Causation in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on medical or specific causation: 1,200 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Louisiana

• Oddo v. Asbestos Corporation Ltd. (4th Circuit, 2015). When a jury's special-verdict answers are irreconcilably inconsistent and the trial court neither sends the jury back nor orders a new trial, that is legal error, and the appellate court reviews the affected findings de novo. In asbestos cases a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product was significant and a substantial factor in causing the disease.
• Smith v. Union Carbide Corporation (2015). Dose reconstruction methodology was sufficiently established and accepted to pass Daubert analysis, and concerns about applying it to one person's dose rather than a population's could be addressed through cross-examination.
• Vedros v. Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc. (2015). An expert's specific causation opinion that every asbestos exposure above background causes mesothelioma is not meaningfully different from the "every exposure" theory and is unreliable under Rule 702 and Daubert. Louisiana law calls for a qualitative evaluation of the plaintiff's specific exposures.
• Vedros v. Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc. (2015). When a court lets a party substitute an expert for one who has died, on the condition that the substitute's testimony stay within the original expert's report, the substitute's opinions that go beyond or contradict the original expert's report may be struck as unfairly prejudicial to the opposing party.
• Vedros v. Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc. (2015). An asbestos exposure expert need not calculate the specific dose or concentration of asbestos from a defendant's product to give a reliable causation opinion, and a motion in limine cannot substitute for a summary judgment motion on whether exposure to the defendant's product occurred.
• Comardelle v. Pennsylvania General Insurance Company (2014). A genuine issue of fact on exposure defeats summary judgment, and challenges to an expert's factual basis and exposure history go to weight rather than admissibility. An expert need not know the dose of asbestos from each defendant to give a causation opinion.
• Davidson v. Georgia Pacific LLC (2014). An expert's "every exposure" theory of asbestos causation is inadmissible under Rule 702 and Daubert and conflicts with Louisiana's substantial factor test; without other expert causation testimony, plaintiffs cannot create a genuine dispute on causation.
• Luna v. AW Chesterton Company (1st Circuit, 2014). Prescription on an asbestos survival claim began when mesothelioma was diagnosed, and a remaining tortfeasor must prove the other defendants' products were a substantial cause of the injury to obtain a virile share reduction.
• Millet v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (2014). Summary judgment is premature where the discovery deadline has not passed and further discovery could produce evidence of a genuine issue of fact; an unopposed motion may be granted where no party offers evidence or argument against it.
• Robertson v. Doug Ashy Building Materials, Inc. (1st Circuit, 2014). A plaintiff in an asbestos case may prove substantial-factor causation through a qualitative assessment of exposure (level, frequency, nature, proximity, duration) without quantifying dose. Disputed fact questions about the relative contribution of chrysotile exposure cannot be resolved on summary judgment.
• Robertson v. Doug Ashy Building Materials, Inc. (1st Circuit, 2014). A plaintiff in an asbestos case may prove causation through a qualitative assessment of exposure (level, frequency, nature, proximity, duration) and need not prove a quantitative dose. Genuine fact issues about exposure to the supplier's asbestos and its substantial contribution to mesothelioma preclude summary judgment.
• Smith v. Union Carbide Corp. (2014). A defendant may reduce a damage award by the fault of a settling joint tortfeasor only if it proves that tortfeasor negligently caused the plaintiff's damages, which requires evidence of significant exposure to its product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury.
• Francis v. Union Carbide Corporation (4th Circuit, 2013). Summary judgment was improper in a take-home asbestos case where the record showed the father worked at a shipyard where asbestos materials were used and the plaintiff was around his dusty work clothes, creating genuine issues of material fact on exposure.
• Landry v. Avondale Industries, Inc. (4th Circuit, 2013). A plaintiff must show significant exposure to the particular defendant's asbestos product such that it was a substantial factor in causing the disease, and this burden is not relaxed in a multi-defendant case. Where the evidence leaves genuine factual questions about the amount of exposure and its causal contribution, summary judgment for the plaintiff is improper.
