Causation in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on medical or specific causation: 1,200 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

New York

• Djokic v. Steel Grip (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A defendant cannot win summary judgment by pointing to gaps in plaintiff's proof; it must show its product did not contribute to the disease, and conflicting expert opinions on general and specific causation raise fact issues. A consortium claim fails where the exposure preceded the marriage.
• Hernandez v. Whittaker, Clark & Daniels (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A defendant cannot win summary judgment in an asbestos case by pointing to gaps in plaintiff's proof; it must make a prima facie showing that its product could not have contributed to the illness, and conflicting expert evidence on general and specific causation raises fact issues.
• Alleyne v. Revlon (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must make a prima facie showing that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's illness; pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof is not enough. New York does not recognize an independent cause of action for civil conspiracy to commit a tort.
• Alleyne v. Whittaker Clark & Daniels (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A talc supplier cannot win summary judgment by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof. It must first show its talc could not have contributed to the illness, and conflicting expert and testimony evidence on contamination raises fact issues for trial.
• Alleyne v. Chanel (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must make a prima facie showing, through admissible evidence, that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's illness; pointing to gaps in plaintiff's proof, or relying on an attorney's affirmation without expert or corporate-representative proof, is not enough.
• Epstein v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). Under New York choice-of-law rules, a causation standard is a conduct-regulating rule governed by the law of the place of the tort. A summary judgment movant must make its own prima facie showing and cannot rely on gaps in the plaintiff's proof or on expert evidence first submitted in reply.
• Gayoso v. Nissan North America (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A personal jurisdiction defense is waived if the defendant does not assert it with specificity in its answer, and general denials do not preserve it. Where the parties' experts rely on conflicting studies, issues of fact on general and specific causation preclude summary judgment.
• Srica v. American Biltrite (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A defendant cannot win summary judgment by pointing to gaps in plaintiffs' proof; it must make a prima facie showing that its product did not contribute to the disease, and conflicting expert reports on causation raise fact issues for trial.
• Chalco v. Burnham (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A defendant in an asbestos case must show its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury, and plaintiffs must then show actual exposure to asbestos from that product; the mere presence of the defendant's boilers is not enough.
• Goodheart v. Kohler Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). On an asbestos summary judgment motion, a plaintiff need only show facts from which the defendant's liability may be reasonably inferred, and conflicting testimony on where exposure occurred raises credibility issues for the trier of fact. An attorney's affirmation may be used to submit admissible evidence such as deposition testimony.
• Mercatante v. PACCAR (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A defendant cannot win summary judgment in an asbestos case by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof; it must show its product could not have contributed to the disease, and conflicting evidence on exposure raises fact issues. A consortium claim fails where the injury-causing exposure occurred before the marriage.
• Young v. Avon Prods. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A defendant cannot win summary judgment in an asbestos case by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof, and conflicting expert evidence on general and specific causation raises fact issues for trial. New York does not recognize an independent cause of action for civil conspiracy.
• Albin v. Mannington Mills (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A defendant cannot win summary judgment by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof. It must make a prima facie showing that its product did not contribute to the illness, and conflicting expert affidavits on general and specific causation raise fact issues for trial.
• Linsky v. Mannington Mills (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A defendant cannot win summary judgment by pointing to gaps in plaintiff's proof; it must make a prima facie showing that its product did not contribute to the disease, and conflicting expert affidavits on causation raise credibility issues of fact that cannot be resolved on papers.
• Young v. Whittaker, Clark & Daniels (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A defendant cannot win summary judgment by pointing to gaps in plaintiff's proof; conflicting expert affidavits on general and specific causation raise issues of fact for trial, and plaintiffs need only show facts from which liability may reasonably be inferred.
• Lewis v. QCP (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A defendant cannot get summary judgment in an asbestos case by pointing to gaps in plaintiff's proof; it must show its product could not have contributed to the disease, and conflicting testimony raises credibility issues that cannot be resolved on papers.
• Licul v. Mario DiBono Plastering Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). On summary judgment in an asbestos case, the plaintiff need only show facts from which the defendant's liability may be reasonably inferred, and a witness's inability to give exact details or contradictory testimony raises credibility issues for the trier of fact.
• Gallagher v. American Biltrite (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A defendant cannot get summary judgment by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof. Where the parties' experts conflict on general and specific causation, issues of fact remain, and the plaintiff need only show facts from which the defendant's liability may reasonably be inferred.
