Causation in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on medical or specific causation: 1,200 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Kentucky

• White v. Cardinal Industrial Insulation Co., Inc. (2007). Legal cause may be shown by circumstantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that the defendant's activity was a substantial factor in the harm, so summary judgment was improper. Products liability standards also apply to a distributor of asbestos-containing materials, and a contractor's compliance with contract specifications did not shield it.
• Bailey v. North American Refractories Co. (2001). Legal causation is ordinarily a jury question. An expert's fiber-drift opinion combined with evidence of the defendant's asbestos products at the plant created a fact issue on substantial-factor causation. The court would not adopt either the fiber-drift theory or the frequency-regularity-proximity test as a matter of law.

Louisiana

• Alford v. Taylor-Seidenbach, Inc. (2025). Under Louisiana law before the Products Liability Act, an OSHA-compliant asbestos warning is not automatically adequate, and whether a warning was adequate is a jury question. Exposure to a particular asbestos product may be shown by circumstantial evidence.
• Chenet v. Colgate-Palmolive Company (4th Circuit, 2024). A discretionary new trial under La. C.C.P. art. 1973 was an abuse of discretion where the stricken testimony had no bearing on the question the jury decided and the facts did not support a finding of a miscarriage of justice.
• Legendre v. Louisiana Ins. Guaranty Association (2024). Experts whose qualifications and reliable methods are shown may testify under Rule 702; disagreements with the facts relied on or with the experts' interpretation go to cross-examination rather than exclusion.
• Legendre v. Louisiana Ins. Guaranty Association (2024). Avondale cannot use the Boyle or Yearsley government contractor defenses against failure-to-warn and failure-to-implement-safety claims. Intentional tort and fraud claims fail without evidence that injury was substantially certain or of fraudulent intent.
• Marsh v. Chas Kurz & Company (2024). A Jones Act plaintiff must show he was exposed to the toxic substance aboard the particular defendant's vessels, and general evidence that asbestos was widely used on ships does not suffice. Expert opinions resting only on that general use and on the plaintiff's assumption may be excluded, and without them causation cannot be shown.
• Matherne v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (2024). Summary judgment may be granted on the narrow facts that decedent had mesothelioma and died of it when no expert disputes them; the court need not state that specific causation and asbestos source remain disputed.
• Rivet v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (2024). Summary judgment is proper on diagnosis, asbestos causation and death where the plaintiffs' evidence supports those findings and no defendant offers contrary evidence; the ruling does not decide the source of the exposure.
• Allen v. Eagle, Inc. (4th Circuit, 2023). A witness's internally inconsistent deposition testimony, offered alone in opposition to a properly supported summary judgment motion, does not create a genuine issue of material fact; the court may consider only documents actually filed in support of or opposition to the motion.
• Chenet v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. (4th Circuit, 2023). An issue summary judgment is appealable only if properly certified as final under La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B). Applying the four R.J. Messinger factors de novo, the court held the certification improper, so it had no appellate jurisdiction.
• Crossland v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (2023). Strict liability under Louisiana Civil Code art. 2317 requires that the defendant have custody or control of the dangerous thing. Under Louisiana negligence law, fact disputes over a husband's workplace exposure and the employer's knowledge preclude summary judgment on a take-home claim. Experts may rely on fact-witness testimony about exposure, and challenges to that testimony go to weight.
• Crossland v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (2023). Under Louisiana law, an asbestos claimant must show significant exposure to the defendant's product and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing her injury; without evidence of any exposure from the defendant's activities, the claim fails even when the motion is unopposed.
• Everett v. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. (4th Circuit, 2023). A motion to join a summary judgment motion is subject to the mandatory 65-day filing deadline of La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(1) and to service requirements. A plaintiff must produce specific evidence tying the defendant to the exposure to defeat summary judgment, but a court abuses its discretion by summarily denying a new trial where counsel's error may have caused a miscarriage of justice.
• Gooding v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (2023). Under Fed. R. Evid. 703, experts may rely on otherwise inadmissible facts or data if experts in the field would reasonably rely on them, so expert opinions based on the decedent's deposition created a fact dispute that defeated summary judgment even if the deposition was inadmissible against the defendant.
• Hutchins v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (2023). Under Louisiana law, a claimant must show significant exposure to the defendant's product that was a substantial factor in causing the disease. General expert statements about asbestos on ships, or an assumption that the worker could have been nearby, do not show exposure to a particular defendant. Co-worker testimony that a defendant's products were used alongside the worker, with no non-asbestos alternative in use, can create a fact issue.
