Causation in Asbestos Cases

Decisions in our library in which the court ruled on medical or specific causation: 1,200 cases, by state. Each line gives what the court held, in our words; the law differs from state to state and changes, so read the opinion and talk to a lawyer before relying on any of them.

Ohio

• Milone v. Aii Acquisition Corp., LLC (8th Appellate District, 2022). Under Goldman and Evid.R. 602, a worker's testimony that furnace boards were asbestos, based on general talk among workers and assumption without training or testing, lacks personal knowledge. An expert relying only on that testimony cannot establish exposure to the defendant's asbestos product.
• Maddy v. Honeywell Internatl., Inc. (8th Appellate District, 2020). To survive summary judgment under R.C. 2307.96(B), a plaintiff need only present evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer exposure to the defendant's asbestos product and that its manner, proximity, frequency and duration made it a substantial factor in causing the disease. The plaintiff need not show that every brake at the workplace was the defendant's or contained asbestos.
• Brucker v. CBS Corporation (2019). Under maritime law, a plaintiff must show exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. The Sixth Circuit's bright-line bare-metal rule bars liability for asbestos-containing products attached to the defendant's product that the defendant neither made nor sold.
• MacLachlan v. AW Chesterton, Inc. (2019). A later affidavit that contradicts earlier deposition testimony need not be struck as a sham if the contradiction is reasonably explained by memory lapses, confusion or new evidence; the resulting inconsistencies go to weight and credibility for the jury. Punitive damages are a form of damages, not a separate cause of action under Ohio law.
• Shaffer v. AW Chesterton Co. (9th Appellate District, 2019). A state court hearing Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims must apply federal maritime substantive law, not Ohio's asbestos causation statute and Schwartz; the Jones Act uses a relaxed 'however slight' causation standard. A trial court also may not grant summary judgment on a ground the movant did not raise.
• Alexander v. Honeywell International, Inc. (2018). A weight-of-the-evidence methodology for asbestos causation opinions is sufficiently reliable under Daubert. Ohio's Schwartz decision on cumulative-exposure theories does not bar an opinion based on exposure to a single product over time.
• Bennett v. the Scotts Miracle-Gro Co. (3rd Appellate District, 2018). A non-examining physician reviewing a file must accept the examining physician's factual findings but may draw his own opinions from them. The trial court could therefore rely on that physician's opinion that asbestosis requires interstitial fibrosis, and the denial was not against the weight of the evidence.
• Schwartz v. Honeywell Internatl., Inc. (2018). Under R.C. 2307.96, a theory of causation based only on cumulative exposure to various asbestos-containing products cannot show that exposure to a particular defendant's product was a substantial factor in causing the disease. The plaintiff must show this through the manner, proximity, frequency and length of exposure to that defendant's asbestos.
• Alexander v. Honeywell International, Inc. (2017). Under Ohio Rev. Code 2307.96(B), a plaintiff's testimony about the manner, proximity, frequency and length of exposure to a defendant's asbestos can let a jury find that exposure a substantial factor, even if the testimony is imprecise.
• Hart v. Honeywell International (2017). Under Ohio's Product Liability Act, a failure-to-warn plaintiff's own testimony that he did not read warnings and would not have heeded them rebuts the presumption of causation, and without contrary evidence the claim fails. Expert testimony is not required to prove a design defect in asbestos brake products, and the existence of asbestos-free brakes is evidence of a feasible alternative design.
• Estate OF Blandford v. AO Smith Corp. (8th Appellate District, 2016). Under R.C. 2307.78(B), a bankrupt manufacturer that is subject to personal jurisdiction in Ohio and is not shown to be insolvent does not trigger substituted strict liability for its supplier. A supplier can still face negligent failure to warn liability under R.C. 2307.78(A)(1) if fact issues remain on its knowledge of the hazard, exposure to its product, and substantial factor causation.