• Robertson v. Doug Ashy Building Materials, Inc. (1st Circuit, 2011). A summary judgment may be granted only on issues raised in the motion. A motion that challenges only exposure to the defendant's asbestos does not put medical causation at issue, and circumstantial evidence that a manufacturer bought the supplier's asbestos can create a fact question on exposure. A raw-asbestos supplier also owes the general duty of reasonable care.
• Robertson v. Doug Ashy Building Materials, Inc. (1st Circuit, 2011). A summary judgment may be rendered only on issues set forth in the motion under consideration, and a trial court must conduct a Daubert analysis tied to the case's facts before excluding an expert as unreliable. An asbestos plaintiff need show only significant exposure to the defendant's product that was a substantial factor in causing the disease, not the dose from each defendant or epidemiological proof.
• McAskill v. American Marine Holding Co. (4th Circuit, 2009). In a latent mesothelioma case, a plaintiff need show only that the defendant's asbestos-containing product was a substantial factor in causing the disease, which can be met by showing he actively worked with asbestos-containing materials; circumstantial evidence that the defendant supplied such insulation to the employer creates a genuine fact issue that precludes summary judgment.
• Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc. (2009). Mesothelioma from asbestos contact was not a covered occupational disease under the 1952 version of La.Rev.Stat. 23:1031.1, so the Workers' Compensation Act's exclusive remedy provision did not bar a tort suit against the employer for it.
• Rando v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (1st Circuit, 2008). The 1952 version of the Louisiana workers' compensation statute did not cover mesothelioma, so exclusivity did not bar a tort suit against the employer. The peremption exception for those in possession or control of an improvement applies to a contractor that controlled the construction, not just to owners, lessors and tenants.
• Thibodeaux v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd. (4th Circuit, 2008). A plaintiff in a Louisiana asbestos case must prove exposure to the defendant's asbestos product and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing the disease. Evidence that asbestos was present, or that the defendant supplied products at a site at some time, is not enough.
• Graves v. Riverwood International Corp. (2nd Circuit, 2007). A worker's tort claim against his employer vests when significant asbestos exposures occur. Exposures before Louisiana's 1952 occupational disease coverage therefore left the claim outside the later workers' compensation scheme. A JNOV or new trial is denied where reasonable minds could differ and the verdict is supportable by a fair interpretation of the evidence.
• Palermo v. Port of New Orleans (4th Circuit, 2007). A port authority that leases wharves to stevedores owes no duty to their employees to provide a safe workplace unless the premises are defective and it knew or should have known of the defect. Ship repairers are liable only if the evidence shows their work was a substantial factor in the plaintiff's asbestos exposure.
• Terrance v. Dow Chemical Company (1st Circuit, 2007). Mesothelioma was not a compensable occupational disease under the pre-1975 Louisiana workers' compensation statute, so the tort claim against a premises owner was not barred. A defendant seeking a credit for a settling party's fault must prove that party's fault at trial; settlement documents are not admissible to prove it.
• Chaisson v. Avondale Industries, Inc. (4th Circuit, 2006). A contractor that knew its job site contained asbestos and knew of the 1972 OSHA standards owed a fact-specific duty to protect an employee's household member from exposure to asbestos carried home on work clothes. The court stated this was not a categorical duty rule.
• Palermo v. Port of New Orleans (4th Circuit, 2006). A port authority that leased its wharves to stevedores owed no duty to their employees absent a known defect in the premises. A plaintiff must also show that a particular defendant's work was a substantial factor in the exposure; the generally substantial exposure from handling asbestos cargo does not supply that proof.
• Thomas v. AP Green Industries, Inc. (4th Circuit, 2006). A premises owner can be directly liable for its own negligence toward a contractor's employee even if the independent contractor defense bars vicarious liability, and the substantial contributing factor test for causation applies to premises owners as well as product defendants.
