Causation in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on medical or specific causation: 1,200 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

New York

• Ronsini v. Worthington Corp. (Matter Of New York City Asbestos Litigation. Elaine Ronsini V. Garlock, Inc.) (1st Dept., 1998). Evidence was sufficient for a jury to link a defendant's asbestos-containing components and products to the worker's injury. A government contractor defense charge was unwarranted without evidence of a conflict between state warning requirements and federal requirements. A defendant that challenges its share of fault must show the equitable shares of the settling defendants.
• Maiorana v. United States Mineral Prods. Co. (In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Lit.) (1995). Daubert enlarged the court's gatekeeping role on admissibility but did not change the traditional standard for sufficiency of evidence; a court deciding judgment as a matter of law must view the evidence favorably to the non-movant and may not weigh competing expert and epidemiological evidence or credibility.
• Reid v. Georgia-Pac. Corp. (1st Dept., 1995). A plaintiff opposing summary judgment need not show the precise cause of his injury, only facts and conditions from which the defendant's liability may reasonably be inferred. Evidence of specific brands in use, interchangeable asbestos products and heavy exposure at the work site raised triable fact questions.
• Zalinka v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. (3rd Dept., 1995). Where plaintiffs show liability of a nonsettling defendant, the burden shifts to that defendant to establish the equitable share of culpability of each settling defendant. Testimony about the plaintiff's inhalation of dust from cutting Kaylo, plus expert opinion on causation, was enough to sustain the verdict.
• Maiorana v. United States Mineral Prods. Co. (In re Joint Eastern & Southern Dist. Asbestos Lit.) (1993). Epidemiological evidence showing a weak, inconsistent association between asbestos and colon cancer, combined with only a differential diagnosis, is insufficient to show that asbestos more likely than not caused the cancer, so a jury verdict resting on it cannot stand.
• Kreppein v. Celotex Corp. (1992). Proof of causation in asbestos cases does not require identification of the precise product that injured the plaintiff; testimony that the plaintiff worked near the defendant's products is enough. Apportionment of liability may reflect relative culpability, and it is generally for the jury.
• Kreppein v. Owens-Illinois (In re New York Asbestos Litigation) (1990). A federal court sitting in diversity applied New York law and held that a dismissal with prejudice of a decedent's lifetime personal injury claim for lack of exposure evidence bars his personal representative's later wrongful death claim against the same defendant, because she stands in the decedent's position. Circumstantial exposure evidence and medical testimony were enough to support the jury's verdict.
• Raney v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1990). Under New York law, a jury may infer from the facts and circumstances that a reasonably required warning would have been heeded, so the plaintiff did not need direct evidence that the worker would have changed his conduct. This inference is not a formal presumption.
• Smith v. Bell Aerospace (3rd Dept., 1987). The Special Fund's liability under the dust disease provision does not depend only on the immediate cause of death; it turns on whether a dust disease such as asbestosis contributed to or precipitated the death. A Board decision that looks only at the direct cause of death, despite undisputed proof that asbestosis precipitated the cancer, is irrational.

