Causation in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on medical or specific causation: 1,200 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

New Jersey

• Fowler v. Akzo Nobel Chemicals, Inc. (2017). In an asbestos case, a plaintiff can show exposure to a particular defendant's asbestos through circumstantial evidence under the frequency, regularity and proximity test. Regular direct handling of asbestos, together with large documented deliveries by the defendant to the workplace, is enough to reach a jury.
• Vesper v. 3M Company (2016). Under New Jersey law a plaintiff needs direct or circumstantial evidence of exposure to the defendant's friable asbestos with frequency, regularity and proximity, applied flexibly to the case's facts. Speculation about a defendant's product is not enough.
• Whelan v. Armstrong Int'l (2016). A manufacturer has a strict-liability duty to warn about asbestos in replacement parts it did not make or sell if its product as marketed contained asbestos components integral to its function and it was reasonably aware routine maintenance would replace them with other asbestos-containing parts. The court disagreed with Hughes v. A.W. Chesterton, and plaintiff must still show frequent, regular and close exposure to the complete product, including necessary replacement parts.
• Estate OF Brust v. Acf Industries, LLC (2015). The Locomotive Inspection Act preempts state-law design and failure-to-warn claims about locomotive equipment even when the user is an urban rapid transit operator not subject to federal railroad regulation. A plaintiff must show asbestos exposure to the defendant's product that was frequent, regular and in close proximity to establish substantial-factor causation.
• Feaster v. AW Chesterton Company (2015). Under maritime law a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in the injury, including that the defendant made or distributed the asbestos-containing product. New Jersey law would give the same result because liability requires an asbestos-containing product made or supplied by the defendant.
• Fuoco v. 3M Company (2015). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to an asbestos-containing product made or supplied by the defendant and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury; speculation that the worker was around the defendant's pump does not defeat summary judgment.
• Haas v. 3M Company (2015). Under New Jersey law, a mesothelioma plaintiff may use circumstantial evidence of exposure, together with expert proof, to reach a jury, and the exposure needed is lower for mesothelioma. Deposition testimony of a deceased witness may come in under Rule 804(b)(1) when a co-defendant who questioned the witness had a similar motive to the party it is offered against.
• Hammell v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2015). Under maritime law, a manufacturer is not liable for, and owes no duty to warn about, asbestos-containing parts it did not manufacture or supply, and a plaintiff must show exposure to an asbestos product made or supplied by that defendant. The government contractor defense could not be resolved on summary judgment where there was a factual dispute over whether the Navy controlled warnings.
• Kaenzig v. Charles B. Chrystal Company, Inc. (2015). In an asbestos failure-to-warn case, a plaintiff must prove product-defect causation and medical causation, and exposure is a substantial factor if it meets the frequency, regularity and proximity test. Discovery of a non-testifying consulting expert's facts or opinions requires exceptional circumstances.
• Latter v. 3M Company (2015). On summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the plaintiff's favor, and testimony plus vessel documents showing asbestos materials can let a factfinder reasonably infer exposure aboard the defendant's vessels, supporting Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims.
• Thomasson v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2015). To recover in an asbestos case under New Jersey law (and similarly maritime law), a plaintiff must identify an asbestos-containing product made or supplied by the defendant and show exposure to it frequent and close enough to support causation; dismissal as a sanction for missed deadlines requires weighing the Poulis factors.
• Haas v. 3M Company (2014). Under New Jersey's frequency, regularity and proximity test, a plaintiff must show exposure to an asbestos-containing component of the defendant's product; speculation does not suffice. A contractor meeting the three Boyle prongs is shielded from both design defect and failure-to-warn claims where the specifications are silent on warnings.
• Buttitta v. Allied Signal, Inc. (2010). In a mesothelioma case, the frequency, regularity and proximity test is applied in light of expert evidence that the disease can follow minimal and infrequent exposure, so brief but regular work near a defendant's asbestos product can support a jury finding of medical causation.
• Kurak v. AP Green Refractories Co. (1997). To hold an asbestos defendant liable, a plaintiff must show with direct or circumstantial evidence that he was exposed to that defendant's friable asbestos frequently, regularly and in close proximity, and mesothelioma's low dose threshold bears on that showing. Jurors must set damages without regard to how fault is apportioned among defendants, and the trial court must correct a jury question suggesting otherwise.
• Goss v. American Cyanamid Co. (1994). A plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's asbestos products with sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity, but may do so by circumstantial evidence, including a distributor's supply of the products to the plant. A trial court may not set aside a jury verdict and resubmit an issue when the evidence supports a reasonable inference for the jury's finding.