• Leavitt v. Rogers Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A plaintiff opposing summary judgment need only show facts from which exposure to the defendant's product may reasonably be inferred, and a defendant's conclusory sales-record affidavit does not meet its prima facie burden. Specific jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) exists where the defendant's sales of its product into New York have an articulable nexus to the plaintiff's claim.
• Marzigliano v. American Biltrite (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A defendant cannot win summary judgment by pointing to gaps in plaintiff's proof; it must make a prima facie showing that its product did not contribute to the illness, and conflicting expert reports on general and specific causation raise issues of fact for trial.
• Linsky v. American Biltrite (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A defendant cannot win summary judgment by pointing to gaps in plaintiff's proof and must show its product did not contribute to the illness. Conflicting expert opinions on whether chrysotile causes mesothelioma and on exposure level raise fact issues that cannot be resolved on papers.
• Mantovi v. American Biltrite (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). In toxic tort cases an expert must show the plaintiff's level of exposure and that the toxin can cause the injury. A defendant's expert reports on exposure level and fiber type can meet its prima facie burden, and a plaintiff's expert who makes no comparison to exposure levels in other studies and no fiber-type distinctions cannot raise a triable issue.
• Stock v. Jenkins Bros. (IN the Matter of the Eighth Judicial District Asbestos Litigation) (Erie, 2019). A manufacturer has a duty to warn of dangers from the known and reasonably foreseeable use of its product with a third-party product needed for it to function as intended. Specific causation does not require precise quantification of dose, only evidence that the plaintiff was exposed to levels of the agent known to cause the harm.
• Leavitt v. AO Smith Water Prods., Co. (2019). Specific long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) and (2) exists where the defendant supplied asbestos-containing product to a New York facility where the plaintiff was allegedly exposed. A defendant seeking summary judgment must unequivocally establish that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury, and conflicting testimony raises credibility issues for trial.
• Margolis v. Amchem Prods., Inc. (2019). A defendant cannot win summary judgment merely by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof, and must make a prima facie showing that its product did not contribute to the illness. Conflicting expert reports on whether chrysotile can cause mesothelioma and on exposure level raise fact issues that cannot be resolved on motion papers.
• Matter of Marzigliano v. Amchem Prods., Inc. (2019). A defendant cannot win summary judgment by pointing to gaps in plaintiffs' proof; it must make a prima facie showing that its product did not contribute to the illness, and conflicting expert evidence on causation raises fact issues that cannot be resolved on motion papers.
• Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. (1st Dept., 2019). A plaintiff need not quantify exposure with exact mathematical precision, but must present evidence of an exposure level sufficient to cause the disease; an expert's opinion that unspecified "detectable" or "significant" levels caused mesothelioma is not enough.
• Yavner v. Fulton Boiler Works (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2019). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must make a prima facie showing that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury, and conflicting testimony about dates raises credibility issues that cannot be resolved on motion papers.
• Moldow v. AI Friedman, LP (2019). A defendant cannot win summary judgment by pointing to gaps in plaintiff's proof; it must show its product could not have contributed to the disease. Conflicting expert affidavits on general and specific causation raise credibility issues that cannot be resolved on motion papers.
• Shanahan v. Aerco Intl., Inc. (1st Dept., 2019). Even assuming the defendant made a prima facie showing that its product could not have caused the injury, the plaintiff raised triable fact issues through testimony of exposure to the named product and documents contradicting the defendant's account of where and when it sold asbestos-core doors.
• Shulman v. Brenntag N. AM., Inc. (2019). Where the parties' experts conflict on whether the defendants' talc contained asbestos and whether it caused the plaintiff's mesothelioma, credibility issues cannot be resolved on summary judgment. Evidence that defendants knew of and concealed asbestos in their talc raises a fact issue on punitive damages.
• Smith v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc. (2019). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must show its product could not have contributed to the injury; conflicting expert and testimonial evidence on exposure and causation raises credibility issues that cannot be resolved on papers.
• Temperino v. Amchem Prods. (2019). Conflicting expert reports on whether exposure caused lung cancer raise credibility issues that cannot be resolved on summary judgment. The court deferred ruling on the admissibility of plaintiff's experts' cumulative-exposure opinions, and a Frye hearing was not warranted before trial.
• Cohen v. American Biltrite Inc. (2018). On a summary judgment motion, a defendant must affirmatively show that exposure to asbestos in its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's mesothelioma or was insufficient to do so; pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's evidence does not meet that burden, and conflicting expert findings raise fact issues.