• Zimko v. American Cyanamid (4th Circuit, 2005). An employer is immune from tort suit under workers' compensation exclusivity unless it committed an intentional act, which requires intent to injure or knowledge that injury was substantially certain; knowingly maintaining a dangerous asbestos workplace is only negligence. An employer owes a duty of reasonable care to household members of employees exposed to asbestos carried home on the employee's clothing or person.
• Roberts v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1st Circuit, 2004). A trial court cannot substantively change a final judgment by a second judgment without a proper procedure, so the change is an absolute nullity. A premises owner that knew or should have known asbestos exposure caused serious lung disease and cancer is liable for mesothelioma even without specific knowledge of that disease.
• Torrejon v. Mobil Oil Co. (4th Circuit, 2004). Under the Jones Act a seaman need only show the employer's negligence was a cause, however slight, of the injury, and the jury's finding of negligent asbestos exposure together with the stipulation that asbestos caused the mesothelioma left no reasonable basis for finding no causation. A defendant seeking to reduce liability for settling manufacturers' fault must prove their liability, and allegations in another suit's complaint do not do so.
• Vodanovich v. AP Green Industries, Inc. (4th Circuit, 2004). A plaintiff in an asbestos case must show exposure to asbestos released by the defendant's activities that was a substantial factor in causing the injury; without direct or circumstantial evidence of such exposure, summary judgment for the defendant is proper.
• Kemp v. Armstrong World Industries (1st Circuit, 2003). In a smoking-related lung cancer case, the exposure rule decides when the claim accrued. A plaintiff who wants pre-LPLA tort law to apply must show with factual support that significant exposures before September 1988 later caused the disease. A history of heavy smoking and general medical opinions are not enough.
• Watters v. Department of Social Services (4th Circuit, 2003). A plaintiff who moves for summary judgment and will bear the burden of proof at trial must establish each point without any genuine factual dispute. Competing expert and fact evidence on causation, exposure and timing creates genuine issues that preclude summary judgment.
• Austin v. Abney Mills, Inc. (2002). In a long-latency occupational disease case where the plaintiff has the disease, a tort cause of action accrues, for purposes of determining the applicable law, when asbestos exposures are significant and later result in manifestation of damages (the significant tortious exposure theory), not at manifestation or disability.
• Estate of Patrick v. BD. OF Sup'rs OF Univ. (4th Circuit, 2002). A trial court acts within its discretion in refusing a second expert examination of a deceased plaintiff's tissue samples, treated as analogous to an independent medical examination, when the defendant had earlier had the chance to examine them. Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief fall outside the scope of appellate review.
• Hennegan v. Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Co. (4th Circuit, 2002). Under federal maritime law, a manufacturer is strictly liable if its asbestos product, unreasonably dangerous and sold without warnings, was a substantial contributing cause of the harm. A non-settling defendant is solidarily liable for the whole of the damages, less the fault share of the settling employer.
• Hoerner v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (4th Circuit, 2002). In Louisiana asbestos cases a defendant is liable only if the plaintiff's exposure to its products was a substantial factor, shown by frequent and regular exposure. An executive officer is liable only with a personal duty to provide a safe workplace, including some control over purchasing equipment and supplies.
• Abadie v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (5th Circuit, 2001). A product is unreasonably dangerous per se if its danger-in-fact outweighs its utility, regardless of the manufacturer's knowledge. Working near contractors who cut the product is enough evidence of exposure to support liability.
• Abadie v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (5th Circuit, 2001). A wrongful death claim arises at death, so the post-1976 workers' compensation immunity barred it against Avondale's executive officers. A survival action in a long-latency disease case is governed by the law in effect when the worker was exposed, so exposure beginning in 1964 left it open.
