Hollingsworth v. AO Smith Water Prods. Co. (2023)

Our plain-English summary of Hollingsworth v. AO Smith Water Prods. Co. (New York Supreme Court, November 21, 2023).

Willie Hollingsworth developed mesothelioma, and the action was brought on his behalf (plaintiff Shontai Hollingsworth) against many companies, including McWane, Inc.'s Clow Valve Company division. Clow moved for summary judgment, arguing that Mr. Hollingsworth's testimony was too uncertain to identify any Clow valve as a source of his asbestos exposure. Plaintiff answered that his testimony clearly identified Clow valves and that Clow had submitted no expert report. Clow relied mainly on an eight-sentence affidavit from its employee, Douglas Peirce, to say a Clow valve could not have been in the boiler room that Mr. Hollingsworth named as his main place of exposure. The court denied the motion. It said a defendant must affirmatively prove its product could not have contributed to the illness, not simply argue that plaintiff cannot prove causation. The affidavit was general and did not establish that a Clow valve could not have been used there, and Clow offered no other evidence, such as proof that its valves contained no asbestos. A reasonable juror could find a Clow valve contributed, so factual issues remained.

We wrote this summary from the court's opinion with the help of AI. It is not the court's wording, and it is not legal advice. The full opinion is below.

The decision

• Court: New York Supreme Court
• Decided: November 21, 2023
• Citation: 2023 NY Slip Op 34172(U)
• Stage: Summary judgment
• Unpublished opinion. Many courts limit citing unpublished opinions as precedent.
• State: New York

Outcome. The court denied McWane, Inc.'s (Clow Valve Company's) motion for summary judgment in its entirety, so plaintiff's claim against Clow went forward.

What the court held. On summary judgment in an asbestos case, a defendant must unequivocally establish that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury; it cannot merely argue that plaintiff failed to prove causation.

Issues decided: Causation, Product Identification.

The people and their exposure

• Willie Hollingsworth: mesothelioma; died

Who	Work	Where	When	Products
Willie Hollingsworth		boiler room		gaskets and packing, Clow valves

The defendants

• McWane, Inc., on behalf of its unincorporated division Clow Valve Company (manufacturer)

Decisions this opinion cites

Earlier decisions in our library that the court cited:

• Reid v. Georgia-Pac. Corp. (New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 1st Dept., 1995). The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of Rapid-American Corporation's motion for summary judgment, so plaintiff Kenneth Reid's claim against it continues.

The court's opinion

The text below is Google Scholar's copy of the court's opinion, a public record. Numbers in brackets, such as [*921], mark where each page of the printed reporter begins.

2023 NY Slip Op 34172(U)

SHONTAI HOLLINGSWORTH, Plaintiff,

v.

A.O. SMITH WATER PRODUCTS CO., AMCHEM PRODUCTS, INC., N/K/A RHONE POULENC AG

COMPANY, N/K/A BAYER CROPSCIENCE INC., BURNHAM, LLC, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS

SUCCESSOR TO BURNHAM CORPORATION, BW/IP, INC. AND ITS WHOLLY OWNED

SUBSIDIARIES, CERTAINTEED CORPORATION, CLYDE UNION, INC, COLUMBIA BOILER

COMPANY OF POTTSTOWN, CRANE CO., CROSBY VALVE LLC, CROWN BOILER CO., F/K/A

CROWN INDUSTRIES, INC, DEAN PUMP DIVISION, DOMCO PRODUCTS TEXAS, INC, FLOWSERVE

US, INC. SOLELY AS SUCCESSOR TO ROCKWELL MANUFACTURING COMPANY, EDWARD

VALVE, INC., NORDSTROM VALVES, INC., EDWARD VOGT VALVE COMPANY, AND VOGT VALVE

COMPANY, FMC CORPORATION, INDIVIDUALLY AND SUCCESSOR TO COFFIN, GARDNER

DENVER, INC, GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, ITT LLC., INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR TO

BELL & GOSSETT AND AS SUCCESSOR TO KENNEDY VALVE MANUFACTURING CO., INC.,

KEELER-DORR-OLIVER BOILER COMPANY, KOHLER CO, MCWANE INC. AND IT'S WHOLLY

OWNED SUBSIDIARY CLOW VALVE CO., PEERLESS INDUSTRIES, INC, PFIZER, INC. (PFIZER),

RILEY POWER INC, ROCKWELL AUTOMATION, INC.,AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO ALLEN-

BRADLEY COMPANY, LLC, ROPER PUMP COMPANY, SLANT/FIN CORPORATION, TACO, INC, THE

NASH ENGINEERING COMPANY, U.S. RUBBER COMPANY (UNIROYAL), UNION CARBIDE

CORPORATION, VIKING PUMP, INC, WEIL-MCLAIN, A DIVISION OF THE MARLEY-WYLAIN

COMPANY, A WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY OF THE MARLEY COMPANY, LLC, Defendant.