• Hooper-Lynch v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. (2018). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must make a prima facie showing that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's illness, and pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof is not enough. Conflicting expert evidence on exposure and causation raises fact issues for trial.
• Hooper-Lynch v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. (2018). A defendant moving for summary judgment on causation must unequivocally establish through admissible evidence that its product could not have contributed to the injury. Conflicting expert evidence on whether the talc contained asbestos raises credibility issues for a jury.
• Germain v. Johnson & Johnson (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). A defendant cannot win summary judgment by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof, and conflicting expert evidence on whether talc contained asbestos and caused mesothelioma raises fact issues for a jury. Plaintiffs need only show facts from which liability may be reasonably inferred.
• Rothlein v. Johnson & Johnson (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must show its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's illness, and conflicting expert evidence on whether talc products contained asbestos and caused the disease raises fact issues for trial. Unsworn expert reports may be considered in opposition if other admissible evidence is also submitted, and a court may consider late sworn affidavits absent prejudice.
• Isernia v. American Biltrite (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must make a prima facie showing that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury. Expert reports that cite unannexed studies or are conclusory do not meet the Parker and Cornell foundation standards, and a defendant cannot succeed merely by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof.
• Swanson v. American Biltrite (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must make a prima facie showing that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury, and cannot do so with conclusory expert reports lacking a scientific foundation or by pointing to gaps in plaintiff's proof.
• Macaluso v. A.O. Smith Water Prods. Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). A jury verdict is set aside only if it could not be reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence, but damages that deviate materially from reasonable compensation must be reduced. A boiler maker has a duty to warn of asbestos hazards from foreseeable removal of its boilers and the asbestos components used with them.
• Juni v. Ford Motor Co. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). Viewing the evidence in plaintiff's favor, it was legally insufficient to establish that Ford's conduct was a proximate cause of the decedent's mesothelioma under Parker v Mobil Oil Corp. and Cornell v 360 W. 51st St. Realty, so Ford was entitled to judgment as a matter of law under CPLR 4404 (a).
• Garrido v. Johnson & Johnson (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2018). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must unequivocally show its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's illness. Defense expert affidavits that relied on speculation, assumptions, unannexed studies, or data from outside the exposure period did not meet that burden, and conflicting expert evidence presented fact issues for trial.
• Pistone v. American Biltrite, Inc. (2018). Under Parker, Cornell and Juni, a plaintiff must offer a generally accepted scientific basis that the asbestos in the defendant's product can cause the disease and that her exposure to it was high enough to do so. Visible dust or cumulative-exposure theories do not satisfy this requirement.
• Pogacnik v. AO Smith Water Products Co. (2018). A defendant moving for summary judgment in an asbestos case must first show that its product's asbestos could not have contributed to the plaintiff's mesothelioma, or that the exposure was too low to do so. It cannot shift that burden to the plaintiff, and expert opinions resting on unsupported assumptions or on discrediting the plaintiff's testimony do not meet it.
• Robaey v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. (2018). Repeated exposure to visible dust from a defendant's asbestos gaskets, shown by its consistency, duration and intensity, can supply enough evidence of exposure to support an expert's specific-causation opinion under Parker; Juni does not require mathematical modeling or product-specific studies. A recklessness finding based on knowledge of asbestos hazards and failure to warn is not a finding of solely intentional conduct.
• Shulman v. Brenntag N. AM., Inc. (2018). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must unequivocally show its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's illness, and speculative or conclusory expert affidavits fail that burden. Conflicting expert evidence on whether talc was contaminated with asbestos raises fact issues for trial.
• Zoas v. BASF Catalysts, LLC (2018). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must make a prima facie showing that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's illness; pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof or rebutting her experts is not enough. Conflicting expert affidavits on exposure and causation raise fact issues that preclude summary judgment.
• Evans v. 3M Co. (2017). Under Parker, an expert need not precisely quantify asbestos exposure; an expert analysis of the amount, duration and frequency of exposure and work history, with epidemiological support, suffices to avoid preclusion and a Frye hearing.
• Miller v. Hennessy Indus. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (1st Dept., 2017). A manufacturer of a grinder used on asbestos-containing brake linings has a duty to warn of the latent danger from the foreseeable use of its product, and expert testimony that the grinder's use created asbestos dust sufficient to cause mesothelioma was adequate to establish causation.