North Carolina

• Pike v. Dempster Industries, Inc. (2024). Under North Carolina law, an asbestos plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product with frequency, regularity and proximity (the Lohrmann test), which also applies in mesothelioma cases; general expert evidence that every exposure contributes does not satisfy it. Without compensatory liability, punitive damages fail.
• Foushee v. RT Vanderbilt Holding Company, Inc. (2023). Under North Carolina law, a plaintiff must show substantial-factor causation through the Lohrmann frequency, regularity and proximity test, meaning evidence of exposure to a specific product on a regular basis over an extended period in proximity to where the person worked.
• Barkley v. 4520 Corp., Inc. (2022). Under North Carolina law, a plaintiff must show frequent, regular and proximate exposure to an asbestos-containing product for which the defendant is responsible. Prior depositions from cases in which the defendant was not present cannot be used against it, and an affidavit lacking personal knowledge or contradicting earlier deposition testimony may be disregarded.
• Walls v. Ford Motor Company (2022). A district court may revisit interlocutory rulings under Rule 54(b), but the asbestos causation test requires proof of actual exposure to the product and that the exposure was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Causation may be shown by direct or circumstantial evidence, and plaintiff's expert evidence supported a genuine fact issue.
• Walls v. Ford Motor Company (2022). Under Rule 702 and Daubert, a dose-response, qualitative assessment of exposure can support specific causation opinions, but 'substantial factor' is a legal standard that experts may not testify to. Quantitative figures without a reliable scientific basis, and speculative opinions about exposure in the Navy, are inadmissible.
• Walls v. Ford Motor Company (2022). Under North Carolina law as predicted by the court, no sophisticated user or learned intermediary defense exists, and the Workers' Compensation Act does not bar product liability suits against third-party manufacturers. Contributory negligence, misuse and intervening cause turn on factual disputes for the jury, but assumption of risk fails without evidence that the plaintiff knew of the risk in time.
• Walls v. Ford Motor Company (2022). Under North Carolina law, an asbestos plaintiff can show causation with direct or circumstantial evidence of regular exposure to a defendant's product over an extended period, without expert testimony specific to that defendant. Punitive damages require clear and convincing evidence that corporate managers actually understood the specific risk.
• Brock v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2021). Under North Carolina law, a plaintiff with mesothelioma must still show exposure to a specific defendant's asbestos product frequently, regularly and in close proximity to where he worked (the Lohrmann test); presence of a defendant's product or business at the workplace is not enough.
• Connor v. Covil Corporation (2021). Under North Carolina law, a plaintiff must show frequent, regular exposure to the defendant's specific asbestos product in close proximity, and speculation does not meet that test. Where another source caused far greater exposure, evidence of the defendant's contribution that shows only a mere possibility of causation is insufficient.
• Reed v. Reichhold Liquidation, Inc. (2021). Predicting Iowa law, the court held that the Iowa Supreme Court would abandon the 'sole proximate cause' defense after adopting the Restatement (Third) of Torts in Thompson v. Kaczinski. Even if the defense existed, disputed facts about the employer's conduct would prevent summary judgment.
• Settlemyer v. Borg-Warner Morse Tec, LLC (2021). Under North Carolina law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's own asbestos-containing product with frequency, regularity and proximity (Lohrmann). A truck or trailer assembler is not liable for third parties' replacement parts, and North Carolina has no exception for parts the assembler specified or recommended.
• Settlemyer v. Borg-Warner Morse Tec, LLC (2021). An expert's opinion that each defendant's product was a substantial factor in causing mesothelioma is unreliable and unhelpful if the expert calculates no dose and merely restates the legal substantial-causation standard.
• Smith v. Schlage Lock Company, LLC (2021). Under North Carolina law an asbestos plaintiff must show actual exposure, and an expert opinion built on speculation cannot supply it. A landowner that hires an independent contractor and does not retain control over the work is not liable for dangers incident to that work.
• Vinson v. Armstrong International, Inc. (2021). In a North Carolina asbestos case, including one for mesothelioma, the plaintiff must show actual exposure to the defendant's asbestos-containing product with frequency, regularity and proximity (the Lohrmann test). Presence of the product at a large workplace is not enough.
• Walls v. Ford Motor Company (2021). In an asbestos case under North Carolina law, a plaintiff must show actual exposure to the defendant's product that was a substantial factor in causing the injury, which requires more than casual or minimal contact. Punitive damages require clear and convincing evidence of fraud, malice, or willful or wanton conduct.
• Walls v. Ford Motor Company (2021). A party seeking discovery from another party's non-testifying consulting expert may obtain the underlying facts and test data, though not the expert's opinions, on a showing of exceptional circumstances under Rule 26(b)(4)(D), such as destructive testing of limited tissue that the other side cannot replicate.
• Finch v. Covil Corporation (2020). A jury instruction on substantial factor causation need not repeat Lohrmann verbatim, but must convey that the plaintiff proved more than de minimis exposure through regular, frequent proximity to the defendant's product. Under North Carolina law, wrongful death damages that are hard to quantify are not speculative and are left to the jury.
• Whitehead v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2020). Under North Carolina law, an asbestos plaintiff must show exposure to a specific defendant's product on a regular basis over an extended period in proximity to where the plaintiff worked (the Lohrmann frequency, regularity and proximity test). The court applied this test to mesothelioma cases and rejected a modified, lower standard.
• Woolard v. Carrier Corporation (2020). Under North Carolina law, an asbestos plaintiff must show actual exposure to the defendant's own asbestos-containing product, on a regular basis over an extended period and near where he worked; the court applied this same test to mesothelioma. A manufacturer was not liable for third-party asbestos parts used with its equipment absent evidence that such use was intended or foreseeable.
• Finch v. Covil Corporation (2019). A verdict for the plaintiff stands where the evidence permitted a jury to find that the defendant supplied asbestos insulation, that the worker was exposed to it, and that no warning was given. Under North Carolina law, a wrongful death verdict is excessive only if the record shows passion, prejudice or disregard of the law, not merely because it is large.
