danger to bystanders and consciously disregarded it.
• Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Garrett (1996). A bystander's proof of substantial-factor causation is judged by the frequency, regularity and proximity of exposure to the defendant's product. Punitive damages in a products case require clear and convincing evidence of actual knowledge of the defect and a bad-faith decision to market the product in conscious disregard of the danger. A defendant found not liable at trial is not a joint tort-feasor, so no settlement offset applies.
• ACandS, Inc. v. Asner (1995). A punitive damages claim in a products liability case goes to the jury if the plaintiff offers evidence that could clearly and convincingly show actual malice (actual knowledge of the hazard and conscious disregard of it). Exposure to the products of non-party companies is irrelevant to whether a defendant's product was a substantial factor. A spouse's death ends the measure of consortium damages but not the consortium claim, and solatium damages may also be recovered.
• Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Balbos (1992). A nonmanufacturing supplier-installer of asbestos is held to a 'should have known' standard in a negligent failure-to-warn claim. A bystander plaintiff must show frequent exposure near regularly used products of the particular defendant to prove substantial-factor causation, and 'fiber drift' alone is not enough. A sophisticated-user instruction requires evidence that the supplier reasonably relied on the intermediary, and punitive damages require actual malice shown by clear and convincing evidence.
• Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong (1992). A trial judge may exclude a document that technically qualifies as a business record if the objecting party shows it lacks the usual reliability, though a heavy burden applies. A cause of action arises under the noneconomic damages cap when it comes into existence, not when it is discovered. The contribution statute does not reduce a nonsettling defendant's liability by another defendant's punitive damages settlement.
• Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Balbos (1990). A jury's negligence verdict was upheld despite arguably inconsistent findings, and a defendant's failure to warn was a cause-in-fact of harm to bystander shipyard workers, with expert evidence of asbestos fibers drifting supporting the inference that bystanders were exposed. Suppliers could not rely on the employer as a sophisticated purchaser. Punitive damages require direct evidence of substantial knowledge that the product itself was dangerous and gross indifference to that danger.

Massachusetts

• Ciolino v. Keystone Shipping Co. (2024). A late expert disclosure by a plaintiff's treating physicians was substantially justified and not excluded under the Esposito factors. Statements by a shipowner's officers about asbestos aboard the vessel are non-hearsay party admissions. Disputed facts on asbestos presence and causation preclude summary judgment on Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness claims.
• Cook v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corporation (2023). Summary judgment is not appropriate where significant facts are genuinely in dispute, such as whether gaskets contained asbestos, what the Navy permitted regarding warnings, and whether DCo supplied asbestos gaskets.
• McIsaac v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2023). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product at a high enough level that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury; the mere presence of the product at the workplace is insufficient. Rule 56(d) allows time to find facts, not to gather additional expert opinions.
• Sebright v. General Electric Co. (2021). Under maritime law, a manufacturer's duty to warn under the DeVries test can reach asbestos insulation added to its bare-metal product if the product required insulation to function, and the court treats the sophisticated purchaser defense as unavailable where a risk and burden balancing weighs for the Navy sailor. A plaintiff must also show that a defendant's specific product contained asbestos, and loss of consortium and parental society claims are not available under general maritime law in this circuit.
• Barraford v. T&N Limited (2013). Under Massachusetts law, an asbestos plaintiff must show product identification, exposure through working with or in close proximity to the product, and that exposure was a substantial contributing factor; a prior deposition from a state case is admissible as former testimony where the earlier defendants had a similar motive and opportunity to examine the witness.
• Whiting v. CBS Corporation (2013). To prove causation in an asbestos case, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's product contained asbestos and that the victim was exposed to the asbestos in that product. Without such evidence, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment.
• Morin v. AutoZone Northeast, Inc. (2010). A plaintiff in an asbestos case must show product identification, exposure, and that the exposure was a substantial contributing factor. Evidence of the defendant's product at the work site and of the plaintiff's close proximity to it is enough to reach a jury, but exposure that is only insignificant or de minimis is not.
• O'connor v. Raymark Industries, Inc. (1987). Where several causes combine to produce an indivisible injury, the plaintiff need not prove but-for causation or separate out the effect of the defendant's product; a 'substantial contributing cause' instruction that distinguishes a substantial factor from a negligible one is correct.