• Abadie v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (5th Circuit, 2001). In a long-latency asbestos case, a cause of action accrues, for choosing between pre- and post-1976 law, when exposures were significant enough to start a disease process that progresses independently of further exposure. Under pre-comparative-fault Louisiana law, a settling or bankrupt solidary obligor found liable counts as a virile (pro rata) share, and co-employee safety officers are liable only for a personal breach of a delegated duty.
• Austin v. Abney Mills, Inc. (2nd Circuit, 2001). A tort cause of action for a long-latency asbestos disease does not accrue on mere exposure, because damage is required; under either the manifestation or contraction theory Hogue showed no injury before mesothelioma was covered by workers' compensation in 1975, so compensation was his exclusive remedy for negligence claims. Intentional tort claims not raised in the summary judgment motion cannot be dismissed on it.
• Emery v. Owens-Corporation (1st Circuit, 2001). Where the substantial injury-producing asbestos exposures occurred before Louisiana's comparative fault law took effect, pre-comparative-fault virile share principles apply rather than jury-assigned percentages. Under the pre-1976 statutes, a premises owner was not a statutory employer entitled to tort immunity, and the statutory employer question is for the court rather than the jury.
• Asbestos v. Bordelon, Inc. (4th Circuit, 1998). Where significant asbestos exposure occurred before the Louisiana Products Liability Act, pre-Act law governs, including strict liability for products unreasonably dangerous per se, by design or for failure to warn, and pre-comparative-fault virile share rules. A manufacturer is liable only if plaintiffs show frequent, regular exposure to its product, and prescription runs from the time a plaintiff has actual or constructive knowledge of an asbestos-related injury.
• Rareshide v. Mobil Oil Corp. (4th Circuit, 1998). A refinery worker with an occupational asbestos disease who is restricted from further asbestos exposure is not offered a suitable job when every offered position carries exposure risk, so the employer fails its burden to defeat supplemental earnings benefits. Temporary total disability benefits are capped at six months from the injury.
• Egan v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. (4th Circuit, 1996). A short exposure to a defendant's asbestos product can be a substantial contributing factor in mesothelioma, and circumstantial evidence can support an inference that the product came from that defendant. Louisiana law, which bars punitive damages here, governed a Louisiana resident's asbestos injury in Louisiana.
• Held v. Avondale Industries, Inc. (4th Circuit, 1996). A marine surveyor who is not a seaman is not barred by maritime law from asserting Louisiana state remedies, and a plaintiff's expert affidavit that any exposure contributed to mesothelioma raises a genuine issue of material fact on causation that prevents summary judgment.
• Quick v. Murphy Oil Co. (4th Circuit, 1994). Where multiple causes are present, a defendant's asbestos-containing product is a cause in fact only if exposure to it was a substantial contributing factor, and not every asbestos exposure meets that standard; a trivial exposure does not.
• White v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (5th Circuit, 1982). Under Louisiana's occupational disease compensation provision, the compensation rate is fixed at the date the disease manifests as disability, not the date of last injurious exposure. A claimant who shows he falls in the 'odd-lot' category shifts to the employer the burden of showing available work.

Maine

• Coffin v. Ametek, Inc. (2021). Under FELA's low threshold, foreseeability turns on actual or constructive notice and is ordinarily a jury question; a railroad's general knowledge of asbestos hazards and disputed evidence of escaping dust prevent summary judgment on foreseeability.
• Coffin v. Ametek, Inc. (2020). An expert's opinion that a plaintiff's cumulative asbestos exposure caused his mesothelioma rests on good grounds and is admissible under Daubert, and challenges to its factual basis or its power to prove a particular defendant's liability go to weight and are for cross-examination. The same Daubert reliability standard applies to FELA claims.
• Soucy v. Briggs & Stratton Corporation (2014). At the motion-to-dismiss stage, an asbestos plaintiff need not identify the particular products of each defendant, and need not allege what alternative warning should have been given, so long as the complaint gives fair notice and plausibly alleges how exposure occurred.