• Schwartz v. Honeywell Internatl., Inc. (8th Appellate District, 2016). Expert testimony on cumulative asbestos exposure and brake dust causing mesothelioma was admissible without quantified dose, and evidence of manner, proximity and frequency of exposure met Ohio's substantial factor test (R.C. 2307.96). Evidence that a feasible non-asbestos alternative existed supported the design defect claim, and enough evidence of flagrant disregard existed that punitive damages should not have been taken from the jury.
• Watkins v. Affinia Group (8th Appellate District, 2016). A trial court must act as gatekeeper and independently evaluate the reliability of an expert's causation opinion under Evid.R. 702 and Daubert. Admitting 'every exposure' causation opinions without a hearing to test their basis was error.
• Bryant v. General Motors Corp. (3rd Appellate District, 2015). A directed verdict is properly denied when, viewing the evidence for the nonmovant, reasonable minds could differ on workplace asbestos exposure and on whether it was a proximate cause of the lung cancer. A conflict between medical experts is for the jury, and an expert may rely on assumed facts that independent evidence supports.
• Fisher v. Beazer East, Inc. (8th Appellate District, 2013). A plaintiff in a multidefendant asbestos case must prove exposure to the defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Under Ohio's apportionment statutes, a jury may allocate fault to employers who are immune from suit under workers' compensation law, as "empty chair" parties.
• Bier v. Am. Biltrite (8th Appellate District, 2012). A plaintiff cannot defeat summary judgment against a raw asbestos supplier by stacking inferences that it sold asbestos to manufacturers whose products the decedent used. The plaintiff must produce evidence that the supplier's asbestos was in the products he was exposed to.
• Fisher v. Alliance Machine Co. (8th Appellate District, 2011). Under R.C. 2307.96(B), an asbestos plaintiff must prove exposure to each defendant's asbestos and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury, weighing manner, proximity, frequency and mitigating factors of exposure. On summary judgment, unauthenticated documents not attached to an affidavit cannot be considered under Civ.R. 56.
• State EX rel. Roger Bacon High School v. Indus. Comm. OF Ohio (10th Appellate District, 2011). Under the last injurious exposure rule, responsibility goes to the employer that last provided an injurious exposure. A commission finding supported by some medical evidence is not an abuse of discretion, and the commission weighs conflicting evidence.
• Welsh v. Ford Motor Co. (8th Appellate District, 2011). A workers' compensation claimant must show by a preponderance that the disease was contracted through injurious exposure in the course of employment. Coworker testimony about exposure, together with expert testimony and corroborating records, was enough for the jury, and a challenge to an expert's scientific foundation not raised at trial under Daubert or Evid.R. 702 was waived.
• Cantrell v. Adience, Inc. (8th Appellate District, 2010). A plaintiff must show some evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the defendant's asbestos product was at the workplace at or near the time of exposure. A past supplier relationship does not support an inference that it continued, and Evid.R. 406 habit evidence cannot prove a continuing business relationship.
• Dean v. Bur. OF Workers'comp. (5th Appellate District, 2010). A claimant seeking workers' compensation for an asbestos occupational disease must show asbestos exposure at an employer's facility that proximately caused the injury. Once the defendants showed through the claimant's deposition that she had no evidence of exposure, she had to come forward with evidence, and she did not.
• Beany v. Ohio State Univ. (2009). Under R.C. 2745.01 and the common-law Fyffe test, an employer is liable for an intentional workplace tort only if it acted with intent to injure or knew that injury was substantially certain; knowing of a risk is not enough.
• Jackson v. AC Product Liability Trust (2009). A verdict is against the weight of the evidence when there is no testimony showing the plaintiff's actual, substantial asbestos exposure on the defendant's vessel. Expert hypotheticals must rest on facts in the record, and a verdict that shocks the conscience is excessive.
• Werts v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (8th Appellate District, 2009). Out-of-court experiments need not duplicate the plaintiff's exact working conditions if they are designed to show the relevant exposure and differences are acknowledged; such differences go to weight. Admitting a proof-of-claim form to show liability violated Evid.R. 408 but was harmless error.