• Coffman v. Keene Corp. (1993). In a strict liability failure-to-warn case, the plaintiff may rely on a rebuttable presumption that he would have followed an adequate warning. In the workplace, the manufacturer can rebut it only by proving that the employee, with meaningful choice, or the employer would not have heeded a warning.
• Landrigan v. Celotex Corp. (1991). Under Rubanick, an expert's causation opinion in toxic-tort cases is admissible if based on sound, reliable methodology, and a qualified non-physician such as an epidemiologist may testify to specific causation; a plaintiff may proceed on both strict liability and negligence without being forced to elect.
• Sholtis v. American Cyanamid Co. (1989). To defeat summary judgment in an asbestos case, a plaintiff must show exposure to a defendant's friable asbestos that was a substantial factor in causing the disease, shown by exposure of sufficient frequency, regularity and proximity, usually with expert proof linking the exposure to the condition. Market-share and similar collective liability theories do not apply to this cumulative-exposure case.
• Millison v. EI du Pont de Nemours (1988). The fraudulent-concealment verdict could rest on circumstantial evidence and a jury could treat defendants' silence as evidence. OSHA citations are hearsay and are not admissible as public records or business entries, but their admission without a limiting instruction was harmless here.

New York

• Keller v. Exxonmobil Oil Corporation (2025). Under Rule 702, a specific-causation expert opinion that rests on an assumed, unquantified asbestos exposure and ignores an obvious alternative cause (radon) is inadmissible, and without it a Jones Act plaintiff whose injury has multiple possible causes cannot prove causation. The relaxed Jones Act causation burden does not relax the Rule 702 admissibility standards.
• Maffei v. Burnham (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (1st Dept., 2025). Expert testimony from an industrial hygienist and a thoracic surgeon sufficed to establish specific causation, and the compensatory, consortium and punitive awards and the 15% fault allocation to the plaintiff for smoking were upheld as reasonable and supported by the evidence.
• Rasso v. Avon Prods., Inc. (2025). Even if an appellate ruling applying Texas causation law were a change in the law, a defendant moving for summary judgment must meet its prima facie burden under New York procedure by affirmatively disproving causation. Pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof under the governing substantive law is not enough.
• Caligiuri v. AO Smith Corp. (2024). A defendant seeking summary judgment on causation must affirmatively establish that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury; competing expert causation evidence raises a question of fact that precludes summary judgment.
• Caligiuri v. AO Smith Corp. (2024). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must affirmatively prove as a matter of law that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's illness; an industrial hygienist's exposure opinion without medical causation evidence does not meet that burden, and competing expert evidence raises a fact question.
• McWilliams v. Jenkins Bros. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (1st Dept., 2024). A plaintiff shows specific causation under Nemeth by expert testimony based on generally accepted methodologies that offers a scientific expression of exposure level, such as quantitative exposure estimates backed by epidemiological risk data. The pain and suffering award did not deviate materially from reasonable compensation.
• English v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation) (1st Dept., 2024). Where a foreign resident's exposure occurred mostly in another state, that state's law (here Texas) governs proof of specific causation. Under Texas law, epidemiological evidence can establish specific causation only if it shows the product more than doubled the plaintiff's risk.
• Seen v. Kaiser Gypsum Co. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation) (1st Dept., 2024). A pain and suffering award that deviates materially from reasonable compensation under CPLR 5501(c) must be reduced or retried, and under General Obligations Law § 15-108 settlement amounts paid by settling defendants are deducted from the total award, with specified offsets for a settling defendant on the verdict sheet.
• Pefanis v. AO Smith Water Prods. Co. (2024). On summary judgment in an asbestos case, the defendant must unequivocally establish that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury; conflicting testimony and competing expert opinions raise fact issues that preclude judgment.
• Pefanis v. AO Smith Water Prods. Co. (2024). A defendant seeking summary judgment on causation must affirmatively prove its product could not have contributed to the injury. Competing expert evidence on whether the product released asbestos is a battle of the experts that raises fact issues, as does evidence that a talc supplier knew of contamination and gave no warning.
• Pira v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. (2024). A defendant seeking summary judgment on causation must affirmatively prove as a matter of law that there was no causation, not merely argue the plaintiff cannot prove it; competing expert evidence on exposure and causation raises a fact question.
• Savianeso v. Aerco Intl., Inc. (2024). A moving defendant must affirmatively show its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's disease; the court found Bakers Pride met that burden and plaintiff's expert, who did not quantify the secondhand exposure, did not raise a factual issue.
• Stiglitz v. AO Smith Water Prods. Co. (2024). A defendant seeking summary judgment on causation must affirmatively prove that its work could not have contributed to the plaintiff's illness, and competing expert evidence on exposure raises a fact question that precludes summary judgment.
