Causation in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on medical or specific causation: 1,200 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

New York

• Mtr OF Nyc Asbestos Litig. (1st Dept., 2017). In a mesothelioma case, as in other toxic tort cases, plaintiff's experts must provide some scientific expression of exposure to the defendant's product at levels sufficient to cause the disease, as Parker and Cornell require. General association between asbestos and mesothelioma, visible dust and unquantified cumulative exposure are not enough.
• O'connor v. Aerco International, Inc. (3rd Dept., 2017). A defendant seeking summary judgment in an asbestos case must first show its products could not have contributed to the plaintiff's illness; pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof is not enough. At summary judgment the defendant also bears the initial burden on specific causation (Parker).
• Snedeker v. Arvinmeritor, Inc. (Broome, 2017). In an asbestos case a defendant moving for summary judgment must first make a prima facie showing that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury; it cannot meet that burden by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's proof.
• Holzworth v. Alfa Laval Inc. (2016). Whether New York or New Jersey law applies, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product at levels known to cause the disease. A single one-to-three-hour exposure within a long career of exposure is insufficient, and the wrongful death claims fail with the underlying claims.
• Holzworth v. Alfa Laval Inc. (2016). A plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's own asbestos-containing product, and a pump maker has no duty to warn about third-party asbestos parts used with its pumps absent evidence it had an active role, interest or influence in their use. Under maritime and New York law alike, wrongful death claims fail if the underlying liability claims fail.
• Battistoni v. ITW Food Equipment Group (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2016). A defendant cannot win summary judgment by pointing to gaps in plaintiff's proof; it must show its products could not have contributed to the injury. Under Parker, plaintiff's experts need not quantify exposure precisely, and whether exposure was a substantial factor is for the jury.
• Bartolone v. Union Carbide Corp. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2016). A defendant cannot obtain summary judgment by pointing to gaps in plaintiff's product identification proof; it must show its product could not have contributed to the injury, and conflicts over a witness's description of a product are for the jury. Under Parker, an expert may rely on work history and product asbestos content without precisely quantifying exposure.
• Jackson v. 84 Lumber Co. (Onondaga, 2016). State-of-the-art testimony is admissible where an adequate foundation is laid. Specific causation opinions on asbestos exposure need only give a scientific expression of exposure, and the question is generally one for the jury, so no Frye hearing was required.
• Feinberg v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (2016). Under CPLR 214-c, whether early symptoms were too isolated or inconsequential to start the limitations period is a fact question for the jury where the evidence is conflicting. On summary judgment, the defendant bears the burden of showing its product could not have caused the injury; the plaintiff need not exclude other causes.
• Miller v. Hennessy Indus. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (2016). A manufacturer that knew its product would mainly be used with asbestos-containing brakes and designed it for that use may be held to have a duty to warn. Visible dust from an asbestos-containing product can support expert testimony on specific causation of mesothelioma without precise dose quantification.
• DePriest v. Crane Co. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (2016). Under Parker v. Mobil Oil, a plaintiff need not quantify exposure precisely if the expert's methods are generally accepted; testimony about cumulative exposure to visible asbestos dust from an asbestos-containing product can support specific causation without a Frye hearing.
• Sweberg v. Crane Co. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation) (1st Dept., 2016). A manufacturer that promoted and sold asbestos insulation for its boilers, and for which insulation was a practical necessity, could be held to have a duty to warn of asbestos hazards. Unpreserved objections to jury instructions are not reviewed.
• Hackshaw v. Crane Co. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation) (1st Dept., 2016). Applying the Court of Appeals' 2016 standard, a manufacturer may be liable for failing to warn of asbestos hazards in insulation used with its products where it promoted and sold that insulation and its products needed insulation to operate safely and efficiently.
• Mtr OF Nyc Asbestos Litig. (2016). A manufacturer has a duty to warn of the danger from the known and reasonably foreseeable use of its product together with a third-party product that, by design, mechanics or economic necessity, is necessary for the manufacturer's product to function as intended. Foreseeability alone does not create the duty.
• Smyth v. Crane Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2015). A defendant moving for summary judgment in an asbestos case must first make a prima facie showing that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury; Crane did not, and plaintiff's deposition testimony also raised fact issues for a jury.
• Assenzio v. Burnham (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2015). A verdict is set aside as a matter of law only where no valid line of reasoning could support it. Testimony on cumulative asbestos exposure, together with evidence of exposure to the defendant's equipment, can establish causation under New York's Frye standard. Awards that deviate materially from reasonable compensation must be reduced.
• Hackshaw v. Crane Co. (In re New York City Asbestos Litigation) (2015). A verdict may be set aside only where no valid line of reasoning could support it. A manufacturer with a significant role, interest or influence in the asbestos components used with its products may owe a duty to warn, and evidence of that role supported the failure-to-warn and recklessness findings. Awards that deviate materially from reasonable compensation are reduced under CPLR 5501(c).