• Gomcsak v. US Steel Corp. (9th Appellate District, 2008). A trial court does not abuse its discretion by limiting an expert to the opinions in his written report under a local rule, or by denying a new trial where competent, credible expert testimony supports the jury's finding that asbestos did not cause the cancer.
• DiCENZO v. A-Best Prods. Co., Inc. (8th Appellate District, 2007). A plaintiff need not quantify the share of workplace asbestos attributable to a defendant to show its product was a substantial factor, and testimony placing the product directly above the worker can create a fact issue. Temple v. Wean's strict liability rule applies retroactively to suppliers who sold asbestos products before 1977.
• Rahmes v. Adience Inc. (8th Appellate District, 2007). Under Horton and R.C. 2307.96(B), an asbestos plaintiff must prove exposure to the particular defendant's product and that it was a substantial factor in causing the injury; merely working in the vicinity of asbestos-containing products is not enough.
• Vince v. Crane Co. (8th Appellate District, 2007). Under Horton v. Harwick, a plaintiff must show that exposure to a particular defendant's product was a substantial factor in causing the injury. Merely placing a defendant's asbestos product in a plant where relatives worked, without evidence of how the second-hand exposure contributed to the disease, does not meet that burden.
• Wille v. AC Product Liability Trust (2007). Under Lindstrom v. Bartel, a plaintiff must show more than that an asbestos product was present at the workplace; evidence that asbestos was released into the air above background levels lets a jury decide whether exposure was a substantial factor. Seaman status under Chandris is a jury question on these facts.
• Snyder v. Ford Motor Co. (3rd Appellate District, 2005). To participate in the workers' compensation fund for an occupational disease, the claimant must show asbestos exposure at an employer's facility that was injurious, meaning it proximately caused, augmented or aggravated the disease. An expert opinion that all of the worker's exposures were significant contributing causes creates a genuine factual issue that defeats summary judgment, even against a latency-period argument.
• Bartel v. John Crane, Inc. (2004). A plaintiff must show substantial exposure to the particular defendant's asbestos product for a substantial period, and that the exposure was a substantial contributing factor in causing the disease. An opinion that every exposure, however small, was a substantial factor does not meet that test, and there is no duty to warn of unknown hazards.
• Lindstrom v. AC Products Liability Trust (2003). Under maritime product liability law, a plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence must show substantial exposure to a particular defendant's asbestos-containing product for a substantial period. A general opinion that every asbestos exposure was a substantial factor does not meet that test, and a manufacturer is not liable for other makers' products attached to its equipment.
• Horton v. Harwick Chem. Corp. (1995). Summary judgment in an asbestos case is governed by the ordinary standard, and Ohio does not adopt the Lohrmann frequency-regularity-proximity test for proving that a product was a substantial factor. Alternative liability does not apply where the defendants' products did not create a substantially similar risk of harm.
• Baechel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1994). A claimant for an occupational disease must show an injurious exposure to asbestos in the course of employment at the last employer, and basic proximate-cause principles allow a dual-causation instruction when employment and environmental exposures combine to cause the disease.
• Lynch v. Mayfield (1991). A trial court may admit testimony about a decedent's cohabitation with another woman and his divorce complaint, because dependency is decided on the facts existing at the time of death. A verdict supported by competent, credible expert testimony that the death was not caused by the work-related disease is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
• Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (1987). Alternative liability requires the plaintiff to prove that all defendants acted tortiously, including that their asbestos products reached the plaintiff's workplace. Market-share liability, developed for the DES drug, was not accepted for asbestos because asbestos products are not fungible.
• Laster v. Celotex Corp. (1984). Under Fed. R. Evid. 201, a court may notice only facts not subject to reasonable dispute. The conditions under which asbestos causes asbestosis, and whether asbestos causes mesothelioma, were reasonably disputed, so notice was refused.