• Hutchins v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (2023). Under Louisiana's substantial-factor test, evidence that the worker actively worked with asbestos-containing materials is enough to create a genuine fact issue on exposure and causation, so the plaintiffs could not obtain summary judgment on their own claims.
• King v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (2023). Under Louisiana law, an asbestos plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's product and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Even when a motion is unopposed, the movant must show it is entitled to judgment.
• Pete v. Boland Marine and Manufacturing Company, LLC (4th Circuit, 2023). A jury instruction that correctly makes fault an element of a take-home claim cures the omission of fault from a verdict interrogatory when no timely objection was made. The reviewing court will not disturb a jury's causation finding or a general damage award unless the record shows manifest error or an abuse of discretion.
• Ragusa v. Louisiana Guaranty Insurance Association (2023). Medical experts may give specific-causation opinions in an asbestos mesothelioma case if they assess the plaintiff's exposures against literature and occupational standards rather than relying on an 'every exposure above background' theory; a precise exposure level is not required, and lack of specialization goes to weight.
• Ragusa v. Louisiana Guaranty Insurance Association (2023). Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff opposing summary judgment need only show a reasonable jury could find it more likely than not that he inhaled the defendant's asbestos fibers. A medical expert who weighs qualitative exposure factors, rather than just reciting an 'every exposure' theory, can raise a fact issue on causation. Contracts to sell custom-built turbines and boilers are sales contracts, not construction contracts, so the peremptive period for construction work does not apply.
• Ragusa v. Louisiana Guaranty Insurance Association (2023). Undisputed medical evidence established that the plaintiff has mesothelioma and that asbestos caused it. This general causation ruling does not stop defendants from distinguishing among exposures and forms of asbestos or from contesting specific causation before the jury.
• Robichaux v. Huntington Ingalls Inc. (2023). In a Louisiana asbestos case, a plaintiff opposing summary judgment need only show a reasonable jury could find it more likely than not that he inhaled the defendant's asbestos fibers, even if the exposures were slight, and that this exposure was a substantial factor in causing his disease.
• Robichaux v. Huntington Ingalls Inc. (2023). Federal pleading rules require only fair notice of a claim, and the amended complaint gave it. Under Louisiana law, plaintiffs defeat summary judgment in an asbestos case by showing a reasonable jury could find it more likely than not that the plaintiff inhaled the defendant's asbestos fibers, even in slight exposures.
• Robichaux v. Huntington Ingalls Inc. (2023). Avondale's contribution claims, which stand in the shoes of the plaintiffs by subrogation, were barred by res judicata because Robichaux had settled and released asbestos claims, including future mesothelioma claims, against the cross defendants. A defendant is also entitled to summary judgment where the plaintiff offers no evidence of exposure to that defendant's products.
• Adams v. Eagle, Inc. (2022). To show cause-in-fact in an asbestos case, a party must show significant exposure to the defendant's asbestos product and an injury substantially caused by that exposure; circumstantial evidence of proximity to the product can create a fact issue and defeat summary judgment.
• Adams v. Eagle, Inc. (2022). Under Louisiana law, a party must show significant exposure to asbestos attributable to the defendant and that the exposure was a substantial factor in the injury; a reasonable jury could find both here, so summary judgment was not proper.
• Allen v. Eagle Inc. (4th Circuit, 2022). Conflicting testimony about exposure is a credibility question that cannot be resolved on summary judgment. An expert's reliance on assumptions about frequency, duration and proximity of exposure goes to the weight of the opinion, not its admissibility under Daubert.
• Becnel v. Lamorak Insurance Co. (2022). Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff opposing summary judgment need only show that a reasonable jury could find it more likely than not that he inhaled the defendant's asbestos fibers, however slight the exposure, and experts need not calculate a dose for each defendant. A manufacturer may owe a duty to warn when its product requires asbestos-containing parts or insulation to function as intended.
• Becnel v. Lamorak Insurance Co. (2022). Under Louisiana law a plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's product that was a substantial factor in the injury. Expert evidence of general and specific causation, including a reliable differential diagnosis, was enough to create a fact question for the jury.
• Becnel v. Lamorak Insurance Company (2022). Under Louisiana law, wrongful death claims are governed by the law in effect at the time of death, so comparative fault applies. Survival claims are governed by the law in effect when the exposure occurred, so pre-August 1980 exposures fall under contributory negligence. A defendant relying on that defense must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff's negligence, here smoking, was a cause of the injury.
• Becnel v. Lamorak Insurance Company (2022). Under Louisiana law, an insurer bears the burden of proving an exclusion applies, and an insurer is liable only for exposures during its policy period. Conflicting expert testimony on whether the exclusion was in the policy, and evidence of exposure to Eagle insulation during the policy period, create fact issues that cannot be resolved on summary judgment.