Index No. 190172/2019, Motion Seq. No. 001.

November 21, 2023.

Supreme Court, New York County.

DECISION + ORDER ON MOTION

ADAM SILVERA, J.S.C.

It is ordered that the instant motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of this action, pursuant to CPLR §3212, is decided in accordance with the decision below.

Here, defendant McWane, Inc. on behalf of its unincorporated division Clow Valve Company ("Clow") files a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss this action on the basis that no Clow product could have caused plaintiff-decedent Willie Hollingsworth's ("Mr. Hollingsworth") mesothelioma. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment By Defendant McWane, Inc., p. 2-3. Defendant Clow argues that plaintiff's testimony was insufficient to identify any Clow valves as a source of asbestos exposure. See id.

Plaintiff opposes, highlighting Mr. Hollingsworth's clear and unequivocal testimony identifying Clow valves as a source of asbestos exposure and noting that defendant Clow has failed to submit any expert report in support of their claims. See Affirmation in Opposition to Defendant McWane Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3. Defendant replies, re-identifying uncertainties in plaintiff's testimony regarding identification of Clow valves and noting the affidavit from its corporate representative. See Reply Brief of McWane, Inc. In Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 9-13. The Court notes that summary judgment is a drastic remedy and should only be granted if the moving party has sufficiently established that it is warranted as a matter of law. See Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 (1986). "The proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering

sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case". Winegrad v New York University Medical Center, 64 NY2d 851, 853 (1985). Despite the sufficiency of the opposing papers, the failure to make such a showing requires denial of the motion. See id. at 853. Additionally, summary judgment motions should be denied if the opposing party presents admissible evidence establishing that there is a genuine issue of fact remaining. See Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 560 (1980). "In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the motion court should draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and should not pass on issues of credibility." Garcia v J.C. Duggan, Inc., 180 AD2d 579, 580 (1st Dep't 1992), citing Dauman Displays, Inc. v Masturzo, 168 AD2d 204 (1st Dep't 1990). The court's role is "issue-finding, rather than issue-determination". Sillman v Twentieth CenturyFox Film Corp., 3 NY2d 395, 404 (1957) (internal quotations omitted). As such, summary judgment is rarely granted in negligence actions unless there is no conflict at all in the evidence. See Ugarriza v Schmieder, 46 NY2d 471, 475-476 (1979). Furthermore, the Appellate Division, First Department has held that on a motion for summary judgment, it is moving defendant's burden "to unequivocally establish that its product could not have contributed to the causation of plaintiff's injury". Reid v Georgia-Pacific Corp., 212 AD2d 462, 463 (1st Dep't 1995).

The appropriate standard at summary judgment for moving defendant Clow can be found in Dyer v Amchem Products Inc., 207 AD3d 408, 409 (1st Dep't 2022). In Dyer, defendants were granted summary judgment not by "simply argu[ing] that plaintiff could not affirmatively prove causation" but by "affirmatively prov[ing], as a matter of law, that there was no causation." Id.

Here, defendant Clow relies heavily on the affidavit of their employee representative, Doug Peirce, to establish that a Clow valve could not have been in the boiler room as identified by Mr. Hollingsworth as his primary place of exposure. See Notice of Motion, Affidavit of Douglas Peirce, dated Sept. 13, 2021. Mr. Peirce's eight-sentence affidavit is a general one and does not establish with certainty that a Clow valve could not have been in use at the time of Mr. Hollingsworth's exposure. Moreover, defendant Clow proffers no other evidence that Mr. Hollingsworth's description could not have applied to a Clow valve or that Clow valves did not contain asbestos.

Thus, defendant Clow has failed to meet its burden to establish that its products could not have been the cause of plaintiff's illness. See Reid v Georgia-Pacific Corp., supra.

Furthermore, as a reasonable juror could decide that asbestos exposure from a Clow valve was a contributing cause of Mr. Hollingsworth's illness, sufficient issues of fact exist to preclude summary judgment.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that defendant Clow's motion for summary judgment is denied in its entirety; and it is further ORDERED that within 30 days of entry plaintiff shall serve all parties with a copy of this Decision/Order with notice of entry. This constitutes the Decision/Order of the Court.

Sources

• The opinion on Google Scholar
• New York asbestos laws
• New York asbestos exposure sites