Oklahoma

• Zinc Corp. OF America v. Reeder (2nd Division, 2007). The 60-day exposure requirement in Oklahoma's workers' compensation statute applies only to silicosis and asbestosis, not mesothelioma, so the general last-injurious-exposure rule applies, under which the last employer is liable without a minimum quantity of exposure.
• Case v. Fibreboard Corp. (1987). Oklahoma does not recognize market share liability or other collective liability theories (alternative liability, concert of action, enterprise liability) in asbestos injury litigation when the plaintiff cannot identify the specific manufacturers whose products caused the injury; creating a compensation scheme is for the legislature.

Oregon

• McKenzie v. AW Chesterson Co. (2016). Under Oregon's strict liability statute (ORS 30.920) and the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comments it incorporates, the product at issue is the pump as sold to the Navy with its asbestos-containing parts, so the bare-metal or no-duty defense does not bar a failure-to-warn claim as a matter of law. Plaintiff's evidence also sufficed on causation and foreseeability for negligence.
• Griffin v. Allis-Chalmers Corporation Product Liability Trust (2010). A plaintiff opposing summary judgment in an asbestos case need only show the defendant's asbestos was present in the workplace and could have been inhaled, including through others' handling of it. Oregon's raw material supplier doctrine does not shield a supplier from claims of exposure to raw asbestos fibers themselves.
• West v. Allied Signal, Inc. (2005). An affidavit need not expressly state personal knowledge if, read as a whole, a reasonable person would understand it to rest on the affiant's personal knowledge. A jury may reasonably infer from circumstantial evidence that a defendant was the likely source of the asbestos product.
• Purcell v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd. (1998). In a mesothelioma case with exposure to several makers' products, Oregon's substantial factor test applies rather than a stricter 'frequency, regularity, and proximity' test. The asbestos-disease limitation statute, ORS 30.907, not the construction-improvement repose statute, ORS 12.135, governs claims based on manufacture, distribution and sale, even if the defendant also installed the products.
• Beneficiaries of Estate of Strametz v. Spectrum (1997). Under the last injurious exposure rule, an employer is not responsible for an occupational disease if it proves that conditions of its employment could not have caused the disease, including where the disease's latency period shows the exposure there could not have been the cause.
• Estate of Strametz v. Spectrum Motor., Inc. (1995). Under Oregon's last injurious exposure rule, a claimant need only show that conditions at the Oregon employment were of a kind that could have caused the disease. It does not matter that the disease's latency period meant the Oregon exposure could not have been the actual cause.
• Matter of Compensation of Fossum (1982). Under the last injurious exposure rule, liability depends on which employment involved conditions that could have caused the disease, not which one actually did. The last potentially causal employer is solely liable, and the statutes in force at the time established as a matter of law that SIAC (now SAIF) covered a shipbuilder that had not opted out.

Other federal courts

• McINDOE v. Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (2016). Custom-built naval warships not distributed commercially are not "products" for strict products liability under maritime law, and a negligence claim requires proof of substantial exposure to the defendant's asbestos for a substantial period, which an "every exposure" expert opinion cannot replace.
• Pace v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporation (2016). Under South Carolina law, a plaintiff must show exposure to a specific product with frequency, regularity and proximity to where she actually worked, and circumstantial evidence that is speculative or shows only that a product was present at the workplace does not meet that test.
• Sequira v. 3M Company (2015). A defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the government contractor defense when the government approved reasonably precise specifications, the equipment conformed to them, and the government knew the hazards as well as the contractor did. A California mesothelioma plaintiff must offer expert evidence that exposure was a substantial factor in causing the disease, and an issue not raised in the district court will not be reviewed on appeal.
• Williams v. Georgia-Pacific (In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (NO. VI)) (2014). Under South Carolina's frequency, regularity, and proximity test, a plaintiff must show exposure to a specific asbestos-containing product, and speculation about whether the product Williams used contained asbestos cannot defeat summary judgment.