• Brindell v. Carlisle Industrial Brake and Friction, Inc. (4th Circuit, 2022). Asbestos causation requires proof of exposure above background attributable to a specific defendant that was a substantial contributing factor. Once the defendant showed the plaintiffs could not meet that burden, speculation and conjecture could not create a genuine issue of material fact.
• Brindell v. Carlisle Industrial Brake and Friction, Inc. (4th Circuit, 2022). A manufacturer is entitled to summary judgment when the plaintiff produces no evidence of substantial exposure to its asbestos-containing product, and a court may rule only on issues raised in the motion or opposition, not on arguments first raised at the hearing.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Ins. Co. (2022). Under Louisiana law as applied by the Fifth Circuit, a manufacturer has no duty to warn the employees of a sophisticated purchaser, and a purchaser need not know the specific disease the product can cause. Whether chrysotile is less potent than other asbestos types is a fact question for the jury, not a ground for summary judgment.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Ins. Co. (2022). Under pre-LPLA Louisiana law, a turbine maker can be liable for asbestos gaskets it supplied or specified as component parts, and slight exposures can suffice for substantial-factor causation. It has no duty to warn about, and no design liability for, asbestos insulation that others made and applied to its turbines.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (2022). A study an expert relies on need not replicate the exact conditions of the plaintiff's exposure; it need only afford a fair comparison, and disputes over the bases of an expert's opinion go to weight and are addressed through cross-examination.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (2022). A defendant asserting the Louisiana statute of repose, La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2772, bears the burden of showing it was a contractor rather than a seller, with specific record citations. Under Louisiana law, even a short exposure can be a substantial factor in causing mesothelioma if a jury could find the plaintiff inhaled the defendant's asbestos fibers.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (2022). Under Louisiana law a duty to household members for take-home exposure can exist before 1972 without an OSHA rule, and Article 2317 custody can be shared. A seller is a professional vendor, liable like a manufacturer, only if it held the product out as its own and had sufficient size and volume of sales.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (2022). A plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment that he has mesothelioma and that asbestos caused it when the medical evidence, including defense experts' testimony, is undisputed; arguments about fiber type, sources and specific causation do not defeat that limited motion.
• Cortez v. Lamorak Insurance Company (2022). Under Louisiana law, an asbestos claimant must show significant exposure and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing his injury. A short period of exposure does not by itself entitle a defendant to summary judgment. Deposition testimony from another proceeding can be considered on summary judgment if it could be presented in admissible form at trial.
• Falgout v. Anco Insulations, Inc. (2022). Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's asbestos product that was a substantial factor in causing injury. Evidence that a defendant's asbestos-containing product was merely present at the worksite is not enough to defeat summary judgment.
• Gooding v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. (2022). Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's asbestos product and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing the mesothelioma; substantial factor is a jury question unless reasonable people could not differ.
• Gooding v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. (2022). Under Louisiana law a plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's asbestos and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing mesothelioma. Where evidence of significant exposure exists, the substantial-factor question is generally for the jury, and a shipyard owner that controlled the work environment may be directly liable for negligently exposing a worker.
• Gooding v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. (2022). Under Louisiana law an insurer is liable for asbestos injuries only if the injured person was exposed to harmful conditions during the policy period, and speculation that he was present at the insured's premises during that period cannot defeat summary judgment.
• King v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (2022). Under Louisiana law, an asbestos plaintiff must show significant exposure to the defendant's product and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing the injury; an unopposed motion still requires the movant to show it is entitled to judgment.
• Labarre v. Bienville Auto Parts Inc. (2022). Under Louisiana law, a seller that did not hold products out as its own or control their design or quality is not a manufacturer or professional vendor strictly liable for them. A non-manufacturer seller can still be liable in negligence if it knew or should have known the product was dangerous, and whether a user is sophisticated is ordinarily a fact question.
• Reulet v. Lamorak Ins. Co. (2022). An insurer's liability under the exposure theory is co-extensive with its insured's liability for harmful exposure during the policy period. Plaintiffs must offer evidence beyond speculation that the decedent was near the insured's products during that period, even if the exposures were slight.
• Reulet v. Lamorak Ins. Co. (2022). Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff need only show that mesothelioma was a substantial factor in the decedent's death, not the sole cause, even if other medical conditions contributed.
• Roussell v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (2022). Under Louisiana law, a plaintiff must prove exposure to asbestos from the defendant's product and that the exposure was a substantial cause of her injury; without direct or circumstantial evidence connecting the exposed person to the defendant's products, summary judgment is proper.