Causation in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on medical or specific causation: 1,200 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Louisiana

• Roussell v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (2022). A plaintiff who fails to oppose a summary judgment motion arguing she has no evidence of exposure to the defendant's asbestos products is treated as admitting she cannot prove her claims.
• Sampey v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (2022). A plaintiff who fails to oppose a summary judgment motion is treated as admitting that she cannot prove an essential element of her claim, here exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product, so summary judgment is entered under Rule 56 and Celotex.
• Sampey v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (2022). A party that fails to oppose a summary judgment motion is treated as admitting it cannot prove an essential element of its claim, so summary judgment is entered against it. Under Louisiana law, an asbestos plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that the exposure was a substantial cause of injury.
• Sanchez v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (2022). Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's product and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing the injury; with no opposing evidence, summary judgment is required.
• Sanchez v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (2022). Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's product and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing the injury; with no opposition and no evidence of exposure, summary judgment is required.
• Sanchez v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (2022). Under Louisiana law, an asbestos plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's product and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing the injury; failing to oppose a motion that points out the lack of such evidence results in summary judgment.
• Sentilles v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (2022). A party who fails to oppose a summary judgment motion is treated as admitting it cannot prove its claims. Under Louisiana law, an asbestos plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that the exposure was a substantial cause of his injury.
• Williams v. Boeing Company (2022). Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff need only show a reasonable jury could find it more likely than not that he inhaled the defendant's asbestos fibers, and a court may not draw inferences against the non-movant on summary judgment. Wrongful death and survival actions are separate causes of action, so a late wrongful death claim by new plaintiffs does not relate back to the decedent's original suit.
• Williams v. Huntington Ingalls Industries (2022). Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product and that the exposure was a substantial cause of the injury. Circumstantial evidence that the product was used throughout the workplace and near where the worker was can defeat summary judgment even without identifying the product by name.
• Bagwell v. Union Carbide Corp. (2021). A jury verdict must be read as a whole, and answers to interrogatories are not inconsistent where the jury could reasonably have found that the exposure source did not make a defendant's products a substantial contributing cause of the disease.
• Broussard v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (2021). Under Louisiana law a plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product, and mere presence of the product at the worksite is not enough. Circumstantial evidence that a worker regularly worked near a defendant's asbestos cloth can create a fact issue on take-home exposure.
• Hsieh v. Badger Oil Corporation (2021). A plaintiff in an asbestos-exposure case must show that a defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm. Where the movants' supported facts show no causal connection and the plaintiff does not oppose them, those facts are deemed admitted and summary judgment is required.
• Hsieh v. Badger Oil Corporation (2021). In an asbestos-exposure case under Louisiana law, a plaintiff must show that a particular defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in generating his harm; defendants who showed they were not involved in the relevant offshore work, with no opposition, were entitled to judgment.
• Hulin v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (2021). Under Louisiana law, an asbestos plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's product and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing his disease; even on an unopposed motion, the movant must show it is entitled to judgment, and here plaintiff offered no evidence of exposure to the defendant's products.
• Jackson v. Avondale Industries, Inc. (2021). Under Louisiana law a plaintiff must show that exposure to the defendant's asbestos product was significant and was a substantial factor in causing the disease. Circumstantial evidence of exposure and causation can raise fact questions that defeat summary judgment.
• Krutz v. Huntington Ingalls Inc. (2021). Under Louisiana law, an asbestos plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's product that was a substantial factor in causing the disease; even when a summary judgment motion is unopposed, the movant must show it is entitled to judgment, and here the record lacked such evidence.
• Lege v. Union Carbide Corporation (4th Circuit, 2021). A jury's allocation of fault and general damages is reviewed for manifest error or abuse of discretion, and exposure need not be long if it was significant enough to be a substantial factor. A non-settling tortfeasor gets a credit for a released party's share only if it proves that party's fault at trial, even when solidary liability was already found.
• Steib v. Lamorak Insurance Company (4th Circuit, 2021). The mere presence of asbestos-containing materials at a job site does not defeat summary judgment for an employer or premises owner. The plaintiff must offer specific, non-speculative evidence linking those materials to the work the plaintiff did, and a witness's internally inconsistent or conjectural testimony cannot create a genuine issue of fact.
• Williams v. Seidenbach (2021). Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's asbestos product as a substantial factor in causing the injury, and the burden is not relaxed in a long-latency, multiple-defendant case. Federal officer removal was proper because the contractor raised a colorable government contractor defense.