• Juni v. Ford Motor Co. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (2015). Under the Court of Appeals' decisions in Parker and Cornell, which the court held control asbestos cases, plaintiffs must offer expert proof of general causation and a scientific expression of the plaintiff's exposure to the defendant's product. An unquantified 'cumulative exposure' opinion and proof of visible dust did not meet that standard.
• Relyea v. Borg-Warner Corp. (2015). An expert's causation opinion that brake dust exposure caused mesothelioma is admissible under Rule 702 and Daubert when based on peer-reviewed literature, the Helsinki Criteria and exposure estimates; challenges to how she applies them go to weight, not admissibility.
• Crews v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2014). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show for each defendant that he was exposed to its product and that the product was a substantial factor in causing the injury. A plaintiff who cannot tell which of two similarly named companies supplied the product offers only speculation, and the defendant has no duty to warn about third-party products used with its valves.
• Hammer v. Algoma Hardwoods, Inc. (2014). A plaintiff opposing summary judgment in an asbestos case need only show facts from which the defendant's liability may be reasonably inferred. A defendant that offers no medical or expert evidence has not shown that a brief exposure was too minimal to be a substantial contributing cause.
• Berensmann v. Georgia-Pacific (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (1st Dept., 2014). A defendant seeking summary judgment must unequivocally establish that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's injury; a plaintiff's belief that the product was asbestos-free does not defeat the claim where the defendant did make asbestos-containing joint compound at the relevant time.
• Konstantin v. Tishman Liquidating Corp. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (1st Dept., 2014). Consolidation of asbestos cases under CPLR 602(a) rests in the trial court's discretion, applying the Malcolm factors flexibly. A manufacturer that has a sufficiently significant role, interest or influence in the asbestos components used with its product after sale may have a duty to warn about them, though foreseeability alone does not create that duty.
• DiSalvo v. Neles-Jamesbury (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation) (1st Dept., 2014). A defendant seeking summary judgment must first show prima facie that its product could not have contributed to the plaintiff's asbestos injury, and a conclusory affidavit without specific factual basis does not meet that burden. Arguments raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered.
• McCloskey v. AO Smith Water Prods. (2014). A verdict will be set aside as a matter of law only if no valid line of reasoning could lead rational jurors to it. A defendant found reckless is liable for the full verdict regardless of apportionment, and a defendant bears the burden of proving the equitable shares of other entities.
• Bernard v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (2013). Under Frye, a testing expert's opinion based on a self-modified TEM method for bulk talc samples that drops accepted fiber-count and fiber-identification criteria is inadmissible because it lacks general acceptance in the scientific community; this is a question of admissibility, not weight for the jury.
• Peraica v. Crane Co. (Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (2013). Under New York law, whether a manufacturer of a bare-metal product had a duty to warn of asbestos insulation others applied to it after sale is a question of fact for the jury where the manufacturer knew or should have known the product would be used with asbestos-containing materials. A court may reduce a jury award that deviates materially from reasonable compensation.
• Konstantin v. 630 Third Ave. Assoc. (2012). A verdict is set aside as a matter of law only if no valid line of reasoning could support it, and a pain and suffering award is reduced under CPLR 5501(c) when it deviates materially from reasonable compensation. Expert causation opinions need only a proper foundation in generally accepted methods, not studies on identical circumstances.
• Matter of Kirisits v. Durez Plastics/occidental (3rd Dept., 2012). A claim for death benefits is separate from the decedent's original disability claim, so where the death claim rests on a new occupational disease (mesothelioma) with no shown causal link to the earlier established disease (pleural asbestosis), the seven-year period in Workers' Compensation Law § 25-a is not triggered and liability does not shift to the Special Fund.
• Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. (1st Dept., 2012). Asbestos actions may be consolidated for joint trial under CPLR 602(a) where they share a common disease, defendant and type of exposure, and the defendant shows no prejudice. Possible differences among states' laws do not require separate trials where the causation standards are the same and jury instructions can address any differences.
• Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. Ronald Dummitt v. AW Chesterton (2012). A valve manufacturer may owe a duty to warn about asbestos gaskets, packing and insulation made by others when it meant its valves to be used with them or knew or should have known they would be. Under CPLR Article 16, the Navy is not counted in apportioning fault because Feres and the grave-injury rule bar suit against it.
• Neuer v. American Art Clay Co., Inc. (2012). Under FELA, with its relaxed causation standard, a plaintiff's own testimony of asbestos exposure plus expert opinions linking the exposure to his mesothelioma raise triable fact issues, and the plaintiff need not quantify his exposure to defeat summary judgment.
• Finazzo v. AO Smith Water Prods. Co. (2011). A plaintiff must show exposure to asbestos fibers released from the defendant's product and that the exposure was a substantial factor in the injury; testimony that can only speculate about when or where exposure to the defendant's product occurred does not meet that burden.
• Penn v. Amchem Products (1st Dept., 2011). Viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing plaintiffs, evidence that Kerr's name was on the liner boxes, that Kerr supplied such liners to the schools, and that Kerr did not test the liners' safety permitted the jury to find product identification, causation and a failure to warn. Objections to summation and to an allegedly inconsistent verdict that were not raised in time were unpreserved.