• Hinson v. Continental Tire the Americas (2019). In a North Carolina workers' compensation asbestosis claim, the employee must prove that workplace exposure was a significant causal factor in the disease. The Commission may weigh the form, quantity and frequency of exposure, air sampling, lung pathology and both medical and non-medical expert evidence, and its findings bind the appellate court if supported by competent evidence.
• Smith v. 3M Company (2019). Under North Carolina law, a premises owner is liable only if it controlled the place and the work, and an asbestos plaintiff must show exposure to a specific product with frequency, regularity and proximity; vague testimony that insulation dust was inhaled does not suffice.
• Connor v. Norfolk Southern Railway Company (2018). Under North Carolina law, an asbestos plaintiff must show exposure to a specific defendant's product on a regular basis over an extended period in proximity to where the plaintiff worked (the Lohrmann frequency, regularity and proximity test), and this applies to mesothelioma cases too; speculative coworker testimony does not meet it.
• Finch v. BASF Catalysts LLC (2018). Under North Carolina law as applied through the Lohrmann frequency, regularity and proximity test, a plaintiff must show regular exposure to asbestos fibers from the defendant's specific product. The mere presence of encapsulated or static asbestos in a product is not enough to support an inference of causation.
• Penegar v. United Parcel Service (2018). Under the last-injurious-exposure rule, a claimant need only show an exposure that augmented the disease to any extent, however slight. If the record has no evidence of asbestos exposure in later jobs, the employer must produce some evidence of it, and the claimant need not prove that no later exposure occurred.
• Lovelace v. B&r Auto Service, Inc. (2017). Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-57, liability rests with the employer where the worker was last injuriously exposed, and the Commission may draw reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence to find that exposure occurred in later self-employment. Findings supported by competent evidence are binding on appeal.
• Phillips v. Pneumo Abex, LLC (2017). Under North Carolina law, a jury may find a defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of injury yet also find that a third party's intervening negligence became the sole proximate cause. Such answers on a special verdict form can be harmonized and are not inconsistent.
• Queen v. CBS Corporation (2017). Under Fourth Circuit and North Carolina law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's specific product regularly over an extended time near where the plaintiff worked; with no evidence of exposure, the product cannot be a substantial factor in causing the disease.
• Phillips v. Pneumo Abex LLC (2016). Plain error has virtually no application in civil cases, and even under that standard a party cannot obtain a new trial based on a verdict-sheet structure (separating intervening cause from proximate cause) that the party itself requested and that did not prejudice it.
• Smith v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2016). Under North Carolina law, compliance with federal labeling standards does not conclusively show a warning was adequate, and proximate cause is ordinarily for the jury. Design defect under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99B-6 does not require expert testimony on a feasible alternative design, and punitive damages require clear and convincing evidence of willful and wanton conduct by corporate officers, directors or managers.
• In re Garlock Sealing Technologies, LLC (2014). In estimating aggregate asbestos liability, a bankruptcy court may use a merits-based legal-liability analysis instead of the debtor's settlement history when that history is unreliable because exposure evidence was withheld and because settlements reflected avoided defense costs rather than liability.
• Logan v. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. (2014). Under North Carolina law (Wilder), a plaintiff must first prove actual exposure to the defendant's product, and the Lohrmann frequency, regularity and proximity test cannot be relaxed so as to dispense with that proof, even in a mesothelioma case.
• Logan v. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. (2014). Under North Carolina law a plaintiff must show actual exposure to the defendant's product, and that rule is not relaxed for mesothelioma. A failure-to-warn claim about third-party replacement parts needs evidence that the manufacturer knew or should have known such parts would be used.
• Logan v. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. (2014). A plaintiff meets the Lohrmann frequency, regularity and proximity test with evidence of repeated work on or near the defendant's asbestos-containing products over an extended period. North Carolina's products liability statute of repose does not apply to disease claims, under Hyer.
• Richardson v. Pcs Phosphate Company, Inc. (2014). Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-57, last injurious exposure is an exposure that proximately augmented the disease to any extent, however slight, and the Commission decides credibility and weight of the evidence. Competent evidence that the worker continued to visit asbestos areas supported a 1995 last-exposure date.
• Starnes v. AO Smith Corporation (2014). To avoid summary judgment, plaintiffs must produce admissible evidence of frequent, regular, and proximate exposure to an asbestos-containing product for which the defendant is legally responsible. A successor corporation can be liable only if it acquired the predecessor's business assets associated with the alleged tort.
• Wise v. Alcoa, Inc. (2013). The Industrial Commission may admit expert testimony from experts qualified in their general fields, and its findings are upheld if any competent evidence supports them. A non-mandatory federal guideline noting a general association between asbestos and esophageal cancer is not binding and does not establish causation in an individual case.
• Payne v. Charlotte Heating & Air Cond. (2005). The time limit in the fourth paragraph of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-61.6, which gave asbestosis and silicosis death claims a shorter period than other latent occupational diseases, violates the Equal Protection Clause under rational basis review. The Commission's findings on asbestosis, causation and last injurious exposure were supported by competent evidence and so were binding.
• Robbins v. Wake County Bd. of Educ. (2002). A disease not listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-53 is a compensable occupational disease if it is characteristic of the trade, not an ordinary disease of life the public is equally exposed to, and causally related to the employment. Competent evidence of higher-than-normal asbestos in the workplace and expert testimony can satisfy this test.
• Bullard v. Johns-Manville Corp. (1979). The evidence did not support a finding that the decedent's lung cancer was caused by workplace asbestos exposure, because no expert said asbestos caused it and the evidence showed only an increased general risk or a possible contributing cause.

North Dakota

• Black v. Abex Corp. (1999). Even assuming market share liability were recognized, a plaintiff must present admissible evidence that the defendants' products were fungible and carried equivalent risks of harm. Alternative liability does not apply when the plaintiff has not joined all possible manufacturers.