• Gaddy v. Taylor Seidenbach, Inc. (2020). Under Louisiana article 2317 as it stood in 1955-1959, asbestos dust from constant, necessary refurbishment work in a plant is not a 'temporary condition' that bars strict liability. Under the maximum recovery rule, a general damages award above the range supported by comparable mesothelioma cases must be reduced to the highest amount a jury could properly award.
• Gomez v. Aardvark Contractors, Inc. (2020). A defendant is entitled to summary judgment where the movant points to the absence of evidence that the plaintiff or his father was exposed to asbestos from its products and no one opposes the motion to show a genuine factual dispute.
• Lopez v. McDERMOTT, Inc (2020). Under Louisiana law, a premises owner is not liable, directly or vicariously, for asbestos hazards inherent in an independent contractor's work absent operational control or authorization of unsafe practices. Strict liability under article 2317 also fails where the contractor, not the owner, had custody of the injurious material.
• Lopez v. McDERMOTT, Inc (2020). Under Louisiana Code of Evidence art. 804(B)(1), a deceased plaintiff's deposition can be used against a defendant who was absent if other defendants present, such as gasket and packing makers, had a similar motive and opportunity to cross-examine. Testimony about exposure and an expert's opinion that above-background exposures were a substantial cause create a fact question on causation.
• Lopez v. McDERMOTT, Inc. (2020). A deceased plaintiff's deposition testimony is admissible against a defendant who was absent if other defendants present had a similar motive and opportunity to cross-examine him. Whether a valve maker had a duty to warn about asbestos gaskets used with its valves depends on disputed facts, and the Supreme Court's DeVries decision was treated as instructive outside maritime law.
• McAllister v. McDERMOTT, Inc. (2020). Under general maritime law a plaintiff must show a defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in the injury, and circumstantial evidence can show exposure, but not when nothing shows the defendant's product was present at the worksite. Louisiana law governed successor liability and does not recognize the product line exception.
• Bagwell v. Union Carbide Corporation (4th Circuit, 2019). A jury's choice between conflicting views of the evidence on exposure and causation will not be disturbed on review. An appellate court that finds a general damages award an abuse of discretion may raise it to the lowest reasonable amount, guided by awards in similar mesothelioma cases.
• Michel v. Ford Motor Company (2019). An expert's specific-causation opinion based on differential etiology and a case-specific relative comparison of exposures is reliable and admissible under Rule 702. It differs from the excluded 'any exposure above background' theory, and disputes over the studies relied on go to weight and cross-examination.
• Michel v. Ford Motor Company (2019). Plaintiffs must show exposure to asbestos from the defendant's products and an injury substantially caused by that exposure. Whether a particular exposure was a substantial contributing factor in causing mesothelioma is a question of fact for the jury.
• Rodrigue v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (2019). Where the movants pointed to insufficient record evidence on an essential element and the non-moving parties submitted no evidence showing a genuine factual dispute, summary judgment is proper under Celotex.
• Schindler v. Dravo Basic Materials Company (2019). An expert's specific-causation opinion in an asbestos case is unreliable under Rule 702 when it rests on too little information about the plaintiff's exposure and on an 'each and every exposure' theory. The Jones Act's lower causation burden does not relax the Rule 702 reliability standard.
• Schindler v. Dravo Basic Materials Company, Incorporated (2019). Ordinary Rule 702 and Daubert reliability standards apply in Jones Act cases despite the reduced causation burden, and toxic-tort claims need expert proof of causation, so experts who merely assumed exposure on the vessel were properly excluded.
• Williams v. Taylor Seidenbach, Incorporated (2019). A voluntary dismissal of remaining defendants without prejudice does not create a final, appealable judgment, and a later Rule 54(b) judgment cannot retroactively turn it into a with-prejudice dismissal.
• Leech v. 3M Company (2018). A defendant moving for summary judgment may show an absence of evidence of exposure to its product, and an unopposed motion with merit may be granted. Under Louisiana law, plaintiffs must show the defendant exposed the decedent to asbestos and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing the injury.
• Leech v. 3M Company (2018). Where the movant shows an absence of evidence and the non-movant files no opposition, summary judgment is proper; under Louisiana law plaintiffs must show the defendant exposed the decedent to asbestos and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing the injury.