• Kline v. Crane Co. (IN the Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.) (2010). A plaintiff must show actual exposure to asbestos fibers released from the particular defendant's product; circumstantial evidence can suffice only where there is a time-and-place link to the defendant's product, and speculative inferences from ship-class similarity, approvals, or other workers' testimony do not meet that standard.
• Penn v. Amchem Products (1st Dept., 2010). Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, evidence that boxes bore the defendant's name, that it supplied liners to the school, and that visible dust arose with expert testimony on dose was enough for the jury to find product identification, causation and failure to warn.
• Convery v. AO Smith Water Products, Inc. (2009). A plaintiff need not show the precise causes of his damages, only facts and conditions from which the defendant's liability may be reasonably inferred; uncertain identification of the insulators' employer goes to weight and does not require dismissal.
• Aguirre v. Long IS. Rail RD. Co. (2007). In a FELA case tried in state court, plaintiffs still need expert testimony to show causation, but under New York law (Parker v. Mobil Oil) exposure need not be quantified precisely if the expert's method is generally accepted. Awards that materially deviate from reasonable compensation may be reduced under CPLR 5501(c).
• Aguirre v. Long Island Railroad Co. (2007). In a FELA case tried in state court, plaintiffs still need expert proof of causation, but under New York law exposure need not be quantified precisely and may be shown through work history and qualitative evidence. A verdict stands if some valid line of reasoning could lead rational jurors to it.
• Berger v. Amchem Prods. (2006). A Frye hearing is not warranted on whether chrysotile in friction products can cause mesothelioma, because the link between asbestos and disease is not novel science and epidemiological studies are not the only acceptable proof of causation.
• IN the Matter of Cammarata v. Caldwell & Cook, Inc. (3rd Dept., 2005). In an occupational disease claim, liability falls on the last employer in the employment that caused the disease, so the carrier at risk during that employment pays. A carrier's coverage is deemed to continue absent evidence of cancellation or non-renewal. The Board may rely on the claimant's expert on causation when there is no contrary evidence.
• DeMeyer v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (Matter of Asbestos Litig) (Wayne, 2005). New York applies the Frye general acceptance standard rather than Daubert; once the challenger makes a prima facie showing that an expert's methodology is not generally accepted, the proponent must prove general acceptance by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence, typically at a hearing with sworn witnesses.
• Diedrich v. Robert A. Keasbey Co. (IN the Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation) (1st Dept., 2004). Evidence that would be inadmissible at trial may be considered in opposing summary judgment if it is not the sole basis for the decision. A plaintiff need only show facts from which the defendant's liability may reasonably be inferred, not the precise cause of the injury.
• Lustenring v. AC&S, Inc. (1st Dept., 2004). A jury could find causation from evidence that plaintiffs worked in dust raised by manipulating the defendant's asbestos packing and gaskets, and a defendant's factual disagreement with the plaintiffs' causation theory does not require a Frye hearing.
• Pack v. Artuz (2004). An inmate's Eighth Amendment claim over asbestos exposure requires proof that the intensity and duration of exposure posed an unreasonable risk of serious harm to health, even without current injury. Without evidence of exposure intensity or an asbestos-related illness, the claim fails. A prior state Court of Claims dismissal did not bar the federal claim by res judicata or collateral estoppel.
• Matter of Conway v. Cbi Services, Inc. (3rd Dept., 2003). Where the medical evidence does not show a dust disease, liability falls under Workers' Compensation Law § 44 on the last employer in the kind of employment that caused the disease, and notice to the employer is imputed to its carrier. A settlement of the disability claim's third-party action does not bar the separate death claim.
• Matter of O'malley v. Consolidated Edison Company of New York (3rd Dept., 2003). A medical opinion on causation need only signify a probability and have a rational basis. If it is uncontroverted, the Workers' Compensation Board may not reject it without contrary medical expert opinion evidence.
• Crawford v. Artuz (2001). A prisoner claiming exposure to friable asbestos under the Eighth Amendment must show a present injury or an unreasonable risk of serious future harm. Where uncontradicted medical evidence shows no asbestos-related injury and only trivial exposure, no reasonable jury could find for the prisoner.
• Caruolo v. John Crane, Inc. (2000). A jury may infer that a manufacturer's asbestos-containing products released hazardous fibers from testimony that handling them produced visible dust and that visible dust carries high asbestos levels, even without product-specific fiber measurements. Under New York choice-of-law rules, prejudgment interest is a loss-allocating issue governed by the same state's law as joint and several liability (here Rhode Island), not automatically by the law governing liability.
• Falise v. American Tobacco Co. (2000). A RICO plaintiff relying on mail or wire fraud must show reliance, which is less demanding for a broad scheme aimed at the public, and must show proximate cause under the Holmes factors. The Trust could not show its own reliance for the settlement and litigation theories, but could show the claimants' reliance for the direct payment theory.