• Tippin v. 3M Co. (2024). A defendant seeking summary judgment in a toxic tort case must affirmatively show its product could not have contributed to the injury, and competing expert causation evidence presents a fact question. Punitive damages require intentional, unreasonable disregard of a known or obvious risk with conscious indifference, which was not shown here.
• Tippin v. 3M Co., Alcat (1st Dept., 2024). A plaintiff opposing summary judgment must offer evidence of exposure to the defendant's product at levels sufficient to cause the disease, and an expert's illustrative estimate of lifetime exposure, with no actual dose calculation, does not raise a fact issue on causation.
• Wagner v. Aerco Intl., Inc. (2024). A defendant seeking summary judgment on causation must unequivocally establish that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's illness; a study of cutting and scoring tiles does not do so where the plaintiff also sanded the tiles.
• Bassier v. AO Smith Water Prods. Co. (2023). A defendant seeking summary judgment must affirmatively establish that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury; it cannot simply argue the plaintiff lacks proof. Plaintiff's deposition testimony identifying the product is enough to raise a fact issue.
• Campise v. Arkema, Inc. (Erie, 2023). Under the Parker and Nemeth test, an expert who estimates exposure levels from peer-reviewed data and compares them to levels shown to cause mesothelioma raises a triable issue of causation without precise quantification. Punitive damages require proof of recklessness or conscious disregard of others' rights.
• Gold v. Avon Prods., Inc. (2023). On summary judgment in the First Department, the moving defendant must unequivocally establish that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury; Revlon did not meet that burden given the decedent's product-identification testimony and its lack of evidence that its product could not have contained asbestos.
• Hollingsworth v. AO Smith Water Prods. Co. (2023). On summary judgment in an asbestos case, a defendant must unequivocally establish that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury; it cannot merely argue that plaintiff failed to prove causation.
• Howard v. AO Smith Water Prods. (3rd Dept., 2023). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must affirmatively show its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury, and cannot merely point to gaps in the plaintiff's proof. Testimony that a plaintiff encountered the defendant's pumps, together with routine overhauls, raised a fact issue.
• McWilliams v. AO Smith Water Prods. Co. (2023). A verdict is set aside as against the weight of the evidence only if no valid line of reasoning could lead rational jurors to it, and pain-and-suffering awards receive great deference. Counsel who submit false discovery responses and let an expert give false testimony uncorrected engage in sanctionable frivolous conduct under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1.
• Munoz v. AO Smith Water Prods. CO (2023). A defendant seeking summary judgment must unequivocally establish that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury; arguing that the plaintiff cannot prove causation is not enough, and a non-case-specific expert affidavit does not meet that burden.
• Petro v. Aerco Intl., Inc. (2023). A jury verdict may be set aside only if no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences could lead rational jurors to the result. Disputed facts, credibility and the weight of expert testimony are for the jury, and expert causation testimony needs enough specificity about exposure but not a precise numerical dose.
• Rasso v. Avon Prods., Inc. (2023). New York law, not Texas law, governed the motion, because the user testified to significant use of the powder in New York and Colgate is based in New York. Conflicting evidence on asbestos contamination of the talc and on specific causation created fact issues that precluded summary judgment.
• Sason v. Dykes Lbr. Co. (2023). On summary judgment a defendant must affirmatively prove, as a matter of law, that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's disease; the Nemeth post-trial standard does not apply, and conflicting expert evidence raises a triable issue of fact.
• Sason v. Dykes Lumber Co., Inc. (1st Dept., 2023). To establish specific causation, a plaintiff must give a scientific expression linking actual asbestos exposure to a level known to cause mesothelioma. Competing expert evidence on that point raises a fact issue that defeats summary judgment.
• Seen v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., Inc. (2023). A jury verdict in a toxic tort case stands where the experts tied the decedent's exposure to historical industrial hygiene data and studies showing sufficient exposure to cause mesothelioma, as Nemeth II requires. A pain-and-suffering award within the range of awards in similar cases is not excessive.
• Badamo v. Chevron USA Inc. (2022). A Jones Act claim for cancer accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the cancer, and a suspicious mass is not enough as a matter of law. Under the Jones Act's relaxed causation standard, circumstantial evidence of asbestos exposure on a vessel can reach a jury.
• Barbarino v. BASF Catalysts LLC (2022). A summary judgment movant must first establish a prima facie case that its product could not have contributed to the injury; it cannot meet that burden merely by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof.
• Cioni v. Avon Prods., Inc. (2022). A moving defendant must itself establish a prima facie case on specific causation; relying on worst-case-scenario assumptions without establishing the decedent's actual exposure does not meet that burden. Punitive damages in asbestos litigation require conscious indifference to a known or obvious risk, which was not shown given Colgate's testing.