• Michel v. Ford Motor Company (2018). A non-diverse defendant is improperly joined when the removing party shows through summary-type evidence that the plaintiff has no reasonable possibility of recovering against it; the 30-day removal period runs from the 'other paper' that first shows the case is removable, here the final expert deposition transcript.
• Bell v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. (2017). Under the court's narrowed bare metal defense, a component maker can be liable under general maritime law if it substantially participated in integrating its part with asbestos products or recommended asbestos for use with its part. A manufacturer is not liable merely because asbestos ended up on its product, or because asbestos use was foreseeable.
• Bell v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. (2017). Under general maritime law, an expert's specific causation opinion in a multi-defendant mesothelioma case is unreliable under Rule 702 if it rests only on population-level studies of exposure levels and not on the plaintiff's own exposure history. Experts may still testify on general causation and on what studies show, but may not offer a backdoor specific causation opinion.
• Bell v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. (2017). A "one-size-fits-all" specific causation opinion that draws no distinctions among a plaintiff's exposures to different defendants' products is unreliable under Rule 702 and Daubert, and an expert cannot rely on general causation evidence alone to say a particular product did not cause the disease.
• Romano v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (4th Circuit, 2017). A solidary obligor gets a virile share credit only if the plaintiff released the other tortfeasor and that tortfeasor's liability was established at trial; absent a settlement, no credit applies. A general damages award that is an abuse of discretion is raised to the lowest amount a jury could reasonably have awarded.
• Smith v. Georgia-Pacific, LLC (2017). A non-diverse defendant is improperly joined only if there is no reasonable basis to predict the plaintiff might recover against it; facts are viewed in the plaintiff's favor, and incomplete discovery that leaves a reasonable possibility of connecting the plaintiff to the defendant's asbestos products defeats improper joinder.
• Williams v. Placid Oil Company (3rd Circuit, 2017). A plaintiff need not prove an exact asbestos dose, only significant exposure to the defendant's product that was a substantial factor in causing the disease. The survival action is governed by the pre-comparative-fault law in force at the time of exposure, while the wrongful death action is governed by the law in force at the time of death.
• Bell v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. (2016). An expert's opinion that each and every "significant" asbestos exposure caused mesothelioma is not meaningfully different from the "each and every exposure" theory and is unreliable ipse dixit under Rule 702. Evidence that exposure raises disease risk does not establish specific causation.
• Boudreaux v. Bollinger Shipyard (4th Circuit, 2016). A trial court does not abuse its discretion in excluding an expert's causation opinion under Daubert-Foret when the proponent offers no independent evidence that the methodology is generally accepted. Without that expert, plaintiffs cannot prove cause-in-fact and summary judgment is proper.
• Sheppard v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (2016). Federal jurisdiction under OCSLA exists where a plaintiff's alleged asbestos exposure on the Outer Continental Shelf is an independently sufficient cause of his illness, so strict but-for causation does not defeat jurisdiction even though other exposure elsewhere was also sufficient.
• Comardelle v. Pennsylvania General Ins. Co. (2015). An expert's opinion that every exposure to asbestos contributes to causing mesothelioma, without reference to the specific facts of the plaintiff's exposures, is not reliable under Rule 702 and Daubert and is inadmissible as specific-causation testimony.
• Comardelle v. Pennsylvania General Insurance Company (2015). An expert's opinion that every exposure to asbestos contributed to a person's mesothelioma is not tied to the facts of the individual's exposures and is unreliable under Rule 702 and Daubert, so it is inadmissible as specific-causation testimony.
• Hayes v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd. (2015). Under the Louisiana Products Liability Act, product identification is a threshold element, and a plaintiff must show exposure to the specific defendant's asbestos product; the presence of asbestos parts at the workplace without proof of actual exposure is insufficient.
• Hayes v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd. (2015). Under Louisiana law a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury; the mere physical presence of asbestos or speculation that a gasket contained asbestos is not enough to defeat summary judgment.
• Hayes v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd. (2015). Under the Louisiana Products Liability Act, a plaintiff must identify the defendant's product as a source of the asbestos exposure and show it was a substantial factor in causing the illness; speculation about unidentified vehicles and brake jobs is not enough.
• Laurent v. New Orleans City (2015). Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff must show with specific evidence that the claimant was significantly exposed to the defendant's asbestos-containing product; the physical presence of such products at a workplace, or work in a ship's engine spaces, is not enough to defeat summary judgment.